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THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

A Memoir of the Great War



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For General Hagedorn:
With deep appre-
-ciation of the big
part he had in
the splendid work
of the S.O.S.
John J. Pershing
March 20
1920

Pershing Says:

"I want the S. O. S. to know how the First Army appreciates the prompt response made to every demand for men, equipment, supplies, and transportation, necessary to carry out the recent operations. Hearty congratulations. The S.O.S. shares the success with us."

THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

A Memoir of the Great War

BY

GENERAL JOHNSON HAGOOD

Chief of Staff S.O.S.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS



BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
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1927

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The Riverside Press
CAMBRIDGE • MASSACHUSETTS
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

TO
JULIUS ROSENWALD

WHO served with distinction as a member of the Council of National Defense during the Great War, and who, in August, 1918, was sent to France by the Secretary of War upon a special mission to the Services of Supply.

The publication of this book was made possible by the generosity of Mr. Rosenwald in his desire that the great work of the men behind the lines should not be lost to future generations.

223049

This work was not of the spectacular kind to strike the imagination, but its tremendous import to the success of the American effort ought to kindle the enthusiasm of those who think and understand.

F. J. KERNAN

I would rather die at the front than spend the rest of my life explaining why I was not there.

J. FRANKLIN BELL

PREFACE

THE following letter was the immediate occasion for writing this book. The original was delivered to the War Department and this version, considerably shortened and brought up to date, is offered to the public.

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

000.4 Off. Div.
Offrs' WK/ame/423

December 10, 1919

From: The Adjutant General of the Army.
To: Brigadier General Johnson Hagood, 30th Coast Artillery Corps.
Subject: Collection of Historical Information.

1. The Secretary of War directs me to bring to your attention the fact that, while every effort is being made to collect and preserve historical documents relating to the recent war, there will necessarily be numerous and serious gaps in the information. You having served as Chief of Staff, Service of Supply and Artillery Brigade Commander, are peculiarly qualified to assist in filling these gaps, and the Secretary directs that an invitation be extended to you to do so. The list of officers to whom this invitation is now being extended is necessarily limited to those who performed the higher functions; in dealing with the subject, however, you are requested to consider also your experience in earlier and smaller affairs.

2. The form and nature of your contribution, should you feel able to make one, must be left largely to yourself. The following points, however, are suggested for your consideration:

One of the principal weaknesses of ordinary documents is that while they may outline proposed operations, follow their progress and summarize the results, they fail to show the inner working of the operation as it shaped itself in the minds

PREFACE

of the directing officers. Hence, one of the most valuable documents would be a record of decisions made by you, with reasons.

• • • • •
(Sgd)

GUY V. HENRY

Adjutant General

During the war I kept a journal and also copies of all important letters, memoranda, and orders initiated by me or bearing upon questions in which I was personally interested. This book is a true, unvarnished tale, based upon these papers and upon facts recorded by me at the time. I have not attempted to describe all the multitudinous activities of the S.O.S. that came under my general supervision or for which I as Chief of Staff was responsible. I have only attempted to tell of those things in which I was individually concerned. There were thousands — yes, tens of thousands — of orders issued over my name or over the names of my assistants that I never saw. There were a great many matters that passed directly between the Commanding General, S.O.S., and General Pershing that I knew nothing about, and there were a great many others that passed between the Commanding General, the Base Commanders, the Bureau Chiefs, and others that did not come to my attention.

It is not my purpose to distinguish between the responsibility, the credit, or the blame, that should go to the C-in-C. at Chaumont, or the C.G., S.O.S., at Tours, on the one hand, and their respective staff officers, on the other. These two commanders had the full responsibility, the credit, or the blame, for all. But the War Department has asked for the inner workings — decisions made by me, with reasons. And General Harbord, in recommending me for the Distinguished Service Medal, in September, 1918, was generous enough to say: 'By his ability for organization, his energy, and his

. . . he (Hagood) was largely responsible for the successful operation of the system that supplies the greatest army known in our history.'

All the correspondence that appears in this book over my signature was initiated by me, as was also that signed Kernan or Harbord, with the symbol 'JH/my' in the corner.

Drawing from my experience as a junior officer sitting upon the steps of the throne in the War Department and as the Chief of Staff of the S.O.S. in France, I have devoted a final chapter to the War Department as it is now organized, with a suggestion as to how it must be reorganized before the next war if we are to avoid repeating the errors that cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars.

In taking this latter step I have been considerably influenced by the kindly advice of General Tasker H. Bliss, one-time Chief of Staff of the Army, and our member of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, who said: 'You are writing about pretty nearly, if not quite, the most important subject suggested by the war. My observation is that most men criticize a whole lot, but they don't make a constructive study to show how things should have been done, or, in a future war, under the same circumstances, could be done better. The men who do that are the ones who make a real contribution to our preparedness, and that is what I hope and am sure you are going to do.'

JOHNSON HAGOOD

Major General, U.S. Army

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

March 1, 1927

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THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

• • •

CHAPTER I INTRODUCING THE CAST

The author — Parker — McGowan — Summerall — Drake — Walker — Kutz — Patrick — McKinstry — Carson — Russel — Bethel — Nolan — Fox Conner — W. D. Connor — Malone — Fiske — Moseley — Davis — McCoy — Craig — Heintzelman — Smither — Fries — Bash — Pope — Williams — Rice — Embick — Marshall — Chamberlaine — Fergusson — Bishop — Hines — Bell — Wood — Roosevelt — Taft — Bliss — March — Murray — Ainsworth — McCain — Liggett — Bullard — Dickman — Goethals — Crowder — Logan — Ireland — Kean — Winter — Langfitt — Taylor — Jadwin — Rogers — Brewster — Hull — Kernan — Harbord — Pershing — Hilgard.

THE writer of these lines was the son of a private soldier — Lee Hagood — who at the age of sixteen ran away from home to join the Confederate army. There was a brother, James R. Hagood, who enlisted at seventeen and before his nineteenth birthday had earned this citation from Robert E. Lee: 'During the whole time of his connection with the Army of Northern Virginia, he was conspicuous for gallantry, efficiency, and good conduct. By his merits constantly exhibited he rose from a private in his regiment to its command, and showed by his action that he was worthy of the position.' There was another brother, Johnson Hagood, who was elected Colonel of the First South Carolina Volunteers (known throughout the war as Hagood's Regiment), fought with conspicuous gallantry as a Brigadier General throughout the Virginia campaigns, and after the war became Governor of South Carolina. On the other side of the family there was my Grandfather, John E. Tobin, Brigadier General of Militia, Uncle Isadore Tobin and Uncle Johnny,

soldiers at sixteen and fifteen, respectively, and finally Uncle Eddie, who, though only nine years old, fled before Sherman's army in its march to the sea and was not heard of again till discovered in a hospital in Atlanta after the war. The women of the family, mother, grandmothers, and aunts, came in for their share of the hardships. Sherman passed through the Hagood and Tobin plantations and destroyed them.

They tell the story on my mother, only twelve years of age, that a Yankee officer, somewhat intoxicated, forced her to the piano and directed her to play him a tune. Very much frightened, the room and house full of soldiers, she struck up the only tune she could think of, 'Dixie.' The soldiers broke into a loud cheer, and the officer, calling her a brave little rebel, asked what she would like to have as a reward. She said that her mother was very ill with a young baby and asked that the soldiers be sent away and the house not burned. Her request was granted, the men departed, a cordon of sentinels was established, and the house was left standing, a white monument in the long black trail of charred ruins.

Thus it happened that my boyhood dreams were about being a soldier, a Confederate soldier, in gray uniform. I never aspired to anything so glorious as Uncle Johnson or Uncle Jimmie, but I did hope that some day there might be another Hagood's Regiment or, perhaps, Hagood's Brigade. Never did I picture myself in the midst of a great war, seated at a desk, far behind the lines, struggling with the problem of supply.

In 1888 I entered the University of South Carolina. There I came to know the first of those who were to play a part in the Great War, Frank Parker, a distinguished commander of the First Division, and Sam McGowan, Paymaster General and head of the Supply Service of the Navy. A few years later I decided to try for West Point. I went down to Saint



JOHNSON HAGOOD



L. R. HOLBROOK



D. E. NOLAN



E. L. KING

WEST POINT CLASSMATES, 1896; GENERALS, A.E.F., 1918

Augustine, Florida, to stand a physical examination and there I heard of Pelot Summerall, described to me by the hotel clerk as the finest boy Florida had ever produced and one who was bound to make a great name for himself. This was the first cadet whom I had heard mentioned by name and it made a great impression. Summerall is considered by some to be the greatest soldier America sent to France. One of his classmates who served in his command attributes to him the combined qualities of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson.

One of the first cadets I met, very tall and very blond, was a classmate, C. B. Drake, known as 'Ducksy' Drake. There was another Drake in the class known as 'Little Ducksy,' but Little Ducksy was 'found' in the Plebe January and after that there was only one Ducksy. Drake became Brigadier General and head of the Motor Transport Service in the War Department.

Meriwether L. Walker, Cadet Captain of 'B' Company, invited me to sit at his table and conferred upon me the first title of distinction that I received in the military service, to wit, Water Corporal. Ten cadets sit at each table in the mess hall and of these from three to five are plebes. The senior cadet at the table presides and is known as the 'commandant' of the table. Opposite to him is a plebe, known as the 'gunner.' To be gunner at a captain's table is a solid foundation upon which to build a successful military career. The gunner pours the coffee. On his right sits the water corporal and on his left the milk corporal. The milk corporal pours milk, beverage milk as distinguished from milk that goes into coffee under the name of cream. The latter is called 'Small Milk' on account of the pitcher. Walker served in the S.O.S. as Brigadier General and Chief of the Motor Transport Corps in France and after the war as Governor of the Canal Zone.

Charles Kutz was First Captain of the Corps during my

plebe year. He was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, at Tours and afterwards became Brigadier General.

And so we could run through a great list of those who served with me at West Point, either as fellow cadets or as instructors, and who afterwards reached distinction and high rank in the Great War. I shall mention only a few of those associated with me in the particular work to which this book is devoted.

Among the instructors were M. M. Patrick, who became Chief of the Construction Service and afterwards Chief of the Air Service; C. H. McKinstry, Director of Light Railways and Roads; J. M. Carson, Jr., Chief Quartermaster, L.O.C.; Edgar Russel, Chief Signal Officer; John S. Winn, Inspector General, and Walter A. Bethel, Judge Advocate; all lieutenants when I was a cadet and generals during the war.

Among the cadets were Dennis Nolan, Le Roy Eltinge, Fox Conner, W. D. Connor, Paul Malone, Harold Fiske, George Moseley, 'Corky' Davis, and Frank McCoy, all generals and high in position on Pershing's staff at Chaumont. Also Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the Third Army; Stuart Heintzelman, Chief of Staff of the Second Army; Henry Smith, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, at Tours; Amos Fries, Chief of Chemical Warfare; Louis Bash, Adjutant General, S.O.S.; Francis Pope, Chief, Motor Transport Corps, L.O.C.; Billy Williams, Chief of Ordnance; John Rice, Chief Ordnance Officer, S.O.S.; Frank Parker, already mentioned; Briant Wells and 'Sish' Embick, with the Supreme War Council at Versailles (called 'Sish' because of an alleged pronunciation of the word 'Psyche' in classroom); and Edwin D. Bricker, with General Dawes on the Purchasing Board.

For the first five years after graduation at West Point, in 1896, I had the usual routine duty that fell to young officers at posts in those days. This included command of companies,

adjutant, quartermaster, and all other staff jobs except medical officer. During the Spanish War I mounted guns at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, and conducted a school for volunteer officers.

In 1901 I became a captain and went back to West Point as instructor. There I found also on duty Frank Parker and Corky Davis, already mentioned, and among the cadets was Douglas MacArthur, a brigade and division commander of great distinction and the most brilliant young officer developed by the war.

After this came a year at Fort Monroe, Virginia. I was commanding the 69th Company, Coast Artillery. My second lieutenant was Puck Marshall, General R. C. Marshall, Chief of the Construction Service in Washington. Among other captains were Billie Chamberlaine and Frank K. Fergusson, who with myself commanded the three regiments of the First Expeditionary Brigade of coast artillery; also George T. Bartlett, who commanded the Brigade, and Percy Bishop, Chief of the Personnel Division, General Staff in the War Department. Among the lieutenants was Frank Hines, Chief of Transportation in Washington and afterwards Director of the Veterans' Bureau. All these became generals. Others had distinguished service in other fields.

In 1905 I went to Washington as Assistant to the Chief of Coast Artillery, subsequently served on the General Staff and was Assistant to two Chiefs of Staff, J. Franklin Bell and Leonard Wood. I was seven years in the War Department. During this time I came in close contact with all the men who played a prominent part in contemporaneous Army affairs and also those who were subsequently to play a big part in the Great War. This included Presidents Roosevelt and Taft; many Secretaries of War, including H. L. Stimson; all the Chiefs of Staff of the Army from 1903 (Young) to 1919

(March); all the bureau chiefs and principal staff officers and most of the men who afterwards commanded large forces in the field. It was to this experience and to this knowledge of men that I owed whatever small measure of success I attained in France. Among the really great executives and administrators in Army affairs from whom I learned most were Arthur Murray, Ainsworth, McCain, Bell, and Wood, but I also learned something from many others, and especially from old-time clerks who themselves became officers and had charge of important activities in France. Among those officers who reached the higher rank during the Great War were Major P. C. March, who became a four-star general; Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, who also attained four stars; Lieutenant Colonels Hunter Liggett and R. L. Bullard, our only two lieutenant generals; and Major J. T. Dickman. These three commanded the three armies of the A.E.F. Others to reach distinction were Major G. W. Goethals, the canal builder and head of the War Department supply organization; Colonel E. H. Crowder, author and administrator of the Selective Draft; Jimmie Logan, G-1 at G.H.Q., and the following, who became heads of the supply services in Chau-mont and Tours or general officers in those departments: Ireland, Kean, McCaw, and Winter of the Medical Corps; Langfitt, Taylor, Jadwin, and Patrick of the Engineers; Russel of the Signal Corps; Rice and Wheeler of the Or-dnance; Rogers of the Quartermaster Corps; Brewster, In-spector General; and Hull, Judge Advocate. Among the men with whom I was most intimately associated was Major F. J. Kernan, an infantry officer of the General Staff, one of the keenest and best men the General Staff ever had. As will be seen, Kernan was the first commander of the S.O.S. and played the principal part in creating and building up that great organization.



G. H. SHELTON



M. B. STEWART



LE ROY ELTINGE



R. E. CALLAN

WEST POINT CLASSMATES, 1896; GENERALS, A.E.F., 1918

I first knew Harbord through the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION
MANILA, P.I.

February 24, 1909

Captain Johnson Hagood
General Staff
War Department
Washington, D.C.

DEAR HAGOODY:

This is simply a note to say that if a vacancy should occur in the head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, I should be grateful to you if you could mention the name of Colonel J. G. Harbord (Captain 11th Cavalry), Assistant Director of the Bureau of Constabulary, to Senator Warren, or to any other person that might help him to get the place.

We hear rumors in Manila of Edwards' promotion, and one thing or another of that sort, and there is a belief that if the vacancy should occur Harbord is the man for the place. He knows these Islands thoroughly — he has been over them from one end to the other. I doubt if there is another officer in these Islands who has traveled through them as much as he. Moreover, he is in great sympathy with the Filipinos in service, and I can testify from personal observation that he is regarded with respect and affection by them.

Yours ever

(Sgd) C. DE W. W.

(Major C. de W. Willcox)

History might have been different if Captain Harbord had succeeded General Clarence Edwards as Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.

From the War Department I went to duty with troops. I had experience as a post commander at Fort Flagler, Washington, and at San Diego, California, and also had a little fling at service on the Mexican border and commanded a

business men's training camp. My principal duty, however, during this time was in the Philippines. I went out there as Coast Defense Officer on the staff of my old chief, General J. Franklin Bell. I was put in charge of the so-called Corregidor Project, a plan to provide everything needful to withstand a long siege. This really laid the basis of the S.O.S. job, because the A.E.F. was Corregidor magnified a hundred thousand times. Among the men associated with me in this work were H. P. McCain, war-time Adjutant General; Ernest Hinds, Chief of Artillery, A.E.F.; J. M. Carson, Jr., and Charles Kutz, already mentioned; Herbert M. Lord, afterwards Chief of Finance and Director of the Budget; E. L. Munson, Chief of Morale Branch in Washington — all generals; and John Palmer, one of Pershing's ablest advisers, but whose illness prevented him from coming into his own.

Among the officers on other duty in the Philippines at this time were, first of all, Pershing, a brigadier general commanding troops in the Moro country. I had the distinction of being on an important conference with General Pershing and he added to this distinction by saying that he knew of me through my work in the War Department. It was here that Pershing got his first experience in trench warfare. His Moro scouts had approached the enemy Moros to within twenty feet. He was entrenched on the outside and the enemy on the inside of an extinct volcano. Only the rim, like a sharp parapet, separated them. Tying fuses onto half-pound sticks of dynamite and using them like firecrackers, he applied the methods of the modern hand grenade and reaped such a victory that the Moro question has never been heard of since. Pershing was recognized as a great leader at that time and General Bell told me that he was undoubtedly the best man in the Army to succeed General Wood as Chief of Staff. Next there was Harbord, captain of cavalry with temporary rank

as Colonel of Philippine Constabulary, a man admired and loved by everybody and of whom all Filipinos are as proud as if he were a native son. Major Ireland, afterwards Chief Surgeon, A.E.F., was a doctor at Fort McKinley. Hull, Judge Advocate General of the S.O.S. and of the Army, was Judge Advocate at Department headquarters. Hilgard, whom we shall meet at Is-sur-Tille, was captain and quartermaster at Baguio. In him we had the man who played the biggest part in the field — an outside man — in the great game of supply.

So here it is five years before the war and, with the exception of Atterbury and Dawes, who came from civil life, we have already marked out in the Regular Army every man who was to be a big factor in that particular phase of war for which many thought that business men alone were qualified. And even Atterbury and Dawes suggested Regular Army men, our friends McCoy and Bricker, to succeed them when they were pulled out.

Ten, fifteen, twenty years before the war these men were on the job being fitted by training and by experience to play their great parts. Most of them were marked as captains and lieutenants. They worked as individuals and as teams. They held down the little staff jobs at posts, the bigger staff jobs at Department headquarters, and the still bigger jobs, with greater responsibility, in the War Department. As post commanders they became team captains with staffs of their own. They learned the principles that govern the supply of armies. They learned to know the soldier. They learned how to work soldiers behind the lines as well as to fight them at the front, and, above everything else, they learned that co-ordination and interlocking responsibility is the key to all success in the Army, just as in civil life competition is the life of trade.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Civil status — Old organization — Purpose of the General Staff — Young, Chaffee, and Bates — Ainsworth — J. Franklin Bell — Leonard Wood — McLaughlin Resolution — Failure of Preparedness — Billions spent to no purpose — Breakdown of General Staff — Collapse of the Quartermaster Corps — Peyton C. March — Joseph Kuhn — George Goethals — Wood, Hines, Marshall, Bishop, and Drake — Enoch Crowder and the Selective Draft — Burr, Jersey, and Munson — Reorganization in France.

To understand the S.O.S., we must first get some idea of the parent organization in Washington. Contrary to popular opinion, the War Department is not a great Army headquarters, not a G.H.Q., but a civil bureau of the Government. It is a ministry, and like other ministries is headed by a civilian. The War Department at the time I became acquainted with it not only handled the Army, but the government of our Insular Possessions, the Record and Pension Office, Rivers and Harbors, the Panama Canal, Old Soldiers' Homes, National Cemeteries, etc. It is not necessary, or even advisable, that the Secretary of War should be a man of military experience.

In time of war headquarters of the Army would not be in the War Department, and though in time of peace it has usually been so, General Sherman once moved out and went to Saint Louis.

In the conduct of war and in preparation for war, a war ministry is concerned with many things entirely outside the Army. It is concerned with great civil, industrial, and political questions about which the Army knows and cares nothing.

In the spring of 1917 our War Department was organized essentially along the following lines:



THE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF OF 1910

Nearly all attained distinction in the Great War. Among them are General Bliss; Major Generals Graves, Leitch, Wittenmyer, Bell, Murray, Swift, Hagood, Sladen, Carlton, Fox Conner, Gordon, and Rhodes; Brigadier Generals Cronin, Lochridge, Simmons, Todd, Knight, Duncan, Beach, Cochen, Macomb, Cheney, Learnard, and Lenihan

There was the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Assistant and Chief Clerk. The latter had nothing to do with military affairs. He handled the civil employees and funds for running the War Department itself. The principal duty of the Assistant Secretary was to handle militia affairs and to assist the Secretary in routine administration.

There was the Chief of Staff of the Army, who with several assistants and a corps of General Staff officers ran the ordinary routine of the Army, under the guise of coöordinating the bureau chiefs. Such plans as might be considered as in preparation for war were handled by the War College.

The administrative staff of the War Department consisted of —

The Adjutant General — who handled orders, correspondence, records, and such personnel matters as had not been stripped from him by other services.

The Inspector General — who inspected troops, property, and accounts.

The Judge Advocate General — who handled court-martial procedure and military law.

The Supply Staff consisted of —

The Quartermaster General — who handled food, clothing, shelter, and transportation.

The Chief of Engineers — who handled field and seacoast fortifications, construction in the field of active operations in time of war, operation of military railroads, and issue of Engineer supplies.

The Chief Signal Officer — who handled telegraph, telephone, and radio communications; also the Air Service.

The Chief of Ordnance — who provided guns and ammunition.

The Surgeon General — who provided hospitals and cared

for the sick and wounded, including the dental and veterinary service.

There was also the Chief of Coast Artillery, who looked out for seacoast fortifications. The other line branches did not have chiefs at that time.

We can now go back to 1903. Prior to that time the military head of the Army was known as the Commanding General of the Army. He had the rank of lieutenant general and commanded the whole Army in the same sense that a colonel commands a regiment. He had a staff quite apart from the War Department, and there were a great many military questions that the War Department handled without consulting him. These related to supply and administration and were handled by the Secretary of War through the *de facto* chief of the staff, the Adjutant General.

This dual organization of necessity led to confusion. It was said that the bureaus had little or no regard for the needs of the line; that each went off on his own tack; and that there was no coördination of effort.

In 1903 the Secretary of War, Mr. Elihu Root, with the assistance of Major W. H. Carter, Assistant Adjutant General, succeeded in getting through Congress a law which created what we now call the General Staff (though the old staff had been called that for a hundred years). The object of this new law was twofold:

First: To provide a Chief of Staff, or more properly speaking, a Chief of the Staff, to replace the Commanding General as the military head of the Army and the Adjutant General as the military adviser to the Secretary of War.

Second: To provide a group of officers, known as the General Staff Corps, to study military problems and make plans for war. These men were to have no responsibility in the matter of routine administration and supply and thus

would be free to make investigations and to lay plans for the future.

The law was quite clear up to this point, but unfortunately it also provided that officers of the General Staff Corps were to render assistance to the Chief of Staff, and to general officers commanding, in coördinating the activities of the bureaus of the War Department. Add to this that the Chief of Staff was not only chief of the staff — i.e., chief of the War Department bureaus — but also chief of the General Staff Corps. Thus we have a circle in which it was impossible to place responsibility or to determine when an officer on duty in Washington was minding his own business and when he was meddling with the business of others.

The same law made the Chief of Artillery *ex-officio* a member of the General Staff and charged him with coördinating the bureau chiefs in matters that pertained to the coast defenses.

Such was the situation in the War Department when I went there for duty — a young captain — as assistant to the Chief of Artillery.

The first three Chiefs of Staff, Generals Young, Chaffee, and Bates, were old-fashioned soldiers — fighting men who had won their spurs in Indian wars, in the Philippines, and in China. They cared little for the administrative and supply problems of the War Department, and after a short term of office each in turn retired without making much impression upon the organization. In the meantime there had been coming along one of the best administrators in Washington, Captain F. C. Ainsworth, Medical Corps, who came to Washington for duty in the Record and Pension Office. He brought order out of chaos and as a reward Congress promoted him to major, colonel, brigadier general, and major general.

In the readjustment incident to the creation of the General

Staff, the powerful Adjutant General's Department had been abolished and the apparently harmless Military Secretary's Department had been substituted, with Ainsworth at its head. It was not long before the name was changed back and Ainsworth became the contender for General Corbin's old place as the real power in the War Department.

The first Chief of Staff who really impressed his personality upon the War Department was J. Franklin Bell. This officer, along with Albert L. Mills and Pershing, had been promoted from captain of cavalry to brigadier general as a result of the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection. He came to the War Department straight from Fort Leavenworth, a young, aggressive, and able general. Upon his arrival he laid before the President, Mr. Roosevelt, a legislative programme for the Army which he hoped to carry into effect during his four years of office. This programme was approved by the President and with one or two minor exceptions was all enacted during Bell's administration.

It provided for an increase and reorganization of the artillery, and of all the staff departments; for an increase in the pay of the Army, etc. In fact, it provided for everything considered needful at that time, except an increase for the infantry and cavalry. As to why General Bell, a dyed-in-the-wool cavalryman and heart and soul a line soldier, should provide for everything except the line was very simple. A very great deal could be accomplished with the staff and auxiliary troops for a small sum of money that Congress was willing to give, but no material increase could be made in the line without a cost that was prohibitive. He planned, however, that after his legislative programme went through, by 'piecemeal,' there would be a general disclosure of the unpreparedness of the country and a drive for general legislation to provide for it.



Major Johnson Hagood
Coast Artillery Corps
With the love & esteem of his family

May 27/1901

Arthur Murray

THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY, 1906-1910

It was about this time that Homer Lee's book 'The Valor of Ignorance' came out and this brought the matter to a head.

President Roosevelt agreed to send a special message to Congress and the War College was set to work to collect the necessary data. General Bell did not like the War College report. Like all such reports, it was principally a compilation of extracts from General Upton's Military Policy and General Bell said it was too dry and statistical. So he turned the matter over to me to rewrite in more popular style.

After much blue penciling and editing on his part, the message was finally ready and taken to the White House. Mr. Roosevelt then said that he was ending his term, that Mr. Taft had been elected, and that it would be better to wait for the new President, who would be in office long enough to carry the plan into effect. Mr. Taft was then Secretary of War, had approved the message, and he agreed to Mr. Roosevelt's suggestion.

In his first message to Congress Mr. Taft stated that he would shortly submit a special message upon the subject of the national defense. There was a great deal of backing and filling upon the form of the message, what it should contain and when it should be sent in, so that finally General Bell went out of office before anything was done. He was succeeded temporarily by Major General William H. Carter who had the message rewritten and made another attempt to get it out. In the meantime, at the instigation of some infantry officers a resolution was passed by the House of Representatives calling upon the Secretary of War for a report on the state of the national defense. This was known as the McLaughlin Resolution. Its author was not one of the House leaders, and though a great friend of the Army he had never before taken any part in Army legislation and was not in a position to do much, though he did get the resolution passed

without the real leaders knowing or suspecting what it was all about. As soon as the McLaughlin Resolution was received at the War Department, I advised General Bell and later General Carter to abandon the Presidential message and concentrate upon Mr. McLaughlin. So the old 'Disclosure' message was rehashed once more — by the War College, I believe; not by myself — and put in shape as a reply to Mr. McLaughlin.

This was the state of affairs when General Leonard Wood returned from South America and took over the reins of the War Department. He came to Washington as the house guest of Ainsworth. They were both doctors by profession, intimate friends as subalterns in the old Medical Corps, but now both major generals and contending for the supreme authority in the Army. For a few days all was lovely. General Wood was 'tipped off' as to whom to keep and whom to get rid of around his office. Among others I was listed as an undesirable. General Ainsworth, for the first time since the General Staff had been established, came in personally to the Chief of Staff with the baskets of papers. He had always sent a subordinate. But at the end of a week there was a big blow-up and it became a fight to the death, with no quarter asked and none given. Finally Washington was dumbfounded to hear that upon the advice of Senator Warren, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Ainsworth had applied for voluntary retirement to escape court-martial for insubordination.

Thus ended the career of one of the ablest and most brilliant executives and administrators the Army ever had and one of its best friends, though few of the line officers knew it. He understood Congress and knew how to get things out of Congress. He was the power behind the throne in securing much of the most beneficial and far-reaching legislation ever

obtained by the Army, though his name was never mentioned in connection with it. Among other things he was responsible, more than any other one man, for the Army Pay Bill of 1908, credit for which is generally given to me. He understood, perhaps better than any other man before or since, that the War Department was not the Army, but something that stood between the Army and Congress; that the way to get legislation for the Army was not to try to educate Congress and the people to Army methods, but to educate the War Department to congressional methods and to get legislation for the Army by following the usual processes established by Congress itself. In other words, he did not attempt to play tennis against a football team.

General Ainsworth kept his own counsel and rarely discussed his affairs with any one, but one day he told me that he made it a practice never to sign an unfavorable endorsement. If anything was to be approved, he approved it. If anything was to be disapproved, the papers were prepared for the signature of the Assistant Secretary of War. This was only one of many stratagems which created in Washington, and especially in Congress, the firm belief that if you could get to Ainsworth, you would get quick action and favorable results, but if you ever got into the hands of the Assistant Secretary of War or the General Staff, you were lost.

General Bell admired Ainsworth, though the feeling was not reciprocated. He used to say that if Ainsworth were made Chief of Staff, it would be hell for the Army for four years, but that after that the General Staff would be established on such a foundation that it would stand until Doomsday.

Of General Wood General Bell said: 'He is not the type of man to play second fiddle. He is better at carrying out his own ideas than at carrying out the ideas of others. He would be better as Commander-in-Chief than as Chief of Staff.'

Leonard Wood came to Washington, a man under fifty years of age, ex-Governor General of Cuba, Chief of Staff, the senior major general of the Army, pronounced by Roosevelt as the best soldier in America, a storm center of devoted admirers and bitter enemies. Under the old law the senior general of the Army held the rank of lieutenant general. Schofield, Miles, Young, Chaffee, Bates, Corbin, MacArthur, all had it. Ainsworth expected it. But the law was changed to keep it from Wood.

He suffered under the handicap of never having served as a junior officer in the War Department and therefore of not knowing its pitfalls and its problems; also of never having commanded line troops, except as a volunteer in Cuba, and therefore of not knowing the routine peace-time difficulties that confronted the Regular Army. But he was a great executive. He knew the heart of the American soldier. He was the only man who visualized America at war and who not only foresaw the difficulties but suggested remedies.

He had hardly landed in Washington before he began his campaign for preparedness. He sought out Mr. McLaughlin and started in at once to prepare a vigorous reply to the slumbering resolution. He had five hundred copies of the reply printed and distributed to the press, with an advance date of release, and all was set to make a startling disclosure as to the weakness of the national defense.

Unfortunately one of these copies fell into the hands of Mr. James Tawney, chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, and, next to Uncle Joe Cannon, the most powerful man in Congress. Mr. Tawney went to the White House and persuaded Mr. Taft that it would be politically inexpedient to make such a disclosure at that time. So the news story was killed and the War Department sent in some kind of wishy-washy reply that passed unnoticed.



*Do not touch
and
do not move*

*but in
the
order*

GENERAL WOOD, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, 1910-1914
Portraits of Young, Chaffee, Bates, and Bell on the wall

General Wood found the War Department General Staff organized into a lot of committees. These committees worked by making studies and then preparing memoranda setting forth all the facts in the case, all the arguments, pro and con, and finally winding up with a recommendation. After all the members of the committee had O.K.'d this, it was signed by the Chief of Staff and submitted to the Secretary of War for approval. A short time after General Wood arrived, I suggested that he select at random one hundred of these memoranda — a stack about twelve inches high, legal cap size — and predicted that none of them would bear upon any question relating to war and that not more than three of them would bear upon a question of any consequence in relation to either peace or war. He did so and found my prediction true. I remember that one of them, about seven pages long, wound up with these words: 'It is therefore recommended that no toilet paper be issued.' This was signed by the Chief of Staff and 'Approved. Robert Shaw Oliver, Acting Secretary of War.'

General Wood reorganized the General Staff into three groups, the Mobile Army Division, the Coast Artillery Division, and the War College Division, each of which was headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff. The memorandum system was broken up and each assistant was authorized to take direct action upon the questions at issue without recording the mental processes by which he arrived at his conclusions.

In this organization I was an extra assistant. During the administration of General Bell and for a part of the time under General Wood, I sat in the same room with the Chief of Staff. I had charge of all Army legislation and was present at all the conferences in his office.

I had never seen General Wood before he came to the

War Department as Chief of Staff. Many years afterwards I asked him why he had kept me, a stranger, in such a confidential relation when he came into office. He said it was because Ainsworth had advised him so strongly to get rid of me. I had been very close to Ainsworth before I went on the General Staff, but the day my detail was announced he said to me, very formally: 'Well, I see you have gone over to the enemy.' He shook hands, said 'good-bye,' and has never spoken a friendly word to me since. But this action has never lessened my admiration for his ability.

The greatest individual accomplishment of General Wood while Chief of Staff was the Plattsburg Camp. The idea was entirely his own and it was the biggest thing done to prepare us for entry into the Great War.

After seven years of bondage I applied to be relieved from duty in the War Department and went out to command a wonderful little three-company post among the big trees in the Puget Sound country. That was in March, 1912, and I have never been back on duty in the War Department. So whatever I say about the War Department after that time is not based upon first-hand knowledge.

General Ainsworth and his friends kept up their fight against General Wood and finally succeeded in getting Congress to pass a law legislating him out of office. The President vetoed it.

General Wood was succeeded as Chief of Staff by General W. W. Wotherspoon and he by General H. L. Scott, who was in office when we entered the war.

The fourteen years, 1903 to 1917, during which the General Staff had been in existence had not been spent in making plans for war, the purpose for which it was created, but in squabbling over the control of the routine peace-time administration and supply of the Regular Army and in attempts

to place the blame for unpreparedness upon Congress. The General Staff wanted more money, and Congress — the people — would not give it. They wanted more soldiers and a little smattering of reserve supplies. But our unpreparedness did not come from lack of money, lack of soldiers, or lack of supplies. It came from lack of brains, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, lack of genius.

For example, if between 1914 and 1917 any one had had the brains — or the genius — to decide that if we did get into the war, we should use the designs of the British or French guns being manufactured in this country, instead of trying to invent some new design of our own, we should not have spent a billion dollars on artillery without firing a hostile shot. The Lewis gun, invented by an American Army officer, was good enough for the British. Next to the French seventy-five, it was perhaps the greatest weapon of the war. But it did not suit us. We wanted something better.

And if between 1914 and 1917 any one had had the brains — or the genius — to decide that if we did get into the war, we should use airplanes of British or French design instead of trying to invent new ones of our own, we should not have spent another billion dollars without getting a single combat plane to the front.

And why between 1914 and 1917 did we not have the brains — or the genius — to send some one to Europe to find out something about war cantonment construction instead of spending millions upon millions erecting ridiculous little villages, with concrete streets and sidewalks, with the most modern and expensive plumbing and everything else, regardless of cost or time, and then have the war close down on us before the job was finished?

If some one had only had the brains — or the genius — to know that the British could lend us more ships and that we could not build them out of green lumber or concrete!

If with five times as much motor transportation as all the rest of the world combined, we had only sent some of it to France instead of trying to standardize design and manufacture!

Pages could be written upon what the General Staff should have been doing and was not doing between 1903 and 1917, especially after the conflagration started and we saw it coming our way. True, the General Staff did work out some plans for invading Mexico — routes of march, information about bridges, etc.; but one illustration will show how feeble was the War Plans Division of the General Staff during these years.

When the first concentration was made upon the Mexican border, the order to move came from the White House quite late in the afternoon. The War College had been expecting it for some time and was all in readiness. General Wood telephoned for the President of the War College to come at once to the War Department and bring the plans. General Wotherspoon was away and a certain very prominent lieutenant colonel of cavalry (now dead) came in his stead. He brought no plans and led General Wood to believe there were none. So General Wood, Captain M. E. Hanna, and General J. B. Aleshire, then Quartermaster General, working that night in General Wood's office, formulated a plan of mobilization and sent out the telegram to put it into effect. Next morning I heard with horror of what had happened. I told General Wood that Captain (now Major General) Malin Craig had been working for months on the plans for concentration on the border and that they were complete in every detail. Craig was sent for, some slight modification made in the orders already sent out, and from that time forward the War College plans were followed in so far as they were applicable to the situation created the night before.



GENERAL WOTHERSPOON
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1914-1916

Let us see, then, what happened when we entered the Great War. The Chief of Staff was General Hugh L. Scott, a real soldier. He had made his reputation among the Indians and the Moros. He was a man of the great open spaces, perhaps the greatest expert on sign languages, a man who could go among wild men in any part of the world, make himself known to them and come away their friend. He was not suited, however, by training, experience, or temperament to sit behind a desk and direct the destiny of that great wheel within wheels, the War Department, in time of war. He was succeeded in September, 1917, by General Tasker H. Bliss and the latter in turn by General Peyton C. March the following May.

General March had been through the Russo-Japanese War as an observer. He had gone with Pershing's expedition to France and knew our conditions there. He was a practical man who knew the War Department thoroughly, having served there both as a General Staff officer and as an adjutant general. He was keen, cold-blooded, and quick on the trigger. He turned the War Department upside down and organized it on a working basis.

The President of the Army War College was Brigadier General Joseph Kuhn, a very brilliant engineer officer, one of the younger generals. He, also, had been through the Russo-Japanese War as an observer and had afterwards been an observer with the German Army before we became involved. I lunched with General Kuhn at the War College a few days before I sailed for France. He had with him from fifty to a hundred and fifty so-called General Staff officers, of whom perhaps half a dozen had been on the General Staff before the war. Kuhn himself left shortly afterwards to take a division.

Thus we see the great American General Staff at the out-

break of war, chafing at the bit, eager to lay down policies, to make big decisions, to coördinate bureau chiefs, and to lead the nation upon its great crusade.

The bureau that bore the heaviest burden, the Quartermaster Corps, promptly collapsed. The head of it, General H. C. Sharpe, was given a commission as major general of the line and sent to command the South Atlantic Division, with headquarters at Charleston. Robert Wood, a retired major of cavalry, on duty with the Transportation Department in France, was brought home, made brigadier general and detailed as Acting Quartermaster General. Frank Hines, a captain of coast artillery, was made brigadier general and placed in charge of transportation. R. C. Marshall, another captain of coast artillery, was made brigadier general and placed in charge of construction. Major General George Goethals, of Canal fame, was brought back from the retired list and placed in charge of a new branch of the General Staff called Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. He had as his principal assistants Henry Jervey of the Engineers and George W. Burr of the Ordnance, both brigadier generals. The Quartermaster Corps retained motor transportation as a separate division under the parent organization. C. B. Drake, a major of cavalry, was put at the head of it, with rank of brigadier general. A new branch of the General Staff was created and called the Personnel Branch, with Major P. P. Bishop, another coast artillery officer, in charge of it as brigadier general. Captain Marlboro Churchill of the field artillery was made brigadier general and placed in charge of Military Intelligence. E. L. Munson, a medical officer, was made brigadier general and placed in charge of the Morale Branch. Enoch H. Crowder, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, was taken out of his job, made Provost Marshal General, and put in charge of the Selective Draft.

Without going into further detail it can be seen that the whole General Staff and War Department organization, generally, fell like a house of cards and a new organization had to be created during the process of the war. The old system failed and individuals had to be pressed in to serve whenever they could be found. In France, as will be seen later, we had to do the same thing, and in the scramble to establish a working machine the organization in France did not match up with the one back in the States.

As I was on duty in the War Department for seven of the fourteen years of misspent energy, it might be asked why, seeing these things, did I not do something to correct them. The answer is that I did not see them or, seeing them, did not understand. Hindsight is better than foresight, and I, like all the rest, did not have the brains — or the genius — to see preparedness in its true light.

CHAPTER III

WITH THE RAILWAY ARTILLERY

Trying to get over — Good-bye to General Wood — No prospect of getting guns — Fort Adams and the Newport colony — Mysterious secrets — New York, Halifax, and Liverpool — Borden Camp — La Marguerite — British cheese and biscuits — ‘40 hommes, 8 chevaux’ — Mailly-le-Camp — Soissons.

IN the spring of 1917 I had finished my tour of duty commanding Fort Flagler, Washington, had been to the Philippines and back, had commanded the Coast Defenses of San Diego, California, and a Business Men’s Training Camp at Salt Lake City, had had a little taste of border service opposing the peaceful Governor Cantu, of Lower California, and was now a lieutenant colonel on staff duty at Charleston, South Carolina. General Wood had completed his tour of duty as Chief of Staff of the Army and had gone to Governors Island, New York, the most desirable and important military post in the States. From this point, in conjunction with ex-President Roosevelt, he had launched such a vigorous campaign for preparedness — in opposition to Mr. Wilson’s programme of ‘Too Proud to Fight’ — that he was summarily relieved from duty in New York City and sent to the unimportant command at Charleston. The South, however, rallied to his banner and he became more popular there than he had been in the North. Such was the situation when we entered the war.

As soon as it became known that we were to send troops to France, every officer in the Regular Army began to lay plans by which he could get over. I appealed at once to my friend General J. Franklin Bell, who had succeeded General Wood at Governors Island, and he took up my case with General Pershing. It was some time before I heard results, but when

the answer came it was to the effect that General Pershing was very sorry, but he had no place for me. I had asked to go with the heavy artillery and the answer was that there would be no heavy artillery for the present. A short time after this, however, I received word from an entirely different source, and through no effort of mine or General Bell's, that I was to go to France at once in command of a regiment of railroad artillery. My knowledge of railroad artillery at this time was confined to the war pictures I had seen in the newspapers, but I was told that the regiment was to be composed of regulars, all selected from the coast artillery; that we were to go over with forty Dodge cars, five-passenger, and get our guns from the French on the other side. This news about the Dodge cars was most gratifying. I had tried in vain to get one Dodge car to look out for a hundred and twenty-five miles of the Mexican border — and to come suddenly into possession of forty!

I went at once to tell General Wood the great news. He was just starting out with Mayor Hyde of Charleston to review a parade. He turned a little pale, held out his hand and said, 'Well, I shall see you there soon.' This was the first and only time I ever saw General Wood show any emotion, and I have seen him sorely tried. But there he was, the Father of Preparedness, the man of men who should have gone, off to review a small civic parade while one of his minor satellites was headed for France in command of a regiment. Years afterwards, in the Malacañan Palace in Manila, he asked me if I remembered the incident. Little did he or I or any one of us think that day that this was only the prologue of the great tragedy; that he was not to go at all.

On July 19th I went to Washington to get a line on what the future held. Everything was in great confusion and little information could be obtained beyond what I already had. I got hold of two ordnance officers, however, Major J. B.

Dillard and Lieutenant Colonel L. T. Hillman, and they gave me some correct but very discouraging information about the guns for my regiment. Hillman had just returned from France. He said there was a misunderstanding between the Americans and the French as to what America was going to do in the matter of heavy artillery and no prospect of getting it straightened out. Dillard added that the Chief of Ordnance and the Chief of Artillery were deadlocked over designs and that there was no chance of getting any guns to France in less than a year or eighteen months.

From Washington I proceeded to Fort Adams, near Newport, Rhode Island, where my regiment, the 7th Coast Artillery, was being mobilized. There was a brigade of three regiments — 6th, 7th, and 8th — commanded by Brigadier General George T. Bartlett, Colonel William Chamberlaine, Colonel Frank K. Fergusson, and myself, all of whom had served together years before at Fort Monroe as captains in the coast artillery.

We spent about two weeks at Fort Adams drilling and getting ready to go overseas to the great unknown. The whole Newport colony turned out to help the soldiers, these being the first they had seen. Governor and Mrs. Beekman of Rhode Island, Mrs. French Vanderbilt, and a Miss Louise Scott were particularly gracious. Quite a large sum of money was raised, about forty thousand dollars, and we were presented with flags, drums, bugles, sweaters, and all kinds of personal gifts and comforts for the expedition.

On August 15th my regiment received orders. I was told orally, in the strictest confidence, that we were to sail from Newport to Hoboken on the evening of the 17th and that I must keep our destination a secret; that under no circumstances should any one know that we were on our way to France. I said to the brigade commander that it would be a



To colored wagons with all
best wishes,
Elsie French Vanderbilt
December 14, 1917

MRS. ELSIE FRENCH VANDERBILT
Welfare Worker, Newport, R.I.

little difficult to move the regiment without letting the men know about it. He replied that it was orders from the War Department and that I should order the regiment to pack up, but not tell them why. I was directed particularly to see that none of the officers told their wives.

What happened? The words 'Begin packing' were hardly out of my mouth before the news spread like wildfire that we were off to France!! Within an hour the Mayor of Newport and a bunch of newspaper men were in camp. The Mayor wanted to know what kind of send-off the town could give us. He offered the assistance of the police. He and the newspaper men were assured, very gravely and officially, that the whole thing was a secret; that the men were simply packing up; and that no one knew or guessed what our destination was. In due course of time two Fall River boats appeared and we spent two days in carting our baggage over to town through the streets to the docks. Hundreds of soldiers and stevedores were busy putting it on board. Still the secret was kept by those to whom it was entrusted.

In the dark of the night of August 17th the regiment slipped quietly out of camp, seventeen hundred strong, and made its way to town. Several thousand spectators strangely happened along the route of our march. The nearer we got to town the thicker the crowd. Finally when we got in sight of the boat we could move no farther. It was a scene of wild confusion. There were no police, no order, and the wharf and streets were jammed with men, women, and children. We were delayed two hours.

Military secret number one had leaked out! The wives were on hand to say good-bye. For some, it was the last good-bye. There were some tears, but a stiff upper lip was the rule. The soldiers all were regulars, and the women were regulars, too.

Standing near the gangplank, very tall and very fair, in evening clothes but with no wrap, was Mrs. Elsie French Vanderbilt. There was a fine, drizzling rain, but no matter. As each of the seventeen hundred soldiers went on board she gave him a smile and a package of cigarettes, neither of which he ever forgot.

At nine o'clock the next morning we were secretly transferred to the steamer Highlander at the Fall River Dock in New York and dispatched to Pier 52, Hoboken. There we were allowed to stand secretly on the wharf for a couple of hours while our baggage was loaded upon the Cunard Liner Aurania and then the men were put aboard and hidden below decks. We were military passengers on board this ship and messenger boys were permitted to collect telegrams from the civilian passengers, but no soldier could send a farewell word to wife, mother, or child. However, there was a kindly proprietor of a German delicatessen store near by and he agreed to tell everybody all about it.

We went to Halifax, where our soldiers were once more hidden below decks. But the Canadians apparently had not been told that we were a 'secret.' So they came down to the shore and gave us a band concert, playing all the latest American musical hits.

The trip across was uneventful. A submarine took a pot shot at one of the other ships of the convoy, but missed. We got a radio that a merchantman had gone down twenty miles to our southward. But the sea was calm, the nights were clear, and we zigzagged along like house flies playing tag on a summer day.

When we got to the danger zone, it was uncomfortable to keep on life belts all the time, especially to sleep in them, fully dressed, with overcoats and money belts — It was annoying afterwards to find in France that the gold we took

in our money belts was worth less than bills, and bills less than checks.

When we got to the south coast of Ireland the submarines became a little too active and we were put in at Berehaven. But the next day we left and later arrived at Liverpool.

From Liverpool we went to Borden Camp, near Aldershot. Being a regular regiment and the first American line troops to pass through England, the British were curious to see what we were like and at the same time more than anxious to extend courtesies and hospitality. Our camp was laid out with curious marquise tents and they even cooked for us until we could become accustomed to handling the British ration, which we never did.

Colonel F. B. Emslie, of the Royal Artillery, Louisberg Barracks, called and invited me and my officers to join his mess. He was very impressive — what we call, typically English; tall, with snow-white hair and waxed mustache. He looked the part of a soldier or a king and was quite a contrast to the youngish-looking colonels in our brigade.

While at Camp Borden we spent our time in routine infantry instruction, ceremonies, and marches. We also made a number of visits to the neighboring British activities. We were much impressed by a miniature artillery range, representing a sector at the front. There was a little stream representing a river; there were forests, rocks, battery emplacements, roads, villages, etc. They had lookout stations, dugouts, and complete fire control installations and conducted, in miniature, all operations of artillery fire at the front.

In company with Major Reginald R. Farrar, M.C., of the 7th Royal Artillery, I went to tea at the home of Captain and Mrs. R. H. Thackeray of Headley, Hampshire. The Captain was a connection of the author and the house in which he

lived had belonged to Lord Roberts. It was my first glimpse of English country life and I was carried away with it. We had ridden over on short, fat, English horses, with bobbed tails, and a groom in attendance. Everything about the visit, the house, the grounds, the hedge-lined lanes, the tea, the women, the conversation, made me think that I had come out of real life and was visiting that fine old gentleman Mr. Wardle of Dingley Dell.

On September 9th a telegram came from the American Embassy in London directing that my regiment, the 7th, should start for France. My regiment was not the senior and there was some question as to why it had been selected, with considerable telephoning and conferring to get the orders changed to let brigade headquarters and the 6th go first. But the order stood, and I had the great honor of going ahead and receiving from the French everything the French heavy artillery could bestow upon the first contingent of their own metal that came to represent America.

We entrained for Southampton¹ on the morning of September 10th and boarded the channel steamer *La Marguerite* the same afternoon. If ever a ship belied her name, it was *La Marguerite*. Certainly she was no flower of the field. 'Sea Weed' would have been better, or, perhaps, 'Le Mauvais Chou.' She was a side-wheeler, dirty as a darkey excursion boat on the Savannah River. No place where the men could sleep, but a few small stuffy cabins where the officers could sit. To lie down was impossible. It took the night to cross, but in the morning we were in France!!

Before leaving the United States we had been issued three days' rations in bulk that had been loaded into the hold of the ship. We had about twenty barrels of flour, two tons of bacon, fifty cases of canned tomatoes, so much salt, pepper,

¹See map, p. 47.



To Captain Johnson bring my
wishes best wishes for the service
June 16th 1910

J. M. DICKINSON
Secretary of War, 1910

baking powder, soap, etc., but no one could tell what we were to do with them, either on board, where we were provided for by the ship's mess, in lifeboats in case we were submarine, or after we were landed. Every organization that left the United States during the first nine months of the war carried this useless impedimenta. We lost track of ours at Liverpool, where we loaded on passenger trains, but it turned up several months later at Mailly-le-Camp.

In the meantime we were disembarking from that beautiful flower of the English Channel, La Marguerite. As each soldier marched proudly down the gangplank he was once more issued rations. This time not in bulk but loose, without even so much as a piece of wrapping paper. This was not the familiar American travel ration of canned tomatoes, salmon — 'gold fish' — and beans, but the British ration of biscuits, cheese, and tea. Each man already had his rifle, ammunition, full pack, overcoat, barrack bag containing six months' individual reserve supplies, and a piece of company property. Some had suitcases and live pets. What to do with the cheese was the question. Some put it under their arms as a Frenchman carries a loaf of bread. Some broke it up and stuffed it into their pockets. Some put it in their hats. And others began to eat it as the simplest way of getting it ashore. But no sooner had the regiment lined up on the dock than the question was settled by an indignant American quartermaster, who declared that the British had no right to issue rations on French soil (full charge, of course, being made against the United States) and directed me to return the whole thing, cheese, biscuits, and tea, to the British forthwith. I returned to the ship and offered to give back the cheese, but the British refused to accept it because it had been broken apart and could not be put together again.

Our next move was to what was known as a 'Rest Camp'

— the reason for selecting this name has always been a mystery — Rest Camp No. 3, at Le Havre.¹

From this time forward the effort to force rations upon us suddenly ceased and all elements seemed combined to keep us from getting any. We were informed that the Rest Camp ran like clockwork; that we should find our tents ready, our baggage in place, and our meals — as for them it would be as simple as a cafeteria!! Every soldier would be issued a meal ticket and all he had to do was go up, get punched, and eat all he wanted. Service was continuous day and night.

The only trouble about this arrangement was that when we applied for meal tickets the British quartermaster, running true to form, said they were all out, and the cafeteria man had adopted a slogan somewhat like the one of the Chinese laundry — ‘No tickee, no shirtee.’

I went to the Rest Camp commander and offered to type-write some meal tickets or give him any other kind of voucher that he wanted, but he shook his head sadly and said that the blankety blank auditors would not pass anything not written on the approved form and that when he last applied for meal tickets his requisition had been returned for information as to why he needed so many. Before he could get his answer back we had arrived.

But you cannot stump an American soldier. The men had money and the company funds were fat. So they all managed to get something to eat in town.

Next morning, September 12th, we marched down to what the French called the ‘gare’ to board a train for our final destination in France. What this destination was or how long it would take to get there no one knew or attempted to guess. It was one of the secrets we were keeping from the Germans.

We were struck by the odd signs on the freight cars — ‘40

¹See map, p. 47.

hommes — 8 chevaux.' I assigned one train to each battalion and four of the little box cars to each company; had the men load on their baggage, company property, furniture for the day rooms, etc.; and then went to the 'Chef de Gare' to learn where we could find the passenger trains. I was told in polite French, which I did not understand, that there were no more trains and that if the Americans filled up the trains with baggage instead of with soldiers, the French were sorry. After two hours' argument, during which time the Chef de Gare, in true French style, had several times ordered the train to start and I, in true American style, had ordered it not to, it was finally agreed that we should let the baggage go ahead with a few men in charge and that additional trains would be provided for the men. As soon as this arrangement was disclosed to the men, they all rushed forward to go with the baggage. Some crawled inside. There was no room for them to sit or stand. Some clung to the outside and some climbed on top of the cars. When company commanders ordered the men on top to get off and fall in ranks, they, too, crawled into the box cars on top of the others. After a feeble effort on my part to unscramble the mess, I decided to let it go as it was and we started off, as we supposed, to the front.

We had no rations except some canned goods the old soldiers had wisely hidden in their baggage before leaving home, and some cheese and biscuits that remained from what the British gave us when we left La Marguerite. The quartermaster at Le Havre, however, had given the company commanders some cash — what is known in the Army as 'coffee money' — and I was instructed to telegraph ahead from time to time to various stations along the route to have liquid coffee ready for the regiment.

Not knowing our destination, our route, or the names of


any stations, we got no coffee. But even if I had known all this, the French do not keep coffee on tap at railroad stations, as we do in the States, and they could not have supplied it.

We were on the train twenty-eight hours. There was no water, there were no sanitary arrangements and no regular stops. Sometimes the train would stop on a siding to let another train pass. Then the men would jump off for various purposes and we would have great difficulty in collecting them again. However, we did not lose a man, and when we arrived at our destination and I made a little talk to the men saying that I was sorry they had had such a — of a time and that I should make it up to them, one old sergeant stepped out and said: 'I hope the Colonel will not worry himself. The men enjoyed it.'

Our destination proved to be Mailly-le-Camp,¹ headquarters of the French railway artillery. It was not at the front, but was within the zone of the army and near enough for us to hear the booming of the big guns, like distant thunder, and at night to see the flashes playing like heat lightning against the sky. The little town lay halfway between Troyes and Châlons and was one of the advance points reached by the Germans in the First Battle of the Marne. The railway station showed the marks of German shells and we all felt that we had arrived somewhere at last.

We were met at the station at 11.30 A.M. September 13th by General Frank Coe, our new brigade commander — General Bartlett had been left in England — and by General Buat, commanding the railway artillery reserve and afterwards Chief of Staff of the French Army. A French band escorted us to camp. It was very inspiring, with the blast of those wonderful French horns and their quick step. Our regiment made a fine show, with its clean-cut, square-should-

¹ See map, p. 47.



HAGOOD'S REGIMENT ON BOARD H.M.S. AURANIA



HAGOOD'S REGIMENT AT MAILLY-LE-CAMP

dered, upstanding young men. We held our heads high and were proud to be Americans;

In the evening we were assembled in the large room of the officers' mess and the French commandant of the camp made us the following address:

MON GÉNÉRAL, MESSIEURS LES OFFICIERS,

Les Troupes Françaises du Camp de Mailly se réjouissent de recevoir aujourd'hui, le 7^e Régiment d'Artillerie de l'Armée Américaine.

Les Officiers de la Réserve Générale d'Artillerie Lourde sont, en particulier, très heureux de compter désormais comme frères d'armes les Officiers de l'Armée Américaine.

Pour vous témoigner leur chaleureuse sympathie, ils ont organisé en votre honneur, cette réunion artistique dans laquelle vous trouverez réunies deux choses dont la France est particulièrement fière: son Armée et son Art.

Je suis certain d'être l'interprète de la pensée de mes Chefs en leur demandant de crier avec moi:

Vive le France!

Vive les Alliés!

America forever!

This was followed by an entertainment in which a number of famous French opera singers participated. Many of them had sung in the States with Caruso, but now they were soldiers in the French Army.

A few days later General Buat stated to General Coe that word had come from the United States that the guns for the railroad artillery were being taken out of the coast defenses; that an agreement had been reached as to the manufacture of the carriages; and that within a short time the American artillery in France would be able to use its own *matériel*. I attempted to tell what I knew from Dillard and Hillman, but I did not get anywhere with it, because both our G.H.Q. and the French were satisfied that everything was going all right.

But none of these guns ever got to France!

Mailly-le-Camp is headquarters of all the French heavy artillery. Before the war it was laid out with a number of stone structures for the principal storehouses, barracks for the permanent garrison, officers' quarters, kitchens, etc., with provision for tenting the visiting troops in adjacent areas left vacant. For the war these vacant spaces were filled by portable wooden shacks known as Adrian Barracks. Only part of this camp was turned over to our coast artillery brigade. It was quite extensive and at one time a French division was encamped there in addition to ourselves.

There was provision for the repair of railroad artillery, shops, storehouses, etc., and arrangements for conducting artillery target practice with long-range guns.

About three miles away was a place called Haussimont, where our troops were set to work to build their own camp and to plan for their own target practice. A battalion of my regiment was sent there under Major F. B. Edwards to do the work.

Chemin des Dames:

About the 18th of October I went up to Soissons — I had been there before — to see the proposed advance at the Chemin des Dames. The weather was very bad, the French could get no aërial observations, and the advance had to be postponed for almost a month. But the artillery preparation continued and I saw a number of railroad artillery guns in action. I was interested in a fourteen-inch gun firing at a minimum range of ten thousand yards, near Vailly. In Soissons some damage was done by German air raids and six-inch shells. Two exploded quite near my hotel, one of which struck a camion and killed thirty-five men. I was very much surprised upon examining the ground to find no marks. The

shell had a super-sensitive fuse and exploded upon striking the camion before hitting the ground. An hour or two afterwards all evidence of the dead and wounded had been cleared away and traffic in the street was proceeding as usual. The other shell killed a large number of horses. One day, while this shelling was going on and shells were bursting all around, I noticed there was a girl in the next room playing a piano. The bursting of the shells did not make the slightest change in her touch on the piano. She paid no more attention to the explosions than if there had been an ordinary thunderstorm. On other occasions I noticed in towns in the front areas that when shelling began the children would move over, just as in a rainstorm, to more sheltered spots, but continued their games just the same.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADVANCE SECTION, L.O.C.

Selected to command — Harbord and Pershing O.K. assignment — Scope of job — Staff difficulties — Transportation Department — Lack of coördination — More secrets — Confusion as to responsibility — Difficulties of 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions.

UPON my return from Soissons, General Coe told me that I had been selected to command the Advance Section, Line of Communications. I asked him what that was. He said he did not know. I found afterwards that I had been nominated by Jimmie Logan, who said —

The duties devolving upon the C.O., Adv. Sec., L. of C., are perhaps the most important of any of those in the organization of the A.E.F. To satisfactorily carry out this work, it requires a man who has had general staff training, administrative training, and duty with troops. All this experience Colonel Hagood has had. He served twice on the General Staff, commanded the artillery defenses at Puget Sound and Corregidor Island, was Artillery Officer on the staff of the C.G., Philippine Division, and in addition has been assistant to the Chief of Coast Artillery. General Wood, General Murray, and General Weaver all consider Colonel Hagood as one of our best all-round officers.

This was endorsed by General Harbord and approved by the magic initials J. J. P., Paris, October 22, 1917.

In giving this description of me Jimmie had drawn a long bow. I had never commanded the Artillery Defenses of Puget Sound or at Corregidor, though I had served as a junior officer at both places. But in those early days of the war Logan was a great power at G.H.Q. He had been in France studying organization several years before the war began. When we got into it, he was with our Ambassador and made



SENATOR F. E. WARREN
Chairman of the Senate Military
Committee, 1908



CONGRESSMAN JOHN A. T. HULL
Chairman of the House Military
Committee, 1905



the preliminary arrangements for Pershing's organization to get started. Toward the end of the war he went with Dawes. After the war he stayed in France to represent American interests and, finally, became an international figure in connection with reparations.

On November 2, 1917, there rolled into Neufchâteau,¹ France, a second-hand Packard limousine with the following contents: One newly appointed organizer and commander of the Advance Section, L.O.C., one adjutant, one sergeant major, one typewriter, one bedding roll, two trunk lockers and suitcases, assorted. Major General R. M. Blatchford had recently been relieved from duty as Commanding General, L.O.C., in Paris, and had taken over the duty of billeting officers at Neufchâteau. I applied to him for office space and a billet. He gave me for my headquarters a room in the basement of his office, and for a billet a room in a house already occupied by my brother-in-law, Colonel C. E. N. Howard, of the Quartermaster Corps.

This being my first billet, it made a great impression upon me. It was on the second floor at the back of an old-time house, approached from the outside by a private, well-worn, stone stairway. It had one window covered with dark curtains, and the bed, at the back of a dark alcove, could hardly be discerned in the dim light. It was deep, with a feather mattress, down pillows and comforters. It had snow-white sheets and pillowcases of the softest linen. Neufchâteau in November was cold and wet. The days were short and the nights were long and this billet was a Godsend — not only to me, but also to the landlady, for being an American I was entitled to wood for my fire and as much oil as I wanted for my lamp. She, on the other hand, was on an allowance of two litres (about two quarts) of 'petrol' a month for both

¹ See map, p. 47.

fuel and light. Under the French law she received only one franc a day each for my billet and Colonel Howard's, but we each allowed her a little wastage on our kerosene oil, so that she was certain of at least one hot meal a day during the time we were there.

Through the courtesy of Colonel Robert F. McMillan, I joined the 26th Division headquarters mess.

The Line of Communications (L.O.C.):

We can stop here a moment to see what is meant by the Line of Communications.

Under our 1914 edition of the Field Service Regulations the country in time of war was to be divided into the Zone of the Interior and the Theater of Operations. The Zone of the Interior was to be controlled by the War Department and the Theater of Operations by the Commander of the Field Forces.

The Theater of Operations itself was to be divided into two zones, the Forward Zone, known as the Zone of the Advance, and the Rear Zone, known as the Zone of the Line of Communications. In the Forward Zone there might be several armies each with a separate commander, and in the Rear Zone there might be several Lines of Communication, also each with a separate commander.

In a Line of Communications there ordinarily would be a Base Section,¹ an Intermediate Section, and one or more Advance Sections. The commander of the Line of Communications was to have a complete staff like the old-time Department Commander, with a Chief of Staff and representatives of each of the Supply Services. Each of the sections was also to have had representatives of the Supply Services and a general staff officer to be known as Assistant Chief of Staff. It was to have no immediate commander, but was to be com-

¹ See map, p. 47.

manded by the Commanding General, L.O.C., through this Assistant Chief of Staff.

The general scheme of supply was that the Base Section would receive supplies from the Zone of the Interior and ship them in large quantity to the Intermediate Section. From there they would be reshipped in smaller quantity to the Advance Sections and distributed at the front.

General Pershing found that this arrangement was not applicable to the situation in France. He found that he was building up a kind of War Department of his own; that he had to perform a work that belonged to the Zone of the Interior, and that the Commanding General, L.O.C., could not personally command all the Sections. The first material change was to substitute actual commanders for the Assistant Chiefs of Staff at the various sections.

It was decided to have only one Advance Section, with headquarters at Neufchâteau. Back of this was the Intermediate Section, with headquarters at Nevers. And back of this were five Base Sections, No. 1 at Saint-Nazaire, No. 2 at Bordeaux, No. 3 in England, No. 4 at Le Havre, and No. 5 at Brest. Others were subsequently added.


What I have just explained was not known to me when I arrived at Neufchâteau. I had no idea whatever as to what my job was. I did not know how our Allies got their supplies or to what extent position warfare had changed the methods of supply prescribed in the book for open warfare. The book said: 'The function of the L.O.C. is to relieve the combatant field forces from every consideration except that of defeating the enemy.' Being in the Advance Section, it looked as though I should be the one to do the relieving and that if the combatant forces failed in their noble purpose of defeating the enemy, I should be like the boy that stood on the burning deck.

It was evident that I could not relieve the combatant forces of every consideration except defeating the enemy, with an adjutant, a sergeant major, and a field clerk holding down one room in a basement. I therefore set about finding a suitable building for my offices.

Neufchâteau was already the headquarters of the 26th Division and for Major General R. M. Blatchford's billeting organization. It had been selected as headquarters of the First American Army to be formed, and the French thought there were too many American activities there already. So I was not a very welcome addition to the overcrowded village.

I tried to get a building called École des Jeunes Filles, but the French said General Pershing had agreed not to take any schools. I then tried to get an old stable that was being used temporarily as a garage on the first floor and hospital on the second. This also met with disfavor. So I went to General Harbord at G.H.Q. and secured from him a letter to General Blatchford and also one to General Edwards, saying that it was more important to have the Advance Section, L.O.C., in Neufchâteau than either of their headquarters and that if they did not find accommodations for me, they would have to move themselves. But even this produced little effect. I finally secured a hall about thirty by seventy-five feet, which was ordinarily used by the City Fathers, or the Town Council, or whatever the French call their municipal organization.

With these temporary quarters I started in to organize a staff. By this time I had accumulated Captain Carl A. Lohr, Adjutant; Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Reno, Chief Surgeon; Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Adams, Transportation Department; Major R. F. Fowler, Engineer Officer; Major James E. McNary, Ordnance Officer; Captain Aiken Simons, personal aide; Lieutenant N. W. French, Chief Gas Officer; Lieutenant



Davis, Signal Officer, and Mr. H. F. Meyers, Field Clerk, who served as my private secretary throughout the war.

In getting my organization started, I received great assistance from Captain Mallick of the French General Staff. He defined for me a Regulating Station, described the four French bureaus, and, in simple language, the principles of the French system of supply.

G.H.Q. had directed that in addition to commanding the Advance Section, L.O.C., I should also perform the duties of Chief of the Coördinating Section of the First Army to be formed. This latter gave me a General Staff status, for which the only excuse I could see was that it authorized direct communication between my office and G.H.Q. without going through L.O.C. headquarters, in Paris. If I received orders from Paris to do something that I did not think expedient, all I had to do was to call G.H.Q. on the telephone and get instructions to do something different. If G.H.Q. wanted to get something done in a hurry, the order would come straight instead of going through Paris. Then if L.O.C. headquarters in Paris complained, G.H.Q. would issue contrary instructions, through Paris, which would reach me too late. Upon one occasion I had three conflicting orders upon the same subject at the same time from three different sources. Needless to say, this led to great confusion.

One of the first difficulties was what control my Chief Quartermaster should have over the Quartermaster activities in my Section. What control should he have over the advance depots and the Regulating Station at Is-sur-Tille?¹ The ordinary procedure was that he was responsible for all of these activities, and I tried to get the very best Quartermaster obtainable for that purpose. The French, however, took the attitude that the big quartermaster activity would

¹ See map.



Gen. Wm. T.

Wm. T. Sherman
Lieutenant General U. S. Army

Wm. T. Sherman

Wm. T. Sherman General
U. S. Army

be at Is-sur-Tille. In their supply scheme they had no such organization as Advance Section, L.O.C., and they objected to having the Is-sur-Tille Regulating Station controlled from Neufchâteau. They wanted the man in control to be on the ground in immediate contact with their own Commissaire Regulatrice.

Lieutenant Colonel M. R. Hilgard of the Quartermaster Corps at that time was supposed to be the only man in the American Army who knew what a Regulating Station was, he having been sent up to the French and British fronts to find that out. So when I succeeded in getting Hilgard detailed as my Chief Quartermaster, the French brought sufficient pressure to bear to get him transferred to Is-sur-Tille the next day. And from that time on Is-sur-Tille was never controlled by the L.O.C., either from Neufchâteau or Paris.

Another question was the relation of the Advance Section to the railroads. I received instructions from G.H.Q. that Colonel H. H. Adams of the Transportation Department had been sent to Neufchâteau to coöperate with me, but not to be on my staff; that my relation to him would be the relation of the Quartermaster at Governors Island to the Division Superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad in New York City; that I could give him no orders, but that he would carry out my requests whenever they were practicable. This relation was absolutely unsatisfactory both to Colonel Adams and to me, although we differed as to what the proper relation should be. The Division Superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad had at least some authority over the road, whereas Colonel Adams had none. There were no American roads in France. All the roads were operated by the French and Colonel Adams could do no more than carry messages from me to the French railroad officials.

I took the same attitude then that I took throughout my entire service in France, to-wit, that the Transportation Department should have identically the same status as other staff services and that the local transportation man should be just as much a member of my staff as the local Quartermaster or Ordnance Officer.

The Transportation Department at that time had a very hazy idea as to what it was expected to do. Colonel Adams told me that American lines would be built from the rear to the front and that from four to eight tracks would probably be laid into Neufchâteau. He and I went out in an automobile to look over some of the existing French lines. The country was rough and there was hardly room for the French double-track line already in the valley. I did not see how it was possible to put in four more tracks, but neither of us doubted that this was going to be included in the American effort.

Among other difficulties at Neufchâteau was an absolute lack of coöordination between General Blatchford's headquarters, those of the 26th Division, and my own. Each outfit was attempting to do everything independently of the others. Billeting certainly did not warrant a special headquarters with a major general in command, but General Blatchford had a large staff, including an engineer officer, with the rank of colonel, who was constructing barracks, quarters, warehouses, etc. This work, I thought, belonged to the Chief Engineer on my staff or myself.

There were no accommodations and no food for the great number of casualties who were passing through Neufchâteau. Officers and soldiers were sleeping about on the floor of the railroad station, in halls and doorways and even on the sidewalks. They would stand in line for hours trying to get into hotel dining-rooms. One officer told me that for three days

he had been unable to get food of any kind in Neufchâteau except one package of Uneeda biscuits.

We were much embarrassed by efforts at secrecy. Supplies sent up from the rear were not marked with their destination. Carload upon carload of all kinds was hustled up from the ports with no shipping directions except the words 'ARMÉE AMÉRICAINE.' One day I received a telephone message that an American battalion had arrived at a French town called Menaucourt and did not know its destination. The battalion commander, as usual, had not been told and the French had simply put them on a train and started them off. After several hours' effort I found out from G.H.Q. that they belonged in the vicinity of Vaucouleurs, on another railroad line and sent them there.

On another occasion the Quartermaster of the 42d Division, Colonel John L. DeWitt, reported to me that he had received notice from the French that nine hundred horses had been shipped to him and that he had no forage and no way of providing for them. He begged me to stop the shipment. I investigated, but was unable to find out anything except that the horses were on the way. We could not find out who ordered them and therefore could not stop the shipment. After much effort Colonel DeWitt succeeded in collecting some little forage to feed them upon arrival, but as a matter of fact, they never arrived. Moreover, we were never able to ascertain the source of the story that they had been shipped. I tried in vain to stop these mysterious shipments.

Fifty carloads of flour got as far to the front as Beaumont, headquarters of the 2d Division, while the bakery for which it was intended was seventy-five miles back at Dijon.¹ These cars so congested the little railroad siding at Beaumont that the 2d Division was unable to get any other supplies. Another

¹ See map, p. 47.

lot, at Certilleux, was congesting the sidings of the 26th Division. The French were requested to send all flour back to Dijon, but they refused to back-track any freight and asked that it be turned over to them for distribution among the people, who were very short of flour, with the understanding that they would replace it at Dijon. I put this up to Paris and it was disapproved. I was told to try again to get the French to send it back to Dijon. I then took advantage of my relation with G.H.Q. and got permission to give the flour to the French. In the meantime Paris took it up with G.H.Q. and had the order rescinded. This went on, back and forth, for a month, and finally, disregarding instructions from higher authority, I directed my Quartermaster to turn the flour over to the French and get a receipt for it. That was the last we ever heard of it, but I suppose it is now one of the items of the French debt.

Among the supplies that came pouring into the 26th Division were several cases of dry goods invoiced to some merchant in Boston, including a large quantity of infants' underwear, General Kernan's bedding roll, lost at Liverpool, and a private horse belonging to Colonel B. T. Clayton, Quartermaster Corps, which he had left at Saint-Nazaire in charge of an attendant. The attendant reported that in spite of all his protests he and the horse had been put aboard the train and sent to Neufchâteau, although Colonel Clayton had been assured, both officially and personally by the commanding officer at Saint-Nazaire, that his horse would stay there until called for. Colonel Clayton was on duty in Paris.

The divisions that first came over had attempted to bring from the United States six months' supplies. These supplies had been loaded on transports, unloaded and reloaded on trains (some in England, across the Channel, and again reloaded), all without any order whatsoever. Trainloads of

wagon bodies arrived in my area with no wheels. The supplies of the 42d Division, at Vaucouleurs, were scattered out over a ten-acre field, most of it in the open and in such condition that it could neither be segregated nor used. This division had only six trucks to distribute troops and supplies over a billeting area of about eighteen square miles.

In order to stop these wholesale shipments to the front, I secured from G.H.Q. an order that nothing would be shipped beyond Is-sur-Tille without a request from me. This would create a kind of dump at Is-sur-Tille where all of these unneeded supplies would be stopped and sorted out. But notwithstanding this order and additional orders given by me daily over the telephone, all kinds of supplies continued to sift through. One of the causes of this trouble was that requisitions had been made for six months' supplies at mobilization camps. Whatever the troops lacked on arriving at the port of embarkation they again requisitioned there. Upon arrival in France they requisitioned once more, at the port of arrival, and at their final destination they again sent in requisitions. Supply officers who got these requisitions sent the supplies forward as soon as they could get them. Thus, supplies that had been requisitioned in the United States a year before were arriving at the front.

The greatest trouble during all this time was the lack of motor transportation. Organizations had been sent from the United States with the understanding that the French would give them motor trucks. But the French had none to give.

Combat Troops:

The 1st Division, commanded by Major General William L. Sibert, was at Gondrecourt and at that time was pretty well fixed up. They had good billets, suitable buildings for schools, and a fair amount of transportation; also, apparently,

plenty of supplies. Colonel B. Frank Cheatham, Division Quartermaster, had established a sales commissary and what amounted to a small advance quartermaster depot. Of course, it was not practicable for a moving division to carry around a plant like this, and when the division did begin to move it had to be left behind. But this division was the only one in this area at this time that was getting fed.

The 1st Division was at a convenient point on the railroad and had some transportation. So the postal service shipped to that point all the mail for troops in that part of the country. The 42d Division, about twenty miles away, reported to me that the postal authorities at Gondrecourt gave them very poor service. The mail man of the 1st Division retorted that if the 42d didn't like the way they were getting their mail, they could come and get it for themselves. At this time the postal service was under civilian control and the mail was being sent forward in bulk like everything else, with no shipping directions except 'Armée Américaine.'

The 2d Division, under the command of Major General Omar Bundy, was just beginning to arrive at Beaumont. I made only one visit to this area and that was for the purpose of investigating the trouble about flour, above referred to, but, to show what a lack of understanding and coöordination of responsibility existed at the time, I received a complaint through the French that Major General Bundy was not *coöoperating* with some captain quartermaster in relieving freight congestion. When I went up there, I found that this captain was really an emergency officer promoted from the ranks and that he was an assistant to General Bundy's Division Quartermaster. It was not possible to find the author of the complaint.

The 26th Division, commanded by Major General Clarence R. Edwards, arrived at Neufchâteau about the same



Jan 1911 To Captain Johnson Hagood
1911 with the best wishes of
Theodore Roosevelt

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time that I did. This division seemed to be worse off than any other in the whole area. There was no sales commissary at Neufchâteau and the officers could not purchase food from the French. Colonel Joseph W. Beacham, Division Quartermaster, tried to get authority to sell rations to officers' messes, but it was disapproved. So, as he described it, there was only one thing left for him to do and that was to have a truck loaded up with provisions, backed up to the kitchen door, and the driver instructed to look the other way. What the division would have done for transportation Heaven only knows had not a near-by French captain secured permission from his Division Commander to lend thirty-five French camions to the Americans at such times as they were not being used by the French. An American general told me that if it had not been for this French captain, his brigade would have starved to death.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL ORDERS SEVENTY-THREE

Letter to Harbord — Outlining requirements — Conference with Wood, Connor, Shelton, and DeWitt — Resultant plan of supply — G.O. 73 — Visit of Kernan.

IN order to straighten out some of the difficulties outlined in the last chapter, I wrote the following letter to General Harbord, Chief of Staff at Chaumont:

HEADQUARTERS
ADVANCE SECTION LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Neufchâteau, Nov. 15, 1917

From: Col. Johnson Hagood, C.A.C., Chief of Coördinating Section, G.S. 1st Army, to be established, and Commanding Advance Section, L.O.C.
To: Chief of Staff, A.E.F. (Copy to C.G., L.O.C.)
Subject: Requirements of Advance Section, L. of C.

1. The line of communications is the most important problem now confronting the American army. Upon its successful operation, more than upon the successful operation of all other agencies combined, depends the outcome of the war. Both sides realize this. The Germans are trying to defeat the Allies by their submarine campaign against Great Britain and the Allies are trying to defeat the Germans by starving them out. It is common knowledge that the greatest weapon Germany has is her wonderful organization of supplies and transportation.

2. *Our own incompetence:* If the United States does not actually fail, its efficiency is certainly going to be tremendously decreased by the sheer incompetence of its line of communications, beginning in the U.S. and ending at the French front. This incompetence not only applies to the machine as a whole but, we may as well admit, applies to the individual officers and employees, none of whom has had experience in solving such a problem. In this, of course, I include myself.

3. I am informed that a ship lay at one of our base ports in France for forty-two days waiting to be unloaded and costing the government in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars a day. At this end of the line the situation has been properly described by one division commander in an official communication to the Commander-in-Chief as an eye-sore to his division and a disgrace to the United States. One of the brigade commanders told me that his men had gone as long as twelve days without potatoes, eight days without any vegetable component at all, and that it was a common experience to have no bread. French and Canadian officers and troops seeing the men in this pitiable condition have come to their rescue and helped them out. At one time ninety per cent of all the transportation of one American division had been borrowed from a French captain, who had secured it by a personal appeal to his own division commander.

4. Not only has the L. of C. failed, so far, to function properly in the supply of our own men but it has so clogged the French railway yards, storehouses and quays in this section as to cause an official complaint to be made to the Commander-in-Chief, with the unofficial statement to me that they were being embarrassed in their movement of troops to the Italian front.

5. *How much longer?* The question naturally arises as to how much longer these conditions are going to last and as to whether or not, with troops arriving at the rate of 50,000 a month, we shall be in a better position to handle the problem a year from now than we are to-day.

DIFFICULTIES

Conflict of interests: There is a natural conflict of interests between those charged with the training and instruction of the troops in the field, those charged with the theoretical instruction in schools and those charged with the responsibility in matters like those assigned to the L. of C. The last has the unpopular end. Most people prefer to be identified with the first and regard the last as a more or less necessary nuisance to which undesirables should be relegated. The

great effort at home has been to rush troops to the training camps. Many of those considered to be worthless for line duty have been recommended for the staff. Few if any persons realize that the best way to get the maximum number of troops into the field in the minimum time is through the immediate organization of an efficient L. of C.

Lack of plans: There are no plans for the establishment and activities of the Advance Section, L. of C., and no decision has yet been reached as to whether we are to model after the French or the British system or as to how far we are going to maintain our own.

Lack of facilities: The Advance Section after having been established one month has been able to obtain no facilities worthy of mention and none of the Sections of the L. of C. has proper facilities. The officers, men, and employees are working from twelve to sixteen hours a day, with no opportunity for rest or recreation. So far as I know, there is no one free enough from the burden of this daily routine to plan for the future. Everything is right up to the elastic limit all the time, and, so far as my headquarters are concerned, every effort to move forward, even in matters of the most trivial detail, has been met, both by the French and American officers, with the statement that it was impossible.

British and French experience: Our difficulties are somewhat relieved by the fact that we have the benefit of the three years' experience by the British and French, but this experience will be of little value unless we are able to study their methods in sufficient detail to put them into operation or modify them for our own use.

I was recently told by a G.S. officer at Chaumont that there was only one American officer who knew what a Regulating Station was. Before we can accomplish any reasonable success in the matter of supply, not only must every American officer have a good general knowledge of the operation of a regulating station, but those connected with supply must be thoroughly familiar with the details of the system which we propose to adopt.

THE REMEDY

The general attitude towards this situation is — 'Don't worry, young man, some one is looking out for this.' But judging by what I see around me, my own twenty-five years' experience in the Army and the whole history of America in war, I am just as firmly convinced that the majority of these things have not been looked out for as I am that Santa Claus does not come down the chimney.

Decision as to methods: The first thing necessary is a decision on broad lines as to whether we are going to adopt the French method or the British method or retain our own method, and then proceed to work out the details of the modifications which we propose to put into effect. These matters cannot be centralized in the hands of a few men, because there is not time. If we take up one thing after another *seriatim*, we will never arrive at a conclusion. The general decision having been made, the entire field should be laid out and the maximum number of men that can be employed to advantage set to work.

Delimitation of responsibilities: An immediate decision should be reached as to the delimitation of the respective responsibilities of all the agencies concerned. At the present time there is not only a conflict between the bureau chiefs at Chaumont and those of the L. of C., but there is a corresponding conflict between the subordinates of those departments and, from the conflicting instructions received in this Section in inconsequential matters, the only procedure seems to be to move away from the greatest pressure and follow the line of least resistance.

Dissemination of knowledge: If we are going to change our methods of administration and supply from those to which we have been accustomed during our entire previous military experience, and if the officers are to follow methods slightly or wholly differing from those prescribed in the Regulations and Service manuals, it is necessary to establish at once some quick and accurate method for disseminating knowledge as to the proposed procedure. Teamwork is absolutely necessary. The secrecy now being enforced with reference to the

location of troops, the handicaps placed upon the mail service and other methods intended to embarrass the enemy have greatly interfered with our own progress of preparation and have already caused ourselves more embarrassment than could possibly be caused to the enemy by such methods during the remainder of the war.

Decentralization: Decentralization and a proper sense of proportion are absolutely necessary. Matters of tremendous importance should not be confused with or displaced by inconsequential matters of daily routine. Those in high position should confine their attention to matters of broad policy and no matter how much they may differ in detail with those charged with the execution of such detail, the latter should be left to the subordinates and the subordinates should be given credit not only for their desire to do what is best but their ability to accomplish results after their own methods.

Adequate facilities: I understand that forty per cent of the entire British forces is non-combatant. Based upon these figures we should have eventually from five to eight hundred thousand troops in the L. of C. Enough of these troops should be on hand in advance of the fighting forces to prepare adequate facilities in order that the fighting forces may be placed in the field in the minimum time in the maximum state of efficiency. The program indicated in Cablegram 138-R of August 28, 1917, does not bring the L. of C. troops over fast enough and in my judgment they should be brought over at the rate of from five to ten thousand a week until the total number is provided. Every subordinate officer should be called upon for an estimate of the maximum number of officers, enlisted men and other personnel and the maximum quantity of transportation and other facilities that can be used to advantage. Immediate steps should be taken to have this personnel and material brought over from the U.S. as rapidly as it can be utilized. In the meantime one complete division should be turned over to the L. of C. and the officers and enlisted men placed on whatever duty may be required pending the provision of regular L. of C. troops and employees.

Subordination of routine: Each agency of the L. of C.

should have a sufficient personnel to subordinate routine to the more important function of planning for the future. The proposition of studying our proposed method of supply should be taken up on some definite and regular basis and some direct connection made between those who are studying these details and those who are charged with putting them into execution. It is a waste of time for officers to go to a staff school and study general subjects in some indefinite way if the methods which they study there are not going to be adopted. Each particular branch of the L. of C. should have attached to it a certain number of officers whose sole duty is to investigate, study and devise the details of the proposed plan as applied to their particular department. These officers, of course, will be absorbed in the regular machinery from time to time as the number of troops in France increases.

Selection of personnel: In organizing a great machine of this kind it is necessary to disregard previous rank and select men particularly qualified for each particular duty. The L. of C. corresponds very nearly to a portentous industrial plant. There is no institution on earth other than the Army that would start out with length of service as a basis for selecting men to head the various agencies, great and small, of such an undertaking. The only excuse for such a system other than a survival of the ancient law of primogeniture is the assumption that the officer longest in the service has had the greatest previous experience, but, as in this case, if the previous experience has been all wrong the more the man has had, as a general rule, the less he is qualified to undertake the new problem.

In my particular case there are very few quartermasters in France who have sufficient rank and general qualifications for the position of Chief Quartermaster of the Advance Section, L. of C. Therefore, the job has languished and a month has been lost in getting the office organized. There are many young officers who have the intrinsic qualifications and from whom I would be quite willing to make a selection, provided the one selected were given appropriate rank to execute his office. I would be unwilling, however, to have such a man

attempt to do the work in his present grade and then be subsequently replaced or superseded by some one senior to him.

The American Army will come to this in time, and the sooner it starts to change the better. For those men below the grade of brigadier general there is no trouble in returning them to their old grades if they do not make good.

THE ADVANCE SECTION

For my own part I ask for three things:

- 1st, that the zone of responsibility be definitely marked out;
- 2d, that I be given a suitable headquarters and personnel;
- 3d, that I be given full power to act and that those higher up not attempt to regulate the small details of my affairs.

Zone of responsibility: There is no distinct line of demarcation between the Advance Section, L. of C., and the other agencies working in this territory. There is uncertainty in activities between my responsibility and that of the Divisional Areas. There is uncertainty as to the responsibility in certain activities controlled directly from Hq. L. of C., in Paris; in other activities controlled by the Asst. to the C.Q.M., A.E.F., in Paris; in others controlled directly by the bureau chiefs in Chaumont; and in still others controlled by division commanders. Moreover, there is a general uncertainty as to the eventual function of the Advance Section, L. of C., in connection with the proposed system of supply.

The letter from the C.-in-C. to the C.G., L. of C., establishing these headquarters stated that orders had been issued directing that I be placed on duty as C.O., Adv. Sec., L. of C. No such order has been issued, however, and I was simply directed to come to this town for the purpose of establishing the headquarters. And even that order was not so generally distributed as to secure for me the necessary recognition of my office. The C.O.'s of some of the troops supposed to be under my command claim that they belong to the Interme-

diate Section. Two of the colonels commanding troops in this Section are senior to me in rank and naturally object to taking orders from me (though they have not so indicated) without some indication as to my authority in the matter. Temporarily I have paid no attention to this but it is a situation that cannot well be continued.

Headquarters and personnel: I would not appeal to higher authority for a headquarters if it were possible for me to secure a building myself, but it requires action of the French Mission operating through Chaumont. So far, every effort that I have made in this direction has been met with the statement either that my demands were impossible to fulfill or that the matter would be taken up with higher authority. No progress whatever has been made in this matter. The situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that two major generals have their headquarters in this small town and no one is very much inclined to give an ear to an inconsequential colonel. I do not think that either of the two major generals is very enthusiastic about my being here and a number of suggestions have been made looking towards my going elsewhere.

Personnel: Every application which I have made to Paris for personnel has been met with the statement that none was available and that I should get the necessary headquarters officers and enlisted men from troops under my own command, particularly the 3d Cavalry. The impracticability of this is indicated by the fact that I myself am asking that the personnel of the 3d Cavalry be doubled on account of its assignment to remount duty. I then attempted to get certain individually named enlisted men from my own regiment under a previous understanding with my brigade commander, but this was disapproved in Paris as a matter of bad policy.

I finally secured an order on two different division commanders in this neighborhood for a certain number of officers and men and after three weeks of effort some of them have been supplied, under protest.

It is with the Q.M. Dept. that I have had the greatest difficulty in getting anything, and at the present time my first and greatest need is for a C.Q.M. He should have the rank of

colonel or lieutenant colonel. He should be the very highest type of officer that the Q.M.D. can turn out and qualified to solve the most difficult supply problem ever presented to an American Army officer. He should have been on the job four months ago studying the French and British systems, but as we did not start then we can start now.

If the Q.M.D. is not prepared to furnish such a man, I can pick out a captain of the line for this duty, provided he be given the rank indicated.

In addition, I need two other quartermasters of previous experience (promoted Q.M. Sgts. will do) and fifteen inexperienced assistants, whom I can get from the divisions.

I also need two experienced record clerks, three other clerks experienced in Q.M. papers and fifteen inexperienced clerks that I can get from the divisions.

These are to meet immediate needs. They should probably be increased two hundred per cent within thirty days and from fifty to one hundred per cent every month after that during the coming year.

Full powers: I have been receiving detailed instructions from both Chaumont and Paris as to matters the details of which should have been left to me. Moreover, in one case where a company of infantry was turned over to me for certain work the C.O. was compelled by his division commander to embark upon the undertaking in a manner directly contrary to my orders and without any arrangements as to his accommodations, tools or transportation having been provided for. It is a common experience for my subordinates to receive instruction from every possible source as to disposition of freight, etc., when such matters are supposed to be controlled entirely from these headquarters. In one case I received a letter from an assistant to the C.Q.M., A.E.F., in Paris, directing me to proceed immediately in person to a certain forest for the purpose of cutting wood. I was instructed to see that it was properly piled and to submit a report once a week upon the progress of the work. And in many cases I have been instructed to do things which from the local standpoint were wholly impracticable and which were in no wise essential to the accomplishment of the job in view.

CONCLUSION

It is quite practicable for me to continue my office here on the emergency basis, following the routine from day to day and solving each problem, as presented, to the best of my ability and with the facilities afforded. Such a neutral attitude, however, would not accomplish the purpose for which I was sent here. I believe it to be my duty to adopt the most aggressive tactics and to go ahead under a full head of steam with a determination to accomplish tenfold more in the next two years than I have accomplished in all my previous life. There is not a moment to lose. I can do no more with my own hands and head than any other average man. I can accomplish my end only by building up an organization, a smooth-running, high grade machine of tremendous efficiency, but if the material for such an organization is not placed at my disposal, there is no use to attempt it.

I request that this matter be laid before the C.-in-C. in person. I consider the issues involved as absolutely vital to a successful termination of the war.

JOHNSON HAGOOD
Colonel, C.A.C.

No direct action flowed from this letter. In fact, my journal is silent as to whether General Harbord ever mentioned having received it. But a short time after this, G.H.Q. directed a conference at my headquarters in Neufchâteau for the purpose of trying to bring some order out of the chaotic conditions surrounding the whole question of supply. At this conference were Colonel William D. Connor, of the Coördinating Section, G.H.Q.; Colonel Robert E. Wood, who was associated with the Transportation Department (he was afterwards Acting Quartermaster General in Washington); Colonel George H. Shelton, Chief of Staff, 26th Division; Colonel John L. DeWitt, Quartermaster of the 42d Division; and myself. I had already had some correspondence and several conferences with Connor upon this subject

and Connor had made a rough draft of the proposed order which was made the basis of our final action.

This conference drew up a plan which was published in General Orders 73, A.E.F., December 12, 1917, and is shown below:

(FOR OFFICIAL
CIRCULATION ONLY)

(G.O. 73)

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

FRANCE, December 12, 1917

General Orders
No. 73

1. The supply of American troops in France is divided into three phases: The first is the procurement of such supplies; the second is their care and storage; the third is their transportation. The responsibility for the first lies with the chiefs of various supply departments, A.E.F.; for the second with the C.G., L. of C., for the third with the D.G.T. The general supervision of all is exercised by the General Staff, as a rule through the Coördination Section.

2. *Chiefs of Supply Departments:* The Chiefs of Supply Departments, A.E.F., are responsible for the procurement of all supplies, material, equipment, plants, establishments, etc., that may be necessary for the American troops in France. This is accomplished by purchase or requisition in Europe or in the United States. (For full statement of their functions see par. 3, G.O. 43, H.A.E.F.)

3. *Commanding General, L. of C.:* The Commanding General, L. of C., through his several agencies, is responsible for the care and storage of supplies, material and equipment, for the construction, maintenance and repair of all agencies necessary to accomplish this purpose; for the manufacture, salvage, repair and cleaning of equipment. He is responsible that the supplies are distributed among the several depots in accordance with the approved projects.

The Commanding Officer of each Base and Intermediate Section, L. of C., in addition to the other administrative,



MARSHAL FOCH
Generalissimo of the Allied Armies

police, and sanitary functions assigned to him by the C.G., L. of C., is responsible for the administration of his depots and for maintaining the proper stock of supplies, materials, and equipment therein, in accordance with the approved project. When the shipment of supplies is authorized, it is his duty to have them loaded into cars and to have the cars properly marked and turned over to the representative of the Transportation Department.

The Commanding Officer, Advance Section, L. of C., is responsible for the administration, police and sanitation of the territory in the Advance Section, including supply depots, hospitals, remount depots, camps, prisons, etc. He establishes camps, hotels, etc., in the neighborhood of regulating stations for the accommodation of troops remaining over night, and is responsible for the discipline, administration and sanitation of the railway personnel and construction troops of the T.D. in his zone, except as regards their technical employment or their location.

4. The function of the L. of C. is to relieve the combatant field forces from every consideration except that of defeating the enemy. All agencies established for that purpose belong to the L. of C. unless otherwise specially assigned.

5. *Director General of Transportation:* The D.G.T. has charge of the unloading of freight and troops from ships at points of debarkation and of the transportation of all troops and supplies by rail, in accordance with instructions received from proper authority. He is responsible for the construction, maintenance and operation of such railroad lines and rolling stock as come within American control. He will have a representative at each regulating station, at each group of supply depots, at each rail head, and at each important railroad station, to facilitate military traffic. He is responsible through his proper representatives, that all freight turned over to the T.D. for transportation is promptly delivered to its destination.

6. The railroad personnel in the Advance Section, L. of C., are subject to the orders of the Regulating Officer, insofar as concerns their receiving, caring for and transporting troops

and supplies and as regards priority of shipments. This control is exercised through the proper railway officers. They are subject to the orders of the C.O., Advance Section, L. of C., in all matters of discipline, sanitation and administration not involving questions of railway management. They are subject to the orders of the D.G.T. in all matters pertaining to their technical work in the construction, operation and maintenance of railways, and as regards their location or employment.

7. The agencies through which the troops in the Zone of the Armies are supplied from the storage depots are the regulating stations and refilling points.

8. *A Regulating Station* is a large railway yard where cars from the supply depots and from the rear are received and made up into trains for the divisions. Usually a separate train is provided for each division. Here also are received all express and mail for organizations at the front. This is sorted in regulating station and distributed in separate cars for each division and turned over to the T.D. for dispatch to destination.

10. *The Regulating Officer* is a member of the Coördination Section of the General Staff. He, as a rule, belongs to the headquarters of an Army or a group of Armies, but not to lesser units. It is his duty to give all orders for the movement of troops and supplies in advance of the Advance Depots . . .

12. All the personnel engaged in the transportation and handling of men, material or supplies in the Advance Section, L. of C., are subject to the orders of the regulating officer in all matters pertaining to these duties. (See also par. 6, above.)

13. *Rail Heads and Refilling Points*: The rail head, as the name implies, is the point on the railway at which the troops or supplies are discharged. The Refilling Point is the place at which the division trains receive the supplies. . . .

14. *Evacuation Stations*: For the reverse movement of personnel or supplies there are evacuation stations and sort-

ing stations. An evacuation station is a place for the collection of men and material that have become unfitted for use in the front and for which movement to the rear is contemplated. . . .

15. *Sorting Stations* are railway stations to which evacuated men and material are sent from the evacuation stations and where they are sorted into their special classes and thence shipped to their final destination in the rear. Sick and wounded are sent to the various hospitals; worn out and broken material to shops along the L. of C.

16. *Classification and Distribution of Supplies:* All supplies desired by troops are, for the purpose of this order, divided into four classes, viz: First, food, forage and any other articles of automatic supply; second, shoes, clothing and other similar equipment without which the individual cannot perform his functions as a soldier; third, articles of authorized equipment, either for individuals or organizations, such as trucks, paulins, axes, shovels, etc., the absence of which, in small quantities, will not prevent the individual or organization from performing its functions; fourth, all articles the distribution of which must depend upon the character of future operations, and all items of an exceptional nature not part of the equipment of troops, but necessary for their protection from the weather or the enemy.

17. *Class 1 supplies* will be obtained and distributed as follows:

(a) Regimental supply officers or supply officers of other independent organizations will submit ration returns to the Division Quartermaster, or Quartermaster of the organization to which they are attached. He in turn will consolidate the returns. The Division return will be submitted to the local supply officer at the refilling point for filling.

(b) If for any reason any of the component parts of the rations demanded by the division cannot be supplied at the refilling point, the supply officer in charge there will furnish the division supply officer with an order on any field base, or dump, which will be honored upon presentation.

(c) The daily automatic supply is based on the actual

strength of the division in men and animals. Reports are made on the 10th, 20th and the last day of each month by headquarters of the division to the headquarters of the corps. Here they are consolidated and Corps troops are added and the same information is sent to the headquarters of the Army (C.S.G.S.) Army headquarters then notifies the regulating officer by wire of the number of men and animals belonging to each division. The regulating officer informs the various supply depots of the numbers for which the automatic supply is required, indicating the division or detached or non-divisional organization for which the supplies are required, by the proper symbol number.

20. Class 2 supplies (shoes, clothing, etc.):

(a) Requisitions are submitted by the company commanders and upon consolidation and approval by the regimental commander are checked by the proper division staff officer and sent directly to the proper advance depot.

22. Class 3 supplies (wagons, trucks, axes, shovels, sanitary and hospital supplies, equipment, etc.): These supplies are requisitioned by the organizations in the manner prescribed for Class 2. These requisitions are received by the supply officers to the division and are filled from any disposable supplies in the division. The remainder of the requisition is forwarded to Corps Headquarters where a similar procedure is followed. The Corps supply officer, in consultation with the A.S.G.S. fills the needs from disposable supplies within the corps parks, trains, or dumps, and the remainder of the requisition is forwarded to Army Headquarters where a similar procedure is followed.

23. The remainder of the requisition, which cannot be furnished from the resources at the disposition of the Army are forwarded to the advance depots, L. of. C., where the procedure is the same as prescribed for articles of Class 2.

24. Class 4 (ammunition, timber, etc.): Requisition for articles of this class are handled in the same way as described for those of Class 3, except that after the articles

which are disposable within the Army have been furnished, the remainder of the requisition is forwarded direct from the Army headquarters to the proper supply officer at G.H.Q., where it is considered in connection with contemplated operations, and of the relative need of other units. Final action is taken in consultation with the C.S.G.S.

25. In order to expedite the supply of these articles to the troops, certain amounts in the depots, called credits, may be placed at the disposition of Army headquarters. Upon these credits Army headquarters may draw without reference to G.H.Q., sending their requisition direct to the proper depot officer.

By command of General PERSHING:

JAMES G. HARBORD

Brigadier General

Chief of Staff

Official:

ROBERT C. DAVIS

Adjutant General

This order was far from a complete solution of the problem, but it marked a big advance. The good point about the order was that for the first time our forces got some idea of the functions of a regulating station and of a rail head. They got an idea of the duties of a regulating officer and of the general scheme under which their supplies were delivered to them. But most important of all, they were introduced for the first time to the system of automatic supply, by which supplies were put into different classes and furnished the troops without the bondage and slavery of red tape under which the Army had struggled during all the dreary years of peace. For the first time the American Army found a method by which food for the entire division could be delivered by merely telephoning a supply depot the total number of individuals present for duty in the division.

The bad points about the order were that it failed to establish a difference of responsibility between the bureau chiefs of the A.E.F. and the bureau chiefs of the L.O.C.; that it continued in operation the system under which the Director General of Transportation was entirely free from the L.O.C., not only with his ships and railroad operations, but with all his construction of storage, etc. In the light of subsequent history it is impossible to understand how any one could have control of the unloading and shipping of troops and supplies through our base ports without any responsibility to the base port commanders. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of General Orders 73 can mean nothing to any one who attempts to visualize their operations, yet this idea that the Transportation Department should be entirely independent of all military commanders, short of General Pershing himself, continued, more and more in modified form, until after the Armistice, when finally the American Transportation Service was turned over to a Regular Army officer. The reason that we got into these difficulties was because we tried to imitate the British, but this matter will be more fully discussed later on.

A number of general officers who were touring France visited my headquarters at Neufchâteau during this period, among them my old friend Major General F. J. Kernan. I pointed out to him the difficulty in the organization of the L.O.C. and the impossibility of getting any results until the whole thing was put on a proper basis.

A short time after this General Kernan was selected by General Pershing to command the L.O.C. — called back after he had sailed from Brest — and he had me detailed as his Chief of Staff.

CHAPTER VI

CHIEF OF STAFF, L.O.C.

Scope of the new job — Basis of the organization — Creation of a General Staff — Zones of responsibility among the Staff Departments — Effort to get suitable office accommodations — Confusion as to shipment of oats — Reorganization of Postal Service — Distribution of work between the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A.

I ARRIVED in Paris on December 2, 1917, and reported as Chief of Staff. Having been relieved from command of the Advance Section, L.O.C., I now found myself Chief of Staff of the whole L.O.C. organization. The difficulties outlined in the preceding chapter were local in character, but the difficulties and responsibilities presented by my new job extended over the entire area occupied by Pershing's army. It included the Zone of the Armies at the front, the training and billeting areas throughout the interior, the District of Paris, all of the French ports used as American bases, all American Army activities in England, and, subsequently, all of those in Italy.

General Kernan set me to work to get a General Staff started and to build up an organization to meet the needs of the future, while he himself took charge of the immediate situation and tried to get some satisfactory solution to the many big problems bearing down upon us.

It might as well be stated here that this arrangement continued to the date of the Armistice. Both under General Kernan and later under General Harbord, I gave little of my time to the actual operation of the L.O.C. or S.O.S.¹ My whole effort was given to building up the machine, keeping it in running order, and making preparations for its future

¹ The L.O.C. afterwards became the S.O.S. See chapter xi.

development to meet the ever-increasing demands upon it. During this period it grew from almost nothing to a force of more than half a million men.

I concluded at the very outset that our supply system, to be a success, must conform in general to what we had been accustomed to back in the States, with the minimum of change necessary to meet new conditions. I was convinced that if we tried to wipe the slate and begin all over again we should never get anywhere. We could not explain a new system to every man that arrived in France. The schemes being worked out by our Allies might be better, but we did not have the time to learn them. In fact, there was no American officer who knew enough about any one of them to explain intelligently the details to any one else. On the other hand, the average American officer had enough ingenuity to adapt his old preconceived ideas to new local conditions. One thing, however, was absolutely necessary. That was to lay out the respective zones of responsibility and let each man know the extent to which he could count upon coöperation and assistance from the others. In other words, it was necessary to organize the team and to let each man know the part he was expected to play.

The first thing was to determine the difference of responsibility between G.H.Q. and L.O.C. Manifestly if there were several Lines of Communications, G.H.Q. would coördinate their work, but there was only one.

The same thing applied to each of the bureau chiefs. General Pershing naturally looked to his Chief Quartermaster for all quartermaster activities in France. How much of this was going to be delegated to the Chief Quartermaster, L.O.C., to what extent was the Chief Quartermaster, L.O.C., responsible to the Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F., and to what extent to the Commanding General, L.O.C.?

This question having been decided for the Quartermaster Corps, to what extent would the decision apply to the Engineer Corps, the Medical Department, etc., because, manifestly, the Commanding General, L.O.C., could not hold in mind a different procedure for each of the different members of his staff. They all had to be governed by a common rule.

So also with the Base Commanders. To what extent was the unloading of ships to be controlled from Chaumont, from Paris, or from Saint-Nazaire, and to what extent was the authority that the Commanding General, L.O.C., had over the whole L.O.C. to be delegated to the Base Commander with reference to his particular Base.

At the time that I became Chief of Staff, L.O.C., none of these questions had been settled. Each staff department had worked it out along its own lines, and the zones of responsibility overlapped like mining claims.

The principal disturbing factor was the Transportation Department. We had been led to imitate the British because their conditions corresponded more nearly to our own. The British D.G.T. was a very prominent railroad man taken from civil life and operated directly under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig. Our D.G.T. was Brigadier General W. W. Atterbury, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and one of the best known and most capable railroad men in our country. He was organizing his service under the direct orders of General Pershing, and at this time the Commanding General, L.O.C., had nothing whatever to do with him or with any of his subordinates. The D.G.T. not only controlled transportation by rail, but also controlled the unloading of the ships. This produced at the ports an anomalous situation of which more will be heard later.

Each of the other bureaus also had ideas of its own as to

organization. It is quite natural, for instance, that the grouping of hospitals should not conform to the grouping of forestry regiments or supply depots.

I did not see how it was possible for any one to understand, much less coördinate, all of these activities if each had an organization of its own. We had divided the area of France into five Base Sections, an Intermediate, and an Advance Section.¹ I believed that we should conform to our geographical departments at home; to-wit: that on the staff of each Section commander there should be a representative of each supply service who should have general supervision over all the activities of that service within his Section. This was the rule at home, but there were exceptions. There were always ordnance depots, schools, base hospitals, major construction projects, etc., that were exempted from the control of Department commanders at home. I believed that we should do the same thing in France; that we should place upon each Base and Section commander the complete responsibility for all activities within his area and that where exceptions were made they should be definite and specific.

This was no easy undertaking. It was very difficult to get either G.H.Q. or the bureau chiefs to agree to it, but as time went on it was accepted more and more and finally after the Armistice the Base ports had a wonderfully efficient organization.

Upon my arrival in Paris, December 2d, I found that Major J. P. McAdams, Infantry, was Chief of Staff. He had no assistants and he alone had been carrying the burden of the whole organization. He had been doing exceptionally fine work and I told him that I wished he had been given proper rank and proper personnel to continue as Chief of Staff instead of being supplanted by me. As this could

¹ See map, p. 47.



To my friend Genl Johnson Hagood, to
whom, with Genl Harbord is due the credit
of developing the organization of the
Trans portation Corps which made its
subsequent achievements possible

Jan 3 1918 W. Atterbury
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.
D.G. 7th A. E. F.

not be, I left McAdams to continue in charge of all routine work and I went off into another room to build up an organization to handle the great flood that was soon to burst upon us.

G.H.Q. had directed us to organize a General Staff along the same lines as that at G.H.Q.; to-wit: five sections, known as Administrative, Intelligence, Operations, Coördinating, and Training.

As a starter I got hold of Captain Aiken Simons, an emergency officer of Charleston, South Carolina, who had been with me at Neufchâteau. Simons did splendid work and eventually became Secretary of the S.O.S., General Staff. I also got Major J. H. Poole, a former engineer officer who had resigned from the Army and come back with a reserve commission. Poole was one of the very best officers in the S.O.S. He served for a time as Secretary of the General Staff and afterwards as head of one of the G-4 divisions. Colonel John R. Procter, C.A.C., helped us with our initial organization. He afterwards commanded an auxiliary advance section near Soissons and finally went to England as Chief of Staff of Base Section No. 3. Lieutenants N. W. French, Stanley L. Wolfe, and Elliott H. Gage, all of the Engineer Corps, were assigned to assist McAdams in the handling of troop movements.

The bureau chiefs at this time were Colonel Frank A. Wilcox, Adjutant General; Brigadier General Mason M. Patrick, Chief Engineer; Colonel Robert Alexander, Inspector General; Colonel F. A. Winter, Chief Surgeon; Colonel David S. Stanley, Chief Quartermaster; and Colonel Charles S. Wallace, Chief Signal Officer. Brigadier General William H. Allaire was Provost Marshal General on Pershing's staff, but his headquarters were in Paris. Colonel E. M. Lewis was Commanding Officer of troops in Paris.

Headquarters L.O.C. were in a small hotel called Hôtel Méditerranée, on the outskirts of Paris. This building was not at all suited for our purpose. The rooms were small, the halls narrow and winding; there was only one little four-passenger elevator, which was generally out of order; and the offices of Colonel Charles G. Dawes, the Purchasing Agent, were also crowded into the same building.

The tendency at this time was to resist expansion, to organize with the minimum of space and personnel that could function from day to day. I took the stand that, although we had only one hundred thousand troops in France, we should be getting ready for two million; that everything should be organized on the basis of the maximum that could be used to advantage.

It has already been pointed out that the Transportation Department, under the direction of General W. W. Atterbury, had a peculiar status, different from anything we ever had in the Army before. The Director General of Transportation was responsible solely to the Commander-in-Chief, and subordinates of the Transportation Department were responsible solely to the D.G.T. This peculiar arrangement soon began to give trouble. In the latter part of December, 1917, we ran short of oats. We had oats at the ports and in some of the depots, but the supply was exhausted at the front and some of the horses went several days without food. We got some hot telegrams asking why oats had not been delivered in the front areas. General Kernan wired back that the oats had been turned over to the Transportation Department, as required by General Orders 73, A.E.F., and that if they had not been delivered it was a matter over which he had no control. This gave rise to the following exchange of correspondence:

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCESC.S.G.S., FRANCE, *January 5, 1918**From:* C.-in-C.*To:* C.G., L.O.C.*Subject:* Responsibility for distribution of supplies.

1. Referring to your telegram 202, the instructions contained in G.O. 73 are correct as you state them, but the inferences that you draw therefrom cannot be admitted. The C.Q.M., L.O.C., is responsible for the proper distribution of Q.M. supplies among his various depots. His responsibility cannot be considered as ending when he has loaded such supplies on the trains and turned them over to the T.D. He is not charged with the transportation, but when a period of two weeks, from December 20 to January 4, elapses and supplies have not yet arrived at the Regulating Station, it is certainly his responsibility to inquire into the matter, through the proper channels, and find out why his supplies have not been delivered.

2. Notification was received from the L.O.C. that oats were shipped on December 20, and double shipments had been made thereafter. These had not yet passed Is-sur-Tille on January 4, and the C.Q.M., L.O.C., should have taken the matter up seriously with the T.D. in order to ascertain why the shipments did not arrive and urge that department to accelerate their movement in every possible way.

By order of the C.-in-C.:

W. D. CONNOR

Colonel, G.S., N.A.

Chief of Section

1st Ind.

HQ. L.O.C., A.E.F.

FRANCE, *Jan. 9, 1918*

To the C.-in-C., A.E.F.

1. Returned, noted. This case was one, not of supplies failing to reach Advance Depots in season, but was a failure to reach divisional troops to whom the oats were consigned.

It is plain, of course, to the L.O.C. that consignments failing to reach Advance Depots from those in rear must be followed up by us.

'He (the D.G.T.) is responsible, through his proper representatives, that all freight turned over to the T.D. for transportation is promptly delivered to its destination.'

In view of the fact that the T.D. is entirely independent of L.O.C., being directly and exclusively under the H.A.E.F., some delicacy is felt as to when and how far officers belonging to the L.O.C. should push inquiries or make urgent representations about freight movements to the T.D., as these inquiries or representations might be interpreted by the latter as unauthorized meddling with their particular duty. It was thought that the T.D. might reason that such action was to be expected from its superior headquarters, but not from one to which it was technically not subordinate.

3. In view of what is said in this letter, however, action will hereafter be had as indicated therein, and to that end copies of it will be furnished the chiefs of staff departments at these headquarters and to Section commanders.

F. J. KERNAN
Major General, N.A., Comdg.

The provisions of General Orders 73 to which General Kernan referred in his telegram were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

FRANCE, December 12, 1917

General Orders

No. 73

3. *Commanding General, L.O.C. . . .* When a shipment of supplies is authorized it is his duty to have them loaded into cars and to have the cars properly marked and turned over to the representative of the Transportation Department.

5. *Director General Transportation. . . .* He is responsible,

through his proper representatives, that all freight turned over to the Transportation Department for transportation is promptly delivered to its destination.

The reason that General Kernan spoke of 'unauthorized meddling' was that that term had been several times applied to us when we had attempted to give instructions to Transportation personnel. Based upon above instructions from G.H.Q., however, the Chief Quartermaster, L.O.C., sent a telegram to the Base Quartermaster at Saint-Nazaire informing him in effect that hereafter if oats and other supplies shipped by him from Saint-Nazaire were not promptly delivered to their destination he would be held responsible. This naturally resulted in the following protest from General Robert D. Walsh:

2d Ind.

L.C. OFFICE COMMANDING GENERAL
BASE SEC. NO. 1, Jan. 14, 1918

To Commanding General L. of C.

1. Forwarded inviting attention to 1st endorsement by the Quartermaster of the Base. At all times there has been perfect harmony between the offices of this Base and the Transportation Department. I have often conferred with the local representative of the Transportation Department. In the present instance, finding that they were short of grain, I ordered 350,000 pounds of oats from Remount station, to be followed by 100,000 pounds more. This loading was done by the Base Quartermaster.

2. Telegram from Colonel Carson reads: 'Responsibility is now placed upon your office to see that these instructions are carried out to the fullest extent.' This involves what appears to be a radical change of policy. If it is the intention that the Quartermaster Department shall control movement in the transportation Department, I request information as to how far should such authority extend. Placing on

Colonel Stanley the responsibility for this service should also transfer to him the right to fully control the movement.

R. D. WALSH
Brigadier General, N.A.

The whole situation was absurd, of course. In the present instance, the oats might have been stalled on a siding anywhere in France and the Transportation Department perfectly helpless to get them out. If they were stalled in a French railway yard, for example, they could not be pushed forward without assistance of the French, and if they were stalled in some American railway yard, they could not be released without the coöperation of the local military commander. The latter was charged with the responsibility of loading and unloading the cars, but if the oats were standing on a siding between other cars waiting to be unloaded, the Transportation Department was helpless to get them out until the military commander opened the way.

If the whole responsibility had been placed upon the L.O.C., then the whole authority and force of the L.O.C. could always be brought to bear at the critical moment to see that most urgent needs received the most immediate attention. The plan decided upon by the Quartermaster Corps to get the oats to the front was to detail a certain number of soldiers known as convoys. These soldiers went with the box cars and whenever the cars got stuck they wired back to their own people to let them know what the situation was so that first aid could be applied.

The Postal Service:

One of the absurdities with which we possessed ourselves at the outbreak of the war was that the United States Postal Service should go to France to handle the mail. This was part of the general idea that pervaded the public mind, and

even some Army officials, that the Army could not run its own affairs and that civilian personnel and methods should be adopted to win the war. Of course, all soldiers are originally and eventually civilians, but there is a great difference between a civilian operating as such and the same man being inducted into the Army and operating as part of the military machine. Even in time of peace, at every little Army post, either a soldier or a soldier's wife or daughter — which is the same thing — is the postmaster. Soldier orderlies collect and deliver the mail. All the Post Office Department had to do to meet the war conditions was to provide a ready and expeditious method by which soldiers with previous postal experience could be authorized to sell stamps and money orders and the trick was done.

Another absurdity was that the Post Office Department not only allowed but encouraged the people at home to fill the mails with useless junk that could not possibly do any good and, in fact, did do a great deal of harm, by consuming time, space, and labor that might have been devoted to winning the war. I saw a box delivered to a soldier containing what had once been six bananas. An officer told me that his wife mailed to him a loaf of bread every day, some of which reached him six months later. Another officer received at one time five dozen packages, each of which contained a glass jar of pickles, jelly, or preserves. And worst of all, there was printed on magazines and periodicals a statement that if a two-cent stamp were placed thereon and dropped into the nearest post box, the magazine would be delivered to a soldier in France. What actually happened to them was that they were brought out of the holds of ships in wheelbarrows, carted off in trucks, and destroyed. Occasionally a few truck-loads of second-class mail addressed to individuals were treated in the same way.

No one would think of mailing a second-hand newspaper to an entombed miner, but millions of them were mailed to soldiers in fox holes and dugouts on the French front.

On the day after Christmas, 1917, I sent for Mr. Clark, the United States postal representative in France, and he disclosed to me the difficulties under which he labored.

In the States, of course, from the time a letter is dropped in the post box to the time of its delivery to the addressee, it remains continuously in the possession of the Post Office Department. Moreover, the method of addressing letters, with towns, States, street numbers, etc., is well understood by the public and by postal employees, and in case of faulty address resort can be had to city directories, etc.

Let's see how a letter got to a soldier in France. We'll say it was addressed by his mother — who does not know much about the military — to Private Casey Jones, Company 'L,' 5th Division. Now, there are seven companies 'L' or batteries 'L' in the 5th Division; and then perhaps it was 5th Regiment or 5th Brigade or any of the other hundred or so '5th's' in France. And then, too, the man may have been wounded, sick, or for other cause transferred out of Company 'L.'

Notwithstanding, however, the letter starts out bravely to find Jones. It goes to Chicago and there along with a few thousand others is received by a young lady in the first joy of a temporary job with the Post Office Department. She, like the mother of the soldier, has rather a hazy idea of the military, but takes a chance by putting the letter into one of the many mail sacks marked '5th.' This sack is sealed and starts on its journey as follows:

1st. Post Office Department delivers it to pier in New York.

2d. Quartermaster Corps put it on board ship.

3d. Army or Navy transport service or American or British merchant ship takes it to Saint-Nazaire, France.

4th. Army Transportation Department unloads it.

5th. Motor Transport Corps delivers it to Post Office Department to be sorted and marked with destination.

6th. Post Office Department gives it back to Motor Transport Corps.

7th. Motor Transport Corps gives it to French railway to be shipped as ordinary freight.

8th. French railway gives it back to Motor Transport Corps.

9th. Motor Transport Corps gives to Post Office Department.

10th. Post Office Department opens sack and makes up contents into small packages for different organizations and gives it back to Motor Transport Corps for delivery at distances from a few yards to ten or fifteen miles.

11th. Motor Transport Corps delivers it to headquarters 5th Division.

12th. Headquarters opens it and makes it into smaller packages for companies.

13th. Company mail orderlies deliver to individuals.

The first Company 'L' to which the letter is delivered has no Casey Jones, but the letter is held with the expectation that perhaps Casey Jones is coming. At the end of a week — or maybe three months — it is decided that there is no Casey Jones in the 5th Division and the letter is sent back to the Central Records Office to find out where Casey Jones really is; and so on.

I saw at once that this would not do; that we should at least have to have a single responsibility after the letter got to France. I got hold of Colonel Charles Hine, a West Point graduate, railroad man, and efficiency expert of the first

water; also of a National Guard officer who had had twenty-seven years' postal experience; and with the approval of G.H.Q. we organized the Military Postal Service. It was bad enough even after that, but the first arrangement could not have worked at all.

Y.M.C.A. work:

At about this time we had presented to us the question of dividing responsibility for welfare work between the Y.M.C.A. and the Red Cross. The K. of C., Jewish Welfare Board, Salvation Army, etc., had not yet appeared upon the scene.

The first troops that came over brought canteen equipment with them such as they had had at home and had taken with them in the field, to the Philippines, and to Mexico. General Pershing decided that this would not be practicable in France, so he entered into an agreement that the Y.M.C.A. should take over the canteens. It was agreed that the Y.M.C.A. would charge actual cost plus transportation. At that time soldiers in France were not only called upon to give military service, but also to give money to support the war. They were expected to buy Liberty Bonds and to respond to drives the same as people back home. It was agreed, therefore, that the soldiers would bear part of the Y.M.C.A. work by paying for certain supplies. They were also to pay for food and lodging at Y.M.C.A. restaurants and hotels and certain expenses incident to leave areas.

In dividing up the territory it was decided to give the front areas to the Red Cross, because they were protected by the Geneva Convention and had the status of non-combatants. The Y.M.C.A. had not been so recognized and it was decided to assign them to the back areas. The Red Cross was equipped for hospital work and for handling the sick and



FRANKLIN S. EDMONDS
Head of Soldiers' Leave and Legal Department
Y.M.C.A., A.E.F.



COLONEL STANLEY D. EMBICK
Adviser to General Bliss, Supreme War Council,
Versailles

wounded on trains, so in order to avoid confusion they were given all troops in transit and what were known as station canteens. All Red Cross service was to be free.

The other welfare organizations, K. of C., Salvation Army, etc., were such small affairs that they were not subject to any rules and went where they pleased. I think they could be classed with the Marines, i.e., they did not do so much, but what they did do they did so well that they were credited with being the whole show.

The supervision of all welfare work was placed upon the L.O.C., and more particularly upon me. I was thus brought into contact with Mr. H. P. Davison, the head of the Red Cross; Mr. E. C. Carter, the head of the Y.M.C.A.; Mr. O. F. Gardner, Y.M.C.A. field secretary for the L.O.C.; Mr. Karl S. Cate and Mr. F. S. Edmonds in charge of leave areas; also, among the women workers, Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Miss Gertrude Ely, Mrs. Victor Radbone, Miss Mary Waller, Mrs. Marion R. Stephens, and a host of others, whose work was just as good in their line as the best that was done in the Army itself.

Leave areas:

In the latter part of December a French commercial concern came to me to get a concession for sight-seeing busses in localities where our soldiers were to go on leave. This was the first I had heard of what afterwards developed into leave areas. I had thought that soldiers would not go on leave in time of war, but would stay on the job. I supposed that if any did go on leave, they would naturally go to Paris or wherever else their fancy dictated. But as the prize-fighter must be groomed for the ring and the race-horse for the track, so also must the soldier be pulled back out of the trenches and 'pepped up' for the next drive.

Through the Y.M.C.A. we established thirty-three leave centers. Here three hundred thousand enlisted men were entertained; transportation, board, lodging, sight-seeing trips, theatricals, and amusements of all kinds being included. These centers, which included all the choicest resorts of France, the Alps, the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees, Monte Carlo, Nice, Aix-les-Bains — places heretofore reserved as the pleasure grounds of kings and for the purses of millionaires — were thrown open to the private soldier of the American Army. The most famous gambling resorts and casinos of the world were rented by the Y.M.C.A. as enlisted men's clubs and were turned into places for their innocent amusement.

The soldier contributed ten days' pay and allowances. The Army furnished the transportation and a small military organization to maintain discipline. The Y.M.C.A. did the rest, and at one time at one place alone — Aix-les-Bains — it was costing them ten thousand dollars a day.

Hotels and restaurants: Besides the leave areas the Y.M.C.A. operated the largest system of hotels and restaurants in the world. The rent for the hotels, restaurants, and officers' and enlisted men's clubs was paid out of the general fund of the Y.M.C.A. The prices charged were just sufficient to cover actual expenses (less rent) and were from one half to one third current French prices.

Theatricals: The Entertainment Department of the Y.M.C.A. provided for the soldier's amusement ninety-five small professional units, six stock companies, seventy-five acts of French vaudeville, and about seven hundred companies of soldier actors. Of course, the Y.M.C.A. is not alone responsible for all of this. Fifty of these companies were recruited by the 'Over There Theater League' and full credit should be given to Mr. E. H. Sothern, Mr. and Mrs. Winthrop

Ames, Miss Elsie Janis, and others who helped to organize this or who gave their services. But the whole thing was under the management and supervision of the Y.M.C.A. and included in the plan was the free distribution by the Y.M.C.A. of \$200,000 worth of musical instruments, four thousand sets of make-up, eleven thousand costumes, thirty thousand copies of sheet music, etc. The Y.M.C.A. play-houses ranged from the simple huts in the field to the best theaters of Paris, and it was all free! Seventy thousand movie shows were given with an attendance of sixty million soldiers.

Athletics: The Y.M.C.A. distributed free two million dollars' worth of athletic goods. Between August and December, 1918, there were four million participants and ten million spectators for these athletic events. They included boxing, wrestling, track and athletic events, baseball, football, basketball, and tennis.

Educational: I am not prepared to say exactly what the Y.M.C.A. did in educational work, but I know that they had about three hundred thousand men under instruction before the Armistice, and after the Armistice some of the best educators of America were brought to France and Germany to give university and vocational training to the men. The Y.M.C.A. distributed twenty-seven million books, periodicals, and newspapers among the men. Paris and American papers were given free by the Y.M.C.A. everywhere and in some cases they were even distributed to the front lines by aviators or trucks.

Miscellaneous: One of the biggest things of the Y.M.C.A. was its fight against venereal diseases. This, to my mind, best illustrated its breadth of mind in handling a practical situation. Prophylactic stations were plainly marked in every Y.M.C.A. hut, hotel, or restaurant. In addition to this, lectures were delivered, instruction pamphlets is-

sued, and the whole matter treated as one should treat a contagious disease. Of course, the Y.M.C.A. early gave up its prejudice against cigarettes, dancing, and the stage. They accepted the soldier as a human being and made the best of him.

During the latter part of the war and back in the States after the war, there was a great deal of ignorant and unjust criticism of the Y.M.C.A., due largely to propaganda by small rival organizations. It was criticized mainly for three things—

First: Not going into the forward areas, which has been explained above.

Second: Selling cigarettes instead of giving them away. This also has been explained above, but, as a matter of fact, besides selling more cigarettes than any other concern in the world the Y.M.C.A. also gave away more than all the other welfare organizations in France put together.

Third: Selling 'gift tobacco.' The reason for this was that in the confusion of supply it was impossible to keep different lots of tobacco separate. Supplies were turned over to the Y.M.C.A. in bulk at shipside or elsewhere in France and adjustments made afterwards. 'Gift tobacco' got mixed with the rest and was sold, not only by the Y.M.C.A., but by the Army. In order to adjust this I myself gave orders that if a soldier bought any tobacco anywhere which upon being opened was disclosed to be a gift, he could go to any Army commissary and have his purchase duplicated free, without returning the original.

So all honor to the welfare workers of France — the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A., the K. of C., the Jewish Welfare Society, the Salvation Army, and all the smaller brothers! There is glory enough for them all. It was not the Army that won the war. It was the American people. And when the Honor Roll is prepared let us make a big place for the welfare workers of the A.E.F., with the women near the top.

CHAPTER VII

PARIS

First impressions — The French idea of liberty — Women of the street — American welfare workers — Y.M.C.A. hotels — Association of French Homes — Address in reply to Marshal Joffre — Comments of the French press on American attitude — Objections to having a large headquarters in Paris.

NO matter how much you have traveled, you cannot fail to be impressed by Paris the first time you are there. I was there first on September 23, 1917, in company with several American officers and Lieutenant Villemere of the French staff at Mailly. We had been at the front near Soissons and nothing that I saw during the war impressed me so much as that first contrast between Soissons¹ and Paris, by automobile only three hours apart.

The German lines ran through the outskirts of Soissons. The railroad station, the principal streets, bridges, etc., were being shelled daily. There was an air raid almost every night. The French and German soldiers in different parts of the town were shooting at each other with rifles and machine guns, and this condition had been going on for nearly a year. There was practically no fuel in Soissons. The hotel at which we stopped had none except for cooking. My room was perfectly open to the elements, because most of the outer wall had been knocked away by a shell.

There were no lights except a few oil lamps and candles, and as soon as these were lighted all windows and doors had to be closed with solid shutters, so that the illumination could not be seen on the outside. Men and animals were being killed on the streets daily by shell fire. When a portion of a building was knocked down, no effort was made to repair it,

¹ See map, p. 47.

but the débris was piled in such a way as to give the maximum protection to what was left and at the same time facilitate passage along the streets.

Leaving Soissons at eight o'clock in the morning, we arrived in Paris at eleven. I do not know how better to describe the transformation than to say that it was like the change in the interior of a theater when the curtain is raised for the first act of a musical comedy. Except for the great number of uniforms one could not believe that there was war. The streets and cafés were crowded, the shops were filled with magnificent displays, and there was no shortage of food, money, clothes, fuel, light. In fact, every necessity and luxury of life was present in the greatest abundance. There were no private motor cars, but there were innumerable taxis and horse cabs, and the fare was one fourth that back home.

The attitude of the French at first seemed strange to us, but soon we realized that it was not only the best but the only thing that could be done. The war was there — 'un fait accompli' — and moaning and groaning would not take it away. They had to live their lives and had to make the most of it. They had to keep up their morale and they could not do this with sobs and tears.

At this time there was probably not a family in Paris that had not lost a father, son, husband, or brother. But the same indomitable spirit that made the men at the front drag themselves on under the anguish of mortal wounds made the women at the rear hide their sorrow behind bright eyes and laughing lips.

There is the story of the young French officer, Lieutenant Péricard, 95th Regiment of Infantry, who, sorely pressed and finding himself among dead and wounded, the lone defender of his position, sprang upon the ramparts and shouted, 'Stand up, ye dead, and fight for France!'



For my friend
General Lagard
from Comtesse d'Azevedo de Silva
18th April 1918

COMTESSE D'AZEVEDO DE SILVA
Volunteer waitress in Y.M.C.A. Hotel, Paris

The body of France lay broken and bleeding, but its spirit stood up and fought bravely on.

The people of Paris knew that for many of them this was the last day on earth and that therefore they had better make the best of it. Some, especially among the aviators, had been to Paris before with comrades and were now the only ones left to come the second time. These men felt that all life held out for them was what they could get before they returned to the front.

Correspondingly, there was a saying in Paris that you cannot refuse an aviator anything.

I am speaking now of the winter of 1917-18. During the following summer the Germans made it so uncomfortable for Paris that things took a much more serious turn.

This pleasure-seeking did not take the form of debauchery or wanton licentiousness. It was most unusual to see a man drunk, and I am sure I never saw a woman under the influence of liquor during the entire time I was in France.

The American idea of liberty is political liberty. The French idea of liberty is personal liberty. The French really have no interest in each other's private affairs. The public is much more interested in a pretty girl, an oil painting, or a Croix de Guerre than it is in a divorce case or a murder. In Paris you can do anything you choose so long as you do not interfere with others. You can array yourself like Abraham and walk along the Boulevard des Italiens without an eye being turned in your direction. It would no more occur to a Frenchman to enact a law forbidding a man a drink or a cigarette than to require him to eat his eggs fried on both sides.

Paris accepts all manners and customs, every race and every creed. The Turk is just as free to bring his harem to

Paris as he is to wear his fez there. A married woman must show her marriage certificate to get a passport from Paris to Bordeaux, but if she is not married it is her own affair with whom she lives. The French say that Americans have just as many vices as they have, but keep them concealed.

I was amused by a story told by an American officer who said that one day just after the Armistice he was about to register at a hotel in Nancy when the old lady at the desk said to him, 'Pas des femmes, Monsieur!' 'Pourquoi pas des femmes?' 'Ah, Monsieur, La Guerre est finie.' She said that during the war officers brought many young ladies to the hotel, but that now since the war was finished she must go back to her old rules. He assured her that he was alone.

On the streets of Paris the women vended their wares just as they would sell flowers or fruit. They learned to speak a few words of English, and if you sauntered along the boulevards any time between dusk and midnight you could hardly move a block without having some pretty little girl take you by the arm and ask you in French or broken English, 'Will you take a promenade with me?' A reply in the negative gave no offense, and after some little appealing she would always give you a cheerful 'Good-bye.'

They had a 'penchant' for newly arrived Americans. They did not seem to bother the Frenchmen, and as soon as Americans had been in Paris for a short while they let them alone also. How they could tell the difference between an American who lived in Paris for a few weeks and one who had just arrived was a mystery, but they could tell the difference all the same.

Picture the effect of this lure upon the average young American. He had seen this on the stage or on the screen, but he had never thought anything like this would come to him in real life.

To offset these temptations there were two influences, not only in Paris, but all over France, the American welfare workers and the Association of French Homes.

American welfare workers:

The welfare workers kept always before the American soldiers the high standard of American womanhood. Women welfare workers were so distributed that the soldiers would see them at their hotels, restaurants, and places of amusement. They could talk to them in their own language, dance with them, and meet them upon terms of social equality.

To the average young American of the great middle class at home, it was an eye-opener to associate with these women welfare workers. As a general rule, they were of a much higher type than the men. The average woman back home could not get over to France. Those who did get over were usually professional women, wealthy women who were quite as much at home in Europe as in America, or women who had broken out from the humdrum of daily routine and taken up some vocation. In other words, the welfare workers were celebrities.

On the other hand, it was also an eye-opener to the welfare workers to see what real Americans were like. Super-refined women discovered that the highest qualities of manhood were often covered by a rough exterior and an inability to speak correct English.

The welfare associations in Paris established hotels, clubs and cafés, restaurants and places of amusement of all kinds for officers and men. It was astonishing to see the number that would collect at these places. With all the lure of Paris, they felt a kind of homesickness which led them to places where they could do the things that they were accustomed to do at home.

The principal Y.M.C.A. hotel for officers was the Hotel Richmond, just off the Boulevard des Italiens and about two blocks from the Opéra. I lived there for a while, as did many others. Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., was in charge. She had with her a number of American girls who lived in Paris and some few French girls who had American interests. Mrs. Roosevelt was subsequently placed at the head of the women's division of the Y.M.C.A. for the whole A.E.F. and was recommended for a Distinguished Service Medal with the following citation:

Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.

For most distinguished service as a welfare worker in the Y.M.C.A. of the American Expeditionary Forces from July, 1917, until November, 1918. She was its first woman volunteer worker to arrive from America, was a director of the first leave area establishment for American soldiers, and was the head of the Woman's Bureau of the Leave Area Department. She combined executive ability of a high order with rare qualities of loyalty and leadership. She exemplified in the highest degree that noble quality of self-sacrifice in American womanhood, which was given expression through the work of women in the welfare associations of the American Expeditionary Forces.

She did not get it because of some legal technicality.

French homes:

Madame Maurice Borel, an American woman, widow of a very distinguished Frenchman, organized a movement among American women living in Paris and among many of her French friends to open their homes for the reception of the American officers who stopped at the Hotel Richmond. Madame Borel's daughter, Mademoiselle d'Azevedo de Silva, who afterwards married an American officer, was one of the workers at the hotel. This movement on the part of Madame



To General Johnson Ita good in memory of the great days.
R. Roosvele, Jane How 1918. Pleasant Roosevelt.

MRS. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR., WITH COLONEL ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL
FRANK PARKER (*left*)
Mrs. Roosevelt was the first woman volunteer Y.M.C.A. worker to arrive from the
United States



Borel was subsequently extended to include not only the officers but also the soldiers throughout the entire district of Paris, and there was no American officer or soldier in that region during this time that did not have the opportunity, if he so desired, of going out to dinners, teas, and parties of all kinds and of mingling with wealth, nobility, and celebrities of all the allied countries.

From this movement in Paris there grew a still wider movement, which spread all over France and was known as the Association of French Homes. This movement was initiated by Madame de Billy, whose husband, M. Édouard de Billy, was on a diplomatic mission to the United States and was subsequently very prominently mentioned for the post of Ambassador. Madame de Billy was the working member of the Association of French Homes, and under the title of Secrétaire Générale she had offices at 24 Rue Mogador. Madame la Maréchale Joffre was Honorary President, M. Bergson, de l'Académie Française, was President, the Comtesse Albert de Mun and Madame Jules Siegfried were Vice-Presidents.

The idea behind the movement of the French homes was twofold. In the first place, it was a genuine manifestation of hospitality on the part of the French. In the second place, it was a desire on their part that the American soldiers should not return to the United States with an impression of the French formed from the women they had met on the streets of Paris. They wanted the American soldiers to see the more substantial side of French life, and it was with this purpose in view that the Association was formed under the auspices of which all the homes in France were thrown open to Americans.

The details for carrying out the scheme for distributing the soldiers among the French homes were placed upon the L.O.C., and particularly upon me. I therefore had a great

many conferences with Madame de Billy and others upon the subject.

Just about the time of the Armistice, at the suggestion of General de Berckheim, we established a leave bureau in Paris, which had a department somewhat like a tourists' Information bureau. Men going on leave could get information from this bureau about the various parts of France; that is, hotel rates, etc. They could also get information as to private parks and reservations open to Americans for hunting and fishing, places where they would be invited to neighboring châteaux for receptions, parties, etc., and French families who were anxious to entertain convalescent Americans as their guests. This worked out very well, and although at first it was thought that our people would not be willing to accept this kind of hospitality from strangers, yet it was accepted and many lasting friendships were formed in this way.

Address in reply to Marshal Joffre:

In the latter part of April, 1918, I was informed that the Association of French Homes was going to make a big celebration at the Cercle Inter-Allié on Mother's Day, which the French thought was America's great national holiday. Marshal Joffre had consented to make an address, his first public speech since the Marne, and they wanted an American general to make a reply. After unsuccessful efforts to get General Pershing, they asked me if I would do so. I was rather floored at this prospect, as I had never before made a public address. However, I accepted.

As the time approached I became more and more worried, especially as I could not speak French. Besides this, I was too busy to work up anything appropriate to the occasion. Finally one night, long after twelve o'clock, I sketched out a

few ideas as the basis of a speech. The next day I showed this to de la Taille, the French officer who was to accompany me. He read it over two or three times and suggested that I just say what I had written and nothing more. He also suggested that I say it in English.

When the fatal day arrived, I went with de la Taille and Captain Aiken Simons to call at the office of Marshal Joffre in Paris, as was the custom in France, to be presented to him and to see a copy of his remarks and give him a copy of mine. Marshal Joffre was very cordial, took the French translation of my remarks and gave me a summary of his own. After lunch we went to the Inter-Allied Club, where the celebration was to take place. Marshal Joffre sat on the rostrum. On his right and left were Mrs. James Cushman of the American Y.M.C.A., Madame Jules Siegfried, famous in the literary and philanthropic world, Monsieur Bergson de l'Académie Française, and myself.

Marshal Joffre made the opening address and was followed by Monsieur Bergson. There seemed little chance for me to say anything that would hold the attention of the audience. But the French, up to this time, had no conception of America's intentions. They believed that we were money-grabbers and boasters. So when I made a very simple statement of our case it was received by them with an astonishing outburst of enthusiasm. Almost every sentence was roundly applauded, and at the end people of all the allied nationalities and of all ranks crowded forward to shake my hand. Among them were Madame Poincaré, the wife of the President of France, who took me to her table for a cup of tea; Admiral Fournier, the senior Admiral of the French Navy; General Pau, the Commanding Officer of the District of Paris; Mrs. Sharpe, the wife of the Ambassador; Professor George H. Nettleton; and a great many others. Comtesse Albert de Mun, whose hus-

band was one of the great orators of France, said it was the best speech she ever heard.

Here follows the address:

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I am very sorry I do not speak French, but as your most distinguished Marshal Joffre spoke in America in his own language I hope I may do the same here, especially as I know there are few among you who do not know English well enough to understand the few words I am about to say.

I feel that it is too great an honor for me to speak for America in reply to Marshal Joffre, the most distinguished living soldier; but perhaps it is better that you should see in me what America really is. Marshal Joffre and the other great generals of France are the professors of the military art. I and the other soldiers of America are the pupils of your great military school. You represent the mature manhood, the tried soldiers of France. I represent the young men of a non-military nation; the youth, the vigor, the spirit of America, untrained but eager to learn.

America comes into this war not to help France, but to fight side by side with France in the same cause. We were slow to come into the war and because of our form of government we have been slow to get ready; but we are in the war now with all our might, with all our soul, with all our mind; and we are in to win!

America is like an overgrown boy who likes to think in big numbers. We want to have the most money, the fastest racers, the biggest wheat fields, the longest rivers, the tallest buildings in the world. Our people like to think they can do things better than anybody else. So when we finally realized what this war was and decided to get into the game, we then and there decided that we were in it to the finish; that we would give all our money, all our young men — everything that we had — and never stop until the game had been won by our side.

France has made a great sacrifice, the greatest sacrifice, undoubtedly, of all the Allies, but you have the war at your



1918
General Hagood

MARSHAL JOFFRE

Photograph presented to General Hagood after Mothers' Day address,
May 12, 1918

door; the enemy is in your country; you feel the dread and horror of his presence; and your people can see the necessity for fighting him away. But it is hard for our people, so far away, to realize what it is, and it is hard for the mothers, the wives, and the sweethearts of America to send their young men across the sea when they know that many of them will never return again. But it is truly like the Spartan mothers who bade their sons return with their shields or upon their shields. Every young man who leaves America feels, his mother feels, his wife feels, his sweetheart feels, that he will come back either victorious or dead.

We come to France for no material gain. We expect to divide no spoils. We come to fight for what we believe is right and, when the victory is ours, we shall return empty-handed, unless it be, perhaps, to take with us our dead.

But while our purpose here is to fight, we wish to make the most of this opportunity to make friends with the French. Many of us have French blood in our veins. I myself have much of it. The American Army wants to bring together the two great nations, France and America; we want our people to understand each other; to make friends not only for the war, but for the great peace after the war, a friendship cemented not only by the comradeship of arms at the front, but the companionship of the fireside at home.

This you have now offered us through the Association of French Homes and for this hospitality I thank you in the name of the American Army.

It is offered by you at a time when every home in France is sad from the losses of the battlefield.

God bless your thoughtful consideration for the lonely American soldier and may He grant all of us speedy relief and a lasting peace through overwhelming victory.

Comments:

The French press received this address with the greatest enthusiasm, particularly that part in which I said we should return to America empty-handed except, perhaps, to take

with us our dead. *Le petit Parisien* said it was like an engraving hammered into bronze. Others said it was the most inspiring sentiment of the war. Le Comte d'Haussonville wrote a special article about it in *Le Figaro*. *The Excelsior* published it in full, with a photograph of me — in reality my aide Captain Simons — alongside of Joffre. Some of it was cabled to the States and published in the papers at home. So that it was a very great, as well as very unexpected, success.

A few days later at a conference in Paris General Pershing came over to me rather formally, held out his hand, and thanked me. He said that a number of people had told him what I had said in reply to Marshal Joffre and that the effect was very beneficial to our cause.

When we got back to Tours after this conference, General Kernan told of the events of the day and said the Commander-in-Chief had laid a wreath of laurels on my head for a speech I made in Paris. General Kean laughed and said that a citation of this kind should entitle me to a Croix de Guerre. General Kernan replied that the favor of kings was more to be desired than bits of ribbon and bronze.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MOVE TO TOURS

Proposed move to Chaumont — Kernan's objections — Survey of Orléans, Blois, Tours — First visit to Saint-Nazaire — Confusion on docks — Shipload of beef ordered back to States — Pig iron makes three round trips — Headquarters goes from Paris to Tours — Château Beaulieu.

GENERAL PERSHING considered it undesirable to have a large headquarters in Paris. He thought that the newspapers at home and perhaps the French might say that the Americans were enjoying themselves in Paris instead of getting up to the front. He also thought that the bright lights of Paris would divert the officers, soldiers, and clerks from their legitimate duties.

General Pershing had moved his own headquarters out of Paris to the obscure village of Chaumont, and just about the time General Kernan took command he decided that the L.O.C. should go to Chaumont, too.

General Kernan saw the disadvantage of Paris, but, on the other hand, he objected strongly to Chaumont. He did not want to be so close to G.H.Q., and Chaumont was too small and inaccessible a town even for one great headquarters. It was cold, disagreeable, entirely off all main lines of travel, and generally so ill-suited to the purpose that the French had avoided it, a reason, perhaps, why General Pershing found it vacant when he arrived.

Paris had great advantages as a headquarters for supply. Paris bears a relation to France that we can hardly understand in our country. At home there is rivalry between cities, but there is only one Paris. It is the heart of France. Every business has a headquarters or branch in Paris. All railroad and telegraph lines run into Paris like the spokes of a

wheel. It is impossible to get from one part of France to another without going through Paris. It was there that the French had corresponding organizations with which we had to keep in touch and it was there that we had to keep our Purchasing Agent, Dawes, and our finance department.

General Kernan wrote a memorandum setting forth his objections to Chaumont. He recommended that his headquarters be moved out of Paris, but recommended that it be located at Tours, where he thought the great supply organization could be properly developed. This was promptly approved in principle by General Pershing; so promptly, in fact, that General Kernan was struck by the openness of mind and willingness of G.H.Q. to listen to sound argument and reverse itself in a matter that had already been settled.

I was designated to make a physical survey of Tours and several other towns under consideration and to recommend the one to which we should go in case Tours was not available. G.H.Q. favored Orléans, but General Kernan insisted on Tours, where he had spent some time before the war.

Colonel David S. Stanley, Chief Quartermaster, L.O.C., a French General Staff officer from the 4th Bureau, and I, started out in an automobile to locate a new headquarters. We went to Orléans, where we were very courteously received by General J. de l'Espée, commander of the 5th Region, who invited us to lunch and showed us that there was no room for us in Orléans. As a possible headquarters he showed us an old music hall or gymnasium, then occupied as living quarters by Belgian refugees, and, as possible billets, two or three rather broken-down buildings surrounded by a high wall.

From Orléans we visited Bourges, Blois, and Tours, each of which subsequently became historic as centers of great American activity. We found no accommodations in Bourges sufficient for our purpose, but some months later this place

was selected for the Central Records Office and Headquarters of the Postal Service. Blois became the Reclassification Depot for officers, and to the A.E.F. was better known by reputation than any other town in France, except Chaumont, but we found nothing there at that time suitable for the headquarters of the L.O.C.

At Tours we found the same lack of enthusiasm. General Henry L. M. J. Réquichot and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Villandroys, both assured us that the only places at Tours suitable for our purpose were already occupied. One of these places, however, was Beaumont Barracks, a new *quartier* constructed for a regiment of cavalry, but which had been very little occupied. Our Air Service was at that time occupying a small part of it. The Air Service was under the L.O.C. and we decided that if it came to a showdown, we could move them out. We decided that if we had to move out of Paris, Tours would be the best chance.

Upon our return I submitted a written report to General Kernan, which he forwarded to G.H.Q. I recommended against moving out of Paris, but recommended Tours as the best place in case we did move. My objections were overruled and we received instructions to move on or before the 15th of January.

Visit to Saint-Nazaire:

While this matter was in progress I made my first trip to one of our big ports, Saint-Nazaire, and came for the first time in direct contact with the great state of confusion incident to bad organization at the ports.

If there was any one thing which would fall in naturally as a function of the Line of Communications, it would be the transportation of supplies. Yet the handling of the ships, and the unloading of the supplies and their transportation by

rail was being handled by the Director General of Transportation, over whom we had no control. The function of the Base Commander at this time was very indefinite. He had on his staff a representative of each of the Supply Services, except the Transportation Department, but he had little control over these services. He had none over the Transportation Department. Not only this, but the Transportation Department had two local representatives with no relation to each other, one for water transportation and the other for rail.

Ships were being unloaded by colored labor troops, who were clothed, fed, housed, and disciplined by their company officers, under the Base Commander. But their work was directed by boss stevedores under the Transportation Department, their officers simply standing around to see that they did not loaf on the job. The maximum of inefficiency was accomplished by this arrangement. In riding over a road alongside of which a railroad track was being constructed, I counted ninety per cent of the negro hands resting. In the warehouses and on the wharves gangs of several hundred negroes would be sitting down waiting for some job that was not quite ready for them; and in one warehouse I noticed fifteen or twenty lying around asleep. This at a time when unutterable confusion existed in the arrangement and sorting of supplies. If all other work had stopped, every laborer at Saint-Nazaire could have been employed for two weeks in merely straightening out the confused heaps of supplies that had been dumped into every possible place where they could get shelter. This was in marked contrast to the orderly procedure and arrangement that I saw a week later at Le Havre, where the British wharves and warehouses were as well organized as any wharf in New York City. This confusion was merely an index to the general lack of efficiency and organ-

ization. The real difficulty was that ships were not being turned around promptly and that supplies were not being sent forward promptly. Every day's delay in discharging a vessel cost the United States ten thousand dollars. But this money was of small importance compared to the consequent delay in military operations. When the result of the war depended upon tonnage, it was taking two or three times as long to turn a ship around as it did in ordinary times of peace. The 26th Division was receiving infants' underwear instead of food and ammunition and the 42d Division was getting wagon bodies, but no wheels.

I shall mention two or three of the many other instances which could be cited.

The French made a request early in the war that the United States send over pig iron. It was put on board ship, but when it got to France facilities for unloading it were lacking, so it was taken back to the United States. Some ships took pig iron back and forth four or five times before they could get it discharged.

During this visit to Saint-Nazaire it was reported to me that an American transport, the McClellan, had come in with five hundred tons of frozen beef; that something was wrong with the refrigerating plant and it was necessary to get the beef off the ship. The Quartermaster Corps had no cold storage available at the port, the Transportation Department had no refrigerator cars to ship it to the interior, and the French were unwilling to take it for themselves. The local representative of the Transportation Department had therefore given orders to *take the meat back to the United States* the next day. With Europe on a meat ration this seemed so preposterous that, although I had no authority, I gave orders that it should not be done. I had no authority, because at the time the L.O.C. could issue no instructions to

the Transportation Department, and my order involved not only instructions to discharge the ship, but also to delay its departure until it had been discharged. As a matter of fact, under the existing organization no one short of General Pershing himself had authority to relieve the situation. I held up the transport and when I got back to Tours required the Chief Quartermaster to dispose of the beef.

One more instance of inefficiency. There was a ship unloading steel rails. They were being handled by colored troops with their hands; some had on white gloves, some had their hands wrapped in burlap; some were bare. I asked the chief stevedore if this wasn't a very poor way to handle steel rails. He said it was; that there were regular implements for handling them, a kind of crowbar for turning the rails over and extricating them from the pile. I asked him why he didn't have some of these implements, and he said that he had asked that some be shipped from the United States, but that they had not come. I asked why he did not have some made in one of the local blacksmith shops, either Quartermaster, Ordnance, Motor Transport Corps, or French civilian, and his reply was that he did not know that this could be done.

It might be thought that an efficient Base Commander would have seen that these things did not occur, but this was the order of the day rather than the exception, and the most stringent orders had been issued to the Base Commander *not to interfere* with the technical services.

We moved from Paris to Tours on January 15, 1918, and established our headquarters in the Hôtel Métropole, an inconspicuous little four-story building of the usual type found in the smaller French cities. General Kernan, with six of his principal staff officers, rented a château called Beaulieu.

We employed a French cook and two maids and, I believe, had the best American officers' mess in France.

We left behind us the Intelligence Section, in charge of Major Cabot Ward, an emergency officer sent to us from G.H.Q. His work consisted principally of counter-espionage. He had started in at once, rented offices, organized his personnel, got in touch with the Intelligence Services of our Allies, made himself personally acquainted with M. Clemenceau and other big men in France, and with Kerensky when that dignitary came over from Russia. In general, he organized what I consider the best Intelligence Service of this kind conducted by any of the Allies. His work in its class was one of the best efforts put forth by the Americans in Europe.

CHAPTER IX

TRIP TO ENGLAND

Camps at Southampton and Rodney — Conference with British Commander, Southampton, on organization of Base Ports — Misbehavior of Americans at camps in England — Visit to Liverpool — Conference in British War Office with General Delano-Osborne — Baggage difficulties of troops in transit — British leave train.

ON January 16th I received a telephone message from Colonel Frank R. McCoy, Secretary of the General Staff at G.H.Q., that General Pershing wished either General Kernan or me to go to England to see whether there was proper coöperation between the British and American interests. General Kernan decided to let me go. I was directed to investigate certain transportation difficulties and to deliver to Admiral Sims a personal message from General Pershing.

I left Paris on the morning of January 17th and arrived at Le Havre about noon. I looked over our plant and also the British warehouse there. The British had acres of warehouse space under one roof. Everything was arranged in the most orderly manner and all business was conducted quietly and systematically, in great contrast to what has already been described at Saint-Nazaire.

That night I took the packet for Southampton. It was a most comfortable trip, very different from the one I had made across the Channel a few months before on La Marguerite.

Upon arrival I was met by Colonel Samuel G. Jones, in command of the American camps in that vicinity. He presented me to Brigadier General Alfred G. Balfour, the Embarkation Commandant, who invited us to lunch. Being a line soldier General Balfour exercised military command, and at the same time, by virtue of his being in the transportation



Alexander

Grand Duke of Russia & General
Johnson Hagood - 1924.

service, exercised technical control over the shipping. Five million men had passed through his jurisdiction, some going to France and some through France to India. Everything was thoroughly systematized and General Balfour's orders were absolute law. The conditions, however, were quite different from ours in France and his organization could not well be compared with that at Saint-Nazaire. Our conditions were more similar to those of Brigadier General H. W. Wilberforce, the British Commandant at Boulogne, which will be discussed later.

From Southampton we went to Winchester and to Rodney Camp and Romsey Camp. At Winchester, besides discussing official matters, I was shown some of the interesting sights of the town, including the old castle and cathedral. Having seen the wonderful cathedrals in France and not knowing much about cathedral architecture, I was much more interested in the famous tombstone of the North Regiment Grenadier, 'who died of violent fever contracted by drinking small beer when hot, on the 12th day of May, 1764, aged 26 years,' to whom the following poem was composed by his comrades:

‘Here sleeps in peace a Hampshire Grenadier,
Who caught his death by drinking cold small Beer,
Soldiers be wise from his untimely fall,
And when ye’re hot drink Strong or none at all.’

Seventeen years later the officers of his garrison added the following:

‘An honest Soldier never is forgot
Whether he die by Musket or by Pot.’

Colonel Jones reported to me that the American soldiers passing through Southampton had behaved very badly and that it was necessary to have a more permanent military police organization. The troops were mostly recruits and

during the short time they were in camp they could not be impressed with the necessity of behaving themselves in a foreign country. The camp was too large to be surrounded by a chain of sentinels and the only way of enforcing discipline was by strong military police. These conditions are described in the following report made upon my return to Tours:

HEADQUARTERS LINE OF COMMUNICATION
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

TOURS, *January 27, 1918*

From: C. of S.

To: C.G.

Subject: Permanent personnel necessary for military police in England.

1. During my recent inspection of the Base in England it was very forcibly brought to my attention that the United States should maintain at Southampton, Winchester, Romsey, Liverpool, London, and such other places where large bodies of troops may congregate, a much stronger and more permanent Military Police and Provost Marshal's establishment than is now provided.

2. Under the British law the American Army has no authority to try men for offenses committed outside of the immediate limits of their camp, to which the principle of extra-territoriality has been extended. As a matter of fact, commanding officers have not hesitated to try their men for such offenses, but it is extremely difficult to collect evidence. Military authorities cannot compel civilian witnesses to testify, so that while certain witnesses have been willing to attend the courts, others have refused, and it is thus impossible to make up complete cases.

3. Under these circumstances it is necessary to maintain strong guards to prevent disturbances in advance rather than to punish offenders after the disturbances have occurred.

4. Among the offenses which have been committed in the vicinity of Southampton and Winchester may be enumerated the following:

(a) 4 cases of medical officers drunk.

- (b) 3 cases of other officers drunk.
- (c) 2 cases of chicken stealing.
- (d) 2 cases of stealing potatoes.
- (e) 2 cases of stealing knives.
- (f) Several cases of stealing blankets.
- (g) 4 cases of defiance of civil authorities.
- (h) Numerous, almost daily, occurrences of drunkenness and disorder among enlisted men.
- (i) One enlisted man stole the entrance key of the Castle at Winchester (subsequently recovered).
- (j) On another occasion an enlisted man stole personal possessions from the keeper of the Castle.
- (k) Enlisted men confined in a municipal jail at Winchester broke out, broke up the furniture, and smashed lamps, doors, etc.
- (l) On one of the channel steamers enlisted men broke open the storeroom of the boat and took some of the officers' stores, value amounting to about £14-0-0.
- (m) Numerous disorders have occurred in the British canteens run by women.
- (n) One enlisted man struck a policeman, which caused serious complications.
- (o) Enlisted men of the Aviation Service broke the lights, windows, etc., of some railway carriages.
- (p) Two enlisted men were arrested by the British authorities on the charge of rape. Both cases unfounded and dismissed.

5. The average number of arrests per night for all causes is about one per cent of the strength of the organization in camp. Since the establishment of the camp at Winchester the average number of cases of disorderly conduct is ten per night; the average number of raids about twenty-five per night.

6. At one time there were nine different nationalities camped in the vicinity of Winchester, and this is a potential source of trouble among the men who have free access to liquor in the neighboring towns. It has been necessary to place a guard over the quarters of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps at Winchester.

7. As a rule, troops arrive at night and as many as nine thousand have arrived in one night. The perimeter of the camp at Winchester is about five miles. It is therefore impossible to prevent men from getting out of camp and it is necessary to send out patrols along all the principal roads and paths leading to the neighboring villages; also to send out parties to bring the men in from saloons and other places where they congregate and make trouble.

8. The greatest difficulty in this whole matter is the constant shifting of personnel. As soon as certain men become familiar with the locality they are changed. The British Commandant at Southampton, General Balfour, and the British Deputy Director General of Movements, General Delano-Osborne, have both written letters protesting against these constant changes in personnel.

9. The objection to these changes, however, is not confined solely to the Base in England but equally obtains in all other Bases and Sections of the L. of. C., and this report is submitted with a view to trying to get some policy adopted which will insure permanency to L. of C. personnel.

JH/my

JOHNSON HAGOOD

London and Liverpool:

I had a conference with Major General George T. Bartlett, Commandant of the American forces in England, called on Colonel Stephen L'H. Slocum, Military Attaché, and lunched with the Ambassador, Mr. W. H. Page. I found that General Pershing's impressions were correct and that the Americans and British were not hitting it off very well. I made a confidential verbal report of this upon my return to France.

From London I went down to Liverpool, where I saw Major Jacob Schick, the American officer in charge. He was struggling under great difficulties, but was accomplishing great results. Schick was working very hard and for one continuous period of seventy-two hours he and his stenographer worked without stopping. After leaving Liverpool, I went

back to London and had a conference on the subject of baggage troubles with Brigadier General Delano-Osborne, Deputy Director of Movements. The result of this conference is indicated in the following extract from a report made upon my return:

HEADQUARTERS LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

TOURS, *January 26, 1918*

From: C. of S.

To: C.G.

Subject: Investigation of baggage difficulties in England January 19-25, 1918.

8. The first and fundamental difficulty is that the officers and enlisted men coming to France bring an amount of baggage which is entirely beyond all reason. They bring baggage on the false hypothesis that they are coming for a two or three years' stay, and that they must equip themselves for an expedition in the same manner as if they were going to explore an uncivilized portion of the globe. As a matter of fact, the unnecessary luggage becomes a burden, and from my personal observation I am convinced that it would be very greatly to the interests of the U.S. and to the individual if no enlisted man brought with him anything except what he carries in his pack, and if no officer were permitted to bring anything except what he could bring in a suit case. No officer or enlisted man can take more than this with him to the front, and no arrangements have been made for storing the balance. If either an officer or soldier needs any more than this while in France, it is much better for him to purchase it when needed, and then throw it away when no longer needed, than to burden himself and the government with the necessity of carrying around a tremendous amount of baggage of no possible use to any one.

9. Everything that an officer or man requires in France, other than what is needed upon the journey or is contained in the soldier's pack or officer's suit case, should be shipped in

bulk and subsequently issued at the proper time. The soldier's barrack bag is a wholly unsuitable carrier for the field. It offers no protection against the weather or against pilfering. These bags, weighing 75 pounds, are taken by the soldiers into their billets, but unless the service of Americans is going to be entirely different from that of the English and the French much of the property will have to be abandoned when the soldiers leave their billets as there is no provision whatever for storing this property. It is a common thing for officers to bring with them five pieces of baggage, including two trunks and a bedding roll. One general officer, with his aides, required two 3-ton trucks for baggage, though he only came over as an observer.

10. The Quartermaster General of the British forces, Lieutenant General J. S. Cowans, said to Colonel Slocum, our Military Attaché in London, on several occasions that the baggage carried by American troops was so excessive and, in his opinion, so unnecessary that it resulted in blocking the British railway lines to such an extent as to prevent their being used for the distribution of food and that at times it absolutely checked the cross-channel traffic.

JOHNSON HAGOOD

Equipment Board:

In order to bring about some reform we appointed a Board at Tours to recommend just what a soldier should bring with him to France. The Board's recommendations did not meet with approval at G.H.Q., but upon the recommendation of General Pershing the War Department put into effect a modified baggage allowance. The final result was that toward the latter part of the war when soldiers arrived at classification camps in France they turned in everything they brought with them except a few trinkets, and after having been deloused, bathed, shaved, insured, and paid, whether they needed it or not, were sent off with an entirely new set of clothing and equipment. If a proper study of this question

had been made by the General Staff before the war, we should have done this from the beginning.

British leave train:

I left London by the Folkestone leave train and sailed from there to Boulogne. There were two such trains daily leaving London, one for officers and one for soldiers. The Channel ship made the crossing in about two hours and a half. A large percentage of the officers and soldiers who made this trip back to the front was always killed and the partings were most distressing. The wife of one officer told me that it would be much better for the morale of the country if the British never came home until the war was over. The ship was filled with officers and men of all grades. The decks were as crowded as a New York ferryboat during the rush hours. It was evidently a dangerous passage to be made in broad daylight and a guard made a tour of the boat to see that everybody had on life belts before starting.

I was struck with the youth of the general officers. The brigadier generals looked about the age of first lieutenants in our Regular Army before the war; that is, around thirty years.

Arriving at Boulogne I found that a compartment to Paris had been reserved for me and I made my way back to Tours.

CHAPTER X

HÔTEL MÉTROPOLE

Headquarters established at Tours — Measures to prevent profiteering — Description of Tours — Visit to the Mayor — General Réquichot, commanding 9th Region — M. le Bourdon, the Préfet — Banquet for American officers — Marquise de Rochambeau — Atterbury Special — Reclassification depot at Blois — Logan's plans for reorganization of General Staff.

WE were much more crowded at the Hôtel Métropole than we had been in Paris. The hotel contained only about 16,000 square feet of floor space and, of course, was badly arranged for offices. Fortunately there was only one bathroom in the hotel, so that did not take up much room and we left it for emergencies. The first floor, consisting of a dining-room, lobby, parlor, bar, and kitchen, was assigned to the Signal Corps. The second floor was assigned to the Commanding General, the General Staff, and the French Mission, allowing one small room, with a little anteroom, for the Commanding General and his two aides, and one room each for the office of the Chief of Staff, of the Secretary, General Staff, of each of the G's and one for the Provost Marshal and the officer in charge of the postal affairs, combined. The third floor was assigned to the Engineers, and the fourth floor to the Quartermaster. The Adjutant General was put in an ell on the back of the hotel, partially on the first and partially on the second floor.

I began at once to look for more space, but this was resisted by G.H.Q. I estimated that we needed 250,000 square feet, or fifteen times what we had, but even this estimate was too small, as we eventually occupied more than a million square feet of office space in the city of Tours, which is the equivalent of a sixteen-story building a quarter of a mile long.

As already stated, the local authorities, military and civil, were opposed to our coming to Tours. The population of the town was normally about 60,000. The war increased this to 80,000, and the American headquarters eventually added about 15,000 more. This became serious, because there were no new accommodations or utilities provided on account of this increase. It was a question of squeezing people in.

There was a rise in prices, especially rent, for which the Americans themselves were largely responsible. If they found a desirable place, they would offer the owner two or three times its value to induce him to give it up. And the same with servants. We issued orders forbidding any American officer or soldier to negotiate with private parties for rental of buildings. An officer who had lived in France was detailed as billeting officer, with a French officer to assist him. All the houses in town were listed, a proper rental rate was established, and officers were then assigned houses appropriate to their rank.

The hotels of Tours were flooded. To meet this and leave accommodations for transients, a rule was established that no one could live permanently at hotels. Y.M.C.A. and other American welfare organizations took over practically all the hotels in the town and ran them for American officers or soldiers. One was set aside for stenographers, telephone operators, and other American girls. This left the Hôtel Univers and the Hôtel Croissant for transients. These hotels did not come up to the standard of hotels in America, so far as rooms and service were concerned, but their cuisine was superior to anything that you could find at home except in a few of the largest cities. Upon special occasions they could turn out a dinner or banquet superior to anything I have ever seen in a public place in the United States, and this notwithstanding the war restrictions on food.

Description of Tours:

The city of Tours is one of the oldest in France. The exact date of its establishment is not known, but some of the old Roman construction is still standing and forms a part of the outer wall of a convent that is yet in use. The modern province of Indre-et-Loire, of which Tours is the capital, is practically coincident with the old province of Touraine, Le Jardin de France, and contains the handsomest and most historical of all the old French châteaux. The river Loire itself is a shallow, muddy, sand-bottom river, filled with small islands covered with willows, and originally must have had swamps on each side and been as unattractive in appearance as the slow, muddy rivers of the Carolinas and Georgia. But during the feudal times this river had been confined to its banks by cut stone revetments, paralleled by the most beautiful highways, and its banks improved by planting forests and constructing wonderful castles and bridges; so that, through the work of man, it is now one of the most beautiful districts in the world. The town itself consists of what might be considered the modern part, which is only two or three hundred years old, and the old part. In the old part the streets are too narrow for automobiles. In the new part they are wide, with sidewalks and parking, street-car lines, etc.

Visit to the Mayor:

Shortly after our arrival at Tours I made arrangements through the French Mission to pay a formal visit to the Mayor. The Hôtel de Ville, where he had his office, was a very beautiful white marble building, with wonderful paintings and all that sort of thing; as handsome on the outside as the municipal building in the city of Washington. Upon the arrival of my car, I found that a large crowd had collected in

front of the building, evidently expecting some kind of ceremony. A carpet had been laid across the sidewalk, up the steps, and through the corridors to the door of the Mayor's office. This carpet, however, had not been laid in a direct line, but by the most circuitous route possible. Standing on each side of the entrance as I appeared were two dignitaries with gold-braided, swallow-tail coats and cocked hats with black plumes. One had around his neck a silver chain that hung to his knees, with links about an inch and a half long. The other had in his hands an enormous key about two and a half feet long. Neither of these men said anything as I approached, but each made a very deep bow. The man with the key placed himself in front and the man with the chain in rear. We then proceeded to follow the strip of carpet. The key man in front established the pace, very slow and dignified, and at each turn of the carpet he came to a full halt, made a right face, and proceeded once more. The crowd in the meantime were peering in at the doors and windows and my guides seemed to march me around so that as many people as possible could get a look. Finally, after marching around the building like a circus procession through the streets of a small town, we arrived at the Mayor's office and I was ushered in. Very much to my surprise I found the Mayor to be rather youthful and in civilian dress. He greeted me in a very cordial and natural manner, offered his assistance and said — perhaps with a mental reservation — that he was glad we had come to Tours. After a pleasant chat he turned me over to my keepers, who marched me out of the building.

I was curious to know who were these two dignitaries in cocked hats and silver chains that had been selected to escort me with such ceremony. The next day when I passed the Hôtel de Ville on the way to my office, I saw the key man

down on his hands and knees with a bucket of water scrubbing the marble steps.

General Réquichot:

General Réquichot, the Commanding General of the 9th Region, was an old French general of cavalry. He had been a general before the war and had had a command at the front. He represented the finest type of old French aristocrat. To look at him suggested a French king of the story books. He stood about six feet one in height, very straight, with a thick head of snow-white hair, and a heavy snow-white mustache, curled and waxed on the ends. Altogether he was one of the most charming gentlemen I have ever met. A few days after we arrived he gave a dinner at the Hôtel Univers to the principal American officers. The dinner put it over any that I have eaten. I shall not say seen, because 'eating' and not 'seeing' is the feature of a French dinner. At the same time there was nothing lacking in the settings. I was between the Préfet, M. le Bourdon, and Colonel Prévost, the town major and president of the Council of War. Both of these men were dressed in elaborate uniforms. Colonel Prévost looked as if he might have stepped out of a comic opera. But the food! It could only be described in French and I don't speak French. Everything was so good I wanted to stop right there and make a meal of it. They had several meats, but the principal one was venison, and I had never tasted venison like that before.

After this dinner there was a reception at the Hôtel de Ville, where about five hundred French and American officers were assembled. General Réquichot, and Préfet, and the Mayor made speeches of welcome in French and these were replied to in French by General Patrick and Major Bayne.



BRITISH, AMERICAN, AND FRENCH GENERALS REVIEWING TROOPS AT TOURS
BASTILLE DAY, JULY 14, 1918

Left to right: Sargent, Hagood, Réquichot, Filléneau, Boulegourd

The Préfet:

M. le Bourdon, the *Préfet*, was also very cordial and hospitable in inviting us to his house and presenting us to his family, an unusual honor in France. He wanted some high-ranking American officer to be billeted in his house and several times appealed to me to get one sent to him. Colonel Samuel Reber and afterwards General Patrick took rooms there and he insisted on giving them a suite with a bathroom, the latter most unusual, and *petit déjeuner*, for none of which would he accept anything in return.

Colonel de Matharel was Chief of the French Mission. His wife, the Comtesse C. de Matharel, was a descendant of Lafayette and therefore felt it her duty to make a great deal of the Americans. They were certainly most charming in every way. The Colonel had previously served as military attaché somewhere in the Balkans and had become acquainted with some Americans whom I knew.

Marquise de Rochambeau:

Prominent among the other residents of Tours who were particularly courteous and hospitable to the Americans was Marquise de Rochambeau, 12 Place de la Grandière. Her husband and three sons had been killed in the war, leaving her with two daughters, so that she was in deep mourning. But still she went out occasionally and gave several dinners and other entertainments which I attended. Her husband was a direct descendant of the Rochambeau who had fought in the American Revolution with Washington; and her husband's brother, the Comte de Rochambeau, being the oldest son, had all the original Washington souvenirs, including the sword presented by Washington to Rochambeau, oil paintings, flags, etc. These were all installed in her Château de Poltertres, about fifteen miles from town. The Marquise de

Rochambeau herself had a very remarkable dressing-case which had been presented by Washington to the original Rochambeau. I was more struck by its state of preservation than I was by its history, because, although one hundred and fifty years old, it was absolutely perfect and not a single piece was missing or damaged. It contained about fifty articles, everything that could possibly be imagined for the toilet or for use in traveling, including a small hot-water kettle.

Comte Paul de Portales was the head of the local French Red Cross. His wife was a nurse in one of the French hospitals. They had a château just out of Tours called Cangé. I went out there once to dinner.

Assisting him in the Red Cross work was Comte Charles de Beaumont, who lived in the Château de Chatigny. This was one of the very interesting old châteaux, because it was built upon the site of old Roman ruins. The Comte had excavated these ruins and exposed old Roman tile baths with hot and cold water connections, etc. The Comtesse de Beaumont was a canteen worker at Saint-Pierre des Corps. She had to leave her château at six o'clock in the morning and did not get back until after dark. She told some extremely harrowing tales of the French wounded and the refugees that she had to serve on the trains passing through Saint-Pierre des Corps. The Comte and Comtesse de Beaumont were extremely hospitable and made a great many friends among the Americans. I went out to their château a number of times to dinner.

Among the many others who extended hospitality to the Americans were Monsieur and Madame Henri Rousset, 8 Rue Émile Zola; Dr. Henry Barnsby, 16 Boulevard Heurte Coup, who married Monsieur Rousset's daughter; Baronne Eugène Auvray, 6 Rue Jules Simon.

Atterbury Special:

Immediately after transferring the headquarters to Tours there was established the American special to Chaumont. This train was known as the 'Attaboy' in honor of General W. W. Atterbury, the Director General of Transportation. It was a French train run over French tracks, under French regulations, by an American crew. These trains are bad enough when they are run by the French, but with all the difficulties attendant upon ignorance of French red tape and French language, it was dreadful. The trip could be made from Tours to Chaumont by automobile in eight hours. The schedule of the 'Attaboy' was about fourteen hours, but it was often from two to six hours late and upon more than one occasion was twenty-four hours late. The train consisted of about three first-class compartment cars the seats of which could be made down into what the French call a *couchette*, each compartment containing two lower and two upper berths. These cars were usually assigned to officers. Besides, there were eight or ten third-class coaches for the use of soldiers.

The crew assigned to the handling of this train were competent railroad men who were accustomed to handling passengers each of whom paid his fare and was entitled to whatever he paid for, but when it came to handling the military, whose prerogatives were determined by rank and the urgency of their business, etc., the thing got into a hopeless jumble. An officer would get on the train and claim that he didn't have as good accommodations as somebody junior to him in rank. In one case I found a British general attached to our headquarters in a third-class compartment, while a lot of privates were riding in the *couchettes* of the first-class car. For a long time no arrangements were made for even cleaning out the train. There were no towels or even water or paper

in the toilet rooms. There were no blankets or other bedding provided, and if the officers and soldiers did not carry their own bedding, they slept cold, because very often the heat was not turned on in the coaches.

There was no way of getting food on the train and no stops were made to get food at stations. So if the train was eight or ten hours late, everybody went hungry. There was an emergency officer at the railroad station at Tours who was supposed to look out for this train. He had been a moving-picture actor in private life, and, while he was extremely willing, he was most hopeless when it came to straightening out these difficulties.

At the other end of the line at Chaumont there was a sergeant who had been a railroad man in civil life and who, no doubt, knew his business, but he regarded everybody merely as passengers, without any regard to rank or whether they were traveling under orders, on leave, or without authority. He had the attitude of 'Damn the public.' There was an officer of the Transportation Department at this time who had somewhat the status of a division superintendent at home. I took up these difficulties with him and told him that he should have the train run according to ordinary American standards. I told him to get blankets, sheets, and pillows from the Quartermaster Department; to get colored porters; to make arrangements through the Red Cross to provide food; and to establish some kind of regulations for precedence among passengers. Owing to his lack of knowledge as to military methods and where to get assistance, he was unable to accomplish anything and I had to do it myself.

I sent a telegram to the Commanding Officer at Saint-Nazaire directing him to find twelve Pullman car porters among his colored stevedores. I gave an order to the Quartermaster Department for bedding; appointed the railroad con-

ductors M.P.'s so that they could enforce regulations; and arranged with the Red Cross to provide meals along the route. I issued instructions to divide the passengers into four groups — general officers, field officers, subordinate officers, and soldiers — with the understanding that accommodations on the train should be assigned in accordance with these groups. If a general officer, for example, turned up at the last minute with an order for transportation and there was none available in his class, he could turn out a field officer; the field officer could turn out some subordinate officer and the subordinate officer could turn out some soldier. But persons in the same group could not disturb each other.

Conditions were improved somewhat, but other difficulties arose to make them worse, such as overcrowding, delays in schedule, etc. The food never worked out, because the porters deliberately mixed it up in order to sell a little food on the train themselves. One told me that he kept a ham and several loaves of bread and that some of the officers showed great appreciation for the sandwiches he made, but that others did not show any appreciation at all. I think this appreciation took the form of about five francs for a sandwich that should have been furnished free.

Blois:

About this time we got instructions that a thousand casual officers were coming from the United States, mostly lieutenants and captains, and that we should establish some place where they could be received, classified, and dispatched to various organizations. The city of Blois, fifty kilometers from Tours, was selected as the classification depot. Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Pulis of the Coast Artillery was sent there to get the place in shape and make the necessary arrangements. I went up there on Sunday, January 27th, to

look it over and found it terribly dirty, with the poorest accommodations I have ever seen offered to American soldiers or officers. The field officers were to get billets in hotels, but the lieutenants were to be put in double-deck bunks in a vacant barracks. No money was available for equipping or starting a mess, nor was there any other provision for the officers to get food. I put Major Max R. Wainer of my office in general charge and he began to make improvements at once. He directed Colonel Pulis to go out and buy whatever was necessary in the way of food and equipment and to have the bills sent to the Quartermaster Department. He was directed to charge the officers board and turn in the money. There were no regulations to cover such a situation at that time and my action was without authority. But Wainer was a man who was looking for results. He said all he wanted was my verbal O.K. and he would make it go. He realized that the bills he contracted would just be bunched in among the claims to be adjusted between the Americans and the French after the war.

Major Wainer was the author of the system adopted for the reclassification of officers sent to Blois. The original proposition put up to us by G.H.Q. was that a certain number of officers arriving from the States would be required for combat duty and the balance could be retained for the L.O.C. Every branch of the L.O.C. and all the bureau chiefs at G.H.Q. were calling for officers, and when any one with technical experience turned up, all the different departments would claim him on one ground or another. Wainer established the plan of having these officers grouped according to their technical experience, with a representative of each of the supply services on hand to pick out the ones he wanted. If two or more departments wanted the same man, a representative of our headquarters made the decision. Sub-

sequently a permanent Classification Board at Blois was established. The most important feature of this developed when we received word from G.H.Q. that nineteen young officers had been turned down by efficiency boards at the front and were being sent back to us for return to the United States and discharge. We applied for and got authority to throw these officers into the general pool at Blois and reassign them to duty. This not only gave the officers a second chance to make good, but also gave us a new source from which we could obtain officers. Of these original nineteen officers ordered discharged from the Army, seventeen subsequently made good. Some went back to the front and made good in combat units. Two received Distinguished Service Crosses. Others rendered valuable service in the L.O.C.

Our plan at Blois was that a bureau chief could get a turned-back officer, try him out, and turn him in again without being asked any questions. It was considered the fairest thing for all concerned that if the officer was not making good, it was better to turn him into a new field with a new start than to hold on to him and try to discipline him or force him to do well something he had been doing very badly. If, however, an officer fell down three times, he was then recommended as unfit for the service and returned to the United States for discharge.

L.O.C. beginning to break:

On January 31, 1918, Colonel James A. Logan, Chief of the Administrative Section at G.H.Q., arrived at Tours with Major Willard D. Straight and Major H. H. Harjes to confer with me on our relations with the French. Major Straight at that time was the head of the War Risk Bureau, and Major Harjes, who in civil life was a member of the firm of Morgan, Harjes and Company, was Chief Liaison Officer

for the American forces. Logan told me that there was a movement on foot to bring the Director General of Transportation and all of the bureau chiefs back to the L.O.C. This, I believe, was the first definite move to put the supply system on a proper basis.

Logan offered to help in getting our General Staff organized and sent the following telegram:

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM

H.Q. L.O.C., A.E.F.
Feb. 2, 1918

Colonel McCoy
G.H.Q., A.E.F.

Number Sixteen

Here with Hagood and find them embarrassed due to lack of competent general staff officers. Hagood talked to Malone this morning by phone and Malone suggested his going to Langres to-morrow to pick out two men for general staff duty L.O.C. Seems to me foolish to make Hagood go all the way to Langres for this purpose when necessities L.O.C. require first choice. Please telegraph quick list of officers graduating staff school to me here so that General Kernan can submit recommendations as to the ones he wants and thus save Hagood trip. Saw C.-in-C. in Paris yesterday after he had had the talk with General Kernan. General Pershing said to do everything possible to get L.O.C. as many general staff officers as possible and to get them quick. General Pershing also told General Kernan to submit him personally list of officers he wanted. Would it not save lots of trouble for us to fix this up. General Kernan absolutely needs ten general staff officers and if this show is to function he has got to have them and got to have good ones. I can spare Wright my Section. Recommend he be sent at once. Also that Bugge be returned here. Would it not be possible also to get three or four general staff officers now at British front sent here. In this connection also suggest Garlington, Addis, MacKall and Hickok.

In addition to general staff officers General Kernan would

also like to get at least ten good field officers who have failed to pass their examination at the Langres school. He should be given these.

If this whole show is going to function well we have got to get these men and we shall rely on your fine Italian hand to put it across.

LOGAN

On February 4th, Colonel Hine came back from Chaumont and brought me a personal note from Colonel G. Van H. Moseley, on duty as W. D. Connor's assistant at G.H.Q., on the subject of the organization of the A.E.F. General Staff. He thought the Administrative and Coördination Sections should be combined into one, which coincided with General Kernan's idea. He also thought that all the bureau chiefs and the [D.G.T. should be transferred to the L.O.C., General Pershing keeping only his military advisers and an inspector general. He thought that our headquarters should be transferred to Chaumont and that General Pershing's headquarters should go farther to the front in closer contact with the fighting forces.

Colonel Moseley's note has been lost, but the above is quoted from my journal and the following was my reply:

A.P.O. No. 717, Feb. 5, 1918

From: Colonel Johnson Hagood.
To: Colonel G. V. H. Moseley, Chaumont.
Subject: Reorganization of the General Staff.

MY DEAR MOSELEY:

1. Your paper sent me through Colonel Hine is one of the best and most logical papers I have ever read on any military subject. As you know, I was very much taken with your views on the subject of the proper organization over here the first time I had them presented to me. General Kernan read your paper also, was very much pleased with it and has sent you a copy of his report on this subject.

2. Logan was down here the other day and I had a talk with him. His ideas apparently are very much along the same line as yours, with this essential difference, that he desires to maintain the separation of the Administrative and Coördination Sections, whereas you propose to consolidate them. He desires to adhere more closely to the French General Staff system, with the four bureaus, whereas you propose to adhere more closely to our own organization back in the States, with an Assistant Chief of Staff and much more authority for the bureau chiefs than he would give them.

3. Logan's views appear to me to be quite sound and I have great confidence in his judgment, but I must confess that I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of the French General Staff system to know to what extent it would be applicable to our own. . . .

4. So far as the General Staff administration of the L.O.C. is concerned, I would have no hesitancy. I am quite sure that with proper personnel I could organize the thing on a big scale and make it work, but I realize that it is necessary not to consider our own organization alone but to make it fit in with that of the Armies, Corps and Division as well as that of our Allies. I make this statement because I do not want to convey the idea to you that I am without an opinion upon a matter of such vital importance to our successful operation in the war, but I want to indicate that I do not care to express an opinion upon so broad a question without having a sufficient basis upon which to rest it.

5.
6. The present organization of the D.G.T. as an independent functionary is contrary to every military principle. It must break down eventually and the sooner this happens the better, in order to force the issue. The scheme, which so far as I know was original with you, of transferring the bureau chiefs to the L.O.C. is, I think, absolutely sound. But I can see no advantage in our going to Chaumont except as a mere matter of occupying office space which has already been provided.

7. So far as the L.O.C. is concerned, if these agencies are

turned over to us I am quite sure that we can decentralize by making the different Bases and Sections practically the same as geographical departments at home, giving to the Base and Sectional commanders general court-martial jurisdiction and all that sort of thing, with suitable staffs to control their own agencies, and by that means cover the whole ground without everything having to go through the narrow neck of one bottle.

8. I think this a wonderful opportunity for substituting a sound military organization for one which is certainly a hodge-podge, and, in my judgment, sure to break down as soon as the strain begins to bear.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Logan.

Very sincerely yours

JH/my

JOHNSON HAGOOD

CHAPTER XI

THE HAGOOD BOARD

Composition — Dinner and conference with General Pershing — Proceedings of the Board — Complete reorganization of A.E.F. Staff — Discussion of the principles involved — Reasons for the changes — How it came out — Request for Moseley.

AS seen in the last chapter, all hands were rapidly coming to the conclusion that the L.O.C. was not a workable organization. On Thursday, February 7th, I received a wire from Harbord saying that General Pershing had selected me to work up a plan for a complete reorganization of the A.E.F. Headquarters, General Staff and Supply Services, and that I should come to G.H.Q. at once.

Reporting at G.H.Q. the next morning I was handed the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

February 8, 1918

From: The Chief of Staff, A.E.F.
To: Colonel Johnson Hagood, Chief of Staff, L. of C.
Subject: Study on Staff Reorganization.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has selected you as the senior officer of a board which he wishes to consider the desirability of any changes in the present organization of the Headquarters A.E.F., including a revision of G.O. 8 and Memorandum 129, these Hdqrs. 1917.

As a basis of the study to be made by your board, there are placed at your disposition the replies to the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum of January 22nd which invited comment and criticism on our organization from the Chiefs of Sections, General Staff; heads of administrative and staff services; and the commanders of divisions and brigades; also a report by the Inspector General on the several staff departments at H.A.E.F.

Your board need not, however, confine its recommendations to the subject matter contained in these papers.

In general, the organization of the H.A.E.F. is working satisfactorily but it is realized that it is necessarily imperfect and that there is no doubt some overlapping of duties in some cases, and lack of clear definition as to the powers and duties of the several departments.

2. The officers to be associated with you on this study are:

Colonel A. D. Andrews, Transportation Department.

Lt. Colonel Frank R. McCoy, General Staff.

Lt. Colonel Robert C. Davis, Adjutant General.

Major S. P. Wetherill, Q.M. O.R.C.

3. While the Commander-in-Chief desires that this study be very carefully made, it is desired that it have the exclusive command of your time until completed, and that it be expedited as much as possible.

J. G. HARBORD

The members of the Board were well fitted to undertake their allotted task. Andrews, West Point '86, had served in the War Department as Aide to General Schofield, and then resigned. He was a banker in New York and had come into the war as Principal Assistant and Military Adviser to General Atterbury. He ended as a brigadier general and G-1 at G.H.Q. — an officer of exceptional ability and broad experience in administrative and executive work.

McCoy, West Point '97, was one of the famous group of young officers identified with General Leonard Wood and President Theodore Roosevelt. He had served in the War Department with General Wood and now was Secretary of the General Staff at Pershing's G.H.Q. Afterwards he commanded a regiment and a brigade at the front in brilliant fashion and finally succeeded General Atterbury as Director General of Transportation — one of the best officers in the Army.

Davis, West Point '98, had had a splendid record as troop commander and as a staff officer. He became Adjutant General of the A.E.F. and later became the Adjutant General of the Army — one of the best the Army ever had in peace or war.

Wetherill was an efficiency expert in civil life.

We spent the first day in getting organized and going over documentary evidence. That night General Pershing gave a dinner party of about twenty at his house. After dinner, while the rest were left standing in a large reception room, General Pershing called me to one side and directed me to sit with him on a sofa where we talked for about an hour, the party breaking as soon as this conversation was ended. We spoke principally of the proposed reorganization of the staff, but also of many other things connected with America's effort in France.

The following is taken from my diary:

I have never in my life been so impressed with any one as I was with General Pershing last night. He talked in a quiet, familiar way, speaking of the biggest projects of the war in the same simple language and as if he were discussing the minor routine of an army post and at the same time indicating his absolute mastery of the whole situation.

I said I hoped I would have a chance for an active command at the front and would not have to spend the entire war in the L.O.C. He replied that —

Every one should be proud to participate in this greatest conflict in the history of the world, no matter in what capacity; that when the war broke out he had hoped, of course, to be in it, but that he never dreamed that he would be the Commander-in-Chief; that he probably would not continue so, but that he was willing to continue in any capacity; and that if he had his real desire, he would command a regiment, as this was the highest command in close touch with soldiers. He went on to say that the men who did things in this war — no



To J. H.
from his friend
Frank McCoy

GENERAL FRANK MCCOY

Secretary, General Staff, G.H.Q.; Brigade Commander, A.E.F.; Director General
of Transportation after the Armistice

matter what — would be the ones to succeed. He said the time was not far distant when aggressive young men would be selected to replace the old men, promoted by seniority. He said, specifically, 'You men who are on the staff now will become the commanders, and it is such as you upon whom I depend for final success.' He said that he had talked to General Pétain and General Haig about this and was convinced that he would have to have young commanders. He said the average age of brigadier generals in the British army was between thirty-two and thirty-eight and of major generals between thirty-eight and forty-five. He said that no man who had arrived at the age of fifty without having had a command larger than a regiment would amount to anything in this war.

General Pershing was about to put this policy into effect when the Armistice was signed; that is, to promote and assign to active commands at the front a number of the younger colonels and generals who up to that time had been holding down the big jobs on the General Staff. It is a pity that the names of these men were never made known to the Army and to the public, because it is to them that we should look for the initial leadership in another war. Some have already sunk into the background on account of their very junior rank in the Regular Army, while other men who were utter failures in France have drifted into positions of power and responsibility in Washington and elsewhere.

Proceedings of the Board:

But to return to our Board. We held our meetings at the quarters of Colonel McCoy. We examined written reports and called as witnesses the principal members of the A.E.F. General Staff, the bureau chiefs, and also Colonel A. W. Bjornstad, one of the directors of the General Staff school at Langres.

All witnesses agreed that the present organization was

wrong; that there was not sufficient definition of responsibility; and that some arrangement should be made by which the Commander-in-Chief would be relieved from the enormous burden of routine administration and supply. On the other hand, the bureau chiefs were opposed to moving away from Chaumont or to any scheme by which a further barrier would be erected between them and the Commander-in-Chief.

The most radical suggestion for a change was in the written report submitted by General Atterbury and sponsored by Colonel Andrews. This was to take the L.O.C. entirely out of military control and place it in the hands of some big business man who would reorganize it and operate it upon the principles of Big Business back in the United States.

When we had completed our work, General Pershing called the Board into his office and spent several hours going over the report, item by item. He suggested certain minor changes. These having been made, he again called the Board together and signed his approval.

Here follow the proceedings of our Board:

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED BY LETTER FROM THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A.E.F.

February 8, 1918

I. The board met on February 8, 1918, all members present, and remained continuously in session, as directed, for approximately seven (7) days. It carefully considered all written statements submitted to it, and the statements of the following officers who appeared in person, viz.: Chiefs of the Administrative and Coördination Sections, the Adjutant General, the C.Q.M., C.S., C.E.O., C.O.O., C.S.O., Acting C.A.S., Colonel Moseley of the C.S.G.S., and Colonel Bjornstad of the Staff College.

II. A study of all the papers and verbal statements indi-

cated that substantially all the views and suggestions placed before the board could be reduced to a few groups, involving the following important questions.

1. What changes, if any, should be made in the administration of supply, in order to relieve the Commander-in-Chief from the immediate direction thereof, and place direct and complete responsibility therefor upon some competent authority?

2. What changes, if any, should be made in the organization of the General Staff, in order to insure greater efficiency and more harmonious relations?

3. What further changes, if any, should be made as a result of the disposition of the foregoing questions?

III. The Board, after careful consideration, recommends as follows:

1. That the Line of Communications as herein reorganized shall hereafter be known and designated as the *Service of the Rear* (S.O.R.).

2. That the Chiefs of the Administrative and Technical Staff Services, under their present titles and authority as members of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, exercise all of their functions in matters of procurement, transportation and supply under the direction of the Commanding General, *Service of the Rear*, by whom these activities will be coördinated.

3. That the headquarters of the following Chiefs of Services be moved to Headquarters, S.O.R.:

Chief Quartermaster,

Chief Surgeon,

Chief Engineer Officer,

Chief Ordnance Officer,

Chief Signal Officer (for the present),

Chief of Air Service (for the present),

Chief of Gas Service (for the present),

Director General of Transportation,

Provost Marshal General.

4. That the headquarters of the following Chiefs remain at General Headquarters A.E.F.:

Adjutant General,
Inspector General,
Judge Advocate,
Chief of Tank Corps (for the present).

5. That the greater portion of the Statistical Division of the Adjutant General's Office, together with all branch post offices, be transferred to the *Service of the Rear*, where they will, at some place, be in close proximity with each other and with the War Insurance Bureau.

6. That the Postal Service of the A.E.F. be placed under military control.

7. That there be a Deputy Chief of Staff, whose duty is to assist the Chief of Staff and to act as such during his absence; that such officer be selected without regard to rank, and that the same principle of selection and under-study be applied to all Staff Services.

8. That the terms Administrative, Intelligence, Operations, Coördination, and Training Sections be eliminated, and that these sections be known hereafter as follows:

First Section General Staff,
Second Section General Staff, etc.,
respectively, in order named, to be abbreviated G. 1, G. 2,
G. 3, etc.

9. That the heads of these sections be hereafter known as Assistant Chiefs of Staff, instead of Chiefs of Section as heretofore, and that their titles be as follows:

Assistant Chief of Staff G. 1 (A. C. of S. G. 1),
Assistant Chief of Staff G. 2 (A. C. of S. G. 2),
the numbers to indicate no relative rank, and the heads of sections to be selected and designated without regard to rank.

10. That the Chief of each of the Services be authorized to designate an officer of his Service to represent him with each General Staff Section, as he may deem advisable.

11. That General Order No. 8 be amended as shown in the revision submitted herewith.

12. That the Headquarters S.O.R. be at Tours, and



To Major General Johnson Hagood
With plaudit memories of our service in France
Peter C. Davis
Major General the Adjutant General.

that its organization, to meet the new conditions, be made the subject of a later report to be submitted after further investigation.

IV. In recommending that the Chief of the Air Service should move his headquarters to that of the S.O.R. it is realized that, at some future time, it may be necessary for the Chief of this Service or his representative, to be attached to General Headquarters A.E.F., and occupy a position analogous to that of a Chief of Artillery.

V. As to the General Purchasing Board, it seems clear that, as a matter of principle, its important functions of supply should be coördinated with all other supply services and through the same headquarters; otherwise there cannot be a complete coördination of supply. The board does not recommend that the headquarters of the Purchasing Board be removed from Paris.

VI. The Board considered that the most important single question presented to it was the necessity for providing a single and direct line of responsibility for all matters of supply, and, at the same time, to utilize to the fullest possible extent the services of the experienced and able Chiefs of the Administrative and Technical Services who are now on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

VII. It was found that great diversity of opinion and practice existed among the different Chiefs of Services with respect to the degree of personal responsibility assumed and methods employed in the matter of supply. The Chief Quartermaster was of the opinion that responsibility for supply was, in a recent case, shown to be divided among seven different officials without the ability to place the entire responsibility upon any single individual, while, in another case, that of the Medical Department, the Chief Medical Officer was of the opinion that practically the entire responsibility for supply had already been placed upon the L. of C. In another case, that of the Engineers, it was found that the Chief of Engineers was exercising control to the extent of passing upon requisitions submitted by the combat forces to the L. of C.

VIII. The Board fully realizes that its recommendations involve the creation of an enormous business machine which will include within itself the entire *Service of the Rear*, in the organization and operation of which the highest form of specialized business methods and the ablest and most experienced personnel will be essential for its successful operation. The Board considers, however, that the necessity for so centralizing responsibility of the Services of the Rear, and removing it from General Headquarters, has been amply demonstrated, and, therefore, so recommends.

IX. It is believed that the physical removal of the headquarters of several services from Headquarters, A.E.F., to Headquarters, S.O.R., will not prevent the Commander-in-Chief from availing himself of the personal services of the chiefs of these services whenever needed; and that their advice and assistance will be more valuable to him by reason of their intimate association with and direct responsibility for all questions of supply in their respective departments.

X. If the above recommendations are approved, it will be necessary to transfer from General Headquarters to Headquarters, S.O.R., a portion of the present personnel of the Co-ordination and Administrative Sections, General Staff, in order to maintain a continuity of policy.

JOHNSON HAGOOD

Colonel, General Staff

AVERY D. ANDREWS

Colonel, R.T.C.

ROBERT C. DAVIS

Lt. Col. Adjutant General

F. R. MCCOY

Lt. Col., General Staff

SAMUEL F. WETHERILL, JR.

Major, Q.M.R.C.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS A.E.F.

February 14, 1918

Approved:

JOHN J. PERSHING

General, U.S. Army

Discussion of the Board's report:

It might be well to pause here and make an analysis of the report, because this was the foundation upon which the whole A.E.F. General Staff and Supply was reconstructed.

Before discussing more important matters I will say that it was at my suggestion that we created the title 'Deputy Chief of Staff' and changed the term 'Chief of Administrative Section,' etc., to Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, etc., the terms G-1, G-2, and so on having been first used by Colonel Bjornstad at the Staff school at Langres.

The most radical physical change was the removal of the bureau chiefs from Chaumont to Tours, but this was only an incident of the general plan, which was:

First, to relieve the Commander-in-Chief from the immediate direction of the administration of supply and place direct and complete responsibility therefor upon some other competent authority.

Second, to make such changes in the General Staff as were necessary to carry this into effect (see paragraph II of report).

The board considered that the most important single question presented to it was the necessity for providing a single and direct line of responsibility for all matters of supply, and, at the same time, to utilize to the fullest possible extent the services of the experienced and able Chiefs of the Administrative and Technical Services who are now on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. (See paragraph VI.)

The Board recommended that the 'Competent Authority with Direct and Complete Responsibility to the Commander-in-Chief' should be the Commanding General, S.O.R. (S.O.S)¹ — see sub-paragraph III-2, the substance of which is as follows:

¹ The name Service of the Rear was changed to Services of Supply.

That the bureau chiefs should retain their old titles and authority as members of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

This was urged by me not only in the Board, but also to General Pershing at our hearing. It was explained and understood to mean that the respective responsibilities of the bureau chiefs would be coincident in scope with that of General Pershing and not limited to the rear as in the case of the bureau chiefs of the old L.O.C., nor limited as in practice subsequently by General Moseley and in his proposed order (see Chapter XXIV).

That the activities of the bureau chiefs under their old titles and authority should be coöordinated by the C.G., S.O.R. (see par. III, sub-par. 2). This in effect made the C.G., S.O.R., a Chief of Staff for Supply, with direct and complete responsibility to the C.-in-C. (see also my telegram of August 1, 1918, Chapter XX).

That a part of G-1 and of G-4 should be transferred to Tours (see par. X). So far as I was concerned, it was the intention that G-2, G-3, and G-5 should continue in full blast at Chaumont, but that G-1 and G-4 should be reduced to a small liaison group.

That the bureau chiefs should appoint deputies to represent their interests with the General Staff sections at Chaumont (see sub-paragraph III-10). I insisted that these men should be appointed by the bureau chiefs and not by the Assistant Chiefs of Staff with whom they were to serve. This was in order to keep them deputies in fact.

How it came out:

From the day of its approval to the day of the Armistice the S.O.S. to a man stood behind the plan as adopted by this board. General Kernan — later General Harbord — and all

the bureau chiefs fought for it unconditionally and without modification. But little by little, as will be seen in Chapter XXIV, G-4 at G.H.Q. took over the function of direct and complete responsibility to General Pershing for supply. It was finally stated that the C.G., S.O.S. (Harbord) was in fact the subordinate of G-4 (Moseley) and that the bureau chiefs at Tours were in fact the subordinates of their deputies at Chaumont (see Chapter XXIV).

In other words, we were drifting back to the old L.O.C. organization, with the responsibility of the bureau chiefs chopped off at the Zone of the Army and their subordinates acting as bureau chiefs at Chaumont. This movement came near wrecking the whole machine by having the S.O.S. removed entirely from General Pershing's responsibility and placed directly under the War Department (see General Harbord's telegram of October 21, 1918 — Chapter XXIV).

Further proceedings of the Board:

However, we are once more drifting far ahead of the immediate situation and it is necessary to go back and pick up the thread of our discussion at the point where General Pershing signed his approval on Saint Valentine's Day, 1918.

With its proceedings the Board submitted the tentative draft of a general order carrying the reorganization into effect. This was known as General Orders 31. General Pershing approved this also and it was printed and issued under date of February 16, 1918. However, it was subsequently suppressed and held in abeyance until the Board had completed the second phase of its work; to-wit, the further investigation and submission of a plan for the headquarters organization of the new Service of the Rear (S.O.S.).

General Pershing directed that in order to conduct this investigation the Board should proceed at once to all the

ports, base sections, principal depots, and regulating stations. We were particularly directed to investigate the conflicts of function between the Director General of Transportation, the Chief Quartermaster, and the Chief Engineer Officer, and to submit some recommendations with a view to straightening this out. We were also to try to fix the responsibility and status of the regulating officer at Is-sur-Tille.

In the meantime I dispatched the necessary telegrams putting into effect so much of the plan as had been approved, and drafted a letter to the French Minister of War requesting additional accommodations at Tours. This letter was signed by General Harbord, and Colonel Jacques Aldebert de Chambrun was immediately sent to Paris to deliver it in person.

General Harbord took occasion the next day to say that General Pershing was particularly well pleased with the report and was very much impressed by the business-like and expeditious way in which the whole matter had been handled.

It has already been mentioned that our report contemplated that part of the old Coördination Section — new G-4 — and of the old Administrative Section — new G-1 — should be transferred to Tours in order to maintain a continuity of policy. The purpose of the so-called Coördination Section was to coördinate the bureau chiefs, and as these were being sent back to Tours it was presumed that as a matter of course the function heretofore exercised by G-4 at G.H.Q. would thereafter be exercised by G-4 at Tours.

Request for Moseley:

At that time Colonel W. D. Connor was Chief of the Coördination Section (G-4), and Colonel Moseley was his principal assistant. Assuming that we were really going to put this scheme into effect, I asked General Harbord if he



GENERAL G. V. H. MOSELEY, G-4, G.H.Q.

One of the outstanding figures of the A.E.F.

would not transfer Colonel Moseley to Tours. It subsequently developed that upon this decision hinged the whole future organization of the Supply System. The application for Moseley was not approved. Colonel Connor went off to be Chief of Staff, and afterwards a brigade commander, of a combat division, and Moseley became G-4 at G.H.Q. After the Armistice Colonel de Chambrun said to me at Marshal Pétain's headquarters that 'The American supply system will always be coördinated wherever Moseley is and the S.O.S. could never be operated from Tours as long as Moseley was at G.H.Q.'

Instead of Moseley we got Colonel Henry C. Smither as G-4, and Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Barber, Logan's principal man, as G-1. Colonel Smither remained G-4 until long after the Armistice and proved himself to be one of the ablest officers in the S.O.S. Among other officers whom we got at this time were Colonel Edwin B. Winans and Colonel J. C. Gilmore, Jr.; the latter had been procured by me for the purpose of becoming Adjutant General of the S.O.R. to succeed Colonel Wilcox who had died. Before Gilmore's arrival, however, Colonel Louis H. Bash had reported for temporary duty and General Kernan made him Adjutant General. I assigned Gilmore to duty for a while as G-2, but he was not suited to this work and was subsequently transferred to England and finally back to the States. Winans went to combat duty, made a fine record, and became a general officer.

CHAPTER XII

BIRTH OF THE S.O.S.

Views of Charles G. Dawes on relations between the Military and Big Business — Visit of Board to Base Ports and Supply Depots — Conditions at Is-sur-Tille — General Pershing's final decision — Distribution of duties under the new organization.

THE work of the Hagood Board at Chaumont having been completed for the present, I left on the Atterbury Special Thursday night and arrived at Tours at 10.30 the next morning, February 15th. I explained to General Kernan what had been accomplished and showed him a copy of our report. He was very much pleased and authorized me to issue orders announcing the assignment of the various General Staff Assistants and the Deputy Chief of Staff. He said that as I had devised this new organization he would leave to me the details as to how it should work out.

Sunday, February 17th:

Colonel de Chambrun came to report the result of his trip to Paris, and he and I together went to General Réquichot and other local French officials to arrange for the additional accommodations for our headquarters. Colonel de Chambrun agreed with me that we should have Barracks 66, so called because it had been occupied by a French regiment of that number. This lay-out had about twice as much space as there was at General Pershing's headquarters at Chaumont, but de Chambrun very wisely decided that even this was not enough and that we should have, in addition, Rannes Barracks, which had accommodations for a regiment of cavalry and was just adjacent to Barracks 66. This seemed

preposterous to General Réquichot. It was the only place he had for training the next class of French recruits and it involved complete disruption of all French military activities in this area, but after arguing back and forth Colonel de Chambrun said to him that the French Minister of War had approved this in advance and that the most graceful thing for General Réquichot to do was to assent to it, which he did.

The members of our Board assembled in Paris and had a long conference with General W. W. Atterbury, Colonel Charles G. Dawes, and others. General Atterbury held that it was a mistake to turn over Transportation to the L.O.C. He pointed out the example of the British transportation service and its operation under Sir Eric Geddes. He was very emphatic that the transportation system could not work if it were subject to arbitrary interference all along the line by local military commanders.

Attitude of Charles G. Dawes:

Colonel Dawes, however, took the opposite view. It was my first experience with Dawes and I was tremendously impressed by what he said upon that occasion. Although we were in a small room and only a few present, Dawes delivered an oration. He walked up and down the room, gesticulating to emphasize his points, and showed more conviction than any one else we struck on this trip.

In substance, Dawes stated that this was a question, not of individuals, but of a big corporation where every unit would have to coöperate to the maximum degree possible under a single guiding hand; that industrial corporations were of comparatively recent growth; that the military corporation was the oldest in the world; that industrial corporations were created to meet some particular purpose,

some to operate banks, some to operate railroads, and some to sell goods; that the American corporation was a very fine machine to accomplish the purpose for which it was organized, but that when the corporation undertook to do something it knew nothing about it would meet with failure. He said that the fundamental principles governing military operations had not changed; that the trade secrets of the military profession were known only to military men; that they could not be understood by civilians; that the military corporation had been organized to conduct war and that there was no other corporation in the world qualified to conduct it. He said that the impelling force behind the industrial corporation was to make something for as little money as possible and to sell it for as much money as possible, thereby leaving a margin of difference for the corporation; that the impelling force behind the military corporation was to get a certain thing at a certain place at a certain time and that money was no consideration except as it might be a means to that end. He pointed to the horseshoe nail as turning the fate of a nation, not on account of its money value, but because of its not being at the right place at the right time.

He summed it up by saying that he considered it the function of Big Business to offer its services to the military, to do as it was told by the military, to give advice, but to abide by the decisions of the military in case its advice was not taken. He considered it the height of folly to propose any scheme by which a business man, no matter how brilliant, should dictate methods to the military, whether it be methods of conducting combat operations at the front or methods of supplying troops from the rear.

Dawes practiced what he preached. In the course of time he became one of the biggest factors of the American effort



For my superior officer, the Chief of Staff, G. S.
General Johnson Hagood, with congratulations
upon his brilliant success and deep
appreciation of his kindness & help to me
from his friend
Charles G. Hawes

in France, but he always maintained the attitude that the military knew what it wanted and how, when, and where; that his function was to help — not to direct.

After spending a week inspecting the principal ports and other L.O.C. activities and getting the views of everybody concerned, the Board reassembled at Chaumont on Wednesday, February 27th, and remained constantly in session until Friday night. The main topic of discussion was the distribution of work between the Transportation Department and the Engineers, the authority which local commanders should have over the Transportation officials within their territory, the disposition of the Motor Transport Service, and the status of the Regulating Officer at Is-sur-Tille. We were absolutely agreed that all the construction work should be turned over to one department. I was of the opinion that it should be the Engineers, but I was argued down to the effect that it was impossible for the Engineer Department to do all the work, because the Transportation Department would have to do its own emergency repairs and should also do all of its own technical railroad construction. I consented, therefore, that all construction work should be turned over to the Transportation Department. We all agreed that the present arrangement for transportation was very bad. The Transportation Department handled railroad and water transportation; the Quartermaster Corps handled motor and animal transportation. We decided that motor transportation should also go to the Transportation Department. After having heard Colonel W. D. Connor, Colonel Moseley, and others, who advocated having regulating officers attached to G.H.Q., we decided that this should not be done under any circumstances; that the regulating officer in theory should belong to the General Staff of the Army or the Corps and should be

there for the purpose of calling out such supplies as that organization desired, but that since his detachment to this duty practically relegated him to the rear he should, in fact, belong to the L.O.C.

Responsibility of Base Commanders:

One matter of discussion upon which it seemed to be impossible to agree was the one in which I insisted that the base port commanders should be responsible for the unloading of the transports and that the local representative of the D.G.T. should be on the staff of the local military commander and have the same status as the corresponding local representative of the other supply services. Colonel Andrews stood out against this, Major Wetherill agreed with it, and Colonels Davis and McCoy, I believe, agreed with it at heart, but did not consider it expedient to make such a radical change in the status of the Transportation Department.

There seemed to be no possibility of an agreement upon such a broad issue, so I notified the other members that we might as well close the thing out and that I should submit a minority report. After thinking this out, however, I decided, the next morning, to change my tactics and go to the limit in the direction desired by the majority. I therefore dictated the Board's action on this phase of the matter and it was finally incorporated in our second report. It provided that the Transportation Department would have a representative attached to headquarters of the base ports and other section commanders, but that under no circumstances would these commanders assume any control over these activities, give these representatives any instructions, or in any way interfere with the transaction of their business. I explained to the Board that I took this action because I was perfectly convinced that my own plan would eventually be brought about

no matter what plan the Board offered to the contrary. (See further discussion of this subject in Chapter XVII.)

My prediction as to the final outcome came true, and it is rather a strange thing that Colonel McCoy himself, a cavalry officer, with not the slightest technical knowledge of railroad transportation, subsequently became the Director General of Transportation in France and that Colonel W. D. Connor, the most ardent of all the advocates of having a technical civilian at the head of the Transportation Department, himself subsequently became Director General of Transportation for the American Army in Washington.

Saturday March 2d:

General Pershing called the Board together and discussed with us our proposed solution of the last phase of the problem. He did not seem to be at all satisfied with it. I told him that so far as I was concerned, my views were very clear and that my mind had been made up long before the war that the three great so-called supply services of the Army should be Supply, Construction, and Transportation; that the Quartermaster Department should handle Supply; that the Engineer Department should handle Construction, and that a new department should be created to handle all Transportation — rail, water, motor, and animal-drawn. He asked me why we did not put this in the report and I told him that it involved such a complete reorganization, both in France and in the United States, that it did not seem practicable in the middle of war, and that even if we could so organize in France, it would result in an unutterable mix-up through having an organization on one side essentially different from that on the other.

After discussing the matter somewhat further, General Pershing directed Colonel Andrews and me to return to

Tours, saying that if he desired any further advice or suggestion from the Board, he would get it from members resident at Chaumont. He then had Colonel Andrews and me to lunch and impressed upon me very forcibly the necessity for decentralization, for cutting out red tape, and for leaving to the bureau chiefs and other subordinates the details of their work. He told me that I must keep in close touch with General Harbord, his Chief of Staff, making frequent trips to Chaumont and talking over the telephone; also that my assistant chiefs of staff must do likewise with the corresponding officers at Chaumont. He said that he himself desired to keep in very close touch with General Kernan.

It is to be noted that General Pershing discouraged the old-fashioned idea of going 'through military channels.' He encouraged and directed subordinates to go directly to the source of supply, information, and authority. He was interested in the ends—not the means. He trusted his subordinates to do their work; he wanted results; and he got them.

This finished the work of our Board and we adjourned. I returned to Tours, taking with me a copy of our supplemental report, which dealt with the headquarters organization at Tours and recommended no material change in our original plan except in the distribution of duties between the Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Department.

March 4th to 8th:

General Kernan left on the 5th for Chaumont for a conference with General Pershing on the subject of the new reorganization. I disposed of a number of matters that had been accumulating during my absence and had several conferences with my assistants as to the details of putting the new system into operation.

In the meantime, so much objection had been raised to the name 'Service of the Rear' that I got our Board to recommend to General Pershing that the name 'Line of Communications' be given back.

Saturday March 9th:

General Kernan returned from Chaumont with the final copy of General Orders 31. It was issued under the same date as the original, February 4th, and was marked 'Corrected Copy.'

After Colonel Andrews and I left Chaumont General Pershing had decided upon the changes necessary to meet the difference upon which our Board could not agree. He had substituted the term 'Services of Supply' (S.O.S.) for 'Service of the Rear.' Then to meet the conflicts existing between the Transportation Department and the Construction Department of the Engineer Corps, the new order abolished the Transportation Department under the Director General of Transportation and substituted therefor a Service of Utilities, which included Transportation, Motor Transportation, and Construction and Forestry.

The initial organization of the new S.O.S. was as follows:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Major J. P. McAdams.

G-1 (Lieut. Colonel A. B. Barber): Ocean tonnage; War Risk Bureau; requisitions on War Department; priority of overseas shipments; replacements; General Purchasing Board; leave areas; Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and other similar activities; Provost Marshal's service.

G-2 (Major Cabot Ward): Secret Service; counter-espionage; military information.

G-3: Not organized.

G-4 (Colonel H. C. Smither): Construction, transportation and supply; hospitalization and sanitation; remount and veterinary service; labor bureau; salvage; billets.

G-5: Not organized.

Administrative Services

Adjutant General's Department (Colonel Louis H. Bash): Routine administration, records, correspondence and personnel; postal service.

Inspector General's Department (Colonel John S. Winn): Investigations; inspection of property and accounts.

Judge Advocate's Department (Colonel John A. Hull): General supervision of courts-martial and the administration of military law.

Supply Services

Quartermaster Corps (General Harry L. Rogers): Food, clothing, fuel and forage; pay; remounts; laundries and salvage plants; graves registration.

Medical Department (General Merritte W. Ireland): Hospitals; care of sick and wounded; sanitation; veterinary service.

Engineer Department (General Harry Taylor): Engineer supplies, depots and shops; electric light, power and water.

Ordnance Department (General John H. Rice): Shops, depots, stores; arms and ammunition; gas bombs, shells, etc., for Gas Service; artillery carriages, harness, and trucks.

Signal Corps (General Edgar Russel): Radio and wire communication; pigeon service; photography.

Air Service (General B. D. Foulois): Airplanes and balloons; aviation and aero stations.

General Purchasing Board (Colonel Charles G. Dawes): Purchase and procurement of supplies in Europe; labor bureau; prevention of competition; adjustment of Inter-Allied accounts.

Gas Service (General Amos Fries): Procurement of supplies not otherwise assigned; invention and experimentation.

Service of Utilities

(General W. C. Langfitt)

Construction (General Mason M. Patrick): Construction and repair of buildings, wharves, roads, railroads, etc.; forestry service, lumber and tie production.

Transportation Department (General W. W. Atterbury): Operation of railways and inland waterways under American control; ocean transport; unloading of ships.

Motor Transportation (Colonel F. H. Pope): Operation of all motor transportation except vehicles of special design in the hands of other services.

Light Railways and Highways (Colonel Edgar Jadwin): Construction of highways and construction and operation of 60-centimeter railways.

Thus was launched the great S.O.S., christened by General Pershing, himself, the 'Services of Supply,' but usually called at Tours the 'Service of Supply' or simply the 'S.O.S.' The organization thus created remained in effect without material change until the Armistice. The only organic change was in the status of the Transportation Department (see Chapter XVIII). The command changed from Kernan to Harbord on July 29th (see Chapter XX), but all the principal staff officers and the general method of doing business remained the same, subject, of course, to a tremendous expansion and to a very rapid and healthy growth to keep pace with the steady increase in the number of arriving troops.

CHAPTER XIII

GETTING STARTED

Survey of the situation March 1, 1918 — The principal projects — General Staff procedure — The new headquarters — Female labor — Madame Avril de Saint-Croix, head of the feminist movement in France — Salvage plant — Visit of Secretary Baker — Leave areas — Long-expected German drive begins — Strike of German prisoners — Bombardment of Paris.

HAVING secured a workable organization it may be well to stop here and make a survey of the situation.

On March 1, 1918, we had 233,000 troops in France. The rate of arrival during the preceding sixty days had been about 1000 per day. Under the programme of 2,000,000 men in France by January, 1919, this rate of arrival would have to be increased to 5000 per day. The arrival of troops was controlled by what was known as a priority schedule broken up into phases. Each phase roughly represented an army corps. It was not required that each division or smaller unit arriving in France should be complete within itself. But it was required that each *phase* should be complete and should provide all components necessary to complete the organizations already in France. This included army, corps, and S.O.S. troops. The dates of sailing were fixed by the available bottoms, but the order of troop shipments was to be determined by the priority schedule.

It might be well to explain what is meant by army, corps, and S.O.S. troops. A division consisted of two infantry brigades and one artillery brigade, the artillery consisting of three-inch guns and six-inch howitzers. A corps consisted of two or more divisions and contained additional forces known as Corps Troops; that is, heavy artillery, engineers, medical units, etc. A division was a definite, complete unit, like a



To Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood with
appreciation of his services in the A.E.F.
Summerall, Maj. Gen.

GENERAL SUMMERALL

Division and Corps Commander, A.E.F.; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

regiment, but a corps was somewhat territorial. It varied in size and complexion, depending upon its mission, and these extra auxiliary forces, shifted from one place to another, constituted the Corps Troops. The army was the same, though on a larger scale, with an air service, still heavier artillery and a greater variety and quantity of auxiliary forces. The S.O.S. troops consisted of labor organizations, replacements, and troops of all the supply services.

On March 1st we were discharging about seven thousand tons of cargo per day. This rate of discharge had been at a standstill for the preceding sixty days. It was less in February than in January, by the number of working days. British experience indicated that forty pounds of freight of all kinds per man per day was necessary to keep their army going. But the Americans were attempting to do a great deal more than the British. We were planning to build railroads with American rails and cross-ties and to operate them with American locomotives and cars. We were planning to dredge harbors and build docks. Europe had not yet been introduced to the Summerall barrage. No artillery brigade had yet fired fourteen million dollars' worth of ammunition in ninety days. It did not seem likely, therefore, that the American Army could make out with less than the British allowance of forty pounds per man per day. Two million men in France meant forty thousand tons every twenty-four hours. It seemed impossible to increase our rate of discharge sixfold, so we determined upon the arbitrary figure of twenty-five thousand tons per day and *determined* to find a way to get this much unloaded.

The general scheme was to keep ninety days' supplies in France — forty-five days' in the ports, thirty days' in the Intermediate Section, and fifteen days' in the Advance Section and in hands of troops.

All this required ships, rolling stock, and warehouses. This

much had been figured out and planned with pencil and paper before the S.O.S. had been created. But it also required the personnel to get this big plant together and to operate it. It required going into the forests, felling timber, sawing out boards, and erecting buildings. It required the taking-over and construction of factories; the manufacture of raw material into finished products; the rehabilitation of broken-down rail and inland waterways; and the management, feeding, clothing, housing, and handling of the S.O.S. troops themselves, scattered all over France.

*Principal projects:*¹

At this time the principal ports turned over to us by the French were Saint-Nazaire, Bordeaux, Nantes, La Pallice, Le Havre, and Brest. At all of these ports except Bordeaux we were planning to use existing French accommodations as soon as we could get hold of them.


At Bordeaux we were planning two construction projects — the Bassens project, which included ten new berths 410 feet each in length and to be served by four tracks, together with electric Gantry cranes, and all other most modern American apparatus; and the Saint-Sulpice project, which was a general storage depot similar to the one described below for Montoir, but about half its size.

The Montoir project (near Saint-Nazaire) included eight berths for ships, 4,000,000 square feet of covered storage space, and 261 miles of siding and storage tracks.


At Gièvres was planned the Intermediate Depot, with 4,492,000 square feet of covered storage space, 243 miles of trackage, storage for 4,000,000 gallons of gasoline and oil, and a refrigerating plant with a capacity of 5200 tons.

At Is-sur-Tille was to be the principal advance depot, with

¹ See map, p. 47.



REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED ON MEN IN FRANCE AT END OF EACH MONTH



CARGO FROM UNITED STATES DISCHARGED IN FRANCE

NOTE: British experience indicated forty pounds per man per day as necessary. This chart does not include purchases in France.

a capacity of 2,000,000 square feet of covered storage space and 96 miles of trackage.

For the Medical Department, hospital accommodations for 200,000 beds were planned in base hospitals and about 25,000 in advance hospitals, on a basis of 2,000,000 men. This meant about 250 miles of standard hospital wards, placed end to end.

It can readily be seen that the existing situation, with only 233,000 men in France, was of small consequence compared to plans for the future. We were told that the British had forty per cent of their men behind the lines. On a basis of 2,000,000 men, this meant 800,000 in the S.O.S. besides those passing through and coming back for training.

The thing to do then was to get ready to organize an 800,000-man team to work with the maximum efficiency. No one man can do more than so much in a day. The Chief of Staff and the General Staff of the S.O.S. must get busy with the big things and let the little ones take care of themselves. Life and death were incidents of daily routine at the front. A man's life often depended upon the decision of his squad leader. Therefore, in the S.O.S. anything that was of no more consequence than the life or death of a man could well be left to subordinates. It had to be done.

General Staff procedure:

The training at West Point for mathematical precision, the temptation to work out puzzles, the long-established custom of our finance department to look for lost pennies, the habit of passing up for decision of higher authority all interesting or knotty problems, no matter how inconsequential, all indicated that certain fundamental principles must be firmly established for the government of myself and my General Staff assistants if we were to find time in each twenty-

four hours to handle the big problems and let the little ones go. These principles were:

First: Rank and authority should not be confused with knowledge. No man should set his authority against another man's judgment. The General Staff was to adjust differences, and when there were no differences then the General Staff was not to act. If the issue could be boiled down to a matter of opinion or judgment, I took the opinion or judgment of the man on the job — not that of the General Staff. The same rule applied to myself. If after a full discussion I could not agree with a bureau chief or other responsible authority upon a matter lying wholly within his department, I yielded my judgment to his and let him do it his way.

Second: When intelligent men differed on matters of minor importance, a minor official had to decide between them.

Third: No subordinate officer should make a final *unfavorable* decision on any matter which a bureau chief or section commander considered vital to his interests. In case of such an unfavorable decision, whether over my own signature or over that of one of my assistants, it was the duty of the bureau chief or the base commander concerned to bring the matter to my personal attention, either by interview, telephone, telegraph, or letter. The question was then re-opened and discussed upon its merits, without prejudice. This took the sting out of all General Staff decisions, and although a number of appeals were made I cannot remember that during the entire term of my service as Chief of Staff there was a single case of this kind that was not finally adjusted to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Fourth: No order, memorandum, instructions, or plan could be changed and issued by the General Staff without first submitting it in final form to the man who originated it.

If that man didn't like it and was unable to adjust it with the General Staff, he had a right to appeal to me.

Fifth: The bureau chiefs were required to see that there was no unnecessary delay in getting General Staff approval of their projects. After a reasonable time had elapsed without getting action on a matter of importance, the bureau chief was required to bring this delay to my attention, and if he failed to do so responsibility for the delay rested with him.

Sixth: Complete responsibility was placed upon the bureau chiefs and section commanders for the initiation and prosecution of all that was needful within their respective spheres unless they were specifically told otherwise. Ordinarily in the military service a subordinate is given a definite mission by his superior and he is not responsible for anything except the accomplishment of this mission. In building up the S.O.S. no one had sufficient grasp of the whole situation to parcel out the work to subordinates. We therefore reversed the usual order, and after giving subordinates a general idea of their field of activity they were held responsible for doing all things needful to accomplish their purpose. That is, all powers not specifically reserved for higher authority were delegated to subordinates. No bureau chief or section commander could stand around wondering if **THEY** were to look after this or that. If he had heard nothing to the contrary, he was '**THEY**'.

Until the above ideas were understood by the members of the General Staff, a great deal of their work had to be carefully supervised. But the principles were very soon accepted and a harmonious relation was developed between the General Staff and the bureau chiefs probably never before experienced in the service. There were exceptions to this rule due to the inexperience of the personnel. In one case a General Staff officer sent a memorandum to a bureau chief directing him to submit a plan showing what he would do in case

one of the divisions were shifted from one part of the line to another. The bureau chief came back with the question whether this was merely a theoretical study or whether it was a move actually under contemplation that he should be prepared to meet. The General Staff officer replied that the bureau chief had had all the information considered advisable and that he would proceed at once to comply with his instructions. This matter having been reported to me, the General Staff officer was summarily relieved from duty at S.O.S. headquarters and sent back to his organization.

Fixing up our new offices:

As soon as we could get a decision from the French, we began to fix up Barracks 66 and Rannes Barracks for use as our headquarters. Rannes Barracks was turned over to Utilities with a stable left out for the War Risk Insurance. Barracks 66 consisted of three main buildings, each four stories high and wide enough for rooms about twenty-four feet deep on each side of an eight-foot hall. The main building was about two hundred and fifty feet long and the others about six hundred feet each. Having been constructed for barracks, they had to be remodeled for office purposes. They were very dirty and had to be thoroughly disinfected by the Medical Department. The Engineers then cleaned them up, whitewashed and painted them throughout, put in partitions, cut doors, installed electric lights, plumbing, etc. The Quartermaster Department provided office furniture, the Signal Corps telephones, and in a short time we were fixed up much better than G.H.Q. at Chaumont.

We allotted all the space to the different departments so that they could expand within their own areas and not become separated. The central building was allotted to the Commanding General, the General Staff, and the Adjutant

General's Department. This one building contained three times as much space as that into which we had attempted to squeeze the whole L.O.C. headquarters at Hôtel Métropole. At first eighty-five per cent allotted each department was vacant, but before the end everything was so crowded that in some rooms it became necessary to provide balconies in order to have additional office space.

Female labor:

I had Colonel Smither of G-4 make a study of utilizing female labor, against which there was apparently some prejudice on the part of section commanders. Colonel Arthur Johnson, at Nevers, had had considerable success with it, so I sent an extract from his report to base commanders. I also sent a copy of it to Colonel Dawes, the General Purchasing Agent in Paris, with instructions to establish a branch for women in his labor bureau.

In the meantime, through the assistance of Madame Borel in Paris, a conference was arranged with Madame Avril de Saint-Croix, the head of the feminist movement in France. Madame Avril de Saint-Croix had placed over 250,000 women with the French Government and said she was prepared to furnish us anything in the way of female labor all the way from the highest-grade stenographers, typists, secretaries, etc., down to stevedores. In order to prove to the French Government that the women were capable of doing the heaviest manual labor, she had put five hundred peasant women of Brittany in competition with a corresponding number of Chinese coolies on stevedore work. These women were quite accustomed to handling boats and heavy cargo and she put them into bunk houses exactly like those occupied by the Chinese. The women won out in a competition based on the quantity of cargo unloaded in a given time. She pre-



2. Very few of these fish supply
all the requirements of the fisherman
and the rest are not used much.

ferred to place the women in factories, or places of that kind, where they could be properly cared for, but had no doubt that there were many places where through her agency women could be hired locally to replace soldiers, preferably by working by the day near their homes. I sent Madame Avril de Saint-Croix to Colonel Dawes. She had a conference with him and with Major John Price Jackson, the head of the American Labor Bureau.

Miss Elsie Gunther:

About the same time, Colonel Dawes sent me Miss Elsie Gunther, who had come over in a clerical capacity with the Red Cross. Upon Major Jackson's recommendation she was put at the head of the Female Labor Bureau at Tours, with an officer as her assistant, where she eventually worked up an organization of about twelve thousand women.

Salvage plant:

When we arrived at Tours we found a feeble effort to establish a salvage plant. Captain Franklin D'Olier, a very prominent young business man back in the States whose particular knack was to rehabilitate broken-down organizations, was put on the job and made a great success of it. When the plant was in full operation, it turned out salvaged material to the value of about \$100,000 a day.

Visit of Mr. Baker:

On March 15th the Secretary of War arrived, accompanied by General Pershing. We were still at the Hôtel Métropole and there was not much to show the Secretary at Tours except the salvage plant, the modifications being made at Barracks 66, and the cathedral. This was the Secretary's first visit to France and, so far as the S.O.S. was con-

cerned, I don't think he could have been very favorably impressed.

General Pershing took me aside and asked me what I thought of the new organization of the Service of Utilities. I told him that I thought it was very fine and a great improvement on the suggestion that had been made by our Board. He struck his hands together and said, 'Well, we have got to make it go!!' He said he was afraid that the Transportation Department felt a little let down, but that it was good for them, because they had been too independent and should be made to know that they must work themselves into the whole scheme and operate as part of the team.

Strike of German prisoners:

On the same day that the German offensive began in March, 1918, we had a strike among the German prisoners at La Pallice. We did not know whether there was any connection between the two, but for a while it was very annoying. These prisoners had been taken by the French and under an international agreement had to be cared for and guarded by them. But they were unloading American transports and our sentinels were around to see that American property was not stolen or destroyed. On this occasion a prisoner allowed a box to fall and the American sentinel took him to task. The prisoner insulted the sentinel, told him he was without authority and dared him to shoot. The sentinel went to the hatchway, discharged his piece and said that the next time he fired he would point his gun at a prisoner. Two hundred and fifty other prisoners immediately refused to work. The French general in charge of the stockade made them stand in ranks all night without any supper. Next morning all the rest of the prisoners in the stockade refused to work. The French general then lined up the whole outfit, 2300 strong,

covered them with machine guns and artillery, and held them standing in ranks all day and all night until, at the end of about twenty-four hours, they decided to give in — and that was the last of the trouble.

Among the German prisoners there were always a few who spoke English and had been to the States. These soon got on easy terms with American recruit sentinels and gave it out to the others that the Americans were 'easy-marks.' Wherever prisoners working for Americans came in contact with the French or British, there was trouble, because the Americans gave the German prisoners more food and better food than the French and British gave their soldiers. Letters written by German prisoners bemoaned the fact that they could not send home the wastage from the American prison camps. An American officer told me that among the German prisoners under his charge was a young fellow who had been a clerk in his grocery store in Baltimore.

The German long-range gun:

On Saturday, March 23d, we were informed by telephone that the Germans were making a daytime raid on Paris; that the planes were very small and so high in the air that they could not be seen. That night, while at the Alhambra Theater with Roger Wurtz, my French Aide, I was handed an afternoon paper which stated that the Germans were bombarding Paris with a long-range gun that was at least sixty-five miles away. I told Wurtz that this was impossible; that the laws of ballistics require such great increases in the size of guns and in the weight of ammunition for such small increases in range that I did not believe any one could make a sudden increase of three times the longest range we had ever had before. But after I got home that night I began to figure out in bed what would happen if instead of shooting

through the air we could shoot up beyond the air, have the shot speed along a certain distance *in vacuo*, and then come back into the air again; and I concluded it could be done.

The next morning, Sunday, I called up Colonel Edwin Bricker, of the Ordnance Department in Paris, and General C. C. Williams, the Chief Ordnance Officer at Tours, and got from them some of the details as to the character of the projectiles, rate of fire, etc. General Williams confirmed my views and told me that Colonel Alston Hamilton of the coast artillery had made calculations along this line some years before the war.

I then called up Colonel Frank R. McCoy at G.H.Q. and asked him what our G-3 friends thought of the long-range bombardment of Paris. McCoy laughed and said that it was all foolishness; that there was no bombardment and that it was merely some high-altitude airplanes dropping bombs. I gave my explanation over the telephone and then sent him a telegram giving the details.

This telegram was the first correct explanation given to our G.H.Q. as to the mysterious German long-range gun and antedated anything given out in the United States. I was very proud of it, because it was not at all in my line of business and I had nothing to work on except my old experience as a coast artillery man. I had no tables or ballistic data and simply worked it out by rule of thumb 'in my head.' I took forty-five degrees' elevation — that actually used was fifty. I took twenty-five miles as the highest point to which the projectile was thrown — the correct height was twenty-three and a half. I took the time of flight to be three minutes, which was correct. I took the velocity to be thirty-five hundred feet per second, which was not far from the average velocity. But I did not have any figures as to the resistance of the air at the surface and missed out on the fact that a

five-thousand-foot initial velocity was necessary to have a three-thousand-foot velocity at a distance of twelve miles up, where the air resistance became negligible. The true figures have since been published in France, England, and the United States. The above facts were recently submitted to McCoy, Williams, Bricker, and Hamilton and confirmed by them.

Here follows the original telegram, with McCoy's confirmation:

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY TELEGRAM

March 24, 1918

Colonel McCoy,
Chaumont.

Reference my conversation this morning, a pith ball or a feather can be fired in a vacuum with the same velocity as a bullet Period Due to resistance of the air, every effort to increase ranges has been offset by the necessity of increasing the weight of the projectile Period A small projectile cannot be thrown a great distance through the air Period A heavy projectile cannot be given a high velocity without prohibitive pressures Period But if a light projectile could be given a relatively high velocity comma say 3500 foot seconds comma and thrown so high into the air as to strike a very rare medium, the projectile could travel through that medium as easily as a much heavier projectile Period Thus the contest between an effort on the one hand to get long range and the difficulty on the other hand to make guns big enough to carry heavy projectiles can be solved by giving a light projectile sufficient initial velocity to carry into the high rarefied strata of the air Period There is no mathematical difficulty in getting a range of 75 or 100 miles but the practical difficulties, of course, are very great.

JH/cte

HAGOOD

CAMP STOTSENBURG, P.I.

Dec. 6/23

I remember this interesting incident and the above telegram with good green reminiscence, for G.H.Q. was quite stirred over the news from Paris and General Harbord and I had been discussing the many rumors and suppositions. The Hagood dispatch and opinion was the first to satisfy our natural curiosity and put us straight.

FRANK McCOY

The next day, Monday, the firing began to be very inaccurate; out of the last ten shots only three struck Paris; and the firing ceased at 11.40, with only one casualty. The total number of shots up to this time had been apparently about seventy-five. By this time the French had worked out pretty thoroughly what was going on. Statement was given out that the gun was located at Crépy, near Laon. The gun was reported to be 229 mm., or $9\frac{1}{2}$ ". The jacket of the shell was about 37 mm. of vanadium steel, leaving a $3\frac{1}{2}$ " cavity, with just enough explosive to break the shell. The range was about seventy-two miles.

Madame Bégin, my French stenographer, returned from Paris and told me that on Saturday all the stores had been closed, that the Métro was not running and that it was impossible to do any shopping. There was the greatest amount of confusion in Paris, but it was more in the nature of curiosity and an effort to meet the situation than it was in demoralization on the part of the people, as was expected by the Germans.

Subsequently I was in Paris during one of the bombardments. No one paid any attention to it. After the Armistice I visited the site of the gun and got photographs of parts of the carriage that the Germans had abandoned.

CHAPTER XIV

BARRACKS 66

Visit to Saint-Aignan — Service stripes — Strike of women employees at Saint-Pierre des Corps — End of submarine peril — Shake-up at G.H.Q. — Visit to Issur-Tille — Brest arrivals increased from 18,000 a month to 40,000 a day — General Harries's plans for accommodating 150,000 returning troops — 'Flu' epidemic.

ON April 4th the grand move was made to Barracks 66. The office of the Commanding General and my own were the last to move. All the other outfits had gone over from time to time during the preceding months.

About this time Colonel J. W. Wright, Infantry, was detailed as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. He remained with the S.O.S. until long after the Armistice and proved to be one of the very best men in the organization.

Visit to Saint-Aignan:

Captain Aiken Simons and I went to Saint-Aignan on Sunday, April 28th, to witness a review and athletic meet. General Alexander, in charge of the camp, had had three bands playing continuously one after another all day. He had thirty-two mayors of neighboring French towns, General de l'Espée, commander of the Fifth Region, also a French general from Paris whose name I don't remember. Besides these he had the Préfet and a number of others. They had a great many events of interest, among others a boxing match between an American soldier and Carpentier, the French champion. He had also a young Marine officer who at the time held the world's record for the mile run. The feature of the day seemed to be an exhibition drill by a squad of Marines in charge of a little French boy six years old, who had been

adopted by them. There were about ten thousand people present, gathered from all over the country.


That night we had a banquet in the hotel. One of the French officials made a very flowery speech in his own language. He spoke of France as a woman on her knees praying for her dead and begging that the few remaining children might be spared; of a black beast that was about to devour her when a great man, the leader of a great people, had come out of the West and was about to strike down the beast and lift the bleeding France to her feet. Many of the French were so affected by this impassioned address that they wept, tears running down their cheeks and splashing into the plates. But one of the American officers who did not understand French thought that the speech was made in praise of himself and those who had assisted him in the arrangements of the day. He arose, therefore, very modestly, and made a short address in English in which he disclaimed all personal responsibility for the great things that had been attributed to him and said that the credit should go not to him but to his assistants.

Later the Mayor of Saint-Aignan presented a large gilded medal to General Alexander.

Service stripes:

About this time the question of service stripes came up. The French had a service stripe to indicate service in the zone of the army, the British had a service stripe to indicate service overseas, and the question was what kind of service stripe should be worn by Americans.

I advocated adopting an overseas stripe, like the British, as our situation was entirely different from the French and it was impossible with us to distinguish between the zone of the army and the zone of the interior of France. The latter, how-



RENNES BARRACKS AND BARRACKS 66, USED AS HEADQUARTERS OF THE S.O.S. IN TOURS

ever, was recommended by G.H.Q. — gold for the front and silver for the back areas. The War Department turned this down and took the gold chevron for France and the silver chevron for the United States.

As predicted, this gave rise to jealousies and hard feeling. If the stripe had been an overseas stripe, the question as to who was entitled to wear it would have been merely a question of fact; that is, those who went overseas would have worn an overseas stripe. But as it was, gold for those who went overseas and silver for those who didn't, it could not fail to produce the impression that those who served in any capacity on one side of the water were more entitled to consideration than those who served in any capacity on the other.

This was made worse by the fact that if a man went across on a sight-seeing tour, he would take off all his silver stripes and substitute one blue one.

As will be seen later, this scheme of having a line of cleavage in Pershing's command between the troops at the front and those at the rear came very near losing the S.O.S. to Pershing and having it go to General Goethals under direct control of the War Department.

I advocated the British scheme of giving a red stripe for the first 100,000. This, again, could not have made hard feeling, as it merely indicated a fact. It would be a recognition of what was known at home as charter members or pioneers. Any arbitrary date could have been set as marking the limit for those to whom the red stripe was issued. My own suggestion was November 1, 1917. To this end I wrote to General Harbord, secured from General C. M. Wagstaff, Chief of the British Mission at Chaumont, a copy of the British regulations, and prepared a letter for General Kernan's signature, under date of March 16, 1918. My journal does not

show what action was taken on these letters, but finally General Kernan wrote a personal letter to General March in Washington, which was the cause of having all men in France put on the same basis.

Strike at Saint-Pierre des Corps:

At Saint-Pierre des Corps we had our principal salvage depot. There were several thousand employees there, mostly women.

The French Government had shown the good judgment, which had not been shown back in the United States, of protecting the industrial conditions by not allowing competition for labor. The wages of labor and all the conditions of employment were very carefully prescribed by laws drawn by the Government in coöperation with French organized labor.

However, as soon as an American industry was started in France, we began to bid for labor on the basis of what it was worth to us. The French stopped this and our G.H.Q. got out rigorous regulations as to the conditions of employment. It was hard, at first, for our people to get adjusted to these rules.

We did not see, for instance, why we were forbidden to pay a French woman more than a dollar and a quarter for doing work that would cost us ten dollars in the United States. On the other hand, we did not understand why we should be required to give all the labor an hour and a half for their mid-day meal instead of thirty minutes. Nor did we understand why every French woman should be entitled to three days' leave of absence on full pay, at any time she might elect, during every month, and five days' additional whenever her husband came home on furlough. Nor did we understand why mothers with small children should receive more pay

than more efficient workers without children. All this, however, became adjusted in time, until we ran into difficulty with our accounting department.

On April 30th the Chief of the French Mission, General Fillenneau, the Mayor of Tours, and Colonel Carson, Acting Chief Quartermaster, came to me with the statement that a very serious strike was pending at the Saint-Pierre des Corps salvage plant and that it was likely to spread to all labor in that vicinity. The cause of the strike was a decision rendered by the Auditor of the War Department, and they came to ask me to get a cable to the United States requesting the Comptroller to reverse the Auditor's decision. Quick action was necessary because the strike had been called for noon the next day.

Having had experience with Army red tape in Washington, I knew that the situation was perfectly hopeless from that standpoint and suggested that we look for some other solution.

It seems that under the French law in case a strike is settled favorably to the strikers, they are entitled to full pay during the time that they were on strike. When we took over the Saint-Pierre des Corps salvage plant from the French, we contracted to take over all of its obligations. Among these obligations was three days' pay under the law to certain women who had been on strike six months before we took over the plant. The American Auditor had held that under the laws of the United States employees could not receive compensation for services not rendered.

No question was raised either by ourselves or by the French as to the equity of the debt, nor as to the fact that the obligation for settling it rested upon the United States. The only question was how it could be paid out of public funds and the vouchers passed by our Auditing Department. The

amount due each woman was something like five dollars.

I suggested to General Fillenneau that we had been trying for a long time to pay these women higher wages, but were forbidden to do so by the French. I asked why the whole thing could not be settled by simply increasing the wages of these women five dollars per day for one day. Colonel Carson said that that would be satisfactory to him. General Fillenneau had to take it up with the French War Office, but they agreed, and before noon the next day the strike had been settled on that basis.

End of submarine peril:

About April 30th we got the first information that the menace of the German submarine had been overcome. Mr. Dwight Morrow, of J. P. Morgan and Company; Mr. W. H. Raymond, President of the Clyde and Mallory steamship lines; Mr. Sherman, who represented our shipping interests in England; and Major Alfred Huger, a judge advocate attached to the Shipping Board, arrived from the United States and came to Tours for conference with our G-1 on the subject of tonnage. We were told that beginning the first of June it was expected that the United States would turn out two ships a day running from five to ten thousand tons each, and that this rate would soon increase. Mr. Morrow told me that this programme, together with the tremendous increase in destroyers on anti-submarine duty, would relieve us of any further worry on account of German submarines. Up to this time our losses had caused the tonnage curve to go steadily down. Mr. Morrow said that after June 1st the curve would turn up and keep going up at a very rapid rate. This was good news of the first magnitude, and subsequently proved to be true.

Shake-up at G.H.Q.:

Frank McCoy telephoned me from Chaumont on May 1st that there was to be a big shake-up there. General Harbord was to take command of the Marine brigade of the 2d Division, General Doyen having been found physically disqualified. Major General J. W. McAndrew, who had been commanding the Army school at Langres, was to replace Harbord as Chief of Staff, G.H.Q. McCoy himself was to get a regiment and was to be replaced as Secretary of the General Staff by Major James L. Collins, formerly one of General Pershing's aides. Colonel W. D. Connor was to be Chief of Staff of the 32d Division and was to be replaced as G-4, G.H.Q., by Colonel George Van H. Moseley. Colonel Le Roy Eltinge, Cavalry, was to assume the new duty of Deputy Chief of Staff. General Alfred E. Bradley had been found physically disqualified and was replaced as Chief Surgeon by General M. W. Ireland. General Benjamin Alvord, the Adjutant General, was to be replaced by Colonel R. C. Davis. I lost a lot of my friends at G.H.Q. by this change, and it did not seem to me that it was wise to keep things so stirred up during this formative period.

Visit to Is-sur-Tille:

As I had not seen Is-sur-Tille for some time, I decided to go up there and see how Colonel Hilgard was getting along.

We left on the famous Atterbury Special at about eight o'clock May 3d, and, strange to say, arrived on time, about seven-fifteen, the next morning. In the same compartment with me was Professor William S. Thayer, of Johns Hopkins University. He was at that time a major in the Medical Department and afterwards colonel and brigadier general. The Medical Department, like the Signal Corps, had secured the services of some of the very best technicians in the whole

country and had given them high commissions in order to get the full benefit of their services. General Thayer had the title of Chief Consultant, Medical Corps, A.E.F. We had a very long and, to me, most interesting talk, but certainly spent a most miserable night on the train.

At Is-sur-Tille I had a very good breakfast at the Red Cross hotel and then went over the plant with Colonel Charles C. Farmer and Colonel Hilgard. Colonel Farmer was supposed to be the commanding officer and Colonel Hilgard the regulating officer. With Colonel Hilgard was my old friend Colonel H. H. Adams, supposed to be the local representative of the Transportation Department. But Hilgard, whose sole idea was to get results, had subjugated Colonel Farmer and Colonel Adams. Their activities, instead of maintaining their separate sovereignties, had become dependencies of Hilgard. I admired Hilgard's work very much. He was my representative when I commanded the Advance Section, L.O.C. Subsequently he had been attached to G-4 at G.H.Q. Under the provisions of General Orders 44 he belonged to the first army that was to be formed. After that he came under the responsibility of the C.G., S.O.S., and finally went back to G-4, G.H.Q., but I think that none of these changes in any way affected the manner in which he did his work or the channels through which he operated. His one idea was to get as much stuff as he could up from the rear and reissue it to the front. He concerned himself very little as to whom he was responsible and what authority he had for issuing his orders.

Hilgard's status at Is-sur-Tille was a very fine example of the fact that in time of war you cannot set up a new theoretical organization with a man who is up against a very difficult practical problem. The only thing you can do is to take the well-established and thoroughly understood old system

and modify it in such detail as may be necessary to meet new conditions. This is what Hilgard did at Is-sur-Tille. But it did not conform to theory or G.H.Q. orders.

Arrivals at Brest:

In the latter part of May we began to receive the enormous troop shipments under the Abbeville Agreement (see Chapter XXII).

When we first made a survey of the available French ports, it was reported that Brest could handle only 18,000 troops a month. This estimate was based on general port conditions and the housing accommodations in the city. Like many other foreign cities Brest had no piers at which troop ships could be unloaded. They had to disembark out in the harbor and be brought ashore in lighters and barges. Nothing had been provided in the way of rest camps or other similar accommodations necessary for handling large bodies of troops.

When Brigadier General George H. Harries, of the District of Columbia National Guard, took command at Brest, the city had very little water even for the modest requirements of its French population. General Harries threw a concrete dam across a small stream above the city and piped in enough water to double the supply of the whole city of Brest.

When, under the Abbeville Agreement, we began to look for a port of debarkation, General Harries was asked how many troops he could handle at Brest. He replied that he could handle all that could be sent there. He was put to the test when they sent in a single convoy of 42,000 troops, but he discharged them within twenty-four hours. This was a very remarkable achievement and was observed with wonder and amazement by the French and British.

I sent General Harries a telegram of congratulations:

SIGNAL CORPS TELEGRAM

HQ. S.O.S., A.E.F., May 29, 1918

C.G., Brest.

C.S. 28. It has been reported to these headquarters that the difficult problem of handling some forty-two thousand troops at Brest within twenty-four hours was executed in a highly efficient manner. It is understood that this was due to a determination by you and your subordinates to overcome all difficulties — to get together as a team and accomplish results. It is understood that all participated in this hearty coöperation, including the Navy, and that some of your subordinates remained constantly on duty for over sixty hours in order to accomplish these results. This fine American spirit is going to win the war and the C.G. desires you to convey his congratulations and hearty appreciation to all concerned.

JOHNSON HAGOOD

JH/my

Chief of Staff

When troops came ashore at Brest they had no transportation; often they landed in the rain and had to carry their baggage, rations, water, stoves, and fuel by hand to the open fields to which they had been assigned for quarters. But they were glad to get off the sea, glad to be in France, and buoyant in the hope of soon getting to the front. General Harries had taken up the proposition of trying to build proper camp sites, but there was nothing available for him, either in lumber, material, transportation, or labor. This was just one of the thousands of difficulties into which we had been led by the Abbeville Agreement and which are discussed in Chapter XXII. In other words, it was WAR.

Later, upon the occasion of a visit by General Pershing, General Harries asked what was going to happen when these troops began to face the other way. He requested authority to start right in to build a camp which could be used at the time for incoming troops and later for homegoing troops. He

wanted accommodations for 150,000 men. He wanted to begin with wooden houses to accommodate 50,000 in double-deck bunks. This was tentatively approved by General Pershing, and General Harries was authorized to go ahead with such transportation, lumber, material, and labor as he could get together locally.

On September 1st I was at Brest and told Harries to go ahead with his 50,000-men camp, but to count it as accommodations for only half that number. On account of the danger of 'flu' epidemic the Chief Surgeon said we must not crowd the men into double-deck bunks, and I promised to try to get tents pending the authority to construct the balance of the camp.

Upon my return to Tours I gave instructions that tentage for two divisions should be sent at once to Brest and that a cable should be sent to the United States for tentage to accommodate 50,000 additional men, together with lumber for tent floors. The lumber for tent floors, at General Harries's suggestion, was brought on the decks of the troop ships. When it reached Brest it had to be carried by hand to the camp, because, as is indicated in the chapter on the Abbeville Agreement, practically all transportation had been taken away from the S.O.S. and sent to the front for the use of the First Army.

In October we had the big 'flu' epidemic. The Leviathan alone arrived with 514 cases of 'flu,' 463 cases of pneumonia, and 68 dead. Harries reported that the men in his camps were dying at the rate of about one every ten minutes. We got information that another convoy had arrived in England with about 250 dead. This trouble was brought over from the United States. There was no spread of disease in France and as soon as men got ashore the death rate decreased. Those in tents at Brest did better than the ones in barracks.

The plans for building the big camp at Brest had been progressing very slowly. On October 4th accommodations had been provided for only about ten thousand men and this was increasing at the rate of about three hundred a day. The feeding arrangements were good. I had told General Harries in September of the arrangements at Saint-Aignan and had sent him copies of the plans. Their system had been installed and was in operation.

On October 4th I had a conference with General Jadwin, Director of Construction and Forestry, Colonels Smither and Poole of G-4, Colonel Cavanaugh of G-1, and McAdams, Deputy Chief of Staff, with a view to throwing the entire force of the S.O.S. behind the building programme at Brest. McAdams agreed to send four thousand large tents and thirty trucks from Le Havre. Jadwin sent a regiment of Engineers to take over construction. We arranged for permanent camp detachments to be organized from the Army Service Corps and authorized Harries to employ French civilian cooks.

I directed Harries to call me on long-distance telephone and make a daily progress report and also to submit daily by wire a report of his greatest needs.

General Ireland sent a surgeon to Brest to keep his office in touch with the situation.

After the Armistice there was a great deal of discussion in the newspapers about the poor accommodations at Brest for returning soldiers, one of the complaints being that the soldiers had no sidewalks and had to go from tent to tent in the mud. Even this condition, however, was finally relieved through the efforts of Colonel Butler of the Marine Corps.

CHAPTER XV

PERSONNEL FOR THE S.O.S.

No source of personnel for headquarters — Staff service mixed up — Men in charge jumped by assistants — S.O.S. suggests remedy — Delayed action at Chaumont — Pershing cables War Department — Answer confused and misunderstood — Kernan suggests Hagood go to States — Pershing asks for Army Service Corps, 4000 officers and 100,000 men — Grade of lieutenant general authorized for C.G., S.O.S.

Up to this time we had no definite source of personnel for our various headquarters, depots, and other activities. Officers, soldiers, and clerks were picked up here and there, detached from their units and assigned to special duty.

For combat units and for the old peace-time administrative headquarters there was a definite personnel prescribed in organization tables, showing the number and grades of officers, soldiers, clerks, etc. The positions in the organization tables carried definite rank or grades to which the men in the organization could be appointed. G.H.Q. had been trying for some time to get us to make up organization tables for our various headquarters, to be approved by the War Department, so that the necessary personnel could be set aside for that purpose.

But conditions in the S.O.S. varied so greatly and changed so rapidly that we found it impossible to work this out. I recommended to General Kernan that we determine from time to time the total number of officers required and divide them up among the different grades on a percentage basis, as had been done in the so-called Extra Officers Bill, with which General Kernan and I had been associated in the War Department. We decided upon the proportion of one colonel

to two lieutenant colonels to four majors to five captains to eight lieutenants, which was roughly that of the Army, as a whole, in May, 1917.

This would solve the difficulty for the line, but for the staff there were still further troubles.

We had created in France a number of new staff services which had nothing corresponding on the other side—notably the Transportation Department, the Motor Transport Service, the Provost Marshal Service, Construction and Forestry, Gas Service, etc. These services were being operated by men detached from other arms. Officers of the Quartermaster Corps were serving in practically all of the other staff departments and even in the line. On the other hand, a very small number of officers on quartermaster duty belonged to the Quartermaster Corps. The Transportation Department had a few officers commissioned in the Transportation Corps, but the bulk of their people were commissioned either in the Engineer Corps or the National Army.

The Gas Service was operated principally by Engineer officers, as were also Construction and Forestry and Light Railways. But though the Construction and Forestry Service was operated by Engineer officers, the Chief Engineer Officer, A.E.F., had no control over their assignment or promotion. Promotions were being made by seniority in the old services, so that in any of these new services, composed of men of all arms, a man in charge of a job was liable to find one of his assistants promoted over his head. Men conspicuously incompetent were being advanced, while men conspicuously efficient were held down to such low grades that we could not take full advantage of their talents.

Washington had notified us that there would be 65,000 officers for the Staff Corps, including eight major generals and

fifty brigadier generals. We decided to ask for a definite allotment of these vacancies for each of the staff departments in the S.O.S. We proposed to create a separate line of promotion in each of the new branches and to place the advancement of officers in those branches in the hands of the men who were at the head of them.

In order to carry this plan into effect, I prepared a cablegram to send to the War Department, over General Pershing's signature. General Kernan approved it and we submitted it to G.H.Q. with an explanatory letter on April 13, 1918.

We got no action on this until May 15th, when General McAndrew, Chief of Staff at Chaumont, called me on the telephone and asked me to explain certain features of our proposed cablegram which he did not understand. I suggested that a month had elapsed and that during that time new conditions had arisen, particularly with reference to the Transportation Department, the Motor Transport Corps, and the Gas Service; that therefore our cable would not be understood in Washington; and I offered to draw up a new one, which I did at once.

Again, however, we got no action. Five days later I was called to Paris for a conference with General Pershing on other matters. I took up with him then the plan of organizing the S.O.S. personnel. He thought it a good scheme and said he would send the cable when he got back to Chaumont. Three days later General Pershing called me on the telephone and, after asking some further questions about the proposed cable, directed me to come to G.H.Q. to assist in putting it in final shape. I went to Chaumont and on May 25th the cable was sent to the War Department. It followed the general lines of my previous suggestions, with some slight modifications as to numbers, and is here shown:

CABLEGRAM No. 1189-S

May 25, 1918

Paragraph —. For the Chief of Staff. It is necessary to establish a definite authorized strength for Headquarters Services of Supply and for Headquarters of the several sections thereof, including personnel for permanent camps. It is proposed by this means to standardize promotion and to create an authorized establishment to which officers and enlisted men may be transferred or assigned. It is not possible to pass intelligently upon recommendations for advancement unless officers belong to organizations having a definite authorized strength for each grade; and there are several hundred officers on duty with Services of Supply still carried on rolls of combatant organizations.

(A) In order to standardize promotion it is recommended that the following rule be established:

'For each of the services provided for herein, the officers below the grade of Brigadier General shall be distributed among the several grades from Colonel to First Lieutenant inclusive, in approximately the same proportion as formerly prescribed by law for all staff corps combined, that proportion as formerly prescribed is: one Colonel to two Lieutenant Colonels to four Majors to five Captains to eight First Lieutenants to eight Second Lieutenants, omitting Captains and Lieutenants from those permanent staff corps for which these grades are not authorized. All vacancies thus created shall be filled by the President upon recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief when in his opinion the conditions of the service warrant it. They shall be filled by present incumbents, by transfer, promotion, or appointment upon recommendation of intermediate commanders and of the Commander-in-Chief and solely on the basis of selection because of demonstrated ability.'

(B) That in addition to the old established staff corps the following new staff departments be created by Executive Order, to include all necessary officers and enlisted men; namely, Transportation Department, Motor Transport Service, and Gas Service. Detailed recommendation regarding personnel of organization will be sent at an early date.

(C) That the Department of Construction and Forestry and the Department of Light Railways and Roads each be a branch of the Corps of Engineers, all officers and troops to be Engineers but each to have its own independent line of promotion.

(D) That all officers of other miscellaneous services, such as the Service of Utilities, Provost Marshal Department, Post Office, War Risk Bureau, labor organizations and so forth, be commissioned in the National Army only and not in any particular branch of the Line or Staff Department.

(E) That a new service, of enlisted men only, be created by Executive Order to be known as the Army Service Corps, the officers to be officers of the National Army, and that all enlisted men in organizations corresponding to Sub-Paragraph D above be included in the Army Service Corps, also that all labor organizations and other similar troops now in France be transferred to the Army Service Corps in the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief.

(F) That for each of the services of the S.O.S. there shall be a certain overhead organization for duty at the various Headquarters S.O.S. and the sections thereof, and a certain field organization as indicated below.

(G) That from the sixty-five thousand officers indicated in War Department cablegram No. 1005 the following allotment of numbers and grades be authorized for the overhead organization:

One Brigadier General and one hundred other officers, Adjutant General's Department,

One Brigadier General and eighteen other officers, Inspector General's Department,

One Brigadier General and twenty-six other officers, Judge Advocate General's Department,

One Brigadier General and one hundred and sixty other officers, Quartermaster Corps,

One Brigadier General and one hundred and twenty other officers, Medical Corps,

One Brigadier General and eighty other Engineer officers, Chief Engineer's Office,

One Brigadier General and one hundred other Engineer officers, Division of Construction and Forestry,

One Brigadier General and sixty other Engineer officers, Division of Light Railways and Roads,

One Brigadier General and two hundred other officers, Ordnance Department,

One Brigadier General and one hundred other officers, Signal Corps,

One Brigadier General and one hundred sixty other officers, Air Service.

(H) That the following allotment of numbers and grades be made from the newly created services recommended in Sub-Paragraph B above:

One Brigadier General and one hundred forty other officers, Transportation Department,

One Brigadier General or Colonel one hundred forty officers, Motor Transport Service,

Sixty officers, gas service.

(J) That the following allotment of numbers and grades be authorized from the National Army:

One Lieutenant General or Major General commanding S.O.S.,

Eight Brigadier Generals commanding sections,

One Major General or Brigadier General, Chief of Staff,


Two Brigadier Generals and fifty other officers, General Staff Corps,

One Brigadier General or Colonel and one hundred other officers, Provost Marshal General's Department,

One Brigadier General or Colonel and twenty other officers, General Purchasing Board.

(K) That the field organization for each of the different services, including Depots, Camps, Construction Gangs and so forth, shall consist of such officers and organizations as may be necessary to meet the actual requirements of each such service as indicated from these headquarters from time to time in the priority schedule.

(L) In order to put the above recommendations into effect I regard it as highly important that the President, in the ex-



MARSHAL PÉTAIN
Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies

ercise of the power conferred on him by the closing proviso of Section 2, Act of May 18th, 1917, should authorize me to organize, maintain and officer by transfer or otherwise, such special and technical units as may from time to time be necessary. If this request is granted, I can relieve combat troops from service behind the lines and more effectively carry on the complex services now united in the S.O.S.

PERSHING

Saturday, June 29th:

Upon my return to Tours from an inspection of the American divisions on the French front, I found that G.H.Q. had just received a cable from the War Department approving in part our plans for organizing the S.O.S. personnel and had been trying to get me to come to Chaumont to discuss it. This cable authorized the rank of lieutenant general for the Commanding General, S.O.S.; major general for the Chief of Staff; two brigadier general assistants, etc. But there was considerable misunderstanding as to which of the other provisions were approved, which were approved conditionally, and which were subject to further discussion. I talked to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Eltinge, over the telephone and agreed to go to Chaumont as soon as I could get myself clear on what the War Department answer to our cable really meant.

The cable was very long, very much involved, and contained a number of counter-propositions. The more I studied it the more complicated the situation seemed to be. Finally I suggested to General Kernan that the only way to get the matter straightened out was for me to go back to the United States for a personal conference with the War Department. I pointed out to him that we were constantly having personal conferences with G.H.Q. and that a great many men had come over from the States to confer with us, but that we had never

had a conference with the War Department. We seemed to be drifting farther and farther apart, the War Department seemed to understand our problems less and less clearly, and I thought that it would be a good thing for General Pershing to send either Moseley or myself back to the States to try to establish a better mutual understanding. He objected to my going, because he said that if I ever got over there the War Department would never let me come back. I said I would take a chance on this, however, and that I believed I could get all we wanted inside of three or four days. He finally agreed this was the best thing that could be done, and wrote the following letter which I delivered to General Pershing in person in Paris the same day:

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, S.O.S.

TOURS, FRANCE, 2 July, 1918

MY DEAR GENERAL:

More than three months have elapsed since the matter of definite organization and personnel for these headquarters and for the S.O.S., generally, was taken up. An interchange of cables has been had, but no real conclusions have been arrived at so far. I have given the whole question (not the minute details) my best consideration and I have concluded that if any satisfactory results are to be reached in a reasonable time, we must send a competent officer, fully conversant with your own views, fully acquainted with the S.O.S., its existing condition and its prospective needs and who has your confidence in a high degree. Such an officer arriving in Washington could get a hearing, could push consideration of the question, and could assent to counter proposition in your name. No plan that any one can devise here will receive the prompt O.K. of the War Department. There will be changes suggested (and good ones, too) and your agent should be able to say yes or no or to suggest further modifications, knowing that upon the whole, he would be serving the A.E.F. advisedly and in conformity to your personal views.

I suggest, therefore, that you send General Hagood to Washington to deal with the whole matter as your authorized agent. He is the best qualified man I know for the task. He is conversant with everything on this side, has the confidence of the Department, I believe, has yours, I make no doubt, and certainly I trust his judgment in a most complete sense. This is my idea of how to deal with the organization problem, and it may be summed up by saying that there are too many points needing adjustment to make it possible by cable. A meeting of minds with consequent opportunity to discuss detail appears to be indispensable.

(Sgd)

F. J. KERNAN

General J. J. PERSHING, U.S.A.

G.H.Q., A.E.F.

P.S. There are several other matters I have directed General Hagood to discuss with you and I beg you will give him the opportunity.

F. J. K.

I went to Paris on July 2nd to see General Pershing on another matter. The General liked the idea of my going back to the States to straighten out the personnel situation, but said that before taking final action he wanted me to meet him at G.H.Q. on July 5th so that he could go over a great many other questions with me. I therefore returned to Tours and prepared another memorandum setting forth the difficulties of the situation.

Sunday, July 7th:

In accordance with General Pershing's instructions I reported at G.H.Q. about noon on July 5th, but I did not get an opportunity to see him until the next morning. I had a long conference with him on Saturday and again on Sunday on the subject of difficulties that had arisen in the Transportation Department and of anticipated difficulties

arising from the Abbeville Agreement (see Chapters XVIII and XXII).

The question of S.O.S. personnel sank into secondary importance. General Pershing decided, however, that he did not want me to go back to the United States at that time. On the other hand, General McAndrew thought that I should go, and when I left G.H.Q. told me to hold myself in readiness to go on short notice in case I should get a telegram from him.

In the meantime, I decided that unless I did go back to the States we had better drop everything with reference to S.O.S. personnel, except the Army Service Corps. We had been discussing the subject three months with G.H.Q. without coming to any clear conclusions and I did not think we should get anywhere by a further exchange of cables with the War Department.

In discussing the Army Service Corps with General Pershing I had asked for 4000 officers and 100,000 men. The General asked me on what I based these figures. I told him that it was merely my guess as the outside figure to cover our needs for the present and immediate future. He said he thought the figures were rather large, but I replied that it was only an authorization on paper and that, in my judgment, the War Department would approve a hundred thousand just as easily as half that, and that we did not gain anything by asking for what we wanted in broken doses.

He said, 'All right, go ahead,' so I drafted the cable and it was sent as follows:

CABLE No. 1426-S
G.H.Q., *July 7, 1918*

AGWAR
WASHINGTON

Paragraph 1-F. In order to organize salvage service units, laundry units, mobile gas treatment units, postal express serv-

ice, renting requisition and claims service, headquarters battalions and companies for the Services of Supply, Casual and replacement depots, Organization and training centers, Labor bureaus, Leave areas, Convalescent camps, Permanent camps, Orthopedic camps, Rest camps, Guard companies, Prisoner of War companies, Garden companies et cetera, there should be allowed to the American Expeditionary Forces in France for the Army Service Corps a total of not exceeding 4000 officers in the ratio of 1 major to 4 captains to 6 first lieutenants to 6 second lieutenants and 100,000 enlisted men of such grades provided by law for the army at large as may be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief A.E.F., in addition to organizations transferred as above. — PERSHING.

Sub-paragraph G. If this be approved proposed Tables of Organization will be submitted from time to time covering such units as will have to be organized in the United States. For units that will have to be formed from personnel already in France, and to meet local conditions, the question of organization should be handled locally, for example, the administrative personnel of a leave area. — PERSHING.

CABLE No. 1762-R
WASHINGTON, *July 24, 1918*

Paragraph 9. With reference to your 1426 paragraph 1-F and 1-G APPROVED. But Paragraph 1-F modified to read 1500 OFFICERS in ratio of 1 major to 2 captains, 5 first lieutenants and 5 second lieutenants. — McCAIN.

It subsequently developed, however, that the 1500 officers allowed by the War Department would not be sufficient to meet our needs, and in October, 1918, we sent another cablegram asking for 4000 officers, which was approved. The Armistice cut the organization short and the maximum actual strength was 1170 officers and 26,000 men.

Here ended our efforts to get any definite personnel for our organization. We never did straighten out the difficulties that it was intended to remedy. Neither General Kernan

nor General Harbord got the rank of lieutenant general, which the War Department had authorized. In the British service part of the duty performed by the Commanding General, S.O.S., was divided between two men, the Quartermaster General and the C.G., L.O.C., each of whom had the rank of lieutenant general. Smith, G-4 for the S.O.S., and one of the ablest officers America sent to France, never got above the grade of colonel, although the officer who had his corresponding position in the British service was a major general.

The Army Service Corps proved to be one of the most valuable institutions we had. We should have such an organization in time of peace, to include all the odds and ends of soldiers on various classes of special duty that do not pertain particularly to one of the supply branches. There was a movement on foot as far back as General Schofield to create such a corps. This was revived during the administrations of General J. Franklin Bell and General Leonard Wood, but just about the time it was to be enacted into law the scheme was shifted to provide that these men should belong to the Quartermaster Corps.

If we do not have an Army Service Corps in time of peace, it should be one of the very first arms to be established at the outbreak of war, and to it should be assigned the great bulk of the officers and men of the organization back of the lines, known as the L.O.C. or S.O.S. It should be the big pool into which the draft boards should dump all skilled labor in order to avoid the devastating raids upon divisions in search of specialists.

CHAPTER XVI

DURING THE CRISIS

The situation on June 2d — Evacuation of Paris — Supreme War Council at Versailles — Regulating station at Le Bourget — Shells and *avions* — General Staff changes — American divisions on French front — Château-Thierry — Cantigny — American divisions on British front — Amiens — British G.H.Q. — Boulogne — Conferences on Supply.

THE early days of June marked the crisis of the war. Back at Tours we did not get much information as to operations at the front, but we got the official *communiqués* and occasionally Major Cabot Ward, C-2 at Paris, would call me on the telephone when something very special happened. The French Mission was also occasionally informed through their war office in Paris.

On June 2d General Moseley from G.H.Q. called me up to say that the situation was most serious and that reënforcements and supplies were being concentrated at Meaux, which was on the Paris-Rheims highway and only eighteen miles from the walls of Paris. I issued instructions to dispatch at once forty-eight truckloads of ammunition to the Second Division at Meaux — 3,000,000 rounds of .30 caliber and 500,000 of .45 caliber. This was my contribution toward winning the Battle of Château-Thierry, for which so many have claimed the glory.

Two days later we heard that the 2d Division had stopped the German advance on Meaux; that Harbord's Marines and other troops of the 2d Division had opened fire with machine guns on the Germans in close formation and had killed them by the thousands.

Evacuation of Paris:

We had begun to be seriously worried about the prospect

of having to evacuate Paris. On June 5th I issued instructions to General W. H. Allaire, the Commanding Officer of troops in Paris, that in case it was necessary to leave Paris he would be responsible for the removal of the records of all the departments and for the welfare of American women and children. He was told that there was nothing in the situation to indicate that this was likely to happen in the near future, but that he must be prepared for any eventuality. A few days later while in Paris I called upon General Allaire and went over the plans with him. Everything seemed to be pretty well arranged, except, of course, they were very short of transportation.

In general, the plan contemplated the removal of all American personnel, both military and civilian. The most valuable records had already been packed and were ready for shipment. All the available transportation had been listed and assigned to the various departments. A census of American women and children in Paris had been taken and all were to be provided with transportation of some kind. The soldiers and men civilians were to walk. Plans had been outlined for feeding the people along the line of retreat and for establishing bivouacs. No decision had been made, however, at that time, as to the direction in which the retreat would be made.

One of the most important matters was the disposition of our financial records. I had a talk with Colonel Dawes and Major Francis E. Drake and it was decided that the Purchasing Board and our Finance Service would go with the French headquarters.

The following letter was written to Colonel Dawes in an effort to find out where the French intended to go. But we could not find out.

HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

June 22, 1918

SECRET

From: C. of S., S.O.S.*To:* G.P.A., Paris.*Subject:* Removal of French Government from Paris.

1. The C.G. directs that you ascertain from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Paris, the proposed destination of the French Government in case it should decide to move away from Paris. This information having been obtained, you will indicate to these headquarters at once what disposition you desire made, under those circumstances, of your personnel and records.

2. CONFIDENTIAL copy of your reply will be handed by you to the C.G., U.S. Troops in Paris.

(Sgd) JOHNSON HAGOOD

JH/my

Visit to Versailles:

On Friday night, June 7th, I was called on the telephone from Versailles by Brigadier General P. D. Lochridge, who informed me that General Tasker H. Bliss, the American representative on the Supreme War Council, desired me to come to Versailles to see him at once. I asked Lochridge if he wanted me to leave that night. He said I need not; that if I arrived the next afternoon it would be satisfactory to General Bliss.

I left Tours about ten o'clock the next morning with Lieutenant Roger Wurtz, my French Aide, and we reached Versailles that afternoon about five o'clock. I had a very interesting talk with Colonel Stanley D. Embick of General Bliss's staff. He showed me a paper that he had written on the 23d of April and that had been adopted by the American unit of the Supreme War Council, indicating that the German at-

tack would be made between Soissons and Rheims. This paper had been given to General Foch by the War Council several weeks before the attack was actually made at the point indicated by Embick. He also showed me another one in which it was predicted that the next attack would be made between Montdidier and Noyon.

I stopped with Embick that night, and after dinner I went over for the conference with General Bliss. He discussed the situation that would result from the evacuation of Paris and requested me to take care of certain of his personnel in case he was forced to leave Versailles, which I agreed to do.

Regulating Station Le Bourget:

I left Versailles Sunday morning and went to Le Bourget, the regulating station just outside of Paris and in charge of Major John Reed Kilpatrick. I found that all the supplies for the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 28th Divisions, to the north of Paris, were being shipped to him from Is-sur-Tille. This was the most convenient thing for him, because they were made up there in solid trains and came straight through. From the standpoint of the S.O.S. it was anything but satisfactory. The supplies went to Is-sur-Tille from the Intermediate Depot at Gièvres and when they arrived there they were farther away from Le Bourget than they were when they started.

I pointed this out to Major Kilpatrick and asked him why everything for his use could not be shipped directly from Gièvres. He begged me not to attempt this, as he was afraid that the change in routing would result in great confusion. I told him, however, that the shortage of transportation and labor with us was such that we could not afford this duplication of shipments. He then said that the French were considering the establishment of a regulating station at Orléans

and that perhaps we might combine with them. Later I took this up with Moseley and with our transportation people back at Tours. We succeeded in getting some of the supplies sent through by the shorter route.

Subsequently Kilpatrick was promoted to colonel and, I believe, was regarded by Moseley as the prize regulating officer. He certainly did most excellent work. He was a contractor in civil life and said that any man who could so regulate the material for a New York skyscraper that it would all arrive exactly at the proper time in a narrow street could have no difficulty in regulating the supplies for troops at the front.

While I was in Paris on this trip there was some little shelling on the part of the long-range gun. Every now and then I could hear a muffled explosion, but nothing fell anywhere near me and no one in the streets seemed to pay any attention to it. The people seemed to be much more worried about the old-fashioned air raids than they were about these occasional shells, the damage by which was very local in character.

The air raids were really very bad at this time. At night Paris was as black as ink. There were a few street lights with blue shades, but taxis and other vehicles were not allowed to have any. All windows and doors were closed so that no lights would shine out of buildings. The Germans frequently sent over bombing expeditions which did a great deal of damage and killed a great many people. But the newspapers said nothing about it, as they did not want to give information to the Germans or to unfavorably affect the morale of the people, which was very bad. Thousands were leaving Paris. They were making the summer season an excuse for this, but as a matter of fact many were leaving with the idea that Paris would soon fall into the hands

of the enemy. It was said that a million people had left, but this must have been an exaggeration.

Tuesday, June 11th:

The third German offensive began on Saturday night in exactly the place where Embick told me it would begin, but the lines seemed to have held pretty well. The papers were full of accounts of the excellent work of the Americans, especially of the Marines under Harbord in the vicinity of Château-Thierry.

General Staff changes:

About this time we made some material changes in our G-1 organization. Colonel A. B. Barber, who had been in charge of this section, was given the Tonnage Division temporarily and subsequently relieved altogether to become G-3 of the First Corps. Barber was succeeded by Colonel Charles W. Kutz, who had been in command of an operating railway regiment of Engineers and, later, principal assistant to the Chief Engineer Officer. General Taylor did not want to give up Kutz, but said that the great advantage of having Kutz in charge of G-1 was sufficient to offset the disadvantage of losing him from his own office.

Kutz was one of the very best men we had in the S.O.S. He was very judicial and had had broad experience in the War Department. He had been one of the commissioners in the District of Columbia and was accustomed to dealing with men, both subordinates and superiors. His experience as Chief Engineer of the Philippine Islands, especially his work in connection with the Corregidor fortifications project, was just what we needed in the S.O.S. Personally he and I were very great friends. Unfortunately we did not keep him very long, as he was sent back to the United States with the rank of brigadier general.



To Major Johnson Major Johnson
of Franklin friend
Hunter, N.Y.

Visit to French front:

I had long been hoping to see how the S.O.S. was serving our divisions at the front. At that time we had five divisions serving with the French and five with the British. The true test of the S.O.S. was whether the troops at the front were properly clothed and fed. I had been anxious to get up during active operations, but thought that it would be rather difficult to arouse interest in our work at that time.

On Wednesday morning, June 26th, I started out at eight o'clock with Colonel C. E. N. Howard in the car and arrived at the Ritz Hotel in Paris about one o'clock, where Howard and I had lunch with Captain Close.

I left Howard in Paris and went on to La Ferté, headquarters of the First Corps, where I saw General Hunter Liggett, Colonel Malin Craig, Colonel Barber, Colonel DeWitt, and a number of others. I asked how the supplies were coming up and they indicated that everything connected with the S.O.S. was highly satisfactory. I spent the night at General Liggett's quarters. There was an air raid and a number of bombs were dropped near the house, but as we were accustomed to hearing cannonading all the time, I slept through the air raid.

During the afternoon I had visited the headquarters of Major General George H. Cameron, commanding the 4th Division, who said the work of the S.O.S. was O.K.

Thursday, June 27th:

I left General Liggett's headquarters the next morning for a small village in the vicinity of Château-Thierry, headquarters of the 2d Division. There I found that Monsieur Clemenceau, the Premier of France, had come to congratulate the division on its good work. General Omar Bundy was in command and Colonel Preston Brown was Chief of Staff.

General Charles H. Muir, of the 28th Division, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Edward L. King, were also there. And so were Colonels Paul B. Malone and Albert J. Bowley, and some others who had been brought up to meet Monsieur Clemenceau. It was very quiet, though there was some little shelling and a Boche airplane made us take shelter.

The 2d and 28th Divisions were also entirely satisfied with the work of the S.O.S.

I left the 2d Division, went over to the 3d, and took lunch with General Dickman, who said he, too, was entirely satisfied with our work.

In order to get to the 1st Division, which was in another part of the line, we had to go all the way back to Paris. The Germans were then only about forty-two miles from Paris and all the main roads and railroads along the front were under fire.

I stayed overnight at the Y.M.C.A. hotel and there was a very severe air raid. I was on the fifth floor and did not go down into the cellar as was the custom. The firing of anti-aircraft guns was very annoying. I could also hear the *avions* very plainly buzzing overhead, and could hear the bombs that were dropped, first the sizzling through the air, then the explosion, and then the rattle of the falling buildings. It lasted about four hours, but I was very sleepy and during a lull along about midnight I went to sleep and did not hear the last of it. The Ritz Hotel, a few blocks away, several buildings on the Place de Vendôme, and some others still nearer were badly damaged. About twenty people were killed in and near them.

Friday, June 28th:

Howard and I went to Headquarters 1st Division, at a place near Montdidier. There we met General R. L. Bullard,

his Chief of Staff, Colonel Campbell King, his G-3, Major George Marshall, and others. They, also, had no complaints to make about the S.O.S. After lunch with General Bullard I took Howard back to Paris, got some gasoline, and started at once for Tours. We arrived there about nine o'clock at night, after having been in the automobile about ten hours that day.

This finished up the five divisions serving on the French front — the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 28th in the Château-Thierry sector, and the 1st in the Cantigny sector.

Friday, July 12th:

A cablegram from the States announced the promotion of Kutz and McAdams, the former to be brigadier general and the latter to be lieutenant colonel. The same cable also announced the promotion of A. W. Bjornstad, E. E. Booth, Malin Craig, G. C. Marshall, Jr., George Shelton, Ed King, M. B. Stewart, Andrew Moses, and a number of other men of that type, including John N. Hodges of the Engineers' class of 1905 at West Point. I was certainly delighted to see that they were down among the working members. In my judgment, this is the best list of brigadiers the Army has had since the Civil War. Meriwether L. Walker, who had just been made Director of the Motor Transport Corps, and J. R. Kean, in the Chief Surgeon's Office, were among those on the list, and Harbord, too, as major general. I sent a number of letters of congratulation.

Visit to British front:

My purpose in making this visit was twofold. In the first place, our divisions serving with the British were being supplied by them. This was part of the scheme under the Abbeville Agreement, as explained in Chapter XXII. Rumors had reached us that our soldiers had not been able to adjust them-

selves to the British ration; that they were dissatisfied with the shoes and clothing and did not have sufficient transportation. In the second place, I was very anxious to visit British G.H.Q. and the British port at Boulogne for the purpose of finding out something of the organization of their transportation department and the manner in which this department and other technical services operated at the ports.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 23d I left Tours with Roger Wurtz¹ and, passing through Amiens, arrived at British G.H.Q. at three-thirty the next afternoon. Amiens at that time was only about seven miles from the German lines. It was therefore under easy artillery fire of all calibers from six-inch up. The population had fled during the German advance and it was said at the time we went through that of its previous population of about 90,000 there was only one person left in the town. We had great difficulty in locating that man to tell us how to find an open road through the débris of the city.

Amiens presented an appearance different from anything I had seen before or since. In towns like Château-Thierry and Soissons, where the lines became stabilized, some of the population had drifted back, the stores had been reopened and the people continued to live — even while the towns were under bombardment. But at Amiens, although the damage to the town was relatively slight, the entire population had fled before the German advance. The débris from fallen buildings had not been removed from the streets. Many of the people had left without even closing the doors to their houses or shops. The goods were still on the counters, fruits, vegetables, and meats having been left where they had been on display in windows and on sidewalk stands. For this

¹ A brilliant young aviator whom the French War Office had detailed as my aide-de-camp.



ROGER WURTZ
General Hagood's French Aide-de-Camp

reason the town had much more the appearance of death or of having been visited by a great plague than many of the other towns that were more seriously damaged, but in which the people were still moving about.

Upon arrival at British G.H.Q. I went at once to call on Lieutenant General Traverse E. Clarke, the Quartermaster General, but he was away, and instead I had a conference with Major General Reginald Ford, Deputy Quartermaster General, and Major General R. S. May, also Deputy Quartermaster General. They explained to me the organization of the Quartermaster General's Department and the relations to it of the Director General of Transportation. They also told me why certain recent changes had been decided upon. Later in the day I went down to the American Mission and saw General W. W. Harts, the head of it, with whom I took dinner. Wurtz and I stayed at a château near Montreuil, rented by Colonel Robert Bacon of the American Mission, who had formerly been an Assistant Secretary of State and later American Ambassador to France.

Thursday, July 25th:

We went over to Boulogne and there I saw the Port Commander, Brigadier General H. W. Wilberforce, to whom I presented a letter of introduction from General F. E. Cannot of the British War Office.

At Boulogne I also met Lieutenant General J. Asser, commanding the British L.O.C. General Asser and General Wilberforce explained to me the organization at the British ports and the difficulties under which they labored. I, in turn, explained to them my idea of organization and they were both most enthusiastic about it, saying that the Base Commander should be supreme and that the local representatives of the D.G.T. and other technical staff services should be

members of his staff. On the other hand, I was very much impressed with their efficient scheme for pooling labor, which was very badly handled in our service.

After lunch with General Wilberforce I returned to British G.H.Q. and had a conference with the D.G.T., General S. D. Crookshank. He also concurred in the view that the Transportation Department should be under the military and not in the hands of civilian experts. He did not concur, however, in the view that in the British service the local D.G.T. and the local man in charge of docks should be under the Base Commander. He admitted that such a scheme would be better for the American ports, because of the long distance from home and the number of unforeseen contingencies that would of necessity arise at our ports in France.

Major General Ford, on the other hand, expressed the view that the G.D.T. representatives at the ports should have the same status as the subordinates of the other directors of supply (corresponding to our bureau chiefs), and informed me that orders were then being issued placing the D.G.T. himself under the Quartermaster General. The latter, as has been explained elsewhere, combined the functions of G-1 and G-4 in the American General Staff organization.

This whole question is discussed in detail under the subject of Transportation Department, in Chapters XVII and XVIII, so no further discussion of it will be given here.

Friday, July 26th:

Having stayed that night again at Colonel Bacon's château, we left early Friday morning for Fruges, headquarters of the Second Army Corps. There I took Colonel George S. Simonds, Chief of Staff of the Corps, in my car and we went to Oudezeele headquarters of the 27th Division. General John F. O'Ryan was not there, but we talked to his Chief

of Staff. From there we went to Watou, in Belgium, headquarters of the 30th Division, where we had lunch with General E. M. Lewis, the Division Commander, and saw a number of other friends on his staff. In the afternoon we went to Rollancourt, headquarters of the 78th Division. Here again the Division Commander was away on some duty and we saw the Chief of Staff, Colonel H. N. Cootes, and one of the regimental commanders, Colonel Marcus B. Stokes.

After this we returned to Fruges for the night, where I had dinner with General George W. Read, the Corps Commander, and Colonel Simonds, at the Corps Headquarters Mess.

Saturday, July 27th:

We left Fruges at seven-thirty in the morning and visited Beauval, General Cronkhite's (80th) Division. Cronkhite, however, was away and we talked to the Chief of Staff, Colonel W. H. Waldron. Later we left for Molliens-au-Bois, headquarters of the 33d Division. There we saw General George Bell, Jr., and some of his staff.

The result of the visit to the corps headquarters and to the five divisions was similar to that of the visit to the divisions with the French; namely, that they were all well satisfied, and they seemed to think that they were getting along very well on the British ration. Most of them said that at first there was a great deal of complaint, but that now they knew how to use the ration a little better and that there was no complaint. In Cronkhite's division they were having a board submit a report. The general feeling throughout all the divisions was that the British ration had the necessary food value, but was not bulky enough for them to feel that they had been properly nourished. A considerable portion of the ration consisted of cheese, and the American soldiers

were accustomed to consider this something extra and not regular food.

As this finished up the divisions serving with the British, Roger Wurtz and I returned to Tours. The sectors to which they were at that time assigned were known as the Dickebush Lake, Scherpenberg, and Canal sectors in Belgium, and the Amiens and Picardy sectors in France.

CHAPTER XVII

TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

Importance — Fundamental difficulties — Changes in organization — Comparison with British — Lieutenant General Asser, British L.O.C. — Major General Crookshank, British D.G.T. — Rise and fall of the Service of Utilities — Jacob Schick at Liverpool — No more railroad men from States — General Pershing's decision.

THE most serious problem of the S.O.S. was transportation. Beside this all other problems sank into insignificance.

At the beginning the problem was ships. The A.E.F. was not concerned with the procurement of ships, which was handled in the United States. But the unloading of ships — their turn-around — depended upon us. If we saved or lost twenty-five per cent in the turn-around of ships, it was equivalent to increasing or decreasing our available tonnage twenty-five per cent. For the S.O.S. the German submarine campaign was more a menace than an actual injury. We suffered only because the precautions taken slowed up our deliveries.

After the Abbeville Agreement, in May, 1918 (see Chapter XXII), we no longer had a deficiency in ships. Our main problem then became rail and auto transportation in France.

Our transportation difficulties could be grouped under three heads, as follows:

- (a) *Material*: Getting engines, cars, rails, ties, etc., and the necessary cranes, machinery and construction material for the development of port terminals.
- (b) *Personnel*: Getting trained personnel for construction work at the ports, for car erection and machine shops and for

the operation of railroad lines; also getting stevedores and labor troops for unloading ships.

(c) *Organization*: Getting the Transportation Department organized so as to work with maximum efficiency and in coöperation with the other services.

With (a) and (b) I myself had little concern except that my office controlled tonnage and priority of troop shipments. General Atterbury, the D.G.T., often came to me for advice and assistance, but the initiative and responsibility were upon him, and although I was always glad to be of assistance I never offered any suggestions nor gave any instructions with reference to these matters.

With (c) I was very gravely concerned. In fact, the organization of the Transportation Department and its relation to the other branches gave me more concern than any other matter while I was in France.

In its relation to the other services the Transportation Department went through four stages:

(a) Completely independent from the L.O.C. and operated directly under the Commander-in-Chief (G.O. 73, A.E.F., Dec. 12, 1917).

(b) Semi-independent from the S.O.S. but coöordinated by the C.G., S.O.S., through the medium of the Service of Utilities (G.O. 31, A.E.F., Feb. 16, 1918).

(c) Amalgamation with the S.O.S. on same status as other supply services (telegram, G.H.Q., July 12, 1918).

(d) Complete militarization under Brigadier General Frank R. McCoy, a cavalry officer. (This was after the Armistice.)

To show this development I will compare the functions prescribed for the C.G., S.O.S.; the D.G.T.; the Base Commander; the Regulating Officer; and the Local Railway Representatives at the Base and at the Regulating Station:

General Orders

No. 73, 1917

The D.G.T. has charge of the unloading of freight and troops from ships at points of debarkation and of the transportation of all troops and supplies by rail. . . . He is responsible that all freight is promptly delivered to its destination.

The Commanding General, L.O.C., is responsible that the supplies are distributed among the several depots in accordance with the approved projects.

The Commanding Officer of each Base and Intermediate Section: Where the shipment of supplies is authorized it is his duty to have them loaded into cars and to have the cars properly marked and turned over to the representative of the Transportation Department.

The Regulating Officer: The local railroad personnel is subject to the orders of the Regulating Officer in so far as concerns their receiving, caring for, and transporting troops and supplies. This control is exercised through proper railway officers. . . . They are subject to the orders of the D.G.T. in all matters pertaining to the operation and maintenance of railways.

Moseley's Order, 1918

(See Chapter XXIV):

The Commanding General, S.O.S., is responsible for the unloading of freight and troops from ships at all ports of debarkation and for the transportation of all troops and supplies throughout the zone of supply. He is responsible for the construction, maintenance and operation of such utilities as may be necessary to accomplish these objects, including such French railway lines and rolling stock as may come within American control.

The Commanding Officer of each Base and Intermediate Section . . . is particularly charged with the responsibility for the prompt unloading of vessels and the transfer of freight from the wharves to depots within his own section, or to other parts of theater of operations in accordance with instructions issued to him.

The Regulating Officer: The work of railway operations (in areas served by Regulating Stations) will be handled by the personnel of the Transportation Department under the direction of a Division Superintendent who will be responsible for the movement of cars in accordance with military requirements as indicated to him by the Regulating Officer. The Division Superintendent is a member of the Regulating Officer's Staff, and it is his special function to assist and relieve the Regulating Officer in the discharge of his duties in respect to railway operation.

I always held that the initial organization of the Transportation Department was fundamentally wrong and that under it the A.E.F. could never have conducted a war of movement. In this view I was opposed, not only by General Atterbury and his adherents, but by some of the best minds in our Regular organization. On the other hand, many men in Atterbury's organization — big railroad men in civil life — will agree that the original conception of a completely independent Transportation Department was impracticable.

Among those who opposed my view was Brigadier General Robert E. Wood, in charge of water transportation under General Atterbury up to the time he left France and afterwards Acting Quartermaster General of the Army under General Goethals. Wood is an old friend of mine, a very brilliant officer whose reputation was made in the Panama Canal even before this war broke out. I have great admiration for his opinion and judgment on matters of organization, but in this we could not agree. In criticizing my attitude he paid me the unintended compliment of saying that I had old-fashioned ideas.

I was told by General Atterbury, and others high up in our G.H.Q., that the basis of our organization was that of the British. So I shall explain the British organization as it was told to me at British G.H.Q. in July, 1918.

At the outbreak of the war the British transportation service was in the hands of the Royal Engineers, the same as is prescribed in our own Field Service Regulations for our own Engineers. The problem of war transportation required such revolutionary changes in the management of the British railroads they were afraid that the people would not stand for turning the matter over to an army officer. So they asked Sir Eric Geddes to take the job of Director General of Transportation. He consented under condition that he report to no one less than the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces and that they give him a competent officer of the Royal Engineers as his principal adviser.

This arrangement was accepted. Exactly how long it was continued in effect I do not know, but at the time when I visited British G.H.Q. the Transportation Department had been turned back to the military, the Director General of Transportation then being Major General S. D. Crookshank of the Royal Engineers. His deputy and principal assistants were all Regular Army officers.

And on the very day, July 24, 1918, that I was at British G.H.Q. another step was taken in the return of the British Transportation Department to its old status. An order was issued placing it under the Quartermaster General, who in a way corresponded to the Commanding General, S.O.S., in our service, though his authority did not extend to the command of troops — only the coördination of supply.

Later I asked the Base Commander at Boulogne, Brigadier General H. W. Wilberforce, what he thought of having the Transportation Department independent of the local military commander, and he answered that no worse plan could be devised. He said that when he looked back upon the troubles that he had had with his organization, he did not see how he ever got through it. He said that there could be

but one proper solution and that that was the plan that General Kernan and I were trying to put over for the American ports.

We shall go back now to the establishment of the Service of Utilities under General Orders No. 31, A.E.F., in February, 1918. Before that time General Atterbury had had no superior except General Pershing. He had had as his military adviser and Deputy Director General of Transportation Colonel Avery D. Andrews, a graduate of West Point who had resigned and come into the war from civil life. General Atterbury had under him in charge of Light Railways Major General William C. Langfitt, an Engineer officer of the Regular Army. Under the new organization this situation was reversed. General Langfitt became Chief of Utilities, with Colonel Andrews as his deputy, and General Atterbury became their subordinate.

I shall try to make a comparison between the office of the Chief of Utilities, as established by General Orders 31, and the office of the Director General of Transportation of the British service. The British officer was a major general of Engineers, the same as General Langfitt, with a brigadier general as his deputy and corresponding to Colonel Andrews. He had one brigadier general assistant known as Director of Rail Transportation and another known as Director of Inland Water Transportation, whose corresponding duties were combined in the American service under General Atterbury. He had another brigadier general assistant known as Director of Construction, whose duties were practically identical with those performed by General Patrick.

He had two other brigadier general assistants, one of whom was Director of Light Railways and the other Director of Roads, whose corresponding duties were combined in the American service under General Jadwin. He had still an-



Souilly France Nov. 18-1918
To General Haig with the 1st Army's appreciation
for the help given by the S.O.S. in the St.
Mihiel & Meuse-Argonne battles.

P. H. Drane
Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff

other brigadier general assistant known as Director of Docks, who had control of dock areas and of the loading and unloading of ships. This duty we finally placed upon our base port commanders. He also had five brigadier general Assistant Directors General of Transportation, one with each of the five British armies and a sixth with the Air forces.

As is shown in Chapter XII, the idea of organizing the Service of Utilities originated with General Pershing personally. To what extent he was influenced by the British organization I do not know, but it was only a hundred miles or so from the British War Office to the most advance British element on the front line. I did not consider, therefore, that we should copy the British organization, any more than that we should copy the French, merely for the reason that they had found it satisfactory for the solution of their own problems. It was very gratifying, of course, to find that British experience completely justified the conclusions which we had drawn from a study of our own problem.

At this point I shall go back several months and give some extracts from my journal to show the difficulties as they arose from time to time and the successive steps that led to the final solution.

Tuesday, April 9th, 1918:

The transfer of Colonel Andrews to the Service of Utilities was a great loss to General Atterbury. He asked me to suggest some one to replace him. I recommended Captain Carl A. Lohr, who came to France with my regiment and had been my Adjutant at Neufchâteau. I knew Lohr to be an A-1 hustler and organizer and suggested that General Atterbury give him the rank of colonel. General Atterbury agreed to this, the necessary orders were issued, and a few days later Lohr came to my office. I told him of the transportation diffi-

culties and suggested that he try to break down their antagonism toward the military. I advised him to make friends among the transportation officers, to keep away from my office and his old associates in the Regular Army, and to thoroughly identify himself with the department he was to serve. I impressed upon him the importance of his being an Atterbury man and not an outside man sent to Atterbury to tell him how to run his department.

The only officer with previous military experience that General Atterbury had in his office at that time was Captain Edward G. Bliss, a young Engineer graduate of West Point and the son of General Tasker H. Bliss, American representative on the Supreme War Council. Bliss was a very fine officer whom I had known since he was a boy. He frequently came to me for advice and assistance.

Thursday, June 6th:

While we were discussing whether the handling of ships at the ports was too technical a subject to be handled by line officers and whether it should not be handled exclusively by experts of the Transportation Department, without interference by local base commanders, an infantry officer, Major Jacob Schick, was actually handling the whole situation in Liverpool without even having a representative of the transportation service on his staff.

Here is an extract from one of his reports:

U.S. DEBARKATION OFFICE
NORTH WESTERN HOTEL
LIVERPOOL

May 4, 1918

MY DEAR GENERAL HAGOOD:

We are now handling the entire debarkation ourselves. We handle as many as five ships simultaneously — two from

Riverside Station, entraining one at Riverside Station and marching the troops from the other ship to Central Station about twenty minutes' march, the baggage of both ships being handled separately from Riverside. Then we handle two ships on the other side of the river at Binkenhead from one station in the same manner; and one ship, usually one of the large ships at the Gladstone Dock on this side.

As an illustration of the rapidity with which this enables us to debark troops, I may say that the last convoy which consisted of seven ships, was unloaded in twelve hours; the first ship began debarking at 8 A.M. and the last train left at 8 P.M. Since we started to handle our troops we have a record of an average time of one hour and fifty-five minutes each in handling of all ships, excepting a large transport carrying over 5000 troops, and we have a minimum time in the debarkation of a ship carrying 2400 troops of an hour and fifteen minutes.

We expect in time to eliminate the only cause of delay that is bothering us at present. At present we cannot depend upon the advance information we get of troops arriving in a convoy. In about fifty per cent of the cases our information is either garbled in coding or decoding the telegram, or else more troops have been put aboard at the last minute which are not reported. In some cases certain organizations will be reported aboard one ship, and when they arrive here they will be aboard another ship, consequently in a great many cases the train assignments which we prepared in advance have to be made over after we board the ship and receive a copy of the landing returns.

I am working on a plan now which I hope to submit in the near future, by which these troubles will be eliminated. I intend to have the British furnish a standard train that will hold a fixed number of officers and men. This standard train will be incorporated in our regulations, and the Commanding Officer aboard the ship will make out his own train assignments before he arrives in dock. The only obstacles in the way of this plan at present are: the Commanding Officer has not sufficient data when he leaves New York to enable him to know the destination of his Command, and we are not sure

always that our regulations will be aboard or handed to the Commanding Officer on the ship. If we could have our order of February last complied with, directing that transport quartermasters be put aboard these ships, and if the Commanding Officer were informed at the Port of Embarkation of his command, this plan could be put into operation.

(Sgd)

JACOB SCHICK

Major, 26th inf.

U.S. Army

Wednesday, May 8th:

I had another long conference with Captain Bliss on the subject of D.G.T. personnel. He says the War Department has decided to draft no more railroad men on account of industrial conditions at home. Thus General Atterbury's source of supply for railroad personnel has been destroyed. This presents a serious situation. In the early days drafted and volunteer railroad men were sent to the combat organizations. They received military training and now have become so much involved in the essential organization of combat units that it is practically impossible to pull them out. Many of them are now serving as officers and non-commissioned officers at the front. Others have become tied up in various other services. Very few of them want to get back on railroad work. They say they had enough railroading at home and came to France to fight — not to flag freight trains.

Monday, May 20th:

General Mason M. Patrick has been relieved from duty as Director of Construction and Forestry and placed at the head of the Air Service. He is replaced by General Jadwin, who in turn is replaced as Director of Light Railways and Roads by Brigadier General Charles H. McKinstry.

The operation of the Service of Utilities has not been as successful as we had hoped. General Kernan received a telegram from General Pershing directing him to come to Paris for a conference on Tuesday morning. He was told to bring General Langfitt and myself.

Tuesday, May 21st:

We arrived at General Pershing's house in Paris at about 10.00 A.M. This house was placed at General Pershing's disposal by a wealthy American civilian resident in Paris. It is very handsome, with a wonderful two-acre garden in the rear. There are many large, old trees, vines, and beautiful shrubs and flowers; also a great many birds, among which I noticed wild pigeons. It gives the effect of a park in the country rather than a back yard in the heart of a great city. The place is entered through a gate opening into a sally port. Within the sally port is a fountain and a paved court surrounded on three sides by the house proper and by out-buildings. Back of the house and opening into the park is a long porch, enclosed in glass.

General Pershing asked General Langfitt to withdraw, as his first conference would be with General Kernan and myself alone. He asked what we thought of the Service of Utilities. After General Kernan had expressed his views he asked for mine. I told him I thought that the organization was fulfilling a useful purpose as a buffer between the Transportation Department and the military. I said that the shifting of General Langfitt and Colonel Andrews from subordinates to superiors of the Director General of Transportation had brought them to a more definite realization of the necessity of the militarization of the Transportation Department and its coördination with the other services; that a little later there would be no further need for the Service of Utilities.

General Kernan had expressed somewhat the same views and General Pershing agreed with us. He said that it was natural that the big railroad men in the Transportation Department should be unwilling to give up their own methods and take those of the Army which they did not understand, but that sooner or later they would have to do so.

This expression from General Pershing seemed to remove the last barrier toward the proper organization of the Transportation Department, namely, that the Director General should have the same status as the Chief Quartermaster and other bureau chiefs; that he should no longer have the status of the President of the Pennsylvania Railroad in its relation to the Army at home. General Pershing said, however, that we could not go too fast. He pointed out the great service that General Atterbury and the other technical railroad men had rendered; their broad grasp of the transportation problem; their ability to speak the same language as the railroad men of England and France; the confidence which they inspired among these men and among the people at home; their ability to get men and material from the States through their knowledge of what was wanted, of where it was and of the men who could get it for them. General Pershing cautioned me, as he had done many times before, that we must not be too unyielding; that what we wanted would come about in good time, and that, meanwhile, he depended upon me to compromise and harmonize these conflicts.

At this, as at the many previous conferences I had had with General Pershing, I was struck with his calm, cool, and impartial manner. However partisan I myself might be at the outset, I always came away feeling that General Pershing's decision had prevailed, not because of his authority, but because of his better judgment. It was characteristic of him to approach the most complicated problems by the simplest

methods. His conclusions appealed to common sense, and, although often away from G.H.Q. for weeks at a time, he never appeared to lack knowledge of any subject which subordinates took to him for decision.

Afterwards General Pershing called in General Langfitt and we went into a general discussion of the Abbeville Agreement, the modification of our priority schedules, etc., all of which is discussed in Chapter XXII.

The three of us then returned to Tours.

CHAPTER XVIII

TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT (*continued*)

Andrews and Atterbury worried — Conferences with Pershing — Praise for General Atterbury — Utilities abolished — Mears and Walsh — Johnston Board — Advent of Harbord — General Orders 40 — Organization tables scrapped — Corps of 125,000 authorized by cable — Final solution — Accomplishments.

OUR conference with General Pershing on May 21st in Paris gave us a very clear understanding of his attitude on the questions of the Transportation Department, both present and future. It was very reassuring to find that he himself accepted our view, though some of his staff at G.H.Q. did not. But it was not long before trouble began to brew. The shoe had begun to pinch the other foot, and from then on it was the Transportation people themselves who became dissatisfied with the situation and who sought relief through another reorganization.

I shall continue with extracts from my journal.

Tuesday May 28th:

Colonel Andrews came to my office to say that, much as he regretted it, he had come to the conclusion that the Transportation Department was very unsatisfactory in its relation to the other services; that Utilities had no difficulty in co-ordinating the work of Construction and Forestry, of the Motor Transport Service or of Light Railways with the other Supply services, but that Transportation would not yield to military procedure. He said, however, that both he and General Langfitt were determined to make it go notwithstanding these difficulties; that when he was in the Transportation Department he himself did not see the broader side of the situation, but that now, since he had become Deputy

Chief of Utilities, he realized that however efficient Transportation might be within itself, we could not get results unless that department played the game in absolute harmony with the others.

Tuesday, June 18th:

General Kernan received a telephone message to go at once to Chaumont for conference with General Pershing, General Langfitt, and General Atterbury. I was not called at this conference and do not know what went forward.

That night I went to an elaborate dinner given by General Atterbury at the Hôtel Univers for Monsieur Albert Claveille the Minister of Public Works, and other distinguished Frenchmen. There were about twenty-five at the dinner, and I had an opportunity to talk with Colonel Georges T. P. H. Maurier, the head of the French Fourth Bureau, corresponding to our G-4, and to Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Boquet, the French Director General of Transportation. This was a kind of get-together party of those most interested in the solution of the American transportation problem. The dinner went off in fine shape and general good feeling prevailed.

Monday, July 1st:

General Atterbury came to my office to say that he knew the Transportation Department was not working satisfactorily. He said that he had had a great deal of criticism and had been told many times what not to do, but that he had had very little advice and had not been told what to do. He said he had always been able to get friendly advice and assistance from me and that he wanted me to tell him frankly what I thought the trouble was. He said he would do anything within his power to straighten the matter out and

would even go so far as to resign from the department himself if I thought that would solve the difficulties. He said that he did not think that the injection of the Service of Utilities between himself and the C.G., S.O.S., had improved matters; that, on the contrary, it had tended to confusion. He asked me to take up with General Kernan and General Pershing the question of another reorganization which would put his service on a better basis.

I said I thought he ought to go himself directly to General Pershing. He asked if I would not see General Pershing and make an appointment for him, and I said I would.

I reported these facts to General Kernan. He sent for General Atterbury and after a short conference with him told me to go ahead and make the appointment. I called up Colonel Bowditch, General Pershing's aide at Chaumont, and was told that General Pershing was somewhere up on the front, but would be in Paris the next day.

Tuesday, July 2d:

I went to General Pershing's house in Paris at eight-thirty in the morning and succeeded in seeing him about half-past ten. After some discussion of the troubles in the Transportation Department and the matters set forth in Chapter XXII, he told me to meet him again at G.H.Q. on July 5th.

Wednesday, July 3d:

Upon my return to Tours I had another long conference with General Atterbury. I told him of my visit to General Pershing and promised that in my conference on Friday I would recommend that Utilities be abolished. I said I thought all his troubles would end if he were placed on exactly the same status as the other bureau chiefs.



General Johnson Hagood avec monsieur Clemenceau

CLEMENCEAU AT AMERICAN FRONT NEAR CHÂTEAU-THIERRY, JUNE 27, 1918

Friday, July 5th:

I arrived at Chaumont about noon on July 5th, but did not get an opportunity to see General Pershing until the next morning. I had a two hours' conference with him on Saturday morning, another two hours' session that afternoon, and still another long session on Sunday morning. We went over a great many matters, including the proposed headquarters organization of the S.O.S., my going back to the United States, and the difficulties that had arisen as a result of the Abbeville Agreement (see Chapters XXII and XXIII).

A considerable part of the time was devoted to the Service of Utilities and the Transportation Department. In this discussion General McAndrew, the Chief of Staff, and General Eltinge, the Deputy Chief of Staff, also participated.

General Pershing finally decided that he would abolish the Service of Utilities and make a redistribution of its sub-divisions. Major General W. C. Langfitt was to be appointed Chief Engineer Officer, A.E.F., with three divisions under him; namely, Construction and Forestry, headed by Jadwin; Light Railways and Roads, headed by McKinstry; and Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies, headed by Brigadier General Harry Taylor. This left Transportation (also Motor Transport) an independent service and directly under the S.O.S., as desired at the time by General Atterbury.

General Pershing suggested that Colonel Andrews be transferred to G-4, S.O.S., to coördinate the Transportation Department with the other services. He also suggested that certain railroad men of recognized ability, such as Major H. C. Nutt, be assigned to G-4, so that transportation problems coming before the General Staff could be thoroughly understood and efficiently handled.

General Pershing took this occasion to express again the

greatest admiration for General Atterbury's ability, his earnestness and his loyalty, and said that there was no use to make any appointment for General Atterbury, as he would not even discuss the question of his leaving the Transportation Service.

General Pershing went on to say that General Atterbury's difficulties came from lack of military experience on the part of himself and his advisers; that he did not know how to adjust his plans to the military requirements; and that the solution lay in giving him the best man we could find to assist him in militarizing his department. I suggested several names for this duty, but General Pershing said that we could discuss that later.

I then returned to Tours.


Monday, July 9th:

I sent for General Langfitt and told him the result of my visit to G.H.Q. He was not satisfied that it would work out. I told him not to mention this proposed reorganization until it was given out by G.H.Q.

A little later General Atterbury came in to present Brigadier General Philip A. M. Nash, then the Director General of Transportation of the British Service. General Atterbury had not been informed by General Pershing as to what the final decision had been in the matter, and therefore I took advantage of General Nash's presence to say nothing to him about it other than that I thought we had found a satisfactory solution and that he could count on my coöperation.

We got a telegram from G.H.Q. late in the afternoon, announcing the abolishment of the Service of Utilities, etc., but there was a mixup in the wording of the telegram, indicating that Construction was to be turned back to the Transportation Department. I got hold of Eltinge on the telephone and

ORGANIZATION CHART OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY



succeeded in suppressing this telegram and got a promise that a corrected copy would be sent right away.

Thursday, July 12th:

Telegram received from G.H.Q. announcing that the new organization was in effect. General Kernan was absent on an inspection trip during all this time and knew nothing about the changes, so I wired him and then notified Generals Langfitt and Atterbury.

Sunday, July 15th:

General Atterbury came in to show me a letter he had received from General Pershing directing him to come to me for advice and suggesting that he ask for a board, with me as a member, to make a thorough study of his organization and to devise some scheme by which it could be better coördinated with the military.

While we were discussing it, General Pershing called me on the telephone and asked what was being done. I told him that I was then in conference with General Atterbury and that I had seen his letter. He said he wanted something done right away toward putting a military man in with General Atterbury. I said that General Atterbury and I could not agree on anybody. He asked me what I thought of a certain Engineer officer. I said I thought he was just the man, but that General Atterbury preferred not to have an Engineer officer. General Pershing said that this would not hold, and that he wanted this officer detailed unless General Atterbury had some strong personal objections to him.

In the meantime, General Atterbury had left the room. I called him back, told him what General Pershing said, and he said that he did have personal objections to the officer referred to. At my suggestion he finally agreed to take Colonel

Frederick Mears, a cavalry officer and a graduate of the Service Schools and of the Staff College, who had rendered distinguished service in connection with the Panama Railroad and the railroad in Alaska. Neither General Atterbury nor I had ever seen Mears, but I knew him by reputation.

I then called General Pershing back on the telephone, told him what we had done, and he said Colonel Mears was satisfactory to him, but that I should get hold of Mears, tell him exactly what we wanted, and see that he did not get off on the wrong foot.

Tuesday, July 16th:

General Kernan returned from his inspection trip of the ports. I told him of everything that had happened while he was gone and of General Pershing's latest instructions. He said that no matter what the difficulties were he was going to carry out General Pershing's idea. He did not agree, however, to taking Colonel Mears as General Atterbury's principal military adviser. He said that neither he nor I nor Atterbury knew Mears personally. He thought the best solution would be to take General R. D. Walsh and detail him as Deputy Director General of Transportation. This would leave Colonel John S. Sewell as Base Commander at Saint-Nazaire, for which he had exceptional qualifications. He pointed out that Walsh had made a wonderful success at Saint-Nazaire, had harmonized all the conflicting interests there, and that a short time ago General Atterbury had praised Walsh's work and had asked General Kernan to detail him for duty in the Transportation Department.

Wednesday, July 17th:

General Kernan called General Pershing on the telephone and told him what he thought about putting General Walsh

in as Deputy Director General of Transportation, and General Pershing said he would decide the matter later. Subsequently, he authorized General Kernan to go ahead, but directed that Colonel Mears also be appointed to duty with General Atterbury.


The detail of Walsh, a former cavalry officer, as Deputy Director General of Transportation, is going much farther than merely detailing a Regular officer as military adviser. General Atterbury is away from Tours about half the time and when he is away General Walsh will run the Transportation Department.

Thursday, July 18th:

As a result of these conferences a board was appointed, of which General Arthur Johnson was president, to make a thorough investigation of the organization of the Transportation Department and its proper relation to the General Staff and other services of the S.O.S. This board conducted a number of hearings and I appeared before it as a witness, but nothing ever came of it.

Saturday, August 17th:

The advent of General Harbord in command of the S.O.S. (see Chapter XX) made a great change in our relations to the Transportation Department. General Pershing had delegated to General Harbord much greater authority than he had ever delegated to General Kernan, and on account of the close relations between General Harbord, General Pershing, and General Atterbury and the great confidence which Atterbury had in Harbord, I believe the Transportation Department finally accepted the fact that it was an integral part of the military machine of the S.O.S. and must operate under those conditions. I told General Harbord that if we



GENERAL KERNAN AND GENERAL OFFICERS OF IHS STAFF
Left to right: Walsh, Winn, Wheeler, Russel, Patrick, Fillemeau, Kerman, Sargent, Hagood, Rogers, Kean. *Absent:* Langfitt, Taylor, Jadwin, Ireland, Rice, Atterbury, Walker

could ever get the people of the Transportation Department to consider that they were Army officers instead of transportation men dressed up in costume, nine tenths of our trouble would be over.

I suggested that certain instructions be published in a general order or incorporated in a letter to General Atterbury. The suggestion was taken. These instructions, below, with some slight modification, were published as General Orders, No. 40, S.O.S., 1918, and although General Atterbury never knew where they originated he told me that they had done more to raise the morale of his people and put a good taste in their mouths than anything else that had happened since they came to France.

PROPOSED GENERAL ORDER OR LETTER

1. To bring about better understanding and closer coöperation between the Transportation Department and the other branches of the Army which it serves, the following instructions are issued:
2. The Transportation Department constitutes one of the great staff departments of the Army. It is as much a part of the Army as any other staff department and, if a success, will in all likelihood, together with at least a portion of its present personnel, be incorporated in the Regular Army after the war. Every possible effort should be made, by all concerned, to remove the unfortunate feelings which perhaps existed at one time to the effect that the Transportation Department was largely a civil institution the members of which occupied a different status in the military service from that of the members of other staff departments.
3. The relation between the officers and enlisted men of the Transportation Department on the one hand and local military commanders on the other is identically the same as that between the officers and enlisted men of the other staff departments and such military commanders. The responsibility of local military commanders in the technical details of staff

corps is different for each staff corps. For instance, a local commander may properly concern himself much more in the technical details of the Provost Marshal service than he may with the technical details of a construction project. But he could with propriety give much more of his personal attention to the details of certain minor construction projects than he could to the details of a minor surgical operation. In the same way, no exact rule can be laid down as to the responsibility of a military commander in the matter of the technical details of the Transportation Department. The *authority* of such local military commander cannot be questioned when a military emergency arises, but the *exercise* of this authority, in accordance with fundamental military principle, must be restrained not by general rules but by the customs of the service in like cases, by the common sense of the individuals concerned and by such limitations as may be imposed by higher authority from time to time as specific cases arise.

4. Section commanders within their several territorial areas are the direct representatives of the C.G., S.O.S. They bear substantially the same relation to all the military agencies and personnel thereof as the C.G., S.O.S., bears to their entirety in the S.O.S. There can be no divided responsibility. He holds Section commanders responsible for results and he expects them to accomplish these results by the proper use of their respective staff officers.

5. The senior representative of the Transportation Department in each Section is on the staff of the Commanding Officer thereof and as such bears the same relation to the Section commander as do the corresponding representatives of the other staff departments. As a member of the Section commander's staff he will supervise and control so far as practicable all the activities of the Transportation Department within that Section. It is recognized, of course, that in the Intermediate and Advance Sections this control cannot be as closely drawn as it can at the base ports, where the activities are more concentrated. Such staff officers, however, must understand that their first allegiance is to the man on whose staff they serve and that their relations to the head of the Transportation

Department is the same as that which other staff officers of the Section bear to the heads of the several corps and departments which they locally represent. . . .

JOHNSON HAGOOD

my

H.Q. S.O.S., Aug. 17, 1918

Wednesday, September 11th:

General Atterbury came in to tell me that his people had been struggling for six months trying to get up organization tables, but that the conditions changed so rapidly his tables became out of date faster than they could be typewritten. He finally had them in some kind of shape and brought in a mass of tabulations and explanations about two inches thick and wanted to know how in the world we could ever get them through G.H.Q. and approved in the United States.

To his great relief I suggested that we cut loose from the whole proposition, formulate a short cable dealing in round numbers and fixing some maximum limits to cover his anticipated needs for the next six months. He had about 30,000 men in his department at that time and his organization table showed that he would need 200,000 eventually. I suggested that there was no prospect of getting even 100,000 on our priority schedules, and that if his paper organization were limited to 125,000, we might get quicker action. He agreed to this and asked me to formulate the cable, which I did. As soon as it was typewritten — about half a page — we took it to General Harbord, who ordered it sent. Inside of a few days it came back from the War Department approved.

Final solution:

A short time after the Armistice General Atterbury secured the services of Brigadier General Frank R. McCoy and placed him in charge of water transportation with a view to

becoming his successor as Director General of Transportation. Finally, when General Atterbury left France he was succeeded by McCoy, and the latter was succeeded as Director of Water Transportation by Brigadier General Sherwood A. Cheney. It will be remembered that McCoy was a member of the Hagood Board which drafted General Orders No. 31, and that at that time he had stood out for having the Transportation Department a semi-independent institution operated by technical civilians.

Accomplishments:

Whatever may be said of the difficulties of securing a proper military organization for the Transportation Department, its actual accomplishments stand out as one of the great things of the World War. Five hundred years from now, when America's participation is reduced to a single paragraph in the school histories, that paragraph will contain the statement that America sent to France troops and supplies for an army of 2,000,000 men.

In my letter to the Chief of Staff, A.E.F., dated November 15, 1917 (Chapter V), I said, in part:

The line of communication is the most important problem now confronting the American Army. Upon its successful operation, more than upon the successful operation of all other agencies combined, depends the outcome of the war. Both sides realize this. The Germans are trying to defeat the Allies by their submarine campaign against Great Britain and the Allies are trying to defeat the Germans by starving them out. It is common knowledge that the greatest weapon Germany has is her wonderful organization of supplies and transportation.

Germany's campaigns on the Western Front were a matter of secondary importance. Germany failed when the sub-

marine campaign against transportation failed. There was never any question but that the American soldier would acquit himself creditably upon the field of battle. The great question with reference to America was, Could she raise, transport, and supply a great army three thousand miles from its base?

For this accomplishment we must give the full share of credit to the Transportation Department in France and particularly to General W. W. Atterbury, the Director General of Transportation. It would be very difficult for any one at home to understand the difficulties which he had to overcome. There was, of course, a natural prejudice against his department by the other supply services, particularly the Quartermaster Corps and the Engineer Corps, because he was an outsider injected into the military service to perform a function which had always been considered as properly pertaining to themselves. There was the difficulty of an organization without rules and regulations as to procedure and one which existing Army orders and regulations did not fit. There was the difficulty of operating in a foreign country where the language and technical terms were unknown to his operatives; where the size, weight, and behavior of all equipment was entirely different from that to which his operatives had been accustomed; where the signals and traffic regulations were wholly different from anything that they had ever known before. Such a simple thing, for example, as coupling freight cars was attended by the greatest difficulty, not only on account of the difference of couplers, but also because the Frenchmen, who were accustomed to handling six-ton freight cars, were unable to make a proper estimate of the speed and momentum of American cars weighing from fifteen to twenty tons. This was the cause of many smash-ups. Add to this the difficulty of getting trained personnel from the United

States and the still greater difficulty of making plans under promise of getting such personnel and then having it fail to turn up.

During the progress of the war the Transportation Department handled two million men and six million tons of cargo. They constructed a thousand miles of standard-gauge switches and sidings. They erected fifteen hundred standard-gauge locomotives and twenty thousand freight cars, brought over from the United States, and repaired and put in use 1947 unserviceable French locomotives and 57,385 French freight cars. They did all this with a personnel sixty per cent short of estimated requirements.

General Wilberforce, the British commander at Boulogne, told me that at the front one American soldier was the equal of any three others in Europe — British, French, or Boche. No other nation could have done what we did at the rear.

Among the many able men of General Atterbury's department with whom I came in personal contact were Colonel W. J. Wilgus, a former vice-president of the New York Central Railroad; Colonel G. T. Slade, first vice-president of the Northern Pacific Railway; Colonel H. H. Adams, president, Kansas City Terminals; Colonel H. G. Maxfield, formerly Superintendent of Motive Power, Pennsylvania Railroad; Colonel James A. McCrea, General Manager, Long Island; Lieutenant Colonel F. W. Green, Louisiana and Arkansas Railroad.

CHAPTER XIX

PROMOTION BY SELECTION

Seniority in time of peace — System falls down — Scramble for promotion — Months wasted — General W. B. Burtt given blanket authority after Armistice — Quartermaster sergeant promoted to be colonel — Franklin D'Olier held down to captain — Lieutenant generals not appointed — Harbord misses out — Letter to Shannon — Memorandum for Harbord — Civilians and soldiers — Medical officers.

IN time of peace promotion in the Army has always been by seniority. The man senior in length of service has been promoted without regard to his qualifications. Until some years after the Civil War promotions were made by seniority within the regiment. Later it was extended to the different arms. Since the war it has been further extended and now the whole Army is on one list. Advocates of regimental promotion claimed that in time of war it would not be practicable to have lineal promotion throughout the several arms; that, for instance, if the colonel were killed it would be necessary to promote the lieutenant colonel on the spot; that it would not be practicable to hold the vacancy for the senior lieutenant colonel of that arm of the service, as he might be in an entirely different part of the country.

In all the years of peace no effort was made to provide for this difficulty. No system had been established for promotions in time of war, so that when the war came and the system of lineal promotion had to be abandoned there was nothing to take its place. Promotion became a wild scramble. All efforts to establish system failed, and advancement in rank became a matter of favoritism, luck, and opportunity.

The fundamental difficulty was that we could not get away from the idea that promotion was reward; that a man should not be promoted unless he had done something to deserve it.

We had been educated to the idea that the men deserved promotion in the order of their seniority and, as proposed in a discussion at G.H.Q., 'no man should be jumped over another unless he has performed a service so brilliant that he is universally accepted as deserving special recognition.'

The question is not who deserves promotion, but where can we find men qualified for the jobs!!!

For myself I have always felt that we should develop a system of promotion by selection in time of peace so that in time of war selection may be made according to system and not according to hodge-podge methods into which we have always been forced.

So it came about in this war that months and months were wasted trying to devise a centralized system of promotion or having a central agency pass upon individual cases, instead of establishing general regulations and placing promotion in the hands of local authority. From the trenches to the ports it was impossible to get proper men into proper places because their cases had to be passed upon at higher headquarters by some one who knew nothing about them, but who considered promotion as a question of individual rights. Organizations were commanded in action by enlisted men who had been recommended time and time again for commissions, but who could not be promoted because their cases could not get to the proper man for consideration. One division commander told me that he could not wait, and that when an enlisted man fell into an officer's command he required him to wear the insignia; that in his division you would find men wearing captains' bars who were in fact only sergeants.

Promotion lagged behind necessity as the tide lags behind the moon. After the Armistice General W. B. Burtt was sent out from G.H.Q. to visit all the organizations of the A.E.F. with blanket authority to promote officers on the spot. Every

division commander should have had this authority all during the war to the extent of filling all vacancies in his division. So also in the back areas. The Commanding General of the S.O.S. should have had authority to promote and demote officers in order to get suitable men into suitable jobs.

One of the objections to this scheme was that while a man could be promoted from grade to grade there was no way in which the reverse could be done. However, at my suggestion, General Pershing sent a cablegram to the United States asking authority to demote officers and reappoint them in lower grades. This was approved, but little advantage was taken of it.

The absurdities of our system of promotion are illustrated by the case of a quartermaster sergeant who rose to the grade of colonel in one year and never had any duty more important than serving with a labor battalion, compared with the cases of Lindsley, Cholmeley-Jones, and Franklin D'Olier.

Henry D. Lindsley was the head of the War Risk Bureau in France. The War Department had authorized the grade of colonel for that office, but we could not get G.H.Q. to make the promotion. One day while the Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, was at lunch at Château Beaulieu, I presented the question to him, as I knew that he was a friend of Lindsley's. He said go ahead, make the promotion, and cable the United States that he had authorized it. It was the same thing with Lindsley's principal assistant, Captain Cholmeley-Jones, whom we could not get promoted to the grade of lieutenant colonel, authorized by the War Department, because we could not get some one at G.H.Q. convinced as to his qualifications. After the war he became the head of the War Risk Insurance in the United States, with a responsibility greater than that of any insurance company president in the

world. How absurd to hold such a man down to the grade of captain all during his principal activity in the war, when men relieved from duty for inefficiency in Tours were being made brigadier generals by the discredited process of seniority!

Lieutenant generals:

On September 10th, during the second visit of Secretary Baker, General Frank T. Hines, who was with him, asked me why no recommendations had been made for filling the grades of lieutenant general authorized for the Commanding General, S.O.S., and for the commanders of the Army Corps at the front. General Hines said that the War Department was expecting names to be sent in and would promptly forward them to the Senate. Here again, I think, we made a great mistake. We can never have proper rank for the Army in time of peace if we do not give that rank in time of war. During the Civil War the Confederate Army was properly organized with eight full generals commanding armies, and nineteen lieutenant generals commanding army corps. On the Union side they had nothing above the grade of major general and difficulties of all kinds arose through placing major generals one above another.

So in the S.O.S. General Harbord was not the senior major general and there was no lawful authority for his taking command over his seniors in the grade of major general. Colonel Sewell at Saint-Nazaire at one time had command of 230,000 men, including many general officers, and yet, notwithstanding his great ability and exceptional service, we could not get him made a brigadier general because it was said he did not deserve to be promoted over colonels at the front. The commanders at the ports of embarkation at home were major generals, though their responsibilities were much less and their problems not nearly so difficult as those of the base com-

manders in France, not one of whom got any promotion on account of his job.

The difficulties of securing proper promotion in the A.E.F. are indicated in the following letter and memorandum, selected from the many¹ that passed between me and others concerned in the matter:

A.P.O. 717, FRANCE
May 19, 1918

From: General Johnson Hagood
To: Major James A. Shannon, G.H.Q.
Subject: Promotions in the A.E.F.

MY DEAR SHANNON:

1. As you know, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction in the A.E.F. because officers feel that men in the United States are being promoted over those serving in France. I hear this everywhere and, so far as the Coast Artillery is concerned, I know that those of us who came with the first expedition have been very much discriminated against. I am not referring to individual fortunate cases like my own or to those like Frank T. Hines and other conspicuous cases of selection, but to cases where solid blocks of men have been promoted over such men as Grant, Barnes, Howard, and Lohr.

2. I am wondering whether you people at Chaumont really appreciate the situation. I know you are loath to recommend people for promotion who have not actually done something to warrant it. But do you really appreciate the fact that there is a perfectly enormous number of vacancies that have got to be filled and that if the men of the A.E.F. are not promoted to fill them others will be?

3. As you know, I have for many years been mixed up in these questions of army organization, re-arrangement of rank, promotion, and so forth, and I shall give you the benefit of some figures that I made out before the war.

4. Taking as a basis the table on page 9 of the Army List and Directory of May 20, 1917, showing the authorized

¹ See my full account from which this book is prepared, filed with Historical Section of the War Department.

strength of the Army in the several grades, here are the numbers we would have to have. We have been talking about an army of two million men. General Wood and others in the States are now talking about an army of five million men. So here is a little table showing the number of officers required in each grade of an army of one, two, three, four and five million men, respectively:

	1,000,000	2,000,000	3,000,000	4,000,000	5,000,000
Generals.....	400	800	1,200	1,600	2,000
Colonels.....	1,650	3,300	4,950	6,600	8,200
Lieut. Colonels...	1,650	3,300	4,950	6,600	8,200
Majors.....	2,000	4,000	6,000	8,000	10,000

5. On May 20, 1917, we had in the Army, of all grades and all branches, 7000 officers. So neglecting the National Guard and assuming, for the purpose of convenient computation, that all promotions in the National Army would be lineal from the Regular Army, you will get the following results:

(a) For an army of a million men every man who was a Colonel on May 20th would be a General, and the junior Second Lieutenant would be one third up the list of Majors.

(b) For an army of two million men all the Lieutenant Colonels would be added to the list of Generals, and the junior Second Lieutenant would be a Lieutenant Colonel.

(c) For an army of five million men all the Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Majors and five hundred senior Captains of May 20th would be Generals, and no officer in the Regular Army of that date would have a grade less than that of Colonel.

6. Now, in these circumstances, there is no need of giving thought to individual cases of distinction, nor of holding back in recommending officers of the A.E.F. until they have done something which warrants a promotion in the way of reward for service. We might as well stare the question in the face and push forward every man who does not show absolute in-



W. Haig, M. For General Johnson Haig
with every good wish
Hai - 3
23 Dec.

competence and get him into the grade in which he or some less competent man must have before the war is ended.

7. I should be glad to have you show this letter to General McAndrew with a view to reinforcing the letters that have been written from these headquarters urging the adoption of some definite rules of procedure by which the forces of the S.O.S. can be promptly organized and a line of promotion established which will insure the government's getting the services of the men who are best qualified to perform them. I care little for promotion as a matter of individual reward.

With best regards

Yours very sincerely

JH/my

(Sgd)

JOHNSON HAGOOD

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

August 15, 1918

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Subject: Promotion of S.O.S. Personnel

1. The Commander-in-Chief, upon a recent inspection through the S.O.S., impressed upon the personnel everywhere the importance of the S.O.S. work and inspired in them the feeling that their work was appreciated by him and by the country. These words had a very great effect and will no doubt lead to greater efficiency, but the effect will soon wear off if we give in empty words what we deny in material fact.

2. There is a distinct feeling that the importance of the S.O.S. is not as much appreciated in France as it is at home. The War Department has been liberal in authorizing high grades for the S.O.S., and when those grades have been authorized from the States, no names have been submitted to fill them. In the matter of the Service Stripe the War Department did not approve G.H.Q.'s omission of the S.O.S., and it was the War Department that forced the delegation of greater authority upon the S.O.S. incident to the recent re-organization.

3. *The S.O.S. as a career:* Most of the men who come

into the war want to fight. They don't want to stay in the S.O.S. They want to go to the front. But everybody cannot go to the front. At least one third must stay in the S.O.S. On a basis of three or four million men three thousand S.O.S. men a day would have to be shifted to let them all get to the front in a year. The project is too great, its permanent organization for maximum efficiency too important, to allow any such plastic conditions. If all the officials remained on their present jobs a year, and retained all of their assistants, they could not be regarded as experienced men, measured either by the standard of corresponding industrial institutions in the United States or of the Army itself. In a race it is not sufficient to make a hundred yards in $10\frac{2}{5}$ seconds if the other man is going to make it in $10\frac{1}{5}$. We cannot be satisfied with mediocrity, or even with a high state of efficiency. We must leave no stone unturned and must strive to attain a degree of efficiency hitherto unknown by man.

4. To attain this we must build up a permanent, fixed organization. We cannot consider the S.O.S. a kind of purgatory in which a man remains in a state of suspension until by good behavior or bad his final destination is determined. The S.O.S. must be made worth a man's career. We must introduce into its organization what is known in international law as 'The most favored nation clause.' We must not deny to the officers and men of the S.O.S. the same opportunity for distinction and promotion that is afforded their comrades who are more fortunate in having an opportunity to serve at the front.

5. Men come here to make great sacrifices. They give their blood and their lives. Therefore, lesser sacrifice can be brushed aside. But we are all human enough to appreciate praise and substantial reward. When the withholding of this praise or reward goes to the extent of creating an impression of injustice, men do not work with maximum enthusiasm. When a man feels that there is no career for him in the S.O.S. he looks forward to the day when he can get away from it.

6. For the Regular Army officer this is a serious question. After the war the Army will be reorganized, as it was after the

Civil War. There will be a re-adjustment of rank and many men not in the Army before the war will be brought into the higher grades; as a mere matter of self-defense and as a protection to himself and his family, no Regular officer can afford to go through this war occupying an inconspicuous position in the S.O.S. Even those who attained the grade of Brigadier General, if over forty-five years of age, will, after the war is over, be very small potatoes compared to those who make their reputations at the front.¹

7. The people of the United States want their soldiers in France to be treated at least as well as the best in Europe. This is what prompted the doubling of their pay last year. For this reason I shall make some comparisons between the treatment of officers in our S.O.S. and that of the British officers occupying similar positions:

8. *The Commanding General S.O.S.:* This job is second in importance in France. There was a recent effort on the part of the War Department to make it almost coördinate with that of the Commander-in-Chief by taking it away from his control. The duty which the Commanding General S.O.S. performs includes all of that of the British Quartermaster General, a Lieutenant General, that of the British Commanding L.O.C., also a Lieutenant General, and a part of that of the British War Office. When the American Army becomes the largest army in France, Congress will no doubt give the Commander-in-Chief rank coördinate with that of Haig and Foch.

9. At that time, with more than a million men under his command, the Commanding General S.O.S. should be a full General, even if this rank is not bestowed upon those commanding armies or groups of armies at the front. Even on the basis of five hundred thousand men in France the War Department authorized the grade of Lieutenant General for the Commanding General S.O.S., a rank which, in my judgment, should have been bestowed upon General Kernan before he gave up the command.

10. *The Base Commanders:* The Base Commanders should

¹ This prophecy did not come true.

be Major Generals. There are already over a hundred thousand men in one of the Bases, which is commanded by a Colonel. We are now embarrassed by the low rank of two Base Commanders and are unable to dispose of certain Brigadier Generals, not because there are no jobs suitable for men of that rank but because they are senior in rank to the commanders of the Bases where they might be placed on duty.

11. *The Bureau Chiefs:* The Bureau Chiefs should all be Major Generals. The Medical Department now has about seven thousand officers in France, and within a year they will have about twenty-five thousand. The man at the head of such an organization should be at least a Major General and should have a number of Brigadiers as his assistants. Several months ago the War Department, I understand, offered to authorize six General officers in the Medical Department for service in France, but the offer was declined.

12. *The General Staff:* There has long been an effort on the part of the War Department to establish the General Staff as the supreme control of the Army, but the General Staff has been denied the only thing recognized in the Army as a carrying authority; namely, rank.

13. Bureau Chiefs object to having 1st Lieutenants, Captains and junior field officers pass upon their recommendations, but with men of no greater ability, or even the same men wearing the straps of a General, the authority is not questioned. For many years the War Department contested for the principle and Congress finally granted it, that the Chief of Staff of the Army should have the highest rank in the Army. In my judgment, it is fundamental that the members of the General Staff S.O.S. should be given rank coördinate with the importance of their duties.

14. The Quartermaster General of the British service performs the coördinating functions which in our service rest with G-1 and G-4. He supervises the work of the Directors, whom we call the Bureau Chiefs. He is a Lieutenant General. He has two Deputies, who correspond to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 and the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4. Each of these two Deputies is a Major General. One of them has

three Brigadiers under him having duties corresponding to the Chiefs of the sub-divisions in the office of our G-4 and the other one has two Brigadiers under him corresponding to the Chiefs of the sub-divisions of G-1.

15. The War Department authorized the grade of Major General for the Chief of Staff S.O.S. and two Brigadier Generals and a number of Colonels, etc., for the subordinate offices of the General Staff, none of which have been filled. When the force is fully developed in France the Chief of Staff S.O.S. should be a Lieutenant General and G-1 and G-4 should each be a Major General. The Deputy Chief of Staff should be a Brigadier General, and some of the larger subdivisions in G-1 and G-4 should be headed by Brigadiers, the same as in the British service. Even the Director General of Transportation in the British service is a Major General and has seven Brigadier Generals under him in his department.

16. *Length of Service:* There has no doubt been a hesitation on the part of G.H.Q. to make promotions before officers have had time to 'make good,' but we have gone too slow in this matter through a lack of appreciation of the necessity for the utmost speed in order to bring the war to a conclusion. The time for laboratory experiments has passed. We must get our material together and go to work.

17. If the present rate of troop shipments keeps up we must have in France within the year about 300,000 officers. The total commissioned strength of the Army to-day is about 165,000. So that there must be brought in from civil life or promoted from the ranks an average of a thousand officers per day if at the end of that time all officers will have had more than six months' service. We must therefore consider every officer a veteran if he has had a year's service and we must use all possible speed to put the men into their permanent positions and try them out before the inevitable flood bursts upon us. In the United States men are being appointed to field grade in the staff from civil life when more competent and experienced men in France are held in the grades of Lieutenant and Captain. Protests have been sent to the United States against the discrimination in promotion made against men in

France. There is an article on this subject in a recent Service paper, but it seems to me that the real trouble has been that the men in France have not been recommended for promotion from this side of the water.

18. Vacancies are occurring with increasing rapidity. They have got to be filled by somebody and if officers in France are not advanced, civilians will be. On a 400,000-officer basis 10,000 will be of the grades of Colonel and above. The total number of officers in the Army the day we entered the war was 7000, so that at least 3000 vacancies in the grade of Colonel and above must be filled by men of no military experience except that gained since the outbreak of the war. I understand the class of 1916 are already Majors in the Field Artillery. In six months more they will be Colonels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. In order to bring this matter down to a specific proposition, I suggest that a recommendation be submitted at once to fill the vacancies authorized by paragraph 1-A of War Department Cable 1598, dated June 25, 1918.

20. *Brigadier Generals, General Staff:* Two vacancies were authorized in the grade of Brigadier General for the General Staff. These two vacancies should be given either to G-1 and G-4 (Cavanaugh and Smither), or one should go to either Smither or Cavanaugh and the other to McAdams.

21. Colonel Cavanaugh is a man of exceptional ability, 49 years of age and senior to a great many men in his own Corps who have already been made Brigadier Generals. He is well qualified to be head of G-1 and, in my judgment, should be made a Brigadier General with a view to his remaining G-1 at these headquarters for the rest of the war. We have already had a number of changes at this office and we cannot afford to have any more.

22. Colonel Smither is also a man of exceptional ability. He is peculiarly well qualified to be G-4. His relations with the Bureau Chiefs and with the Base Commanders is exceptionally harmonious; they all have great admiration for him; and there is no officer in France, in my judgment, as well

qualified as he to conduct the affairs of G-4, S.O.S., through the remainder of the war. He should certainly be made a Brigadier General with a view to his retention in that job. Smither also is senior in rank to a number of officers who have been made Brigadier Generals in the United States and in France.

23. If it comes to a matter of what a man deserves, there is no man more deserving of promotion than McAdams. General Kernan has recommended him on several occasions to be promoted to the grade of Colonel, and on one to the grade of Brigadier General. If it rested with me I would make him a Brigadier General at once, but since no man of his rank and service has yet been promoted to be Brigadier General, perhaps it would be better to urge his immediate promotion to the grade of Colonel and try to get him made a Brigadier a little later.

24. *The Adjutant General:* The grade of Brigadier General was authorized for the Adjutant General S.O.S. Colonel Bash has been the Adjutant General S.O.S. for a sufficient length of time to demonstrate his exceptional ability for that duty. I had had long experience in the War Department and at Department Headquarters, and with the possible exception of General McCain himself I have never seen so competent an Adjutant General as Colonel Bash. With no exception have I seen an Adjutant General who so clearly defined the proper relations of the Adjutant General's Department with the General Staff. Colonel Bash is a Colonel of Infantry unassigned and was sent here with the understanding that he might be called away at any time. Such an indefinite status is most unsatisfactory and in my judgment the interests of the government require that he should be made a Brigadier General and retained permanently as Adjutant General of the S.O.S. for the balance of the war.

25. *The Judge Advocate:* The grade of Brigadier General is authorized for the Judge Advocate. Colonel Hull, the present incumbent, is the senior Judge Advocate, next to Crowder in the Army, and a number of his juniors have been given the grade of Brigadier General. He has performed his

duties in a highly efficient manner, and in my judgment, should be given the rank the War Department has authorized and should be made the permanent Judge Advocate General at these headquarters for the balance of the war.

26. *Other General Staff Promotions:* Lieutenant Colonel Cabot Ward should be promoted to the grade of Colonel. This, perhaps, could wait two months as he has just been made a Lieutenant Colonel. He was recommended for the grade of Colonel by General Kernan. Colonel Ward is Chief of our Intelligence Section and has intimate relations with some of the biggest men in Europe. He has done most valuable work and I know of no man connected with the S.O.S. who would be so hard to replace in case he were lost. His low rank up to this time has been an actual detriment to the service. In my judgment he should be made a Colonel, retained on his present duty for the duration of the war and towards the close of the war given the rank of Brigadier General as a reward for his services. He is a National Army officer and his promotion would be in line with the policy of trying to build up the S.O.S. organization as far as possible with officers who have had no combat experience. It is my hope that there shall be no combat officers in G-2.

27. Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Poole should be made a Colonel. This officer is a graduate of the Military Academy who went into civil life and afterwards came back as a Reserve Officer. He is now Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 and would be a good man to replace Smither in case such a calamity should befall us. Poole has recently been offered the Colonely of an Engineer regiment but General Kernan would not approve it because he considered that the interests of the service required Poole's retention here. To this sacrifice of his personal interests Colonel Poole yielded.

28. The following officers have been on duty with the General Staff, these headquarters, for six months or more except as noted in 'Remarks.' They have demonstrated their efficiency in the duties assigned them, and are recommended for promotion and permanent retention on their present duty. None of these officers are in the Regular service and their

promotion is in line with the policy of building up the S.O.S. General Staff of non-combat officers.

NAME	PRESENT RANK	DUY	TO BE MADE
Rider, James G.	Captain, A.G., N.A.,	Secretary G.S., S.O.S.	Major
Pope, Joseph B.	2nd Lt., Q.M., R.C.,	Personnel Division	1st Lieut.

G-1

Simons, Aiken	Captain, F.A., N.G.,	Replacements	Major
Pill, L. M.	Captain, Engr., U.S.R.,	Tonnage	Major
Taylor, Roy	Captain, Engr., N.A.,	Tonnage	Major
Chaffins, C. J.	1st Lt., Engr., U.S.R.,	Statistical	Captain
Wolfe, S. L.	1st Lt., Engr., U.S.R.,	Administrative	Captain
Wulfekoetter, B. H.	1st Lt., Engr., U.S.R.,	Secretary	Captain

G-2

Henrotin, Frederick	Captain, Q.M., U.S.R.,	D.A.C. of S.	G-2	Major
Otto, Henry S.	Captain, F.A., U.S.R.,	G-2		Major
Turner, Q. Campbell	Captain, Inf., U.S.R.,	G-2		Major
Campanari, C.	2nd Lt., Inf., U.S.R.,	G-2		Captain
Brevoort, W. H.	2nd Lt., F.A., U.S.R.,	G-2		1st Lieut.
Gammell, R. H. Ives	2nd Lt., Inf., N.A.,	G-2		1st Lieut.
Hornblow, Jr., A.	2nd Lt., Inf., N.A.,	G-2		1st Lieut.
Goodwin, Phillip L.	2nd Lt., Inf., N.A.,	G-2		1st Lieut.
Colwell, Kent G.	2nd Lt., Inf., N.A.,	G-2		1st Lieut.

G-4

Jackson, John Price	Major, Engr., U.S.R.,	Chief Labor Bureau	Lieut. Col.
Cooper, J. W.	Captain, Inf., N.A.,	Executive Branch	Major
Darby, E. G.	1st Lt., Inf., U.S.R.,	Troop Movements	Captain
Grant, Arthur	1st Lt., Inf., U.S.R.,	Troop Movements	Captain
French, N. W.	1st Lt., Engr., U.S.R.,	'Plans ahead'	Captain
Griffith, W. M.	1st Lt., Inf., U.S.R.,	Executive Branch	Captain

REMARKS

Captain James G. Rider, A.G., N.A., commissioned for duty with War Risk November 21, 1917; on duty Board C. & A. from February until April, 1918; on duty these headquarters since April 12, 1918.

2nd Lieut. Joseph B. Pope, Q.M., R.C., on duty these headquarters over six months. Exceptional devotion to duty and marked efficiency.

Captain Aiken Simons, F.A., N.G., entered U.S. Service

July 25, 1917; left U.S. October 11, 1917; duty these Headquarters since December 6, 1917.

1st Lieut. S. L. Wolfe, Engr., U.S.R., was one of the first officers selected for the S.O.S., General Staff. Since being detailed from his regiment five of his juniors have been promoted over him.

1st Lieut. B. H. Wulfekoetter, Engr., U.S.R., is a young officer of exceptional ability.

Captain Frederick Henrotin, Q.M., U.S.R., of the Intelligence Section is second only to Ward. General Kernan recommended him to be made Lieut. Colonel.

Captain Henry S. Otto, F.A., U.S.R., is at the head of the Bordeaux office of G-2, S.O.S., and is also responsible for the G-2 office in Base Section No. 7.

Captain Q. Campbell Turner, Inf., U.S.R., is at the head of the G-2 office at Base Section No. 3, with station in London, and is in charge of the other G-2 offices in England.

2nd Lieut. C. Campanari's assignment is that of Director of C.E. activities (under the D.A.C. of S., G-2, S.O.S.) for a large area comprising Blois, Gièvres, Romorantin, Issoudun, Nevers, and shortly Saumur and Angers.

2nd Lieut. W. H. Brevoort, F.A., U.S.R., is Intelligence Officer at Base Section No. 1, which is one of the most important posts of G-2, S.O.S.

2nd Lieut. A. Hornblow, Jr., Inf., N.A., is Intelligence Officer at Base Section No. 4.

Major John Price Jackson, Engr., U.S.R., has shown unusual energy and devotion to duty in the organization of the Labor Bureau and in obtaining civilian labor for the A.E.F. It is intended to assign him an important position in the organization and administration of the Army Service Corps, which should be filled by an officer of the grade of Lieutenant Colonel.

Captain Cooper and Lieutenants Darby, Grant, French and Griffith of G-4 have all rendered good service. They are capable and are men I want to keep in the General Staff with increasing responsibility.

29. The above officers represent the remainder of a great

many who have been tried out and passed on to positions of less responsibility. The recommendations are made solely in the interest of the United States.

JOHNSON HAGOOD

Chief of Staff, S.O.S.

August 15, 1918

Among the officers not mentioned in my memorandum, but who rendered most efficient service with our General Staff at Tours, and who, no doubt, would have received more substantial reward if they had been allowed to go to combat organizations, were: Colonel G. D. Arrowsmith, G-1, in charge of priority schedules and troop movements from the United States; Colonel H. H. Tebbetts, G-1, in charge of replacements; Major James L. Frink, G-1, in charge of organization, equipment, prisoners of war, etc.; Colonel John W. Wright, G-4, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff; Colonel Alden F. Brewster, G-4, in charge of Field Artillery matters; Major D. A. Robinson, G-4, in charge of 'plans ahead,' equipment, etc.; Major Chester P. Mills, G-4, miscellaneous duties; and Colonel James K. Parsons, who served with us for a while in G-4 and who afterwards joined a combat organization and received a distinguished service cross.

I did not recommend these men for promotion because their duties did not require higher rank. My concern was with getting a properly organized team, not with rewarding merit, however great.

Promotion of soldiers and civilians:

It came to my attention that there was great delay in commissioning soldiers and civilians in the staff departments in France. I called for Major Wainer and was told that the matter was progressing as rapidly as possible, but that the officers conducting the examinations were very busy with

other duties and, as a rule, could meet but once a week. He said that some cases had been held up for as long as ninety days without getting action. I told him to issue instructions at once that all the bureau chiefs should convene a sufficient number of boards to clear up all cases and that hereafter every case should be disposed of within forty-eight hours after the man reported for examination.

As always, Wainer rose to the occasion and the new order was executed at once.

Promotions in Medical Department:

We had been in constant trouble with getting promotions for the Medical Department. There were several thousand vacancies, and men who had come over in the first expedition were still lieutenants, while men whom they had instructed in training camps at home had come over subsequently as captains and majors. G.H.Q. issued a very complicated order prescribing that mathematical computations should be made and percentages established to determine in each case whether or not a medical officer was entitled to promotion.

By this time General Harbord had taken command of the S.O.S. I prepared the following endorsement, which he signed:

1st Ind.

A.E.F., Hq. S.O.S.
October 9, 1918

To the C.-in-C., G.H.Q.

1. To determine the percentages indicated in paragraph II, Section 1, General Orders 162, G.H.Q., is mathematically impossible. The quantities entering the equation are indeterminate and unknown. Not only do these quantities change every hour of the day but there has never been an initial determination of what constitutes the S.O.S., either geographically or numerically.

2. It is believed that G.O. 162 would be strengthened if section 1 were entirely rescinded and nothing substituted for it. Vacancies are created and filled by order at will. There can be no value, therefore, in launching out into an involved theoretical calculation in order to determine whether a vacancy exists. Such action simply substitutes delay and circumlocution at a time when we should have speedy action and quick results.

3. In this connection, attention is invited to paragraph 8 of Cable No. 2011-R.¹ This simple method of handling the Transportation Department was submitted to the War Department by these headquarters and that one paragraph takes the place of hundreds of pages of organization tables over which the departments both here and in the United States had been laboring for months without results.

4. Attention is also invited to paragraph 7 of the same cable. That very simple manner of handling vacancies for the Coast Artillery Corps originated in the War Department.

5. Most of the staff departments already know how many vacancies they are entitled to in the different grades. If they don't know they can easily find out from time to time and when recommendations for promotion are submitted by them accompanied by a statement that a vacancy exists that statement would seem to be sufficient without entering into involved mathematical computations for its verification.

6. In the case of the Medical Department such theoretical discussion has already greatly interfered with the efficiency of that department. With several thousand vacancies existing, great delays have been experienced in getting any of them filled owing to inability to agree on a proper method of computing these percentages.

(Sgd) J. G. HARBORD

JH/my

Major General, Commanding

¹ Cable drawn by me for General Atterbury. See Chapter XVIII.

CHAPTER XX

HARBORD TAKES COMMAND


Why Harbord supplanted Kernan — Kernan did fine work — Harbord best general in France — Scheme proposed to make Harbord Chief of Staff for Supply — Isaac Marcossen and Elinor Glyn write up the S.O.S. — The Road to Berlin — Method of handling office routine — Big things to be accomplished by S.O.S.

Sunday, July 28th:

WE must now go back to the day of my return from the British front (Chapter XVI). I had telegraphed to Tours saying that if there was nothing special on, I should stop over Sunday in Paris and be down Monday morning. When I arrived at the Hotel Richmond, I found a wire from General Kernan saying, 'No reason for your immediate return'; but later in the day I got a second message saying, 'Return to-night. General Pershing will be here Monday morning.' I therefore left after dinner, arriving in Tours about midnight.

Monday, July 29th:

At seven-thirty Monday morning Lieutenant John E. Ewell, General Kernan's aide, came into my room and said that General Pershing would arrive at eight o'clock. He also told me that orders had been received from Washington relieving General Kernan from duty with the S.O.S. and sending him to Switzerland; that he was being replaced that day by Major General J. G. Harbord. This was certainly a great shock, as General Kernan had rendered most distinguished service in organizing the S.O.S. and it was impossible to understand why he had been replaced. We were told that it was by special selection of the War Department on account of his legal knowledge. We assumed that it must be some



GENERAL PERSHING TRANSFERRING COMMAND OF S.O.S. FROM GENERAL KERNAN TO
GENERAL HARBORD

Left to Right: Kernan, McAndrew, Pershing, Harbord, Hagood

very important mission — perhaps preliminary negotiations for peace.

General Pershing's train was late and he got in about nine-thirty. General Harbord came in a few minutes later. We made an inspection trip of Tours, Harbord and McAndrew riding in my car. General Pershing had a talk with the bureau chiefs.

Harbord expressed to me the greatest confidence in General Kernan's work, as well as in mine, and assured me of the hearty relations that would exist between himself and me as his Chief of Staff. He also said that he was going to try to get the S.O.S. personnel more permanently established and would try to speed up the work.

General Pershing invited me to dinner on his private train. No one else was present outside of his own party. After dinner he took me for a walk of about three quarters of an hour and discussed the whole question of the S.O.S., asking me a great many questions. He impressed upon me his confidence in what had already been done, emphasized the great importance of the S.O.S., and promised that he was going to give it greater support in the future than he had in the past. I told him that it would be impossible to build up an efficient organization unless service in the S.O.S. was made worth while as a military career; that the base port commanders and others holding down big jobs should be given the rank authorized for them by the War Department. He promised to make these promotions and also promised to do everything else in his power to boost the operations of the S.O.S.

General Pershing left that night to inspect the ports, taking General Harbord with him and leaving us to wonder what it was all about.

In discussing the S.O.S., its possible present and future, General Pershing had not mentioned any reason why Gen-

eral Kernan had been relieved. Nor have I ever since heard him mention the subject. I did discuss the question, however, with General Harbord and at that time he did not seem to know why General Kernan had been relieved. Little by little since that time information of one kind or another has leaked out and finally there was an item in one of the service papers. I will give the story for what it is worth, but cannot vouch for its correctness:

There was a movement on foot in Washington to cut off General Pershing's command at the zone of the army and to attach the S.O.S. to the War Department. This idea was unintentionally fostered in the A.E.F. by efforts to draw a definite line of demarkation between service in the S.O.S. and service in the zone of the army. For example, to make a difference in color of service stripe, to control supply in the front areas from Chaumont instead of from Tours, to chop off the responsibility of the bureau chiefs at the regulating station, etc. In other words, every effort made by G.H.Q. to follow the French in making a distinction between the zone of the armies and the zone of the interior was an invitation to follow the scheme to the limit and to place the administration of the S.O.S. under the War Department instead of General Pershing.

There had been too much supervision of the S.O.S. by G-1 and G-4 at G.H.Q. Requisitions that should have gone directly from Tours to Washington had to go through Chaumont for a pro-formal examination and O.K. by the General Staff there. Cables that should have passed direct were going through the same channel and were often subject to long delays.

Taking these things into consideration, so the story goes, the War Department decided to take over the S.O.S. and to place it in the hands of General George Goethals, of Canal

fame, who at that time was at the head of the Supply organization in Washington. It was thus expected that General Pershing would be relieved from all responsibility except the actual fighting at the front and would submit his requisitions for men and supplies to Tours instead of to the War Department at home.

According to the story, General Goethals was in New York with his baggage on the pier when a cablegram was received by the War Department from General Pershing saying that he had reorganized the S.O.S., had placed it under command of the best general in France, and had given that officer authority to deal directly with the War Department. The cable requested that hereafter the War Department communicate with Major General J. G. Harbord and not with himself upon all supply questions not involving matters of policy.

Thus it seemed that the War Department plan to substitute Goethals for Kernan was thwarted by General Pershing's putting in Harbord. How much of this is true I do not know, but it had credence in France at the time, and some of it has since been published in the United States.

General Harbord told me that he had been called up by telephone very unexpectedly late one night and had started off at once in an automobile to join General Pershing in time to accompany him to Tours. His sudden arrival at Tours and the summary relief of General Kernan seemed to indicate some great urgency. Yet the departure of General Pershing and General Harbord that night for a ten days' inspection trip, without making any changes in the organization or giving me any instructions as to what to do during their absence, indicated that if there was anything radically wrong with the S.O.S., they were not prepared to prescribe the remedy.

Upon General Harbord's return from the inspection trip he told me that he considered the work of organizing the S.O.S.

complete; that he could make no suggestion for improvement in what General Kernan and I had accomplished; and that his only opportunity lay in trying to speed up the work of the team, as he found it already organized. As a matter of fact, no material changes were made in the organization up to the Armistice. On top of this Harbord formally approved two memoranda submitted by me, which will be seen elsewhere in this chapter. The first showed our headquarters organization and the method of handling routine work. The second indicated the big projects confronting us and our proposed solutions.

So much for conjecture. Now, for a few words as to General Kernan. I had known him first while he was a major and I was a captain on the General Staff in Washington. I considered him then, and I consider him now, as having one of the best analytical minds with which I ever came in contact. Cool and collected at all times, with splendid judgment, a rare quality for picking men and a wonderful perception of good organization, he had rendered most brilliant service in building up a substantial system in the S.O.S. The system was not perfect. It had many defects. But in every big issue General Kernan, in my opinion, took the side of that which was most logical, most practical, and most consistent with the best interests of the military service.

If he had not been taken away from his division and diverted to the S.O.S., he certainly would have been a corps commander. From time to time as the war went on he made the best estimates of the situation of any man with whom I came in contact. During the darkest days of the German drive on Paris, he made the statement, time and time again, that if the Allies would only take the offensive, they would win the war before Christmas, 1918. This was at a time when every one else was planning for the big Allied drive in the

spring and summer of 1919. And the whole American effort was based on that theory.

But turning from General Kernan to General Harbord. If it be true that General Pershing told the War Department that he had turned over the S.O.S. to the best general he had in France, and for that matter, the best in the whole Army, he certainly told the truth. As between General Kernan and General Harbord I was on much more friendly and intimate terms with the latter. We had served together in the Philippines and were more nearly of the same age. In fact, at the time when Harbord came back to Tours I was senior to him in rank in the Regular Service, although he had had six years' more commissioned service in the Army.

But outside of any comparison that might be made in the relative ability and leadership of the two men, General Harbord had the great advantage of having General Pershing's confidence to a greater extent, perhaps, than any other man in the A.E.F. Moreover, as Harbord had served as Chief of Staff at G.H.Q., with Moseley, Fox Conner, Logan, Eltinge, and the others as his assistants, these men were much more apt to listen to his requests than they would be to the requests of General Kernan or myself. Thus, the advent of General Harbord made a new epoch in the history of the S.O.S.

He told me that he did not expect to remain with it very long; that his ambition was to command a corps at the front, and that when this came about he would recommend that the command of the S.O.S. be turned over either to me or to General W. D. Connor. The importance of this to me can be realized when it is remembered that the War Department had authorized the grade of lieutenant general for the Commanding General, S.O.S.

It was assumed that General Harbord would get the grade

of lieutenant general right away and would, of course, keep it when he went back to the front in command of a corps, but, as will be seen later, the Armistice broke this up. His nomination to be lieutenant general was sent in, but too late. He went back to be Chief of Staff at Chaumont instead of being a corps commander.

Connor succeeded him as Commanding General, S.O.S., but only with the rank of brigadier general, while I went with the Army of Occupation in command of a brigade of field artillery. However, in the reorganization of the Army after the war, Kernan and Harbord were both made major generals in the Regular Army, while Connor and I were made brigadier generals.¹

Tuesday, July 30th:

General R. D. Walsh, who had recently been detailed as Deputy Director General of Transportation, reported his arrival for duty. I went over the whole proposition very thoroughly with him and told him what I had learned at British G.H.Q. as to their organization of the transportation service.


Wednesday, July 31st:

During the month of July we disembarked 363,000 troops and had increased our discharge of cargo from an average of 16,000 tons per day in June to 21,000 tons per day in July. Relatively, however, we had fallen back from thirty-four

¹ Upon General Pershing's recommendation I was appointed Brigadier General, National Army, April 12, 1918. He nominated me Major General, National Army, October 20, 1918, but the appointment failed on account of the Armistice. He cabled the War Department on July 15, 1919, recommending my appointment as Brigadier General (from Lieutenant Colonel), Regular Army, to fill a vacancy existing at that time. This was not done, but upon his renewed recommendation I was appointed a year later. On August 2, 1925, I was promoted to my present grade, Major General.



To General Gouverneur Warren - my
efficient and able Chief of Staff in
the Service of Supply, H. C. F. and Nielson
when at the Rush in the 1st & 2d "Barracks"
when I so often profited by his counsel.
F. M. D.



TOTAL CARGO DISCHARGED IN FRANCE MONTHLY
(*in thousands of short tons*)

SOURCES OF INFORMATION: Tonnage Division, G-1, Bureau of Statistics, Transportation Service, and Statistics Branch, General Staff, Washington. Figures of discharges from other sources than the United States are not available previous to December, 1917.

pounds per man per day to twenty-five pounds per man per day, based on the number of troops in France.

Upon leaving for Saint-Nazaire General Harbord had indicated that he was going to make an effort to speed up the unloading of ships and movement of supplies. It was his idea to establish some form of competition among the various ports and he put his aide, Captain Robinson of the Marines, to work to organize some such scheme. This developed into what was called 'The Road to Berlin'; a certain table of equivalents was made out so that all the ports, irrespective of size, could be placed in competition. It had a splendid

effect in building up *esprit de corps* and accelerating the discharge of ships.

Thursday, August 1st:

I had a long-distance conversation with General Harbord in Saint-Nazaire and he told me that there would be a number of changes in personnel; that among others, W. D. Connor was going to command Bordeaux. This indicated that General Pershing was going to give him the pick of personnel. He also told me that Colonel Eltinge and Colonel Fox Conner were coming down on August 2d for a conference with a view to decentralizing the activities at G.H.Q., turning over to us the cables, etc. This was in accordance with the scheme recommended by the Hagood Board, but G.H.Q. had never before been willing to let us do it.

I sent Harbord a telegram on this subject as follows:

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM

Hq. S.O.S., August 1, 1918

General Harbord,
Care C.G., Brest.
C.S.1.

1. The following idea is suggested for your consideration as a fundamental basis of organization. It was my idea at the time of the reorganization that resulted in the bureau chiefs being transferred to Tours. It is not essentially different from the British organization since they have placed their D.G.T. under their Quartermaster General. It is somewhat simpler than theirs however and in my judgment gives greater mobility and quicker action.

2. The C.-in-C. should have two G.H.Q.'s, one for operations and training at Chaumont and one for supply at Tours. They should be coördinate and one should not be superimposed upon the other. G-5 and G-3 should be at Chaumont, G-4 and G-1 at Tours. The headquarters of G-2 should be at Chaumont but all those G-2 activities within the S.O.S.,

such as counter-espionage and so forth, should be handled by the Paris branch of G-2, under Tours, with close liaison between Tours and Chaumont. The immediate control of G-3, G-5 and the Chaumont branch of G-2 should be under General McAndrew Chief of Staff. The immediate control of G-1, G-4 and the Paris branch of G-2 should be under General Harbord Commanding General S.O.S.

3. The C.-in-C. should look directly to General Harbord in all matters of supply in the same manner and to the same extent that he looks directly to General McAndrew in all matters of operations and training. There should be no intermediary between General Harbord and the C.-in-C. any more than there is between General McAndrew and the C.-in-C. General McAndrew would thus have the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff at British G.H.Q. General Harbord would have the duties and responsibility of the Quartermaster General at British G.H.Q. combined with those of the Commanding General of the British Line of Communications, these two functions being separated in the British organizations. The British Quartermaster General coördinates all questions of supply through the bureau chiefs and the C.G. L.O.C. is in actual command of the troops in the rear.

4. Liaison between G-1 and G-4 at Tours and G-3 and G-5 at Chaumont should be maintained, but the G-1 and G-4 representatives at Chaumont should not supervise or chaperon activities of the main body at Tours.

5. With the C.-in-C., whether he be at Chaumont or at Advance G.H.Q., there should be a high-ranking and responsible representative of General Harbord in the same manner as the British always have with their C.-in-C. a Deputy Quartermaster General.

6. The organization proposed would bring the C.-in-C. more directly in touch with those whom he holds responsible, would give quicker action and greater efficiency, and would avoid the vast amount of duplication inevitable in any system by which all the action taken at these headquarters is reviewed by subordinates at Chaumont.

HAGOOD

JH:my

General Harbord disapproved this on the grounds that it went very much farther than anything General Pershing had in mind. But two months later he accepted it and offered it to G.H.Q. as a substitute for a scheme proposed by General Moseley (see Chapter XXIV).

During the afternoon Mr. Isaac Marcosson, a representative of the *Saturday Evening Post* and author of a book called 'The Business of War,' describing the British L.O.C., came in to get information for a similar book on the American S.O.S. I gave him a letter authorizing him to visit our activities.

Among other literary celebrities who visited the S.O.S. were Irving Cobb, Ian Hay, and Mrs. Elinor Glyn. The latter wrote an amusing article called 'Ermyntrude Visits the S.O.S.,' in which she described a number of our people and the activities in which they were engaged. It was her purpose to publish this as anti-German propaganda and give the proceeds to some welfare activity, but the Armistice prevented this and it came out in a magazine.

Friday, August 2d:

Colonels Eltinge and Fox Conner came down for the conference. We had the bureau chiefs in later, and in the afternoon drew up a memorandum covering the question of decentralization for the S.O.S. I did not like it, however, because Conner did not go as far as I thought he should and I was convinced that General Harbord would get much more out of General Pershing than Eltinge and Conner were willing to give to me.

Tuesday, August 6th:

General Harbord having returned from his inspection trip,

I laid before him the two following memoranda. The first, dealing with methods of office administration, he approved. The second, being merely a statement of the situation and requiring no action, he returned to me, noted.

Personal and confidential

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

August 6, 1918

MEMORANDUM for General Harbord:

Subject: Methods of handling routine business at Hq. S.O.S.

1. The following methods of handling the routine business at these headquarters are submitted with a view to your approval or modification:

2. CHIEF OF STAFF: The Chief of Staff handles no ordinary routine and when the Commanding General is present there are no ordinary routine papers that require the former's signature or approval. During the absence of the Commanding General, he initials over the typewritten signature of the Commanding General, all papers which would ordinarily be signed by the latter. The Chief of Staff's entire time is taken up in the consideration of the broader questions of policy, in conferences with the Commanding General, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff and others and in the study and preparation of such questions as he himself initiates.

3. DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF: The Deputy Chief of Staff handles all routine matters, which in a smaller command would ordinarily be handled by the Chief of Staff. This includes all questions which require coördination between the Sections of the General Staff and all questions of the assignment of personnel, the Personnel Division being a branch of his Office.

4. ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF: There are three Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, Colonel Cavanaugh; G-2, Major Ward, in Paris, with a local representative, Captain Henrotin, at Tours; and G-4, Colonel Smither. Each of these has authority to issue orders or instructions over his own signature by direc-

tion of the Commanding General. However, all action taken by them, and also all action taken by the Deputy Chief of Staff, is kept in a diary which each morning is placed on the desk of the Chief of Staff and the work of the preceding day is gone over. This conference also includes a discussion of new matters under consideration. The Chief of Staff at this conference checks up the action of the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff and if any action has been taken by them which does not meet with his approval, he reverses it or takes such steps as may be necessary. Since this system has been installed there have been only three cases where action of any consequence was reversed, whereas the institution of the system has saved an enormous amount of time for the Chief of Staff which would have been used in going over the work of his subordinates looking for things which he might not have approved of. The Diary is placed on the desk of the Commanding General immediately after the conference and he, in turn, calls on the Chief of Staff for any explanations he may care to have.

5. BUREAU CHIEFS: The Bureau Chiefs are called in conference, as a rule, only when the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General has some definite proposition to lay before them. Recently, however, at the suggestion of one of them, it was decided to have a conference of the Bureau Chiefs, to include the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, at 8:30 every Monday morning. This, in my judgment, is of questionable value and I think they will all soon get tired of it as it results in waste of time and a lot of useless talking unless the meeting is needed for some specific purpose.

6. COMMANDING GENERAL: As a rule, three persons present papers to the Commanding General.

The Secretary of the General Staff presents all matters originating in the General Staff. Matters of a routine character are explained by him to the Commanding General and the latter signs them. If, however, there is any question on which the Commanding General desires further explanations he, as a rule, sends for the Deputy Chief of Staff or the particular Assistant Chief of Staff who prepared the paper. If it appears to him to involve a question of policy upon which he

desires the advice or views of the Chief of Staff, he also sends for the latter.

The Adjutant General presents papers of a routine character which are not ordinarily considered by the General Staff, such, for example, as disciplinary matters, routine recommendations for promotion, requests for information, etc.

The Judge Advocate presents all courts-martial cases.

REMARKS

7. Under this organization the entire routine is handled by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 and G-4. No routine matters are held up either for the action of the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff. If the Commanding General is absent, even if only for a portion of the day, the routine papers are initialed by the Chief of Staff. In the same way, if the Chief of Staff is absent any routine matters which would ordinarily be presented to him are disposed of by the Deputy. At the same time, through the Diary the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff are both kept informed as to all matters being handled by the General Staff. The work moves along, so to speak, on a company front instead of in single file and no time or energy is wasted by having one set of men going over and checking up in a proformal way papers that have been prepared by somebody else. Moreover, the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff are at all times entirely free to travel about, to take up the bigger questions to give them full consideration and to confer with their subordinates with reference thereto.

8. Considerable difficulty was experienced at first and both General Kernan and I were annoyed beyond all measure by subordinates sending out instructions which were absolutely contrary to his wishes or my own, but the organization has been thoroughly whipped into shape, and, although the standard of the General Staff personnel is not nearly so high as that at G.H.Q., and very, very much inferior to that of the War Department or of a Department Headquarters in time of peace, yet the results we are now getting are more satisfactory than those obtained at any other headquarters at which I

have ever served and the Bureau Chiefs seem to be thoroughly satisfied with them. In fact, since the establishment of the General Staff I have never known a headquarters where the Bureau Chiefs, the Adjutant General and the General Staff worked so harmoniously together.

9. The Deputy Chief of Staff, McAdams; G-1 Cavanaugh; and G-4, Smither; are men in whom you can put the fullest confidence. Their judgment is sound and you can depend upon them absolutely to loyally carry out your policies. Arrowsmith in G-1; Poole in G-4; Wainer, who has charge of the reclassification division, in McAdams' office; and Henrotin, in local charge of G-2; are also men who handle their own particular jobs with exceptional ability.

JOHNSON HAGOOD
C. of S.

NOTE: This memorandum has been dictated by me to my confidential stenographer ¹ and has been seen by no one else.

— J. H.

Personal and confidential

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

August 7, 1918

MEMORANDUM for General Harbord:

Subject: Big things to be accomplished by the S.O.S.

1. ROUTINE: As indicated in another memorandum the fundamental organization of the S.O.S. is believed to be good. The routine matters are handled efficiently and expeditiously and so far as that phase of the matter is concerned the S.O.S. could continue to run itself, without a particularly efficient head or Chief of Staff. Among these routine matters I include, for instance, troop movements. We have handled a million

¹ Mr. H. F. Meyers. He was clerk for General J. Franklin Bell when I was a young officer on the latter's staff. Subsequently he served as my clerk at a Business Men's Training Camp at Salt Lake City, in 1916. He was with me in France during the whole period of the S.O.S. and is with me now. I am greatly indebted to him for making me keep up my diary, for keeping extra copies of important communications and for helping me in the preparation of this manuscript.



GENERAL DENNIS E. NOLAN
'96 West Point; G-2, G.H.Q., 1918

troops quietly, expeditiously and with so few errors that they may be considered negative. Also tonnage. We have a tonnage organization in G-1 that is quite as good if not better than that at G.H.Q. There are certain officers, young in the service, whose names are not even known but who are quite as well able to handle the tonnage situation as Barber was six months ago.

2. But there are certain big things yet to be accomplished, which General Kernan and I have been unable to put over. All of them are important and some of them are most pressing. Owing to your experience at G.H.Q., and owing to the great confidence which General Pershing and General McAndrew have in you, you will no doubt be able to accomplish many things very easily which were impossible of accomplishment by the former administration.

3. DECENTRALIZATION: You have already arranged for further decentralization of authority from G.H.Q., and for giving to the S.O.S. the means of accomplishing the results for which it is responsible. This in itself marks an epoch and will undoubtedly lead immediately to tremendous improvement in efficiency.

4. TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT: The Transportation Department is admittedly the least efficient organization we have. It is generally assumed that the weakest point in the American effort is the unloading and quick turn around of ships, but in the opinion of some, General Atterbury and myself included, the weakest link in the chain to-day is the Transportation Department. Owing to shortage of cars, to the fundamental weakness of the French railroad system, to poor organization, lack of personnel and . . . there is a tremendous amount of lost motion, waste of labor, backing up of supplies at the ports, etc., which constitutes the biggest factor in the difficulty we have in unloading ships.

5. While all sides admit that the Transportation Department is 'sick' and while there is a general agreement as to the diagnosis of the trouble, the greatest difference of opinion exists as to the proper remedy.

6. General Atterbury, Colonel Wilgus, Major Moore and

General R. E. Wood (now with Goethals), think that the remedy lies in making the Transportation Department wholly independent of the military and giving them the status of the Pennsylvania Railroad in the United States under government ownership. That is, they want 'the military' to tell them exactly what is wanted and then they want to be allowed to work it out the best way they can in accordance with their own methods. . . .

7. Dawes, Nutt, Slade, Conway, Harjes and many others, men who made big reputations in civil life and some of whom are big railroad men like Atterbury, see the necessity of the Transportation Department's bending itself to the military way; of its adapting itself to the military problem and playing the game along with the rest of the team according to military procedure. I myself regard the Transportation Department as one of the great staff departments of the Army. I believe that it has come to stay and that it should be incorporated into the Regular Army after the war. At any rate, we will get no results in France until it is *thoroughly* militarized.

10. REMOUNT SERVICE: The Remount Service and the Veterinary Service are in very bad shape. The British and the French are much concerned about it for the reason that we are depending upon them to make up our deficiencies. Owing to the shortage and inexperience of personnel, conditions have existed from time to time in Remount Service which are comparable with those at Tampa in '98. I have seen 2000 horses, standing knee-deep in muck in a corral not large enough for 500, with nobody to look out for them except a few Infantrymen who, so far as their military experience was concerned, had never seen a horse. The death rate among horses has been very high; the Sick Report has also been very high; and General Burnett, the head of the British Remount Service, estimates that we will be 400,000 horses short at the end of the next twelve months.

11. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION: The Motor Transportation is almost as bad as the Remount business. Hundreds and hundreds of trucks and motorcycles have gone bad owing to

improper handling and have lain idle owing to inability to furnish the simplest spare parts. We have less than forty per cent of the transportation we should have and the situation is getting worse instead of improving. The transportation which we have is not handled to the best advantage.

12. **LABOR:** Labor is not efficiently handled. Various estimates have been made as to its efficiency and figures have been submitted from the United States indicating that the tonnage unloaded on this side was only twenty-five per cent per man compared with that in the United States. Individual cases have been reported at the ports where only ten per cent ¹ of certain labor gangs was usefully employed and there is a feeling everywhere that vast quantities of man-power are wasted. The principal cause of this is due to poor organization. In many cases the men do not live near enough to their work; in other cases they are not properly fed, the Sick Report is too high and, in general, the labor is not properly officered.

13. We are trying to remedy this by the transfer of all labor into an Army Service Corps. This has been approved by the War Department and a plan is being effected now for accomplishing it. It is proposed to have a Director General of Labor, and a Supervisor of Labor at every port and large depot; to pool the labor, to properly officer it, and, in general, to try to raise the standard. But this problem has by no means been solved yet.

14. **WOMEN:** An effort is being made to replace men in the S.O.S. by women as far as practicable. We now have about 25,000 women employed, including 5000 British W.A.A.C.'s. This matter, however, is capable of much greater development and better organization and, in my judgment, the number we now have employed could be multiplied by three or four.

15. **POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT:** Great complaint, of course, has been made against the mails. The Post Office Department has been militarized and is on a much more stable basis than before, but owing to the greatly increased volume

¹ See my comments on Saint-Nazaire, Chapter X.

of mail the actual results accomplished are not much better than those accomplished with not so good an organization but with less business to perform. It is expected, however, that when the Post Office and the Central Records Office get located in permanent quarters and get a permanent personnel, results will begin to show up rapidly.

16. LEAVE AREAS: The plans for handling officers and enlisted men on leave have not yet been properly developed. The concentrated leave areas under the Y.M.C.A. have not been a complete success. Monsieur André Tardieu has recently written a letter making some suggestions about this matter and an association known as the French Homes also has it under consideration. It is a difficult and very important question which should be straightened up as soon as possible.

17. PERSONNEL: Perhaps all the difficulties of the S.O.S. may be attributed to inefficient and inexperienced personnel. This is especially true if we consider those who review our action at G.H.Q. and in the War Department because it is manifestly impossible to build up in so short a time an efficient staff for handling an army of from one to five million men. Some people are optimistic enough to think that the blow will be driven home this fall, others expect that it will be done next spring, and the most conservative hope to accomplish it within two years. According to the present program 3,000,000 additional troops will be sent to France within the next twelve months. This will include between 100,000 and 200,000 officers. With such a prospect it is manifestly necessary to organize every agency of the S.O.S. on a stable and permanent basis at the earliest possible moment. We have been running now for about a year. The time for experimentation and try-outs is past and we should now get the team in shape and 'play ball!'

19. The constant shifting of personnel is one of the greatest causes of inefficiency, and to show how bad it is the Provost Marshal submitted a report a short time ago showing that the average length of time that officers had been on duty in his Department since it was organized was eleven days. There

has been constant shifting of organizations as well as of individuals. Almost every man in the S.O.S. considers his status more or less temporary and is in hopes that he will get a change of duty. This hope is fostered by the feeling that as long as a man stays in the S.O.S. he has no chance of promotion or advancement and that his only hope for a career is to get away from it. As long as this situation exists it is not possible for human beings to be so unselfish as to be willing to stay. Innumerable instances can be mentioned where especially good men have been held back for duty at the base ports, on the General Staff at these headquarters and for other important duty, and their being held back has resulted in their being ruthlessly overslaughed by their juniors or by those who are junior to them in rank and much less efficient.

20. An unsuccessful effort has been made to build up a certain line of promotion in the S.O.S., to attach certain rank to certain positions and to make it worth a man's while to stay in the S.O.S. for the duration of the war with expectations of making his career there. But while G.H.Q. has put this up in a modified form to the War Department and the War Department has approved it, yet no recommendations from these headquarters with a view to putting them into effect have brought forth any results.

21. Another great difficulty is the actual shortage of personnel, both commissioned and enlisted. As long as the personnel is short, constant shifting is necessary owing to the inability to take up the slack and the necessity for supplying personnel at the points where the pressure is greatest. A number of recommendations have been made from here in order to try to catch up and get a little ahead on the commissioned personnel, but these efforts have not received approval at G.H.Q.

22. PLANS FOR MOVING FORWARD: No definite plans have been made for any of the Departments in case there should be a move forward into German territory. Our responsibility in this matter has not been fixed and we have been considerably handicapped by G-1 at G.H.Q., and G-4, as they have

disapproved every effort that has been made here to anticipate this matter.

23. This is particularly true in the case of a recently made study by G-4 here in connection with the Transportation Department as to possible Regulating Stations in case we took a Sector of the front different from that in the vicinity of Is-sur-Tille. This matter was taken up by us and a careful study made and submitted to G.H.Q., but it only resulted in a calling down to the effect that the Regulating Stations were matters which should be handled at G.H.Q. and that we had exceeded our authority in discussing the matter with the French.

24. SUMMARY: There is a great difference between an efficient organization and one which is accomplishing the maximum possible results. In my judgment, the S.O.S. is efficient. Its organization is better than that of either the French or the British. But it is not as efficient as it can be made. It may perhaps be an exaggeration to state that its efficiency could be doubled, but there is no doubt that it could be greatly increased.

25. The difficulty which we all feel here is that G.H.Q. has been too conservative; that there has been too much delay for fear a mistake or misstep might be made. So far as I am concerned, I feel that it is a great deal better not only to run the risk of mistakes but to actually make them than to hold back when times are so pressing.

JOHNSON HAGOOD

C. of S.

JH/my

CHAPTER XXI

VARIOUS MATTERS

Swagar Sherley, Chairman, Appropriations Committee — First year of war cost more than all previous governmental expenditures — Pershing's plan for Saint-Mihiel attack town gossip — Foolish censorship — Playing 'Blind Man's Buff' slows up Supply — Secrecy kills morale — Harries and Wilson at Brest — Fine work of Sewell — Second visit of Secretary Baker — Harbord's generous action — Tours out of coal — The situation September 25, 1918 — Faulty training of replacements — Huger Jersey goes to States.

Wednesday, August 21st:

MR. SWAGAR SHERLEY, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House, came down on the noon train from Paris and I took him to the château. During the afternoon we made the rounds of the salvage plant, aviation field, etc., and at his request I arranged for an interview with the bureau chiefs. His committee having made the appropriations, he was interested in seeing what became of the money. Our people could not tell him much about this, as they dealt with the supplies after they had been purchased. But he was satisfied that the interests of the Government were being conserved and the supplies economically expended.

I mentioned to Mr. Sherley that once, while testifying on preparedness before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, I had stated that our military expenditures in the first year of the Civil War had exceeded the total of all previous military expenditures and that I had predicted the same thing would happen in case of another great war. I asked how my prediction had come out. He replied that the amount appropriated by his committee for the first year of the present war had exceeded the total of all previous expenditures for all purposes. In other words, that the first year of the war

cost more than the whole government had cost up to that time.

Mr. Sherley asked about relations between the bureau chiefs and the General Staff. They reported it most satisfactory. General Ireland, particularly, paid a fine tribute to the S.O.S. General Staff. General Atterbury was asked if there was any friction between the civil and the military interests. He replied that whatever friction there was would have to be straightened out locally and that there was nothing that any one could do in the United States to help out.

Mr. Sherley left at five o'clock for G.H.Q.

Thursday, August 29th:

I left at eight in the morning for Brest and Saint-Nazaire on an inspection trip. We went on to a place called Carhaix, in Bretagne, where I had dinner and spent the night. It was a very quaint old place and apparently few Americans had been through there.

After dinner two French civilians engaged me in conversation and expressed their great admiration for what the Americans were doing. They said that they were very much interested in the plans General Pershing was making for the attack of Saint-Mihiel; that the concentration being made there was one of the biggest things that had happened during the war; that it would no doubt be successful and the Germans greatly demoralized. This is another eye-opener on the subject of secrecy. At Headquarters S.O.S. we were not allowed to know officially that any attack was going to be made. Our bureau chiefs and supply service were directed to hustle stuff up to the regulating stations, but nobody was allowed to know its final destination. By pretense at secrecy, we did everything we could to embarrass ourselves. We beat about the bush and played 'Blind Man's Buff,' and yet here

in an obscure little village in Bretagne, entirely out of the usual line of travel, the civilian population knew what was going on and gossiped about it around the village hotel.

The date of the attack was subsequently given out in the newspapers in Paris, in spite of all the censorship regulations. It came out in an announcement to the effect that the reader should 'Look out for something big on the American front on the morning of September 12,' which was the date of the Saint-Mihiel attack. Officers and soldiers going up to the front with supplies or on other duty came back with stories of all kinds about the concentration and congestion, but no official correspondence, telegrams, or even telephone messages were allowed to refer to it. The preparations were so perfectly obvious and wide open that the Germans believed it was a fake to cover an attack somewhere else.

We knew the German order of battle, the designation, and characteristics of all their troops. The Germans knew just as much and more about us. In fact, captured German reports, and even radio bulletins of the German press, indicated exactly where our people were. Yet to the utter confusion of our mail service and to the great distress of the people at home, no soldier in France was permitted to say where he was. Even in the back areas soldiers were not permitted to drop a letter in a French post office.

This effort at playing secrets was not only an annoyance to individuals and a serious interference with the prompt transfer of troops and supplies within the A.E.F., but it delayed the shipment of troops and supplies from the United States. A cable was received from the War Department complaining that the port commander at Hoboken did not receive sufficient notice of the arrival of returning transports. He was unable to make proper preparations in advance to berth them, discharge their cargo, and reload them. I investigated

this and found that the ships often arrived at Hoboken before the notice reached there that they had sailed from France, because it was not considered safe to give the notice of sailing until five days after the ship had cleared and because a lot of additional time was lost in getting the cables coded and transmitted through the channels of the Navy and War Department in Washington.

The foolishness of this was that the ships cleared from Bordeaux, for example, in full sight of any man, woman, or child who chose to loaf along the water front. Bordeaux was within twenty-four hours of the neutral ports of Spain, where German agents were on hand to get all the shipping news from neutral ships clearing French ports. In other words, when an American transport cleared from Bordeaux the German agents in Spain knew everything about this ship within twenty-four hours and the German high command got it a few hours later.

But the Commanding Officer at Bordeaux could not notify Tours, G.H.Q., or the War Department that the ship had cleared and that its berth was available for another. Any civilian could come to Paris and tell all about it in a public *café*. Any officer or soldier could discuss it, but he could not write it on a piece of paper or say it over the telephone. It was feared that German spies without blue goggles and green whiskers might tap our wires, steal our code, rob our mails, or otherwise feloniously discover our secrets in preference to obtaining the information by more obvious and direct methods.

The above facts and arguments were presented by General Kernan, General Harbord, and myself in an effort to get this foolish embargo lifted, but without success. Responsibility was divided between G.H.Q. at Chaumont, Admiral Sims in London, the Navy Department and the War Depart-

ment back home, and we were following the practice of our Allies.

Sir Ian Hamilton complained bitterly at Gallipoli of this stupid censorship, though the British were more liberal than the Americans. He said it made no difference to the Germans whether the attack was led by Smith or Jones, or whether they had been thrown back by the Southampton Blues or the Northampton Greys, but that it made all the difference in the world to the morale of the people back in England. We ourselves killed all interest in particular units during the war, when it was a live issue, and then, when the war was over, we tried to bring it back to life by plastering the uniform with brass marks of mimic heraldry.

Friday, August 30th:

I arrived at Brest in the morning and in company with General Harries looked over the port and the general situation. He took me to see Admiral Henry Braid Wilson. I found that everything at Brest was working in the most harmonious manner. Admiral Wilson told me that they recognized no service lines; that all the United States facilities at Brest were pooled; but that he thought it would be a good idea to have a definite understanding that the Navy was to handle everything afloat and the Army everything ashore. Harries agreed to this and I was told that it would be put up officially. I was very favorably impressed with the situation at Brest. General Harries seemed to be looking forward and was planning for the evacuation of the Army after the war.

Admiral Wilson expressed the view that it would be much better for all personnel to be handled through Brest, leaving Saint-Nazaire and Bordeaux solely for freight. He said that by November all worry about submarines would be over and

that ships could be conducted in and out of Brest from the United States and back with perfect safety.

Saturday, August 31st:

We got to Saint-Nazaire about ten o'clock in the morning. I went around the port with Colonel John S. Sewell, whose work as Engineer Officer and Base Commander was one of the biggest accomplishments of the S.O.S. We visited the Montoir project, the Rest Camp, and went over the docks. Everybody seemed to be busier here than I had ever seen them before and a greater percentage of men were employed. The warehouses and docks of the Montoir project were about three quarters finished and work had begun on the piers. I had a very satisfactory talk with Major Green, the Transportation Officer, who seemed to be handling the proposition very well; also with Major Brown, the head of the Motor Reserve Park. Brown, in civil life, was vice-president of the Willys-Overland Automobile Company. He seemed to have built up a splendid park, without much cost or assistance. Most of his buildings were constructed out of crates and dunnage lumber from the ships.

Tuesday, September 3d:

Mr. Julius Rosenwald, president of Sears, Roebuck and Company, came in. He was a member of the National Defense Council and had come to France under authority of a letter from the Secretary of War. Mr. Rosenwald asked me to give him some information to use in his talks to the soldiers in the S.O.S., which I did. We afterwards heard that his messages of cheer and appreciation from Senators, Governors, and other prominent Americans at home had been received enthusiastically and that his work in this connection had been a great success.

The Secretary's letter follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1918

MY DEAR MR. ROSENWALD:

I want you to go to France, move around among our American troops, and avail yourself of every opportunity which arises to address our boys on the conditions at home, and particularly on the opportunities of American life as you have observed them in your own successful business career.

It is not unlikely that your chief opportunities will be among the men in the so-called Services of Supply, of whom there are great numbers, who are deprived of opportunity for service at the front to render valuable service in the lines of communication, upon which the safety and efficiency of the army at the front depends. You will find them filled with the spirit of service and sacrifice; you will find all our boys enthusiastic, intelligent, and brave. Your special opportunity of usefulness to them will be to take a message from home, pointing out how the country appreciates the services they are rendering and how great the opportunity will be for them to build up business and professional careers at home when once the menace of militarism has been removed from the world. Carry them as a message from me, or rather from the people of the United States, for whom I venture to speak to them, this thought: that in a time of universal sacrifice they are having the heroic opportunity, and that their privilege is to vindicate again in the eyes of the world the wholesomeness and beauty of the principles upon which American liberty is based; that this war will free France and Europe, but that in addition to that it will free America, and that when they have helped to make men free everywhere the blessings and rewards of a finer civilization will be especially theirs to enjoy since they have so greatly contributed to their preservation.

Cordially yours

(Sgd) **NEWTON D. BAKER**
Secretary of War

Saturday, September 21st:

Secretary of War Baker, Secretary Ryan, General Frank T. Hines, General T. H. Bliss, and a number of others arrived at Tours with General Harbord at eight o'clock in the morning and we met them at the station. General Réquichot, the Préfet, the Mayor, and the French Mission were there, together with a large number of staff officers and about fifteen hundred troops. General Harbord said he was not very well and would not take the Secretary around and directed me to take him in my car, show him through the Salvage Plant, Prisoner of War Camp, Aviation, etc. We had lunch at the château and in the afternoon we went to Blois, where the Secretary made a talk to the men.

Upon our return to Tours I was surprised to see General Harbord sitting at his desk with every appearance of perfect health. When I asked him about his recovery he laughed and said, 'Oh, that was a put-up job. I told the Secretary that General Pershing was going to include you in his next recommendations for Major General, and I let you go around with him so that he could size you up.' This is a very good index of the type of man that Harbord was. It was the first time that the Secretary of War had been to our headquarters since the S.O.S. had been organized and ninety-nine men out of a hundred in Harbord's position would have thought that it was a good time to have the Secretary size up Harbord and not Hagood.

Wednesday, September 25th:

The Mayor of Tours came to me to say that the city had run out of coal, and that if the Americans could not give him any, the city light, power, and water would have to be cut off. As most of the cooking in Tours was with manufactured gas, the result could be imagined. We had no reserves of coal at



Gen Johnson Hagood, to me
with continual regards Robert L. Bliss
as a souvenir of our service together in France
in the Great War

Versailles France, Nov 11 1918

GENERAL BLISS

Chief of Staff, 1917; Supreme War Council, Versailles, 1918

or near Tours, so with about sixteen thousand of military population the matter was one of great concern to ourselves. However, we managed to collect enough coal to tide him over the day from the stock of our various activities, and I took up with the French War Office the question of some regular and dependable supply. It developed that Tours had a liberal credit of coal at one of the ports, but could get no allotment of rail transportation to handle it. I put it up to our own Transportation Department to see that we did not run short again.

How many times Tours had run out of coal I do not know, but this was the second time it had been put up to me. They were also continually running out of flour.

It was astonishing to us how the French would run along with so little concern for their reserves. They did not do this with military supplies. In Versailles, for example, there were hundreds of well-cared-for reserve auto trucks parked along the city streets. But in the matter of food and fuel the French were certainly very different from the British. It was common belief that the British had plenty of food in England held in reserve in case they should be cut off, but they always had food restrictions. On the other hand, the question in France seemed to be whether there was food or no food. There was never any restriction on sugar and butter until it was all gone. I remember that I bought a five-pound box of crystallized fruit at about half the United States peace-time price. A few days later the sale of all sweets was forbidden and I never saw any more during the remainder of the war. There was a bread ration, but so far as the military was concerned, certainly so far as the American Army was concerned, it never made the slightest difference in the restaurants and hotels whether you had a bread ticket or not.

The situation:

In another chapter I spoke of the diaries kept by the Deputy Chief of Staff and the G's, which were placed on my desk every morning. These were accompanied by a summary of general conditions throughout the S.O.S. for the preceding twenty-four hours — ordinary market report. The responsible heads of the S.O.S. were kept informed of what was going on by these diaries and reports and not by the peace-time method of trying to read thousands of communications drifting over their desks in that muddy stream known as 'Military Channels.'

The following is an example of these daily reports which summarized the general conditions:

*Secret***THE DAILY SITUATION****FOURTH SECTION, GENERAL STAFF***September 25, 1918***GENERAL SUMMARY**

An improvement is noted in the hospital situation, the number of patients increasing but very slightly, while there was a noticeable increase in the capacity of the hospitals. The tonnage figures are abnormally high due to placing on one report the amount of three days' port operations at Marseille. A marked improvement is noted in the dock congestion at the various ports, Brest being the only port yesterday to report congested dock conditions. An increase of 28,404 men is shown by the daily strength report, 23,303 troops having recently landed in England. The balanced and reserve ration both increased a day's supply yesterday, while the forage situation also improved slightly. There were only a few minor changes in the supplies of ammunition.

HOSPITAL CAPACITY INCREASES¹

The number of vacant beds in the hospitals increased 2542

¹ See Hospital Chart, p. 345.

yesterday, the total now being 30,025. The normal capacity of the hospitals increased 2200 to 86,770 while the crisis capacity increased 1900 to 142,320. There was but a slight increase, 115, in the number of hospital patients, the total number now being 60,135.

DOCK CONGESTION RELIEVED

The congested dock conditions at the various ports have been noticeably relieved, Brest being the only port to report dock congestion yesterday, a shortage of cars being the given reason. Due to the placing on yesterday's report of the amount of three days' port operations at Marseille, figures for tonnage handling are unusually high. The delay in the receipt of the reports from Marseille was due to wire trouble. There were 35,495 tons unloaded yesterday and 33,694 tons¹ evacuated, these figures including 5024 tons unloaded and 5097 tons evacuated at Marseille on the two previous days. The amount of tonnage yet to be unloaded is 151,855 tons. There were six locomotives and 118 cars erected as compared with eight locomotives and 102 cars erected the day previous.

TROOP INCREASE 28,404 MEN

An increase of 28,404 men is shown on yesterday's troop strength sheet, the total number of men in the American E.F. being given as 1,667,296. Of the recent increase, 23,303 men were landed in England, the increase probably representing that of several days' period. The number of men in the Advanced Section increased 4948 to 979,207. There are 52,687 troops serving with the French and British. There were 6982 troops unloaded yesterday.

FORAGE SITUATION IMPROVES

The reserve stock of hay in all France increased one day yesterday to 10 days' supply. The supply of bran increased two days to 46 days in reserve, while the 24 days' supply of oats remained unchanged. The situation in the Advanced Section is unchanged, Is-sur-Tille reporting a reserve supply

¹ See Tonnage Chart, p. 261.

of four days' hay, nine days' oats, and six days of bran in reserve. Late advices indicate that only 25,000 of the 42,000 tons of hay called for on priority schedule can be floated during September.

FOOD SUPPLY INCREASES¹

The reserve ration supply increased one day yesterday to 31 days in reserve while the balanced ration supply also increased a day to 18 days in reserve. The ordinarily fluctuating supplies of the flour and coffee components remained unchanged at 90 and 45 days' respectively. The supply of the salt component decreased three days to 26 days' supply.

MORE 37 MM. AND 9.2" HOWITZER AMMUNITION

The supply of 37 mm. gun ammunition increased 10 days yesterday to 112 days' supply, while the supply of 9.2" howitzer ammunition increased from 105 to 116 days' supply. There was a sharp decrease in the supply of 240 mm. ammunition, which dropped from 103 to 92 days' supply.

H. C. SMITHER
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4

Replacements:

One of the duties of the S.O.S. was classifying casual officers and soldiers that arrived from the States and sending them to the various organizations as replacements. The time they spent in camp awaiting shipment was used in filling out their deficiencies in equipment and preliminary training. Our principal camp for this purpose was at Saint-Aignan, where the 41st Division had been converted into a Replacement Division, and where the routine was something like this:

When a casual arrived he dumped all articles of clothing and equipment except a few souvenirs. He was then bathed, deloused, dressed in clean new uniform and underclothing, shaved, and his hair cut, after which he was examined for

¹ See Tonnage Chart, p. 265.

classification and assigned to an organization. From there he was marched along a counter as in a cafeteria and drew all articles of equipment, including rifle and ammunition. He was then insured and given thirty-five francs in cash, whether he had any pay due him or not. After this he was ready to be shipped to his organization. If there were some fundamental elements of training that he had not received, he was given instruction therein. It was developed that there were men who had been in the Army four months and had never fired a rifle, had any gas instruction, or marched a mile with a pack; that many of them had spent their time on setting-up exercises, learning the customs and courtesies of the service, singing, and acquiring a knowledge of court-martial procedure.

At this time many thousands of replacements were being sent through Le Mans and stopped off there for a couple of hours to get gas instruction before going to the front. General E. F. Glenn, the Depot Commander, telephoned me to get authority to keep these men eight additional hours in order to give them some target practice. He said that a great many had never fired a rifle and that some did not even know how to open a breech block. He said it was a shame to send these men to the front in this condition when with eight hours' delay he could give them at least one string of shots on the range. I took it up with G.H.Q., but the answer came back that the need for them at the front was too great to warrant this delay and that they must be sent forward immediately.

At our replacement depots we felt that if we could keep men for ten days, we could give them the absolute essentials. The trouble was that the replacement proposition was not properly organized at home. Troops were being trained in division camps to come over with divisions. Division commanders knew when they were expected to sail and were get-

ting their divisions ready to go at that time. Suddenly, however, they would be called upon to detach men as individual replacements, perhaps before their training had been more than a third completed. The results we have seen. Manifestly some system of individual training should have been established in the United States by which men would have received the essential elements of training before the non-essential. They should have been taught to shoot before they were taught to sing.

Major Huger W. Jervey, an emergency officer of the Judge Advocate's Department, acting as General Staff officer at Saint-Aignan, was largely responsible for the excellent system of training and equipping replacements in operation at that place. So I arranged by cable correspondence with the War Department to send him back to the States to get a proper system installed over there, and he reported to me on October 8th for instructions (below). He sailed about the middle of October, but, of course, the Armistice was signed before he had a chance to do anything.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY

October 8, 1918

From: Chief of Staff, S.O.S., A.E.F.

To: Major Huger W. Jervey, General Staff, A.E.F.

Subject: Visit to the United States in connection with replacement problems.

1. You are being sent to the United States in accordance with the following:

(Cable 159-S, Hq. S.O.S., A.E.F., to Agwar, Washington) 'Paragraph 1-B. Reference A-1932, Paragraph 1. It is desired to send Major Huger W. Jervey, G.S., A.E.F., G-1, 1st Depot Division, to the United States in view of the following: Rapid and systematic preparation for combat of practically untrained replacements has reached a

high state of efficiency in our depot divisions. Major Jervey has had wide experience in this work and it is believed he can render a great service by aiding the proper agencies in the United States to conform, as far as practicable to the system of training in our depots. To best accomplish such duty it will be necessary for Major Jervey to leave with this distinct purpose in view. The approval of the War Department is requested for sending Major Jervey to the United States for the purpose intended and for his return on completion of this duty. — HARBORD.'

(Telegram from G.H.Q., A.E.F., Sept. 27, 1918, to C.G., S.O.S.) 'Following paragraph from War Department Cable 1977 just received repeated for your information and necessary action Quote Paragraph 2. Reference S-159, Paragraph 1-B. Return Major Huger W. Jervey to United States for purpose stated. We will be glad to have him. MARCH.' — DAVIS.

2. In the performance of this duty you will proceed to Washington and report in person to the Chief of Staff of the Army, or to such person as may be designated by him, giving the officer a copy of these instructions. You will present to him the following suggestions based upon our experience over here:

(a) There should be in the States training cadres similar to those organized in France for the purpose of training green replacements. Experience here has shown that in from three to five weeks we can develop infantry replacements acceptable to combat divisions, provided they are trained not as organizations in themselves, but as a flow of student privates through a cadre containing expert noncommissioned officers.

(b) Under present conditions it has been found impossible in France to guarantee the completion of any complete prearranged system of training course. It is therefore essential that the training course should begin with those things most essential in case of sudden call to the front. There have been individual instances of men having been in the service for four months without having had any rifle

practice. In other cases replacements have reported that their principal training consisted of setting-up exercises, marches and maneuvers. Instruction in small arms nomenclature and rifle practice should begin within forty-eight hours after the soldier has been mustered into the service. Gas instruction and instruction in bayonet and hand grenade work should also be taken up at once. Every replacement sent to France should have target practice at least up to three hundred yards, and any soldier with six weeks for training in the United States should complete the full course before leaving.

(c) There should be close coördination between the training of replacements in the United States and that given in the depot divisions in France. The one should supplement the other and a replacement picked up at any time from a depot division in the United States should be able to continue his training in France immediately upon arrival, without repetition and without loss of time or efficiency.

(d) Each replacement should be provided with a qualification card upon which is indicated the military training he has received. When such a man received the minimum training required in any subject, he should be marked as a qualified replacement. Ordinarily no replacements should be sent who have not completed their qualification cards, if replacements are sent with only partially completed qualification cards, upon presentation at the replacements depot in France those qualifications can then be completed.

(e) There should be established near each port of embarkation a depot or reservoir where qualified replacements are kept on tap to fill up at the last minute vacancies that occur in organizations about to sail; also qualified replacement casualties to occupy unforeseen accommodations that may become available on ships just before sailing.

(f) In the special case of replacements for the heavy artillery, you will go to the Chief of Coast Artillery, Major General Frank Coe, and ascertain from him what steps, if any, have been taken to carry out the plan which at his re-

quest and that of General Hinds was submitted to him by me before he left France. The plan for the qualification cards above suggested would be particularly applicable to heavy artillery replacements.

(g) In the matter of so-called specialists, see if it is not possible to relieve the depot divisions here of this class of training by having men with special qualifications either tested out or trained in the United States, segregated and sent over in detachments or companies, with their qualifications indicated on their cards.

3. You are perfectly free to express your opinion upon any subject presented to you, but you are not authorized to represent the views of the C.-in-C. or the C.G., S.O.S., in any matter not covered by the above instructions.

4. You will finish up this duty as expeditiously as possible and upon completion thereof return to your proper station in France. It is important that you should not delay too long, as an essential feature of the plan under which you are being sent to the United States is that you shall bring back to the depot divisions here fresh information as to the manner in which the replacements' plan is operating in the United States.

JOHNSON HAGOOD

JH/my

CHAPTER XXII

THE ABBEVILLE AGREEMENT

Kernan writes Pershing's order — Identity of American Army must be preserved — Principle threatened — British offer ships for replacements — Two hundred and eighty thousand additional troops for May and June — Priority schedules upset — Shortage of 393,000 auxiliary troops — Atterbury demands 5000 locomotives and 30,000 railroad men — Pershing cables Washington to stop sending infantry — Visit to Versailles — British borrow Engineers — Moseley's estimate of the situation — Copy of British agreement.

IN accordance with the plan of segregating certain important subjects I have omitted up to this time everything except casual references to the so-called 'Abbeville Agreement,' which was reached in May. I shall now go back and explain the effect of that agreement upon the S.O.S. during the months of May and June. After that I shall take up the effect it had on our actual operations when the army at the front was making ready for its final drive in the Meuse-Argonne during the months of October and November.

When General Pershing was selected as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and sent to France, it was necessary that he be given instructions. It is manifest that such instructions could not be prepared personally by a civilian Secretary of War or President. It became necessary, therefore, that they be formulated by an Army officer on duty in the War Department. The officer who prepared the instructions was Brigadier General Francis J. Kernan, afterwards Commanding General of the S.O.S.

The instructions were contained in a letter signed by the Secretary of War under date of May 26, 1917, and included the following, which I have taken from a magazine article, General Kernan's copy not being available:



For
My dear friend Tolman Herne
With the highest esteem and affection
B. K. Lee
C. May 1914 "Last of the Lee's" 1914.

In military operations against the Imperial German Government, you are directed to coöperate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision as to when your command, or any of its parts, is ready for action is confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in determining the manner of coöperation. But, until the forces of the United States are in your judgment sufficiently strong to warrant coöperation as an independent command, it is understood that you will coöperate as a component of whatever army you may be assigned to by the French Government.

In substance this meant that an American army was to be formed and to fight under the American flag. General Pershing stuck out for this principle through thick and thin, and although at one time it seemed an international agreement to the contrary would be accepted, the principle prevailed. We all know now that, if America had not had an army fighting under its own flag, our prestige among the nations of the world could never be what it is to-day.

The principle was threatened in the spring of 1918. The German offensive brought the Allies to the realization that America's forces must be thrown into the balance at once or it would be too late. Up to this time American troops and supplies were being brought over as rapidly as possible, but it was suddenly realized that we had to do the impossible.

It will be remembered that the American priority schedules contemplated bringing over our troops and supplies in what are known as 'phases.' Each phase represented about one

army corps. It included combat divisions, which were complete units within themselves, and, in addition, certain auxiliary forces, such as heavy artillery, labor troops, engineers, S.O.S. troops, replacements, etc. — so arranged that when sufficient combat troops arrived in France a complete American army could be formed with sufficient forces back of the line to keep them properly supplied.

Monday, May 20th:

General Kernan, General William C. Langfitt, Chief of Utilities, and I were directed to meet General Pershing in Paris for the purpose of discussing modifications in our priority schedules to meet the conditions imposed by certain agreements made with the British, of which up to this time the S.O.S. had no knowledge. General Pershing explained the situation to us as follows:

On May 1st we had in France 432,000 American troops and it had been estimated that we should receive 70,000 more during the month of May and the same number in June. He said that as a result of an agreement with the British we should receive 280,000 additional troops in May and June, to be brought over in British bottoms especially loaned for the purpose, and that the new situation as to anticipated arrivals would be as follows:

May, 1918

Expected arrivals, American bottoms.....	70,000
Expected arrivals, British bottoms.....	<u>130,000</u>
Total.....	200,000
To be distributed as follows:	
Infantry and machine guns for six Divisions on British front.....	
.....	120,000
Artillery.....	<u>45,000</u>
.....	165,000
Balance available for S.O.S. troops.....	<u>35,000</u>

June, 1918

Expected arrivals, American bottoms.....	70,000
Expected arrivals, British bottoms.....	<u>150,000</u>
Total.....	220,000
To be distributed as follows:	
Infantry and machine guns for six Divisions.....	120,000
Artillery.....	<u>45,000</u>
Total.....	165,000
Balance available for S.O.S. troops.....	<u>55,000</u>

He estimated that the total number of American troops in France by July 31st would be 1,000,000 and that thereafter arrivals would average about 200,000 a month. He also said that freight arrivals would probably increase from 7000 tons a day to 25,000 and that we must be prepared to handle it.¹

General Pershing said that there was a strong effort on the part of the British and the French to use American troops as replacements. They claimed that the President was backing this proposition, but that he, General Pershing, would not consent to this scheme or to any other scheme except that of having a complete American army in France; that he had refused to build up an army of infantry only and had insisted on having the necessary artillery and S.O.S. troops so that we could operate independently. He went on to say that the Lorraine sector was going to be built up for the Americans; that troops coming back from the British and French fronts would go into the Lorraine area for their rest, etc., and that eventually the American Army would operate on that front.

Wednesday, May 22d:

General Kernan went off on an inspection trip of the ports

¹ See Tonnage Chart, p. 161.

with Colonel Smither, G-4, S.O.S., and expected to be absent about a week.

I called all the bureau chiefs together and gave them such information as I had with reference to these agreements with the British and directed them to submit revised estimates as to what was needed for the S.O.S. within our allotments of troops and tonnage. Later in the day General Langfitt and General Atterbury came back with some further information, and it was agreed that as soon as I could get the data together I should see General Pershing again. Atterbury said that he would require five thousand additional locomotives and thirty thousand additional railroad employees to handle the troops expected in June; that if we could bring over the railroad personnel, he would try to get the locomotives from the French. To this I assented. I telephoned to Barber in Paris to come back at once to get his G-1 organization to work.

It should be remembered that while the British had agreed to supply the ships, our own S.O.S. would be required to handle the troops at the ports and to transport them and their supplies to the British front. We were short of labor and matériel to handle the tonnage and troops to arrive in our own ships. How could we handle four times that quantity, to be brought by the British?

Thursday, May 23d:

General Pershing called me on the telephone, asked some questions about the proposed S.O.S. personnel,¹ and directed me to come up to Chaumont to discuss that matter and the revision of our priority schedules. That night Colonel Barber, Lieutenant Wulfekoetter, and I, together with several stenographers, clerks, typewriters, etc., went up on the Atter-

¹ See Chapter XV.

bury Special. We worked quite late that night on the train preparing a cablegram to the United States modifying our priority shipments of troops and supplies.

May 24th and 25th:

At Dijon we found there was a freight wreck ahead, so we made arrangements to proceed the balance of the way to Chaumont by automobile. We arrived about 12.30 P.M. and I lunched with Logan. In the early afternoon I had a conference with Fox Conner, Moseley, Logan, and others on expediting the shipment of S.O.S. troops. I was told at this conference that the figures given me offhand from memory by General Pershing in Paris were not altogether correct and that a more detailed statement of the situation was as follows:

There had been two agreements with the British. One was the Lord Redmond Agreement, made in London, which was very unfavorable to the United States. The other was the Abbeville Agreement, which specifically provided that the United States was to organize a complete army, under its own flag, but that to meet the present emergency a certain number of infantry and machine-gun organizations were to be sent without the accompanying auxiliary troops and without any S.O.S. troops. This agreement was to the effect that seven divisions, approximately 140,000 men, were to be sent in May and six more divisions in June. This allowed only 15,000 S.O.S. troops for May and 25,000 for June, instead of 35,000 for May and 55,000 for June, as had previously been understood. Moreover, if the total number of troops brought over in June exceeded 150,000, the excess was all to be machine-gun and infantry troops.

The result of this situation is that we shall have in France on July 1st infantry, machine-gun, engineer, and signal corps

troops sufficient to form four army corps, but shall be short 400,000 S.O.S. and auxiliary troops as follows:

Shortages May and June

S.O.S. troops.....	154,000
Artillery, etc., for six Divisions.....	50,000
Corps troops.....	59,000
Replacements for July (minimum).....	40,000
Aviation.....	18,000
Army troops.....	<u>72,000</u>
Total.....	393,000

Note. Tank corps not included in shortages, as matériel will probably not be available.

Serious situation:

This presented a situation very much more serious than anything we had previously considered. We had no agreement for British assistance in ships after the 1st of July. If their ships were withdrawn and if all available American ships were used exclusively for the transportation of replacements, S.O.S., and auxiliary troops, it would take us all the months of July, August, September, October, and November to catch up with our programme. During these five months our whole organization in France would be upset. Not only would the S.O.S. be unable to meet the demands made upon it, but the whole training programme would be disorganized. The divisions would have their infantry trained, but not in coöperation with their artillery. There would be an excess of training along certain lines and none at all along other lines. Back in the States the orderly procedure of drafting men, training them, and sending them overseas would have to be entirely reorganized. Divisions occupying training camps would have to be held for months beyond that time. There would not be proper accommodations for housing or training these auxiliary troops, etc.

The best that we could hope would be that the British ships would not be withdrawn and that the months of July and August would be devoted exclusively to replacements, S.O.S., and auxiliary troops, in order to give us a chance to catch up.

Based upon this more detailed study of the situation, Moseley, Conner, and the rest of us decided that the only proper move was to place squarely upon the British and the French the responsibility for the supply and the transportation of this excess of troops. There had been an informal understanding to this effect in connection with the Abbeville Agreement. We believed, however, that the British and the French would not be able to meet the situation and that we should not drift along without coming to some definite understanding.

Telegram to Langfitt:

It was agreed, therefore, that I should request authority from General Pershing to send to General Langfitt, Chief of Utilities, a telegram which he and I and General Atterbury had previously drawn. It was to the effect that the American S.O.S. was not responsible for the supply and transportation of the excess troops brought over under the Abbeville Agreement. It directed that General Atterbury should enter into negotiations with the French for transportation on that basis and should inform them that it was our duty to look out only for such railroad material and personnel as pertained to our own yards and for such stevedores and labor troops as were necessary to clear our own ports.

It had been understood between General Atterbury and myself that armed with this telegram he should procure from the French some kind of positive statement on the subject; that if he found they could furnish material but not personnel he should then attempt to procure five thousand locomotives

and should promise that he himself would procure thirty thousand railroad men from the United States.

The proposed telegram was as follows:

PROPOSED TELEGRAM

CHAUMONT, *May 24, 1918*

To Chief of Utilities, Tours.

Inform the Director General of Transportation that after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief the following conclusions have been reached. Under the Abbeville agreement combat troops are to be shipped at a rate much greater than that contemplated by our Service of the Rear project. The immediate result will be the arrival of troops and supplies to an extent that it will not be possible for us to handle them with our own facilities now available or contemplated. This situation however was foreseen and was thoroughly discussed between the governments concerned. It was accepted by our Government with the understanding that the British and French would transport and supply the excess of combat troops. It would be a violation of the terms of the agreement if we attempt to bring over S.O.S. troops to do this ourselves. And under the terms of the agreement there will be no tonnage available now or in the near future to make any substantial increase in railroad personnel or material to be brought from the United States.

You are therefore directed to proceed at once to lay before the French and British Authorities your needs in the matter of additional transportation facilities to handle the 425,000 troops to be embarked in May and June. You will at the same time make it thoroughly clear to them that the responsibility for any failure in this matter rests with them and not with us.

An effort will be made to secure for you the increase of personnel at the ports to handle the expected increase on supplies. But here again it must be understood that the modification of our programme was at the request of the British and French and that if the tonnage allotted for us for Service of Supply troops by the Abbeville agreement is not sufficient to handle

the situation at the ports our Allies must either make up this deficiency or modify the agreement in order that we may make it up ourselves.

JOHNSON HAGOOD
Chief of Staff

We had two conferences with General Pershing, one on Friday afternoon and one on Saturday. General Pershing disapproved our proposition. He directed me not to send the telegram to General Langfitt, but to have General Atterbury meet him in Paris for a conference. He stated that he would himself assist General Atterbury in trying to crystallize this matter. He also said that he would make an effort right away to have the United States devote the entire month of July, and perhaps August, with all available ships, in an effort to catch up with the programme. His cablegram here follows:

SECRET

2BB/wej

May 25, 1918

PROPOSED CABLEGRAM:

Paragraph —— *Confidential*. For Chief of Staff Place at head of priority schedule of S.O.S. troops for promptest possible shipment 6000 stevedores in addition to 2400 called for in Paragraph 3G, Cable 704, and checkers, coopers, and gearmen called for in Paragraph 1, Cable 869, and Paragraph 1A Cable 684. Also 3000 railway operating personnel from Items E 453 and E 453A for handling terminal work at ports and depots. All totaling 12,100. These are indispensable to discharge of ships and are needed by June 20th. Send them in units or as individuals as may be most expeditious. In addition to this and repeating previous requests, it is urged that all available space not otherwise assigned be utilized to send small service of supply units or detachments or individuals as nearly as practicable in accordance with priority schedule.

Paragraph —— Preliminary studies show that it is essential that the entire month of July and probably all of August

must be devoted to bringing over indispensable Service of Supply troops and combat units necessary to care for our troops and to complete divisions, elements of which will have embarked prior to June 30th. Detailed study of essential priorities to cover month of July now being made and will be cabled within ten days.

PERSHING

Visit to Versailles:

About this time I had occasion to go to Versailles and to talk with one of the American officers attached to the Supreme War Council. He told me that to whatever extent we might theorize on the subject and to whatever extent we might desire to maintain our national independence, the aggressive power of the Allies would have to be combined in such a way as to produce the greatest effect. He said that the British Supply Service was now feeding a certain number of men on the British front, that it was not proposed to increase this number, and that this supply organization could feed the American replacements as well as they had fed the British who would have been killed off by the Boche. He also said that the French and British were not losing their artillery. They had sufficient artillery for all the divisions they proposed to maintain on the Western Front and that when the American infantry came over it would go to make up composite divisions, which would at first be French or British divisions with American infantry and would finally become American divisions, with French or British artillery.

He told me that however much we might regret such an arrangement, it was absolutely necessary to meet the situation. He went on to say that he thought the game for G.H.Q. to play was to turn these divisions into American divisions at the earliest practicable moment and combine them under American commanders. He said that so far as



To my great Chief and Guide J. P. McAdams

COLONEL J. P. MCADAMS
Deputy Chief of Staff, SOS

the S.O.S. was concerned, I had a wonderful opportunity to make the British and the French turn over to us all the facilities in material and labor that we were lacking to organize our own supply system, and that if we played our cards right, America would in a few months take the leading part in the Great War, not only to our own advantage, but to the advantage of the cause.

He did not commit General Bliss to these views and the latter subsequently denied that he had ever advocated or consented to the amalgamation of American units with those of the French and British.

Immediately upon my return to Tours, on Monday, May 27th, I was confronted by Colonel McAdams, the Deputy Chief of Staff, with a number of requests made by the British for assistance in handling the incoming Americans and for engineer and other auxiliary troops to help them at the front. Up to this point we had complied with these requests because of the extreme urgency of the situation. But now I formulated a telegram to G.H.Q. asking that we be definitely informed as to our responsibility and requesting that we be furnished with a copy of the Abbeville Agreement. The next day Moseley wrote me the following letter:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SEC. 4, G.S., May 28, 1918

MY DEAR HAGOOD:

Personally I feel that the situation in regard to our troops with the British is going to become more and more unsatisfactory, and I was glad to see your telegram of the 27th, of which we all got a copy, asking that the C.G., S.O.S., be definitely informed of his responsibilities in the matter. Every day requests are coming in to assist the British in equipping our troops with them in one way or another, and if we allow

ourselves to depart from the Abbeville agreement, in an attempt to meet their requests, we are going to find ourselves in bad shape.

With very kindest regards, believe me

Very sincerely yours

(Sgd)

MOSELEY

2 encls.

Brigadier General Johnson Hagood
Headquarters S.O.S.
A.P.O. 717

Tuesday, May 28th:

I had a meeting of the bureau chiefs and explained to them our new situation and particularly the result of my last conference with General Pershing. I told them that I had been unable to procure a copy of the Abbeville Agreement and that we were very much in the dark as to where we stood.

General Fillenneau, Chief of the French Mission, hearing of this, told me that he had a copy given to him by a friend in the French War Office. He offered to have it translated into English and sent to me if I would make no official use of it that would embarrass him. I gladly accepted his offer. The original has since been published. The version given me by General Fillenneau, translated first into French and then back into English, contains all the essential features of the original document.

May 28, 1918

ABBEVILLE AGREEMENT

MEMORANDUM — personal for Brig. General Hagood.

Resolution No. 5 passed on May 2d, by Supreme Council of War.

The Council is of the opinion that it is necessary to form as soon as possible an American army which will fight under its own flag and will be placed under the direct authority of its chief. In order to face present difficulties, priority of trans-

portation will be given to the Infantry of the Divisions, which Infantry will complete its training with the French and British Armies. Later on this Infantry will be withdrawn and autonomous Divisions of Army Corps be formed, at the will of General Pershing, after consultation with the General Commanding the Allied Armies.

In May priority will be given to the transportation of the Infantry of six Divisions, the surplus tonnage will be allotted to the transportation of other troops.

In June, same programme (Infantry of Six Divisions), on condition that the British Government furnish tonnage necessary for 130,000 men in May and 150,000 in June. The six first Divisions will go to the British armies—the troops transported in June will go where General Pershing decided.

Should the British Government transport a supplement of 150,000 men in June, this additional force will be composed of Infantry and Machine Gun Units.

A fresh examination of the situation in June will be made to fix arrangements for the future.

FILLENEAU
Général de Brigade
French Mission

Thursday, June 6th:

Herewith is a long personal letter received by me about this time from General Moseley. It enclosed an official letter of instructions to the C.G., S.O.S., which he had had prepared, but, for reasons explained by him in his personal letter to me, it was never sent out. The most interesting feature to us in Moseley's letter was the statement that four divisions—the 35th, 42d, 77th, and 28th—were to be withdrawn from the British line and turned over to the Americans in the vicinity of the Toul Sector. In other words, the dam was about to break ahead of time. Excess combat troops were being turned over to us even before the Abbeville Agreement had gone half into effect and we were without facilities for

supplying them or for organizing them into higher combat units.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SEC. 4, G.S., 4 June 1918

MY DEAR HAGOOD:

Several days ago I saw a telegram in which you asked that the C.G., S.O.S., be furnished with a copy of the Abbeville agreement and another in which you asked that he be furnished with the special arrangements under which we have loaned troops to the British from time to time. I inquired to-day and found that they declined to furnish you a copy of the Abbeville agreement. I think this agreement is going to be somewhat shaken up, due to the fact that four divisions are being withdrawn and they are coming down to us. They come down in the following order: 35th, 42d, 77th, and 28th. The arrangements for this move are just being made and I cannot give you all the details to-night.

We have sent you a telegram to-night, stating that we had gotten back the 11th and 16th Engineers, as General Kernan requested. The British asked for one week's notice only, and this I am giving to them to-morrow. In the morning I leave for French G.H.Q., to talk with Payot who has given me permission to establish an army dump in the vicinity of Paris. This will not effect the automatic supply, but is simply to meet the needs of clothing, gas masks, small arm ammunition, medical stores, etc. Just as soon as I see Payot and make the arrangements with him as to the exact location, I will let you know the details. If we retain the Toul sector, I am going to establish a similar army dump, probably in the vicinity of Colombey-les-Belles, but this will depend upon the sector to be occupied by the divisons when the new shift is made. Anticipating the present situation, several weeks ago I wrote a letter on the policy of development in the S.O.S. About that time the great strategists around here had finally settled with the French that we would occupy the Toul sector when our forces

were assembled some time in August. They thought this letter of mine was very good, but that I should modify it to state that in August it was contemplated that the army would be in the definite sector as stated. I maintained that no one on this side of the line was able to tell us where the American army would be in August. With the exception noted, every one seemed to think the letter was very sound and I believe it is more sound to-day than ever before and I am enclosing it for your information. There is nothing new in it to you, but I thought it would be a good thing to make such a statement so that every one would realize that we must keep our S.O.S. in a position of readiness to supply the army anywhere.

• • • • •

I have been waiting, hoping that you were going to give me some good suggestions on the Motor Transport situation, which you wanted me to follow here. There have been several things come up in reference to the officer whom you spoke of the other day as being in my office, and I am just waiting for a good chance to let him go or put him on other work. Most of my sections have good men at the head of them now and I can rely on what they get out, but I always feel uncertain in signing anything the man you refer to writes, unless I read it over very carefully.

With very kindest regards, believe me

Very sincerely yours

(Sgd)

MOSELEY

1 encl.

General Johnson Hagood

Headquarters, S.O.S.

A.P.O. 717.

CHAPTER XXIII

EFFECTS OF THE ABBEVILLE AGREEMENT

Two hundred and thirty thousand troops disembarked in August — Discharge of cargo falls behind — Pershing forms First Army — Excess of bayonets and machine guns — Divisions short of artillery — Army and corps troops sadly lacking — Insufficient replacements — No horses — Motor trucks abandoned — Dawes says situation desperate — Harbord appeals to Pershing — Combat divisions broken up.

ALMOST three months have now elapsed since we have had the discussions on the subject of the Abbeville Agreement, under which the British were to bring American infantry to France in British ships faster than we could bring over the auxiliary troops to complete combat units or the S.O.S. troops to supply them. At that time our difficulties were anticipated rather than real. We may now begin to see what the actual effect of this agreement was upon the American situation at the front.

In the meantime General Harbord had taken over the command of the S.O.S. and the difficulties that had been anticipated by General Kernan were now realized by General Harbord.

Sunday, September 1st:

During the month of August — that is, during the first month after Harbord took command — we disembarked 230,000 troops and had increased our discharge of cargo¹ from an average of 21,000 tons per day in July to 23,000 tons per day in August. Relatively, however, we were falling still farther behind, because while in June we had discharged thirty-five pounds per man per day and in July twenty-six pounds per man per day, in August we had discharged only twenty-four pounds per man per day.

¹ See Tonnage Chart, p. 161.

Thursday, September 5th:

In the middle of August, General Pershing began the formation of the First Army, with headquarters first at La Ferté and then at Neufchâteau. He assumed personal command on August 30th, and there began to develop at once the difficulties into which we had been led by the Abbeville Agreement. The infantry that the United States had undertaken to furnish to fill gaps in the French and British lines was being turned back to us, and on September 1st we found ourselves with nearly a million and a half soldiers in France, but with a great excess of bayonets and machine guns and not enough auxiliary troops. Most of the divisions had no 75's and no 155 howitzers, and the army and the corps were sadly lacking in the longer-range artillery. I am speaking of men and trained organizations, not guns. We did not have the engineers, pioneer and labor troops to build the roads, the medical troops to attend the sick and wounded, the ordnance troops to handle the ammunition, the signal corps troops to establish telegraph and telephone lines. We were short of chauffeurs and auto mechanics. We did not have the supply trains nor the military police to regulate traffic. In short, we had the personnel to form some units up to and including the divisions, but we did not have the personnel to form corps and armies. In transportation we were short of wagons, horses, ambulances, trucks, locomotives, and railroad cars. We were lacking in replacements of all kinds, both of personnel and matériel.

General Pershing was planning to make the first great American drive at Saint-Mihiel and in order to make this drive a success these deficiencies had to be made up. Cables had been sent to the United States urging that no more infantry be sent and that army corps and S.O.S. troops be hurried over to the exclusion of everything else. We wanted

no more bayonets. We wanted stevedores, railroad operatives, engineer troops, etc. But the War Department replied that it was impossible to change the priority of troop movements already under way.

Combat divisions broken up:

G.H.Q. then decided that it would be necessary to break up the next five arriving combat divisions and to use the men as replacements, as labor troops and whatever else was necessary to make up the deficiencies. All the long hard work back in the training camps, all the enthusiasm, *esprit de corps*, and fighting force of these units were to be cast aside, and they were simply to be used as huskies to lift a bale of goods or wield pick and shovel.

Further than this, it was decided that it would be necessary to comb the already depleted S.O.S. for combat officers, labor troops, engineer regiments, and for transportation of all kinds. Men who had been working day and night on the big Bassens project, driving piles and constructing the berths for the relief of freight congestion, had to drop their tools on the ground and go forward to assist in the handling of ammunition.

No horses:

Having exhausted the resources of France and Spain to make up the deficiencies in horses, a telegram was sent to the S.O.S. directing that we give up half of all our animals, sending forward those in best condition. After a hasty survey we replied that in the whole S.O.S. there were only eight hundred horses left, while it would take fifty thousand to make up the deficiencies in the combat organizations.

After having borrowed the French reserves of motor transportation from Toul and Bar-le-Duc, G.H.Q. once more

turned to the S.O.S. and directed us to give up the bulk of our small stock of trucks, already being used continuously twenty-four hours out of the day in an effort to comply with other demands for getting supplies to the front. Mechanics and other workmen engaged at assembly and repair shops were ordered out until there was no one left to make even minor repairs. As pressing as was the need for their services, thousands of trucks were lying idle for lack of some minor repairs and no one to make them.

With only twenty-five per cent of the personnel necessary to do our work, with thirty per cent of the necessary transportation in the whole of France, with a prospect of greatly increasing troop arrivals and double the cargo to be discharged within the next thirty days, with further prospect that the American troops might have to move forward, those of us who did not know General Pershing's plan considered this policy of robbing the S.O.S. as absolutely ruinous. General Harbord put up protest after protest. I, too, in my small way, did what I could. Moseley at Chaumont backed us up.

Now or never!!

But the men of General Pershing's staff who were responsible for operations at the front took the position that it was now or never, and so the decision was made. McAndrew and Fox Conner insisted that the blow must be struck, and that whatever might be the future development of conditions in the S.O.S. the time had now come when America was to show its teeth and that the great drive must go through.

The war ended two months later, so their decision was justified. Success in war comes from taking advantage of the unexpected opportunity and in taking a course of action that the enemy is not prepared to meet. In this case the Germans were trying to win the war before the Americans were ready.

They knew our difficulties and our deficiencies as well as we did. By making the decision to go in, G.H.Q. upset all the German plans and turned their slight chance of success into overwhelming disaster.

This journal is not written for the purpose of proving who was right. It is written for the purpose of recording an unvarnished statement of the conditions as they existed. In reading military history we are too apt to consider that because certain conditions lead to victory, those conditions should be imitated in planning for the future. To those of us who were responsible for the S.O.S. at this time, it looked as though we were going on the rocks. So while giving all the more credit to those who steered us safely through this terrible storm, I shall at the same time indicate the conditions as they existed from our standpoint.

Situation September 1st:

All during the month of July and August our situation was getting worse and worse. In the latter part of August I had a long conference with General Charles G. Dawes, who was head of the Purchasing Board and at the same time the American representative on the Inter-Allied Board for the pooling of supplies. Dawes told me that unless there was some relief within the next ninety days, the S.O.S., he thought, would collapse. Up to this time the most critical point in our problem was the question of ships — the race between the shipbuilders at home and the German submarine campaign. But this crisis had been passed. The S.O.S. had never in any way whatever been embarrassed by the German submarine campaign. There had been no loss of life to speak of, and the quantity of supplies that we had lost was absolutely negligible.

Dawes and I agreed that the real neck of the bottle at this



Dr Captain Dugordy with
the 1st. 15700 best miles of ^{French} ~~French~~ Capt.

time was in the matter of rail and motor transportation in France. These matters had been the subject of many conferences of the gravest concern on the part of all the bureau chiefs. Finally, in order to get the matter reduced to some concrete form that could be more fully realized by General Pershing and his staff at G.H.Q., I called the bureau chiefs together on September 5th and gave them a written memorandum directing each to submit a brief statement of exactly what effect had been made upon his respective department by the present shortage in personnel and matériel.

Upon receipt of these replies¹ I presented the whole proposition to General Harbord, together with the following telegram, which he signed and sent:

SIGNAL CORPS TELEGRAM

Hq. S.O.S., Sept. 13, 1918

RUSH!!

C.-in-C., G.H.Q. — Attention Eltinge.

C.S. 9.

1. Recent withdrawal of troops from S.O.S. is having disastrous effect here.

a. Chief Ordnance Officer reports that he has not sufficient personnel to handle requisitions for ammunition.

b. Chief Engineer Officer reports that construction has been slowed up thirty per cent. Work in quarries has entirely ceased. Montoir project, involving warehouse, additional berths and trackage, set back one month, as well as double track line from Saint-Nazaire to Montoir. Similar situation everywhere with reference to engineering projects.

c. Chief Motor Transport Service reports that overhaul parks are now operating with one third necessary personnel and that in some places all repair work has stopped as the personnel is insufficient to do more than handle spare parts. At a time when motor transportation is most needed, it is ac-

¹ Contained in my full account of the S.O.S. and official papers, from which this book was prepared, on file in the Historical Section, War Department.

cumulating in bad condition, with no facilities for being repaired. Available motor transportation is being operated continuously day and night, with loss of efficiency at night and no proper opportunity for care and preservation.

d. Chiefs of other supply departments report similar conditions. The situation with reference to railroad transportation is getting worse every day. Due to insufficient personnel, slowing up of construction work on terminals and so forth, traffic is being congested and for several days shipment from some ports practically ceased. October tonnage estimates require evacuation forty thousand tons a day, double the best ever accomplished heretofore. Instead of getting ready for this crisis our facilities for meeting the situation are being daily diminished. We are called upon to-day to furnish one thousand additional troops for salvage squads and two thousand to handle ammunition for First Army. This is impossible.

2. The S.O.S. must have some immediate relief. It is as much involved in the present push as is the First Army, as that army cannot get its food, clothing and ammunition unless the S.O.S. continues to function.

3. The only troops in France not concerned in the immediate situation are the divisions in training areas. It is urgently requested that three such divisions be immediately turned over to the S.O.S. and allowed to remain with it for such use as I desire to make of them until the arrival of S.O.S. troops from the United States under October programme. The situation is most serious and a crisis is inevitable unless averted by immediate action.

HARBORD

JH/my

Saturday, September 14th:

In answer to this appeal for authority to use three of the combat divisions for S.O.S. work, G.H.Q. informed us that these divisions had been trained in the United States and sent to France to fight and that the S.O.S. would have to wait

until its own troops arrived from the United States. To this General Harbord replied as follows:

2d Ind.

A.E.F., Hq. S.O.S.

Sept. 14, 1918

Return to the C.-in-C., G-1, requesting reconsideration.

1. I am, of course, willing to accept, without question, any decision made by the C.-in-C. I cannot accept, however, merely as a matter of logic, the conclusion drawn from paragraph 1 above and stated in paragraph 2.

2. The C.-in-C. himself strongly opposed the shipping to France of combat units in excess of the corresponding S.O.S. requirements. Merely because troops have arrived in France with combat designations does not satisfy me that these troops should not be diverted from combat purposes for more pressing needs in the S.O.S.

3. The great question of the moment is the active operations in the Saint-Mihiel Sector. These operations are being conducted by the First Army and the S.O.S.¹ The First Army cannot move without the food, clothing, ammunition and transportation provided by the S.O.S., and if the S.O.S. fails the First Army will fail. There are in France a vast number of American troops who are not participating in this drive. They are the combat divisions in training areas. In another communication I have requested that three of these divisions be immediately assigned to the S.O.S. to replace First Army troops recently withdrawn and to do the work of S.O.S. troops which have failed to come from the United States. I am enclosing copy of this telegraphic communication for the information of G-1. It was sent yesterday. Conditions, however, are very much more serious than is indicated in the telegram.

J. G. HARBORD

Major General, Comdg.

1 Incl.

JH/my

¹ See frontispiece. This was a telegram used as a Poster.

Tuesday, September 17th:

As a result of the foregoing, G.H.Q. notified us that we should have three divisions turned over to us temporarily pending the arrival of S.O.S. troops. The 87th Division was placed at our disposal immediately. This division was commanded by Major General Samuel D. Sturgis. Brigadier General R. P. Davis of the Coast Artillery commanded the Artillery Brigade. Instructions were given that the division was to be distributed wherever labor was most needed, but principally for duty with the Division of Construction and Forestry. General Otho B. Rosenbaum, commanding one of the infantry brigades, was sent to Blois to take command of the reclassification station at that point.

Our exact status with reference to troops at this time is indicated in the following telegram:

TELEGRAM

H.Q. S.O.S., Sept. 20, 1918

C.-in-C., G.H.Q. — G-1.

C.S. 15. Reference telephonic request; total number troops engaged S.O.S. work 291,966, in round numbers as follows: Headquarters of Sections 9500, Engineers 53,000 Quarter-masters 37,000 Aviation 32,000, Signal Corps 7800, Military Police and Guard 16,000, Medical 27,000, Ordnance 9000, D.G.T. 42,000, Schools 3600, Motor Transport Corps 9300, Tours and vicinity 15,000 and Miscellaneous 30,000. Details by mail.

HARBORD

JH/my

CHAPTER XXIV

MOSELEY'S ORDER

Harbord's command cut off — Bureau chiefs handicapped — Alternative project — Two Chiefs of Staff, one for Operations, one for Supply — Unanimous agreement by General Staff and bureau chiefs — Harbord telegraphs Pershing — Conference at Ligny — Atterbury, Langfitt, and others give strong endorsement — Proposed reorganization of War Department — Moseley greatest supply man in A.E.F.

ON October 10, 1918, we received an advance copy of a general order about to be issued from G.H.Q. and were invited to submit suggestions with reference thereto. This order had been drafted by Brigadier General George Van H. Moseley, Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 at G.H.Q. and is referred to in this book as 'Moseley's Order.' This order proposed to reorganize entirely the existing system of supply. It proposed to cut off the responsibility of the S.O.S. and of the bureau chiefs at the zone of the army, as in the case of the old L.O.C. It proposed to transfer the responsibility for supply from the C.G., S.O.S., to G-4 at G.H.Q. and to make the former, in effect, subordinate to the latter. It proposed to remove the bureau chiefs from the staff of the C.-in-C. and give them a subordinate status at the rear. It proposed to relieve the Chief Surgeon, A.E.F., from all responsibility for the sick and wounded in the forward areas and to place that responsibility upon a subordinate medical officer attached to G-4 at G.H.Q. and to place corresponding restrictions upon the other bureau chiefs in their respective activities.

I had copies of the proposed order made and distributed to the bureau chiefs for criticism and also drew up two memoranda myself suggesting an alternative scheme essentially along the line of that submitted to General Harbord two days after he took command, but which at that time he did not approve.

The two memoranda here follow:

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

October 17, 1918

MEMORANDUM for the Commanding General:

Subject: Proposed order reorganizing supply system.

7. Maximum efficiency in the service of supply must depend upon the smooth working of a machine rather than upon peculiar qualifications of individual officers. Each of the supply departments has such a machine. It is constituted by law and its responsibilities and methods of operation are definitely fixed by customs of the service and by regulations grown out of a hundred years' experience. The final test of efficiency is the manner in which the goods are delivered to the man with the bayonet and, in my judgment, it is a great mistake to chop off this responsibility at an imaginary line half way between the trenches and the ports in an effort to build up an entirely new responsibility under an entirely new machine with indefinite responsibilities and with a lack of mutual understanding and confidence.

8. In my judgment, it is better to simplify rather than to complicate the lines of responsibility. It is better to extend the responsibility of the bureau chiefs as far to the front as possible and thus charge them to the maximum extent with the accomplishment of their mission as prescribed by law and the customs of the service. In the final show-down they are going to be held responsible anyway, and any restriction placed upon this is merely a handicap which will have to be subsequently overcome.

9. It is impossible to build two identical structures upon entirely different foundations. The American army is to operate independently, so there is no compelling reason why we should conform to the French staff system. The French distinction between the Zone of the Armies and the Zone of the Interior is based upon their own local military and civil situation and I cannot see the wisdom of warping our entire

military organization to conform to it, though of course I can see great advantage in accepting British and French experience and adapting both to our own organization.

10. An officer in commenting upon our military policy stated that we had copied something from every military power on earth but that we had failed to copy the one fundamental principle common to them all; that is, that the military system of a country must be adapted to the genius of its people. No other nation in the war has supply services corresponding to ours and we must count them in our organization at the front as well as at the rear.

TOO MUCH CONCENTRATION AT G.H.Q.

11. When the bureau chiefs were taken away from G.H.Q. and again when General Harbord was assigned to command the S.O.S. an effort was made to decentralize from G.H.Q. and to place upon the C.G., S.O.S., the responsibility for supply. But notwithstanding this there is an unwillingness on the part of G.H.Q. to turn loose. There is a constant pressure for control of supply activities and the present proposed order will practically take away from the C.G., S.O.S., all responsibility for supply other than the requisitioning from the United States and the receiving at the ports.

12. Carrying this to its logical conclusion there is no reason why General Pershing's activities should not be confined to the Zone of the Armies and the C.G., S.O.S., be attached to the War Department in the United States. Many arguments (in which I do not concur) can be made to show that this is a more logical arrangement than the present one.

13. In my judgment, G-1 and G-4 at G.H.Q. should be abolished. The C.-in-C. should look to two men — call them by whatever titles you choose — one a Chief of Staff for Operations and the other a Chief of Staff for Supply. One should control G-2, G-3 and G-5, while the other should control G-1 and G-4. One should be at Chaumont, with certain liaison at Tours. The other should be at Tours, with certain liaison at Chaumont.

14. The present C.G., S.O.S., has served as Chief of Staff

to General Pershing. He is therefore in every way better qualified to-day to perform the functions of Chief of Staff for Supply than he was formerly to perform the combined duties of Chief of Staff for Operations and of Chief of Staff for Supply. The operations of the American armies in France has reached such proportions that General Pershing cannot longer expect to give his personal attention to the details of combat at the front. He has already turned over the command of the armies to his subordinates. It seems to me that he can now consider his two main headquarters as Chaumont and Tours and can regard the one as coördinate with the other in every way. Tours should not be subordinate to Chaumont. The carefully prepared plans of the bureau chiefs, having been passed upon by one G-4 and approved by one of General Pershing's principal officers, should not be sent up to Chaumont to be again reviewed by a G-4 and again passed upon by a Deputy Chief of Staff or a Chief of Staff who does not represent the person of the C.-in-C. any more or to any greater extent than does the C.G., S.O.S.

15. The adoption of such a system would clear the atmosphere and greatly simplify the whole proposition. The responsibility of the chiefs of the supply departments would be complete from the ports to the wire entanglements. The whole question of supply would follow natural lines. Supply chiefs would know where they stand and their subordinates would have no divided allegiance.

(Sgd)

JOHNSON HAGOOD
C. of S.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

October 19, 1918

MEMORANDUM for the Commanding General:

Subject: A single agency of supply for the American E.F. with centralized responsibility and control.

1. The present supply system of the American E.F. is faulty in the following:

FIRST

G-1 and G-4 at G.H.Q. supervise the work of G-1 and G-4 at S.O.S. Hq., duplicate a great deal of it and (from our own viewpoint) restrict its efficiency.

Remedy: (a) Make the C.G., S.O.S., ex-officio Chief of Staff for Supply. Restrict the present Chief of Staff, American E.F., to operations only. So that General Staff control of the whole American E.F. will be divided between the present Chief of Staff, through G-2, G-3 and G-5, and the C.G., S.O.S., through G-1 and G-4.

(b) Transfer to S.O.S. Hq. all G-1 and G-4 functions except those pertaining to troops in the advance . . . and leave at G.H.Q. only so much of G-1 and G-4 as is necessary to co-operate with G-3. The portions left, however, should be sub-sections of G-1 and G-4, S.O.S.

SECOND

The chiefs of the technical services do not have complete and continuous responsibility from the ports to the trenches.

Remedy: Extend the jurisdiction of the C.G., S.O.S., to the trenches. Transfer the chiefs of the technical services from the staff of the Commander-in-Chief to the staff of the C.G., S.O.S. Make their jurisdiction coincident with that of the C.G., S.O.S., and make their relations to subordinates of their respective services in the Advance Section and with combat units the same as that they now have to subordinates at the ports.

• • • • •

(Sgd)

JOHNSON HAGOOD

C. of S.

JH/my

Copies of these memoranda were furnished the bureau chiefs and two days later they were all assembled in my office, together with the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, to discuss the relative merits of the two plans. All reported against Moseley's Order and, to my surprise, all reported in favor of the alternative scheme. I could hardly believe my ears, because a unanimous agreement at a meeting of the bureau chiefs and the General Staff was unique. So I directed a poll, and each General Staff officer and each bureau chief expressed, in turn, his unqualified approval of my plan.

I went across the hall to General Harbord's office, told him what had happened, and asked him to come over, himself question each bureau chief, and witness for the first time in history a unanimous agreement between the General Staff and bureaus upon a matter vitally affecting their interests. He did so and then personally dictated and sent to G.H.Q. the following telegram:

SIGNAL CORPS TELEGRAM

October 21, 1918

Maj. Gen. McAndrew:
H.A.E.F.
C.G. 60

Conference here of chiefs of all technical and administrative staff departments and of General Staff unanimous in recommending rejection of proposed order revising General Orders 31 and 44. This accord between staff chiefs and general staff is so strong as to be very significant as to their earnestness in opposing the proposed order. It confuses and divides responsibility; gives authority without responsibility in some cases, and holds Staff Departments and S.O.S. generally responsible at the same time that it curtails our authority. It is an actual reversal of the Commander-in-Chief's policy announced in August of throwing greater amount of responsibility with commensurate authority to Services of Supply. It reduces S.O.S. to mere unloading and forwarding



To my friend Johnson Haygood as a
emento of the Wofford Brigade and our
service together on the Rhine in the 37th Corps

Campbell King

GENERAL CAMPBELL KING
Chief of Staff, Third Corps

agents from port to regulating stations and lends itself to the attempt already made to attach us to the War Department instead of to the Commander-in-Chief.¹ We are a unit in believing that the time has come when the activities of G-1 and probably G-4 should pass to the Services of Supply. We are in agreement to an alternative proposition which we believe will preserve the control desired by General Moseley and at the same time retain to S.O.S. the authority which should go with the responsibility for which, notwithstanding the General Staff control, the Services of Supply must ultimately answer at the bar of public opinion in the Army. I am leaving to-night for an inspection trip, returning Friday morning, and request that at the convenience of yourself and Commander-in-Chief thereafter I be called to G.H.Q. for conference on these matters.

JGH/elw

HARBORD

In order that there might be no misunderstanding as to the issue, I then directed each of the several G's and bureau chiefs to submit his views in writing and to indicate exactly what his objections were to Moseley's Order, also exactly what his reasons were for advocating the alternative plan.

Meanwhile General Harbord had talked to General Pershing and received authority to send me up to G.H.Q. to present our side of the case, and I was busy collecting the necessary data.

Harbord then sent the following telegram:

SIGNAL CORPS TELEGRAM

October 31, 1918

Maj. Gen. McAndrew:
H.A.E.F.

CT-86. For attention of General Pershing. In the course of business on my return I find a copy of a letter sent by General Moseley on October 26th to General Dawes, in which the statement is made that he had 'just finished reading

¹ See Chapter XX.

proof on our new order on staff arrangements, supply, transportation, etc., and we hope to have it in print in a few days.' If this statement of General Moseley is correct, the only hearing accorded the S.O.S. has been on a matter already determined, and I consider it not only a courtesy but a very grave defect in our organization when with my responsibility in matter of supply a distant staff officer can be so permitted to draw orders which entirely change the methods by which I shall meet these responsibilities. I request authority to retain General Hagood here and to cease troubling Bureau Chiefs for data on a matter already settled before my visit to you.

HARBORD — 10.30 A.M.

JGH/elw

In answer to this Harbord was informed by telephone that the question had not yet been settled and that General Pershing would be glad to see and discuss the matter with him.

On the afternoon of October 28th he and I started on his special train for Ligny, General Pershing's advance P.C., and arrived there at seven-thirty the next morning. We found, however, that General Pershing was away, and we had a conference instead with General McAndrew, General Eltinge, General Moseley, and General Fox Conner. General Harbord made a long and vigorous protest against chopping off the S.O.S. at the zone of the army and strongly advocated the alternative plan which I had submitted. His argument, however, did not seem to produce much effect, primarily because Moseley had already made up his mind and the others were much more concerned with the immediate situation at the front. So that after lunch we left, feeling that our visit had been in vain.

On November 3d Harbord sent me to Chaumont to make one more effort. I went over the whole proposition in detail

with Moseley and prepared a very complete, written statement¹ setting forth the views expressed above, which I left with the Chief of Staff.

This is the way the matter stood when the Armistice was signed. After the Armistice there was a board before which I appeared as a witness. This board, I believe, rehashed the whole thing. Whether it reached a conclusion I do not know, but the principles involved have not been settled. Some of the final reports on the war indicate, by diagram and otherwise, that the S.O.S. was actually operated under the plan proposed in Moseley's Order. But this is not true. And the post-war reorganization of the War Department did not conform to our war experience, either in Washington or at Tours. The War Department is not a G.H.Q., though some would make it so.

The principles enumerated in the memoranda of October 17th and 19th are fundamental and apply to peace and war. Combat, administration, and supply cannot be handled by the same group of General Staff officers or by General Staff officers of the same training and experience. Each is a specialty which should be turned over to men qualified by training and experience for that particular job. We shall discuss this matter at length in Chapter XXVI.

The men who bore the heavy burden of responsibility for supply during the Great War — with one accord and at the time when the pressure seemed more than they could stand — endorsed these principles. They did it orally as a group and as individuals, and they did it subsequently in writing over their several signatures. I do not pretend to say that these men agreed with all I said then or would agree with what I say now, but they endorsed the plan which I submitted in

¹ Contained in my full account of the S.O.S. and official papers, from which this book was prepared, on file in the Historical Section, War Department.

October, 1918, and they endorsed it unanimously and without qualification.

These men were the Commanding General, S.O.S., Major General J. G. Harbord; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel J. P. McAdams; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Colonel J. B. Cavanaugh; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Colonel H. C. Smither; also the following heads of the supply services, from whose reports¹ I have made the quotations shown:

Engineer Corps — Major General Wm. C. Langfitt: 'I concur with the proposals made in your memoranda of October 17th and 19th, which separate but coördinate the above two main army functions; are in accordance with the practice of our large industrial organizations, and are in conformity therefore with American ideas, whose soundness is witnessed by our successful conduct, for example, of great railroads and enormous industries.'

Signal Corps — Brigadier General Edgar Russel: 'This office concurs with the two memoranda of the 17th and 19th of October from the Chief of Staff, S.O.S.

'The Chief Signal Officer, American E.F. (and this applies also to the chiefs of other technical services) is responsible under law, regulations and orders for the efficient functioning of his corps throughout the American E.F. To attempt to limit his jurisdiction territorially in any way, even by inference, is, in the opinion of this office, a most serious mistake and one which will result in inefficiency in his corps.

'The duties of the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., come broadly under two general headings, viz.; operations and supply. The proposal of the Chief of Staff, S.O.S., is to place the heads of these two grand divisions on an equal footing and divide their jurisdiction functionally rather than territorially. This is believed to be a most excellent idea.'

Ordnance Department — Brigadier General J. H. Rice: 'The reasons of this office for concurring with the two memo-

¹ Contained in my full account of the S.O.S. and official papers, from which this book was prepared, on file in the Historical Section, War Department.

rnanda above referred to are that the method outlined in these memoranda provides for fixing definitely on the head of each Supply Department in the American E.F. the responsibility for the Supply of material of his Department, from its receipt in France till its delivery to the troops for which intended, and gives him the necessary authority to accomplish this.'

Transportation Department — Brigadier General W. W. Atterbury: 'The memorandum of October 17th signed "Johnson Hagood" is an exceedingly able presentation and, in my opinion, concentrates in paragraph 13 the gist of the entire matter — that is, the C.-in-C. should look to two men: (1) A Chief of Staff for operations (military), and (2) a Chief of Staff for Supply (Business). If you accept the above, everything else follows concurrently.'

'Memorandum of October 19th signed "Johnson Hagood" is also good and my reason for concurring in both is very simple: It gives the Transportation Service a continuous operation from and including the ports to the trenches without any divided responsibility, although subordinate to the C.G., S.O.S.'

Motor Transport Corps — Brigadier General M. L. Walker: 'The memoranda referred to above meets with full approval of the D.M.T.C., as expressing his views as to the principles on which our supply system should be based.'

Quartermaster Corps — Brig. General J. M. Carson: 'The Chief Quartermaster concurs unreservedly with these memoranda. They represent opinions he has held from the beginning on the subject of the Supply Service of the Q.M.C.'

Construction and Forestry — Brig. General Edgar Jadwin: 'I concur in general with the plan outlined in memoranda of the 17th and 19th October, because it is a step in the direction of unifying and simplifying the control and responsibility for supply and construction. Its operation will save time in making controlling decisions and coördinating the various departments and in getting supplies to those who need them.'

Air Service — Brig. General B. D. Foulois: 'I am in abso-

lute accord with your views as so clearly set forth in your memorandum of October 17, 1918.'

Chemical Warfare Service — *Brig. General Amos A. Fries*: 'Memorandum of the 17th and 19th of October, respectively, is concurred in by this service as being a clear and strong exposition of a method of fixing a definite responsibility on definite personnel for a definite supply function and of coördinating all information regarding the availability of every item of supply in one central authority.'

Medical Department — *Brig. Gen. F. A. Winter, Acting Chief Surgeon*: 'In my judgment, questions of strategy and tactics should be left to G.H.Q., and the rest of the detail of the problems of this whole enterprise should be devolved upon the C.G., S.O.S.'

Inspector General's Department — *Brig. Gen. T. Q. Donaldson*: 'My reasons for concurring in these two memoranda are that I believe the means therein proposed for the reorganization of the supply system of the S.O.S. will save time and will more nearly provide continuity of supply and responsibility from base ports to trenches than those contained in the proposed order or in the orders now in force.'

Judge Advocate General's Department — *Col. John A. Hull*: 'If any principle has been well established by the history of war, it is that singleness of command is essential, and a division of authority is fatal for the successful prosecution of war. In my opinion, the views of the Chief of Staff, S.O.S., are in accordance with this cardinal principle, while the project under discussion is directly opposed thereto.'

'Divided responsibility will require consultation of responsible officers in matters of procedure, policy and personnel, whereas at all times their thought and energy should be given to the problem incident to the war. In many administrative matters promptness of action is more essential than an absolute correct determination. A continuity of policy is also essential if good results are to be accomplished. This is impossible when there are three or more equally responsible officers engaged in the same line of work.'

'I, therefore, strongly recommend that the views of

the Chief of Staff, S.O.S., be put in force as soon as possible.'

Adjutant General's Department — *Colonel L. H. Bash*: 'I concur completely in the opinions expressed by the Chief of Staff, S.O.S., in his two memoranda dated, respectively October 17 and October 19, 1918.'

War Risk Section — *Colonel Henry D. Lindsley*: 'To operate under the form of organization as outlined in the two memoranda of the Chief of Staff, S.O.S., dated 17 and 19 October respectively would place not only the full responsibility for the successful operation of the War Risk Section throughout the American E.F. upon the Commanding General, S.O.S., but full authority as well.'

The head of the British Mission, General H. N. Sargent, also wrote a paper endorsing the plan.

The following editorial from one of the service papers shows the contrast between the relations of the General Staff and the bureau chiefs in Washington and the harmony that has been shown to exist at Tours:

THE TROUBLE WITH THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Never before within the memory of those now living who are conversant with military affairs has there been so much unrest, discontent, distrust and manifestation of grievances as now exists in the War Department. The reasons are not far to seek. They are because of the methods pursued by the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff in administering the affairs of the military establishment, if the guarded comments of other military officials are to be received as having a basis of fact.

Charges are constantly made, in many quarters of the War Department, that there is refusal in most instances on the part of those in control to give consideration to the recommendations and advice of the heads of the various branches of the departmental organization, and that business is carried on and vital questions decided in an arbitrary manner without opportunity being given for the views of others to

be submitted. More often than not, when the views of others are sought they are disregarded; it is known that questions vitally affecting staff branches have been settled without the chiefs of those branches being consulted at all. Not only do the heads of the staff departments, as a rule, have no opportunity for access to the Secretary of War, but some of them seldom even see the Chief of Staff.

(Army and Navy Register, February 15, 1919)

In the last chapter of this book I shall set forth a plan to reorganize the War Department in accordance with our experience in France and the principles set forth above. It should greatly reduce the overhead in Washington and throughout the service; should give us a cheaper and better army; should fix responsibility, speed up action, and place us on the real road to preparedness, without increasing our demands upon the taxpayer.

Before closing this chapter I want to say something about General Moseley.

Notwithstanding our sharp differences of opinion upon this particular phase of organization, I had greater confidence in his judgment upon such matters than in that of any other man, perhaps, in the whole A.E.F. Moseley was one of the really great figures at our G.H.Q. He personally contributed more than any other one man to the success of supply in the A.E.F. and I rate him to-day as the best qualified man in the whole Army to head a properly organized supply service in peace or war.

CHAPTER XXV

SOME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE S.O.S.

John Wright's letter — Big men in S.O.S. — Fine work of the Engineers — Quartermaster Corps up to schedule at Armistice — American soldier best fed, clothed, and shod in Europe — Motor Transport Corps overcomes all difficulties — Medical Department working for 200,000 beds — No shortage of ammunition — Fine work by Signal Corps — German prisoners well cared for — War Risk Bureau prompt and effective — Dawes and the Purchasing Board — British Mission — French Mission — Final review of supply situation — Smither the great coördinator.

THREE is little left for me to tell except some of the accomplishments of the S.O.S. I have already devoted two chapters to the Transportation Department, and now I shall take up some of the other services.

Before taking up the subject in detail, I shall quote from a letter recently received from our old friend John Wright, whose monograph entitled 'Organization of the S.O.S.' has been published by the Historical Section of the War Department General Staff.

FORT WILLIAMS, MAINE
October 28, 1925

MY DEAR HAGOOD:

I was very glad to receive your letter and to see that you have not given up the idea of publishing your book. . . .

Previous to the World War, the greatest oversea expedition in the annals of the world, that is, in point of numbers, was the British South African War. As I recollect, they did not have over 300,000 men. We sent across the sea two millions of men and fed and clothed them, maintained them, on a scale hitherto not seen in any military force. Owing to the limited shipping, submarine risk — something new in war — it was found necessary and desirable to procure approximately half our supplies in Europe, so the S.O.S. was not only a great distributing agency but also a procuring agency — a War Department. It should also be remembered that

this army was supplied in a war where there was the greatest expenditure of matériel ever known. Finally, this was reduced to a system that became practically automatic. During the war there was not a failure in this system of supply. Practically everything we accomplished in the S.O.S. was unprecedented. We constructed more temporary shelter than any other army in history had ever constructed. The rate of troop arrivals in France during the last three months was phenomenal; yet they were cared for, provided with food and shelter, and transported promptly to their assigned destinations, training areas, which were found ready to receive them. Our hospitalization was on a scale never before even contemplated. The great hospital centers exceeded in capacity and efficiency all permanent hospitals ever constructed in the greatest of cities.¹

This work was visualized and overseen by the General Staff of the S.O.S. and carried out by the various Supply departments. Go ahead and say these things. Unless some one comes out and bravely states what we accomplished, it will never be presented. The most wonderful part of America's participation in the war was the S.O.S. — two million of men sent across the seas and across the land and maintained, not merely as troops were accustomed to be maintained, but in luxury and without a failure. Remember, we were in the country of our ally and could not resort to requisition, the main support of all armies since the French Revolution.

None of the above is known to most people, and among those who know the great truth it is not appreciated. The imagination of a poet is required to visualize what we did.

If you will put it up to your reader just what that gigantic S.O.S. really was, stimulate his imagination to the extent that he can really see what it was, you will have accomplished a great end.

Well, I am through, but I call upon you, as the representative of that body of men who worked themselves to ex-

¹ Two hundred and twenty-five miles of barracks; one hundred and twenty-seven miles of hospital wards. The project called for twice this amount.



John H. Hagaard

haustion on a problem that was new to nations, a body of men who did have the vision and who did meet the crushing requirements and made possible the victory of the Allies — as the representative of these men, who are practically unknown, I call upon you to put the story straight and pin no roses where they do not belong, but, on the other hand, to state what was done and who did it. It is all a matter of record.

Sincerely
(Sgd) JOHN W. WRIGHT

Who are the men whom John Wright calls upon me to name as having done this great work? Shall we give the credit to Kernan, who organized it, built it up, and commanded it until three months before the Armistice? Or shall we give the credit to Harbord, who took it over at that critical time, left its organization unchanged, but by his great personality, his wonderful leadership, and the very inspiration of his presence carried it through to successful conclusion? Undoubtedly these were the two great actors. But what about the half-million others who played the minor parts? Were they, as has been hinted during and since the war, men of second-rate ability who, not good enough to serve at the front, pottered along in rear, doing chores behind the lines?

No! They were the best America had, and words can say no more.

Dawes, Atterbury, John J. Carty, Henry P. Davison, Franklin D'Olier, Willard Straight, and William S. Thayer were not looking around for scrubs to help them out. Ireland, Rogers, Hart, Williams, Patrick, Taylor, Jadwin, Hull, and Fries were not made major generals and placed at the heads of the respective services in the War Department because they did not make good in France. Meriwether Walker was

not sent back to organize and command the Motor Transport Corps and after the war made Governor of the Panama Canal Zone because he was lacking in fighting qualities. Nor was Harbord 'canned' when he came back to Tours! On the contrary, in testifying before a congressional committee, General Pershing pronounced him his best general. And so among our base commanders. We had John S. Sewell, R. D. Walsh, W. D. Connor, and George H. Harries, every one of whom should have been a major general for his work in France. And in London we had John Biddle, who stood along with Sims. Our replacement depot at Le Mans was commanded by E. F. Glenn, a fighting general of the first water, who, with any kind of luck, would have been a corps commander at the front. At Southampton our camps were commanded by Sam Jones, quite as well qualified to command a brigade or division as the majority of those who did it, and yet Jones ate his heart out on the job assigned him.

Among our General Staff at Tours, McAdams and Smither, together with Moseley at G.H.Q., were the three outstanding figures of the war in the supply branch of the General Staff. All of them should have been major generals, and would have been so in the British service. There, with the front line only twenty-four hours from London, the work corresponding to the S.O.S. was divided between two lieutenant generals, and men whose work corresponded only in part to that of McAdams and Smither were major generals. Max Wainer was a tower of strength. Charles Kutz and J. B. Cavanaugh were Engineer officers of conspicuous attainment and performed their work as G-1 with marked ability. The only reason they did not stand out more conspicuously was that there was not room for them at the top.

Other men on our General Staff, like John Wright, Poole, and Arrowsmith, were just as able in their line as any others

in France and would have come in for their share of glory at the front had they had the chance.

And so with still others to the number of thirty thousand in officers, and half a million in men.

It is true that the S.O.S. was frequently 'combed' for combat officers. But it was 'combed' not to find officers qualified for combat duty, but for officers who could be *spared* for combat duty. In one case G.H.Q. asked if a certain general officer was not qualified to command a division and the answer was, yes, but he could not be spared.

It is true that we had about two thousand officers that had been sent back from the front.¹ Some of those who came back in September and October were demoted generals, but these men were only extras. They filled in gaps in the ranks, but no one of them performed any big part in the organization.

And finally we must remember that a great many men who came back to the S.O.S. after being relieved from duty at the front had been condemned unjustly. 'War is hell,' and when troops did not reach their objectives or were accused of not doing so, commanders were relieved first and investigated afterwards! In one case a colonel who had been relieved and sent back to report to me was afterwards returned to his regiment, given a D.S.C. and the brigade commander was relieved for having relieved him — all based upon the same incident. The question was whether the colonel had ruthlessly sacrificed his men by holding an untenable position or had gallantly held on till all but he had fled. At the suggestion of the French, decision was finally made in favor of the latter.

And in many other cases during the heat of battle there was no time for explanation. Results only were counted. The innocent suffered with the guilty. Many great reputations were built upon other men's accomplishments. The good and

¹ About six per cent of our total.

the bad fell together before the enemy's bullets, and many a good man was shot in the back — accidentally, perhaps — by the darts of jealousy and ambition.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT

We have already seen that the Engineer Department was reorganized several times, principally by adding to its activities, and that the Engineer officers most prominent in these several reorganizations were Langfitt, Taylor, Patrick, Jadwin, and McKinstry. Other Engineer officers rendered distinguished service in every field of activity, combat and staff.

It would be impossible in a work of this kind to give even an approximate idea of the work performed by the Engineer Department during the Great War.

The Division of Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies, up to the date of the Armistice, had received about one and a half million tons of engineer supplies. This included such items as 4400 miles of standard steel rails, 10,000 switches, with 17,000 tons of accessory fastenings, 100,000,000 square feet of sheet steel, 100,000,000 square feet of roofing, 25,000,000 feet of copper wire, 10,000,000 feet of pipe, 115,000 miles of barbed wire, etc. The money value of these supplies was about \$200,000,000. Engineer depots occupied about twenty acres of covered storage and about four hundred acres of un-covered storage.

The Division of Construction and Forestry at the signing of the Armistice had a personnel of 117,000 men, including soldiers, civilians, and prisoners of war, but this was only about sixty per cent of its actual requirements. Among its accomplishments may be recorded the construction of 18 new ship berths, 225 miles of barracks, 127 miles of hospital wards, 80 miles of warehouses, and the cutting of 190,000,000 board

feet of lumber, 3,500,000 cross-ties, 392,000 cords of fuel wood, and 38,000 piles.

The Division of Light Railways and Roads had its operations largely confined to the Zone of the Army. The headquarters of the Director of Light Railways and Roads was in the Advance Section, S.O.S., at Neufchâteau. At the signing of the Armistice this Division had in operation about 600 miles of narrow-gauge track, 347 locomotives, and 3281 cars.

QUARTERMASTER CORPS

During the progress of the war the Quartermaster Corps lost land and water transportation, which went to General Atterbury; construction, which went to the Engineers; the veterinary service, which went to the Medical Department; the motor transport service, which was created a separate branch; and practically all labor battalions, which went to the Army Service Corps.

At first it was supposed to have on hand ninety days' supply, but this requirement was afterwards cut down to forty-five days. When the Armistice was signed it had on hand more than forty-five days' supply in all the principal ingredients of the ration. For example, 59 days' meat, 63 days' sugar, 98 days' flour, 108 days' butter, 146 days' milk, and 375 days' tobacco and cigarettes. Besides bringing over supplies from the United States the Quartermaster Department established a number of factories and bakeries in France. It had a capacity of 3,000,000 pounds of bread a day. It manufactured in addition large quantities of crackers, biscuits, candies, chocolate, etc. It also had large plants for roasting coffee. As to coal, the total cargo received was delivered to the French at the ports. Against this a credit was established and the French supplied the American forces with coal wherever it was needed. When the Armistice was signed the

United States had on hand a credit of about 253,000 tons. The gasoline consumption up to the signing of the Armistice was 33,000,000 gallons.

The Quartermaster's clothing estimate was based upon thirty divisions and it had on hand at all times more than six months' supply for the troops in France. Some of these items ran as follows: 13,000,000 pairs of drawers, 25,000,000 pairs of socks, 18,000,000 undershirts, 10,000,000 olive drab woolen shirts, 9,000,000 pairs of breeches, etc. The salvage branch turned out reclaimed clothing and equipment to the value of about \$200,000 a day, aggregating \$87,000,000. Among the items were 396,000 pairs of shoes, 357,000 blankets, and 1,500,000 shirts.

In general, I think it can be stated without fear of contradiction that the American soldier was the best-fed, best-clothed, and best-shod soldier in Europe. In fact, in the matter of supply the operation of the Quartermaster Department in the Great War was not only far superior to anything that we had had in any previous war, but, as a rule, throughout the A.E.F. the service was more efficient and more satisfactory to the individual than it had been at home in time of peace.

The Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F., was General H. L. Rogers. The Chief Quartermaster, L.O.C., at Tours was Colonel J. M. Carson. When the bureau chiefs were moved from Chaumont, Carson became General Rogers's principal assistant and after the Armistice, when General Rogers went back to the United States to be Quartermaster General, Carson, then a brigadier general, succeeded him as Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F.

MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS

Originally motor transportation was divided between the

Quartermaster Corps, Air Service, Ordnance Department, and Medical Department, each branch shipping to France, operating and repairing its own vehicles. This led to great confusion, duplication of effort, and inefficiency. Under General Orders 31 all motor vehicles, together with certain personnel, were turned in to a consolidated branch called the Motor Transport Corps and operated under the Service of Utilities. The general shortage of personnel, however, threw practically the entire burden upon the Quartermaster Corps. The Air Service overhaul park at Romorantin was also supposed to be turned over, but the Motor Transport Service did not have men to operate it. Colonel Francis H. Pope, Quartermaster Corps, headed the organization up to this time and did splendid work.

When the Service of Utilities was abolished, the Motor Transport Corps was created a separate service, with General M. L. Walker, an Engineer officer of exceptional ability, as Director, and with Pope as his principal assistant.

Through no fault of those in France, I believe that in motor transportation the United States has less to be proud of than any other one activity with which the S.O.S. was concerned. With more trucks, automobiles, chauffeurs, and auto mechanics in the United States than in all the rest of the world put together, the A.E.F. had to go through the war with less than fifty per cent of the vehicles and thirty per cent of the personnel prescribed in the meager allowance of organization tables.

With the streets of Washington jammed with army and civilian cars, the 33d Division on the British front did not have a single car that could be trusted to go twenty miles without a breakdown. (Statement to me by the Division Commander, July 27, 1918.) In the effort to get standard designs we failed to send over available vehicles and spare

parts and the 66th Field Artillery Brigade had to manufacture its own spark plugs out of gas pipe, copper wire, and chewing gum. With traffic cops on every corner of the training camps at home and thousands of cars and trucks in reserve, we were put to the mortification of having to borrow transportation from the British and the French to keep men from starving to death. (Statement to me by a Brigade Commander, 26th Division.)

On Armistice Day we had in France only 7604 motor cars, 5516 ambulances, 13,928 motorcycles, and 17,571 bicycles. We should gladly have exchanged these bicycles for Cadillacs or even Fords. We had 24,055 cargo trucks, 4197 ammunition trucks, and some 4700 other trucks of special design, including light aviation, artillery supply, machine gun, gas tank, tractor, machine shop, and repair trucks — less than half of what was needed.

No one in France worked harder than the men who assembled, operated, and repaired the motor transportation. They ran their trucks at the front without lights at night over roads congested with traffic and cut up by shell holes. They kept them going without spare parts, material, or facilities for repair. They delivered the goods, but — !!


MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The Medical Department underwent no change in organization. Nothing was taken from it and the only thing added was the veterinary service. Owing to the shortage of material and labor it became evident in the early part of the game that there would not be available sufficient bed space in regularly organized hospitals to care for the American sick and wounded. The Chief Surgeon was therefore compelled to go out into the cities and secure hotels and other large buildings and even private residences in which to establish hos-

SOME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE S.O.S. 345

pitals. This separation of activities greatly increased the difficulties of the shortage in personnel. Medical officers could not attend as many patients if they were scattered about and these places did not have proper sanitary or other conveniences for rapid work.

In October the Chief Surgeon feared that the number of wounded on the American front would be greater than he could properly look out for. This would have been the case if the Americans had had more fighting. Even as it was, from



BASE HOSPITALS, ALL SECTIONS

Condition of base hospitals, all sections, as to normal and crisis capacity, compared with total beds occupied. Source of Information: Daily Report on Relations of Beds to Patients, Office of Chief Surgeon, Hq. S.O.S.

the 10th of September to the 11th of November the admissions were considerably greater than normal capacity. On the 23d of October the number of patients exceeded normal capacity by 20,000. The Chief Surgeon, however, was prepared to handle what he called crisis capacity by excessive

crowding. Never was the crisis capacity approached, on the whole, but there were many times when particular hospitals were overcrowded.

In the middle of September there was more bed space available than beds and bedding. At all times the personnel available was only half of that estimated as necessary to look after the sick under the assumption that all beds were occupied. There were about 145,000 patients in the base hospitals the day the Armistice was signed.

However, I have already said I thought that our soldiers were better fed, better clothed, and better shod than any other soldiers in Europe. I am absolutely certain that they had better medical attention. In fact, one of the worst things that could be said about a sick or wounded man in France was that he had not yet been taken to the American hospital. To many this sounded almost as bad as to say that he was still lying on the battle field.

The first Chief Surgeon was Brigadier General A. E. Bradley. He was succeeded early in the game by Major General M. W. Ireland. The Chief Surgeon of the L.O.C., Colonel F. A. Winter, went to England when the S.O.S. came to Tours. General Ireland's principal assistants were Brigadier Generals W. D. McCaw, Jefferson R. Kean, and James D. Glennan.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

The Ordnance Department, also, underwent no change of organization. It was presided over first by General C. C. Williams, who afterwards became Chief of Ordnance of the Army. He was succeeded by Brigadier General C. B. Wheeler, who in turn was succeeded by Brigadier General John H. Rice. It is very difficult to form any clear conception of ordnance operations from statistics. It may be said, how-



To Brig. General ^{John}
General ^{John}
J. J. Marshall

GENERAL BARON TANAKA
Japanese Minister of War

ever, in general, that the American troops were never lacking in ammunition or ordnance supplies. Their estimates were based on thirty divisions and only a small part of the ammunition received was expended. There was plenty on hand to continue the war. There were fired about five million rounds of artillery ammunition and about half a billion rounds of small arms. In weight of ammunition expended it would be about one pound and a half for each man, woman, and child in the United States.

Our Ordnance Department did not get to the front any American artillery, but there was a great deal of artillery used in France that had been manufactured in America for the Allies.¹

CHEMICAL WARFARE

This service was at first a branch of the Engineer Department and was then organized as a separate service under the jurisdiction of an Engineer officer, Brigadier General Amos A. Fries. While it operated under the S.O.S. it also had a combat function. There were regiments operating at the front and there were officers giving instruction to troops at the front as to defensive measures against enemy gas. The principal function of the Chemical Warfare Service, however, was to collect and issue supplies and equipment. They, too, were operating on a basis of forty-five days' supply for thirty divisions. When the Armistice was signed they had on hand anywhere from two to six times the required quantity of articles pertaining to their service.

¹ The only American artillery fired by Americans in France was fired by the Navy. All guns fired by the Army, together with the ammunition, were furnished by the Allies. The 2d Corps, operating with the British against the Hindenburg Line, had no artillery at all. It was furnished by the British — guns and gunners to the extent of about 22,000.

SIGNAL CORPS

The Signal Corps underwent no change of organization. It was presided over from beginning to end by Brigadier General Edgar Russel. The personnel grew from seven officers and six soldiers who arrived on June 13, 1917, to 1400 officers and 33,000 soldiers on November 11, 1918.

The Signal Corps telephone and telegraph system included 125,000 miles of wire, of which about 38,000 miles were combat lines at the front. Of the balance about half was constructed by the Signal Corps and about half leased from the French. Among the principal construction projects was a twenty-wire line from Chaumont to Paris and another twenty-wire line from Chaumont to Tours.¹ From Tours there was constructed one ten-wire line to Saint-Nazaire and Brest and another ten-wire line to Bordeaux. There was also a leased wire from Tours to Bordeaux, from Tours to Marseilles and Nice, from Tours to Brest, Le Havre, etc. There was a leased cable across the English Channel from Dover to Calais and one was constructed by the Signal Corps from Le Havre to Beachy Head. In England there were leased wires from London to Dover, to Beachy Head, Southampton, and Liverpool.

During the course of the war the Signal Corps handled nineteen million local telephones calls and one million long distance calls, also five and a half million telegraph messages.

Colonel J. J. Carty: At the beginning of the war the Signal Corps procured the services of some of the best telephone and telegraph experts in the country and gave them emergency commissions. Among these was Colonel J. J. Carty, the

¹ The telephone system of the whole S.O.S. was organized and operated like a local system in a town. There were no calls for long-distance, and with twenty trunk lines between Tours and Chaumont we got instant connection and used the telephone as between offices in the same building.

Chief Engineer and Vice-President of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, a pioneer in development of the telephone, for which he invented many improvements. During the war he rendered invaluable service with the headquarters of the Signal Corps at Tours.

AIR SERVICE

The Air Service had a peculiar status in that it was a combat arm under the S.O.S. The S.O.S., however, had no control over the Air Service except in questions of construction and supply. The Air Service was first headed by Brigadier General B. D. Foulois, with Colonel Henry C. Whitehead as principal assistant. When the S.O.S. came to Tours, Foulois came with it. Subsequently, however, there was a redistribution of duties. Major General Mason M. Patrick was placed at the head of the Service and personally took charge of construction and supply, with headquarters in Paris. Foulois then became head of the Operating and Combat Service, with headquarters at the front. Subsequently Foulois was succeeded by Brigadier General William Mitchell.

The principal production center was at Romanortin. There were Air Service schools at Tours, Issoudun, LaCourtine, Souge, Meucon, Coetquidan, Valdahon, and elsewhere, but the principal depots, warehouses, and airdromes were in the Advance Section.¹

PROVOST MARSHAL'S SERVICE

The first Provost Marshal General was Brigadier General William H. Allaire, with headquarters in Paris. He was succeeded by Colonel Samuel Reber, a very prominent officer of the Signal Corps, son-in-law and for many years aide-de-

¹ No American combat planes ever got to the front. All that we used were borrowed from the Allies.

camp of Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles. Reber was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Groome, an emergency officer who had been very prominently identified with the Pennsylvania Constabulary. Groome was succeeded by Brigadier General Harry H. Bandholtz.

The principal duties of the military police were in the forward areas. The only duty in the S.O.S. which I thought pertained to them was guarding prisoners of war. Colonel Groome is entitled to credit for having established the excellent German prison camp at Saint-Pierre des Corps. This camp had a capacity of about 2000 prisoners and up to October 6th had handled about 30,000 of them. The camp was well constructed and organized in accordance with international agreement. I saw a number of prison camps under the management of the British and French and I also saw some in Germany where American prisoners had been confined. I did not see one anywhere as good as the one at Saint-Pierre des Corps.

WAR RISK BUREAU

One of the most efficient of all the activities supervised by the S.O.S. was the War Risk Bureau, which was in great contrast to conditions back home. This bureau was originally organized by Major Willard D. Straight, with Major Henry D. Lindsley and Captain R. G. Cholmeley-Jones as principal assistants. Straight had collected a number of very fine young business men, some of whom were commissioned as captains and lieutenants, but most of whom served as soldiers. When they got to Paris there was no proper provision for housing them and they were assigned an attic at number 10 Rue Sainte-Anne, where they slept on the floor without bedding. This was the place and these were the conditions that subsequently became famous on account of the alleged

ill treatment of prisoners kept there.¹ These fine young soldiers submitted to these conditions without complaint; did their work in a most efficient manner and made up the Government's deficiencies in food, quarters, and transportation out of their own pockets. Subsequently Straight was transferred to an active command and met his death. He was succeeded as head of the War Risk Bureau by Lindsley, who was afterwards promoted to the grade of colonel.

GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD

The Purchasing Board had its headquarters in Paris. It was nominally under the S.O.S., but in fact most of the big propositions were settled by General Charles G. Dawes, the head of the Board, directly with General Pershing. The general manner of operation was that the chiefs of the various supply services kept General Dawes informed as to their needs and submitted requisitions to the United States only for what he could not get in Europe.²

The larger proportion of the supplies used in France were thus procured by General Dawes. This not only saved our tonnage, but gave the civilian population of the allied countries a market for their goods and gave the allied military authorities an opportunity to dispose of their surplus stocks. General Dawes was, of course, peculiarly fitted for this duty.

Later Dawes became the American representative on the Inter-Allied Board for the pooling of supplies. He thought at first that he would be unable to continue as General Purchasing Agent and he took up with me the proposition of a successor. I was much surprised when he told me that he was going to recommend a Regular Army officer, Colonel Edwin D. Bricker, Ordnance Department. This was particularly

¹ The Hard-boiled Smith investigation.

² See Tonnage Chart, p. 265.

pleasing to me, not only because of the compliment to the Regular Army in having Dawes select an officer for such duty, but also because Bricker was a personal friend for whose ability and good judgment I had great admiration. As a matter of fact, however, after the war, when Dawes became Director of the Budget, he took Moseley and Smither with him and later nominated a Regular Army officer, Lord, as his successor.

BRITISH MISSION

On April 23, 1918, Brigadier General Harry N. Sargent reported as head of the British Mission at our headquarters. He had with him at the Mission seven very fine young British officers.

The British were of great assistance to us in connection with the purchase of supplies in England and in the reorganization of our veterinary service. They excelled all the other Allies in handling horses with the minimum of losses from fair wear and tear and disease.

FRENCH MISSION

On April 27, 1918, Brigadier General Étienne Fillenneau reported, relieving Colonel Matharel as head of the French Mission. General Fillenneau proved himself to be a very able officer and rendered most valuable service to the S.O.S.

The Monthly Review:

In a previous chapter I indicated that each morning my assistants placed upon my desk a summary of the preceding day's work and a summary of the conditions throughout the S.O.S., including a written report from General Dawes.¹ Here is the last monthly review by G-4, which gives an

¹ Published in full in General Charles G. Dawes, *A Journal of the Great War*.

idea of the condition of Supply on the day of the Armistice.

Secret

THE MONTHLY REVIEW
FOURTH SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

October 31, 1918

For the Chief of Staff:

GENERAL SUMMARY

Tonnage unloaded in October again set a record. Base Ports evacuated more than in September.¹ There was no appreciable port congestion. An unimportant decrease in locomotives and cars erected and placed in service did not mar a splendid month. The increase in forage assured an ample reserve of hay, grain, and oats for the animals of the A.E.F. October was chiefly remarkable as regards the munitions situation in the arrival of certain calibres of American-made shells and the first issue of the British manufactured Cal. 30 service ammunition for combat and practice.

A hospitalization crisis in October was successfully passed.² The crisis was due to three causes; first, a lack of stations for slightly wounded, which necessitated sending such cases far to the rear; secondly, casualties were being received from an offensive, lastly, an epidemic of influenza and pneumonia added a large number of patients. Such a combination will probably not occur again before the rapidly increasing hospitalization program will place the A.E.F. in a position to cope with any similar crisis. A decrease in the number of troop arrivals is recorded due to the precautions taken against influenza. The number of prisoners increased slightly as did the number of civilian laborers. The supply of the coffee component continued to decrease. The supply of the fruit components also decreased considerably in the face of an increased jam issue for November.

FORAGE INCREASES FOR AMERICAN E.F. ANIMALS

In October the actual amount of hay, oats and bran in the

¹ See Tonnage Chart, p. 265.

² See Hospital Chart, p. 345.

A.E.F. increased by 8697, 8208, and 2769 tons respectively over the amounts on hand at the close of September. These increases have not as yet become evident in the Advance Section which has little more than held its own in tonnage on hand. Due to erratic changes in the reports on the number of horses and mules in the American E.F., it is impossible to make a statement as to the number of days' rations the above increases represent for any given period. It is doubtful whether the calculations of the total number of days' supply on hand, as given in the Daily Forage Report, can be regarded as accurate. The report on the animals in the A.E.F. as of October 30th showed 123,972 horses and mules with corps and combat divisions. With artillery in training, depot divisions and schools, together with the S.O.S., there were 31,350. There are 2400 animals in transit. This makes a total of 165,366 animals in the American E.F. in France. On this basis, the hay in France represents 20 days' supply, the grain as full ration of oats 40 days' and the bran 72.

A total of 12,112 animals was received from the French during the period of September 8th to October 23d. During the same period 2917 came from the States and 7666 were purchased and shipped from Spain. Confidential advices from the War Trade Board indicate that 20,000 more animals will soon be on their way from Spain and Morocco, with excellent prospects of an additional 20,000 to follow. On the last day of October, 1900 horses were shipped to Le Havre from England.

TONNAGE UNLOADED 'GOING UP EVERY DAY'

October kept up the general increase in unloaded tonnage of all sorts. Saint-Nazaire continues to lead all ports with Bordeaux a good second. The increase in October from all ports over September was 151,840 short tons. The total daily average discharged last month was better than the preceding month by 4073 short tons. The average tonnage unloaded per boat per day in October was greater by 34 short tons than in September. All ports evacuated 994,746 short tons, beating their large September record by 217,657. Bayonne

reported 33 per cent and Nantes 15 per cent congestion at the close of October, but with these exceptions the situation was fair. There were 92 fewer locomotives and 20 fewer cars erected and placed in service in October than in September. The exceptionally heavy arrivals of cars and locomotives in September plus the accident to the 'Westward Ho' are held responsible for this decrease which is considered too slight to be serious.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Due to a change in the method of computation of the ammunition supply, made by order from G.H.Q., no accurate comparison between the months of September and October can be made. On October 31st, however, the table of days' supply of ammunition in depots for issue to guns estimated as active, figured back to October 18th on the basis of the new computation method, represented small changes only. Slight fluctuations of no importance indicate that the balance of supply and demand is slightly in favor of supply. The manifest of a ship which docked at Saint-Nazaire on October 30th shows the first arrival of 6" Sea Coast Shells in France,¹ there being 11,800 on board. The first American-made 155 mm. shells, 1200 rounds in all, were on the same ship. Ships en route for France show by their advance manifests that about 30,000 of 4.7" H.E. shells will arrive soon to make up for the lack of that type of shell in France. In October also the first of the Cal. 30 special cartridges made by the British Government for the American E.F. have been released for combat issue.

RATION FLUCTUATIONS — FRUIT AND COFFEE COMPONENTS LOW

The number of men to be rationed in the American E. F., increased from 1,718,230 at the close of September to 1,935,-659 at the end of October. The special reserve rations increased 1.9 days during this time to 4 days' reserve, while the reserve rations decreased to 28 days' reserve — a drop of

¹ Too late to be used in the war.

7 days. The various ration components show a general downward fluctuation, exceptions being milk, vinegar, salt, pepper, cinnamon, and syrup, all of which show an increase. The supply of meat and flour components fluctuated during the month, but were the same at the end of October as at the beginning, 26 and 91 days' reserves respectively. Pronounced decreases were evidenced in the supplies of the fruit and coffee components. The ration of jam, which is part of the fruit components, is to be increased beginning with November, yet during the month of October the supply of fruit components decreased 20 days to a 33 days' reserve. The coffee component which had decreased 29 days during September dropped 7 days more in October to 28 days' reserve. The shipment of green coffee in September should have totaled 8,700,000 pounds. To date but 1,519,503 pounds have been received despite the fact that September shipments should now be in France. It is very important that shipments of green coffee be made as requested. The supply of potato components decreased from a 21-day reserve to a 19-day reserve.

REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF TROOP ARRIVALS

During October 217,614 troops arrived in France, according to the tonnage report of the Transportation Department — a decrease of about 30 per cent of the September arrivals, 311,969. This decrease may be attributed to the precautions taken against the influenza epidemic, crowding of transports being especially guarded against. The total strength of the American E.F. now numbers 1,900,566, of whom 1,169,503 are serving in the Advanced Section, an increase of only 130,183 as compared with an increase of 170,436 in September. The number of troops serving with the French and British increased to 224,086, while the number in Russia remained the same, 5419. The number of Prisoners of War increased 13,811 to 35,497, of whom 4423 are still classed as Army Prisoners. The number of civilian laborers increased to 40,231 during October, the increase, 4531, more than making up for the decrease recorded during September. This

increase is due largely to the addition of 2273 to administrative labor companies.

HOSPITALIZATION ¹

Up to October 25th there were 37,904 new cases of influenza reported. This is a grave increase over the total number reported for the corresponding days of September, when only 11,910 cases were reported. Since that date, however, reliable reports indicate that the epidemic has considerably abated. No later figures are available to prove it at this writing. There were 140,227 patients in base hospitals at the end of October, an increase of 70,735 over September. The number of vacant beds decreased by 3141, to 26,866. The normal capacity of hospitals was 40,548 beds greater at the end of October than at the end of September, the total number being 137,478.

H. C. SMITHER
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4

Colonel Smither:

Colonel Smither, who had charge of this matter, is a good illustration of what the Regular Army officer can do when called upon to handle the Business of War. A cavalry officer, with no previous experience, he became the Master Mind of Supply in the S.O.S. After the Armistice Dawes took him in the Budget. And under the title Chief Coördinator of the United States, Smither has handled federal estimates and appropriations in a manner described by the press as miraculous.

But our organization should not hang upon the hope of finding men like Smither after war breaks out. Our peace-time supply staff should be built up around men of his character and natural ability, who, in addition to those essentials, are possessed of training and experience that will fit them for the great adventure of war.

¹ See Hospital Chart, p. 345.

CHAPTER XXVI GRAND FINALE

SECTION I


SEVEN YEARS AFTER

LEAVING Tours in the afternoon of November 10th, I awoke the next morning in Paris to find the Armistice signed. Paris on Armistice Day! And Paris on Armistice Night!! I went to 'Au Vaudeville,' where Yvonne Printemps sang the *Marseillaise* to an audience that became a mob, and afterwards to the 'Folies Bergère,' where another audience became the same.

I was given command of the Army Artillery, 3d Army, and was at Coblenz and saw the first troops cross the Rhine. I went over myself on New Year's Day and remained there until May.

When I got back I was given command of the railroad artillery — four regiments — at Camp Eustis, Virginia. From there I went to a coast artillery district in the South and then to the Philippines, where I had a field artillery-cavalry-air-service command at Camp Stotsenburg. During my two years in the Islands I was intimately associated with the Governor General, my old friend and chief Leonard Wood, and had a chance to talk over with him many of the matters discussed in this book. From the Philippines I went to New York City, where for a year I once more commanded a coast artillery district — this time including twelve of the new reserve regiments (officers only) and four regiments of National Guard.

And now after seven years as a brigadier I find myself a major general — the highest grade in the Army in time of



GROUP IN COBLENZ

Mrs. Radbone, General Craig, General Dickman, General Hagood



CHÂTEAU BEAULIEU

Occupied by the Commanding General S.O.S., General Hagood, and other members of the staff

peace — and a corps commander, with twelve good years still ahead of me on the active list.

It may not be out of place — perhaps it is my duty — to draw some conclusions from my experience and to suggest a plan by which the War Department may in the future fore-stall the difficulties that we have encountered in the past. It is not so organized now.¹

There is no use to cry out from the housetops that Congress and the people are not heeding the lessons of the war if we of the Army do not heed those lessons ourselves. We cannot justify holding on to an organization or to methods which have failed or which will not bear analysis.

Paraphrasing my criticism of the S.O.S. while I was its Chief of Staff, I will say that the War Department is efficient, but it is not as efficient as it could be made. It has carried upon its rolls, and carries now, officers of preëminent ability; as able as any in our own army or in any other army in the world; but these officers could accomplish more if they had a simpler organization — one that is not doomed to crack at the outbreak of war.

Too many agencies: We have too many agencies working to accomplish the same thing. What are these agencies and how do they overlap?

First, we have the old bureaus of the War Department, known from the beginning up to 1903 as the General Staff.

Second, we have the new General Staff, created in 1903.

¹ In the National Defense Act we must differentiate between that part which deals with the Regular Army, National Guard, Reserves, etc., and that part which deals with the War Department. The former was conceived and executed along broad national lines. The latter was largely influenced by sentiment and personalities. The adherents of Pershing, of March, of Wood, of Crowder, of the Engineers, of the Quartermaster's (Rogers), of Construction (Marshall), and of Transportation (Hines), each contended for the men and principles they thought should prevail. The result was a *mélange* — a cross between a War Ministry and a G.H.Q., with the bad features of both. For myself, I belonged to all of these groups, or to none of them, as you choose to put it.

Third, we have the chiefs of branches, one created in 1901 and the others in 1920.

Each of these groups in itself covers the entire field of Army activity.¹ The first group carried us through most of our wars and was complete and sufficient without the others.

The old staff system:

Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, Chief of Operations of the British General Staff, G-3, during the World War, writing in 1925, says that Robert E. Lee stood high in British public opinion prior to 1914, but that it was not until after the experience and lessons of the Great War that Lee was recognized as one of the supreme military commanders of all time.


I do not know what General Lee thought of the efficiency and sufficiency of the old Army staff departments of which he and some of his principal generals had been members. We cannot say what he or Stonewall Jackson would have thought of the G's. But in a series of investigations following the Civil War, hundreds of lesser leaders, on both sides, gave the old staff system their unqualified approval.

The Confederacy, with a free hand, adopted and maintained that system and here are a few quotations from the testimony of Union generals:²

General W. T. Sherman: 'A staff system that has admitted of an increase of the line of the Army from the mere nucleus of 1860 to a million of men, and its reduction back to the present standard without confusion, and with the most perfect accountability as to property and money, at all times providing for the Army abundantly, is entitled to our respect.'

Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan: 'The present system has worked very satisfactorily, I think. It has carried us through a long war, and I believe that, properly managed, it

¹ See diagram, p. 361. ² Series of congressional investigations, 1873-78.



*OVERLAPPING AGENCIES
OF THE
WAR DEPARTMENT
1925*

is about as good as anything we can get. As other nations have different systems some officers want to make changes, but they forget that other nations are subjected to different conditions, so that what might be good for Germany or France in the staff organization would not be suitable for the United States.¹

Lieutenant General John M. Schofield: 'Our present system works well in time of peace, and proved remarkably effective in war.'

Major General George B. McClellan: 'It has grown up under the hands of able administrators and has met the wants of the peace establishment as well as of our various Indian wars, the Mexican War, and the late Civil War. The test to which it was submitted during the war of 1861 to 1865, when an immense army was built up upon the narrow foundations of the old establishment, resulted so favorably that it would, in my judgment, be exceedingly unwise to revert to a system tried and condemned long years ago. (Note. A system of temporary details for staff duty terminated in 1837-38.)'

Major General George G. Meade: 'I have had a fair opportunity to observe the workings of the present system both in time of war and peace. It has always worked well.'

Major General Winfield S. Hancock: 'From the recent experience of our great war we have an assurance that those (staff) departments can be relied upon under the present system to perform their respective duties in the most successful manner under all circumstances.'

Twenty-five years later men without war experience, and in imitation of a German system which they did not understand, plastered upon this already well-organized General Staff another so-called General Staff which covered exactly the same ground as the old one without changing a word or comma in its duties or responsibilities.

When we got into the World War this combined bureau

¹ This last sentence has a double significance to-day.

and general staff system failed completely, both in the War Department and in France. In Washington it was reconstructed by March and Goethals, and in the A.E.F. it was reconstructed several times through the Hagood Board and other agencies. After the war the pre-war plan was restored for the bureaus and a modified A.E.F. plan was adopted for the General Staff — a mixture that is not satisfactory in time of peace and that will collapse within a few weeks after war breaks out.

In the meantime, the third group, the chiefs of the line branches, came up, each of whom has an office that covers every military activity with which his particular arm is directly or remotely concerned.

Congress, seeing the encroachment of the General Staff upon the bureaus, passed numerous laws to stop it, the latest being contained in the present National Defense Act and in the new law reorganizing the Air Service. But to little avail. Coördination, policy-making, and so-called war plans are slowly strangling the bureaus, and the Quartermaster Corps worse than all.

General Staff not qualified to handle Administration and Supply: The General Staff, as we now understand it, is selected from an eligible list and, except for G-3 (Tactics), eligibility has little relation to qualification. Eligibility should be based solely upon qualification and for G-1 and G-4 (Administration and Supply) qualification should be based solely upon experience and successful performance.

The General Staff eligible list consists of two groups — those selected because of war service, and those who graduate from the Service schools. Of the first group, known as the 'Initial List,' some had actual experience in General Staff work during the war, and may be called upon again. Others, like the Surgeon General, were put on the eligible list as an

empty compliment. And still others preëminently qualified for general staff work were excluded.¹

It goes without saying that graduation from a school does not qualify a man to solve executive or industrial problems. Nor can it qualify a man to serve in the Administrative (G-1) or Supply (G-4) branches of the General Staff. How, then, was a situation created by which Service school graduates — and no others — are eligible for such service?

About twenty years ago there was a revolt of the line against the staff. The line began to mutter, 'I'm just as good as you are.' It became the fashion to refer to adjutants as high-grade clerks and to quartermasters as magnified grocer boys. The members of the General Staff, essentially line officers — gentlemen — adopted the European fashion of considering themselves superior to the Army tradespeople, the 'routine staff.' They concluded that the fighting men and not the 'routine staff' should determine policies, make plans, and lay out projects; that the will of a commander should be expressed through a General Staff officer, not through an adjutant or directly to a quartermaster; and that the sole purpose of the old staff was to carry out the details of the various plans handed to them by the 'Brain Trust,' as the General Staff came to be called.

The subjugation of the old staff was completed by taking away their special advantages in fast promotion for the officers and high pay for the men.

This new arrangement placed the control of Army administration and supply in the hands of officers, temporarily detailed for the work, who lack knowledge and experience, who do not want it, do not like it, are not interested in it, and who would desert it to get command at the first outbreak of war.

The men who have chosen this kind of work as a life pro-

¹ Kernan, Sladen, John Wright, etc.

fession are held down to the subordinate routine, in accordance with policies laid down by men temporarily detailed from time to time as their supervisors.

The necessity for a permanent trained staff: Quoting again from the reports of congressional investigations after the Civil War, we have:

Coburn Report, 1873: 'It is not too much to say that an army sent into the field without efficient and thoroughly well-organized and long previously trained staff and supply departments is an army foredoomed to dogs and vultures, and that no expenditure at the moment, however lavish, can supply these wants or avert this doom.'

Banning Report, 1876: 'The staff is the most important part of a skeleton army. In it is preserved the military knowledge and experience necessary for carrying on war in the most scientific and economical manner. Could we have had a staff sufficient to have fully controlled the late war, the expenses of the same would not have been one half what they were.'

George Washington said — 'The general officers are important, but the staff is all-important.'

The Doughboy is King of No Man's Land, but he has no place in a swivel chair. He should not come back out of the trenches to teach the Quartermaster how to deliver supplies, the Ordnance Officer how to manufacture ammunition, or the Medical Officer how to treat the sick and wounded. Each man has his own part to play on the team. Let the line officers play their part, and let the staff play theirs.

Putting down the staff was like the overthrow of the Intelligentsia by the Communists. The line (especially the Infantry), which, so to speak, constitutes the masses, revolted against the idea that the Engineers, the Ordnance, the Adjutant General's Department, or the Quartermaster Corps requires intelligence superior to that of the fighting men.

But the facts remain as before!¹

No man who has risen to the grade of captain but knows that it requires a more intelligent enlisted man for special duty than for 'straight' duty. No man who has had a staff of his own but knows the difficulty of picking qualified staff officers. And no man who is honest with himself but knows that grade for grade in time of peace the staff corps require better men and harder work than the line.

The staff is in fact the 'brains' of the Army. As quoted above from the Banning Report, the staff and not the line is the skeleton around which we must build the great army of citizen soldiers. In a serious war the line would be expanded ten thousandfold; the old Regular line organizations would be swamped by new men, and their peace-time efficiency would be of little moment. But the efficiency of the permanent staff is vital.

Preparedness is a staff job and calls for the best talent the Army can produce. War is a line job, but in our country the line troops that conduct war do not exist in time of peace. The leaders in Preparedness are staff officers. The leaders in War are line officers. But men who do nothing but straight line duty in time of peace are not the great commanders of line troops in time of war.

It will take years to get our permanent staff back to pre-war standards and it never will get back unless it is properly reorganized to develop technical knowledge, initiative, military character, and a willingness and ability to take responsibility. Under present conditions, never again could we expect to find on the rolls of the permanent staff such names as Alexander Hamilton, Inspector General; Joseph E. John-

¹ The reader can draw his own inference. In the Army, just as in civil life, some jobs require a higher order of ability than others. These jobs are not equally distributed throughout all the arms, and the staff has a higher percentage of them than the line.



J. Johnson Nagood
with sincere regard.

P. C. Harsh.

THE WAR-TIME CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

ston, Quartermaster; Tasker H. Bliss or R. L. Bullard, Commissary; Arthur MacArthur or Peyton C. March, Adjutant General; three of whom became full generals and two lieutenant generals. Every inducement should be held out in time of peace to get the best men to go into the staff corps — extra rank, rapid promotion, better pay. After all this is done and the staff corps are all filled, rank and file, there will be plenty of good men left and the gaps in the line will be unnoticed.

I say this as a line officer who in thirty years of commissioned service never spent one day in any of the old permanent staff corps. I am echoing the sentiments of one of the greatest friends the line ever had — the father of the Leavenworth Schools, J. Franklin Bell.

And in case it should be thought that I am prejudiced against the General Staff, I will say that I myself have served on the General Staff three times, that I am now on the sacred Eligible List, and that, far from being opposed to the General Staff, I am ambitious that we shall have the best General Staff in the world — one that will inspire the love and confidence of the Army and of the country, instead of being an institution which, in the words of General Harbord, has received more unfavorable criticism and aroused more antagonism than any other agency of our Government.¹

SECTION II

ANALYSIS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT

It is difficult to draw conclusions as to a proper staff organization based upon our own experience during the World War —

¹ It has been said that the old staff system failed in 1898. But if we had been conducting a war 'on our own' in 1918, I doubt if we would have done any better.

First, because the people who were in Washington naturally think their plan was the best;


Second, because in the A.E.F. we were wet-nursed by the French and it is impossible to know what we should have done without their assistance;

Third, because none of our great leaders at the front knew enough about the supply system in rear to tell whether it was good or bad. They knew the results; that was all.

Fourth, because, as seen in Chapter XXIV, there is great confusion as to the facts, and as to whether the good results should be credited to the G's; or to the old services in spite of the G's.

But let's wipe the slate for a moment of any particular plan and go back to the fundamentals in the organization of a military staff. Let's bear in mind that while the agencies and methods change with the times, the principles are fixed and must govern the armies of to-day no less than they did the armies of Cæsar and Ptolemy.

The entire field of military staff operations may be tabulated as follows:



If we assign to agencies of a War Department the various functions indicated upon the above diagram, we shall find that we have an organization not unlike the one suggested at Tours in October, 1918. We shall have three grand divisions instead of two, because the Tours plan was to separate Supply from Combat and it did not go into any further subdivisions that might be made at Chaumont. The difference between the two plans is more apparent than real, and as the author of both I consider them identical, in so far as it is possible for a War Department to be like a G.H.Q.

We have a military head with three assistants, one for Tactics, one for Administration, and one for Supply, each of whom should fulfill the condition imposed by General Ainsworth in a hearing before Congress:

‘It stands to reason that a man who devotes his whole life to a specialty knows more about it than a man who devotes a few years to it.’

Let’s see how this organization works out:

(1) *Advice to Commander or Secretary of War:* This, of course, goes to the Chief of Staff, though I prefer the term ‘The Chief of the Staff.’ He should have the rank of General. What could be more absurd than having the Chief of Staff, the military head of the Army, with the same rank as other General Staff officers, the bureau chiefs, and hundreds of other officers of the Regular Army, National Guard, Reserves, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Public Health Service!! The Confederate Army had eight full Generals, and the Navy now has four full Admirals.

We like to think that our Army played some real part in winning the war. How can we expect the world to accept this if we ourselves deny the leaders of our forces the rank common to all armies of the world and which we ourselves

gave to those who fought in previous wars, including the little war with Spain? The only thing that carries authority in the Army is rank. We could not operate a regiment of corporals, and the War Department will never function as long as it is a loose confederation of major generals.¹

The Deputy Chief of Staff (which is a routine job) should have rank not above that of Brigadier General. There should be a secretary and two aides, each with the temporary rank of Colonel.

(2) *Tactics*: We could call the head of this service 'The Director General of Tactics' — G-3. He should be a fighting man, a distinguished soldier. He and his assistants should come up through the Service schools — Leavenworth men, military students, troop commanders. He should have the rank of Lieutenant General. The Confederate Army had nineteen Lieutenant Generals. In 1909 there were six Lieutenant Generals of the Regular Army on the retired list, appointed one after another following the Spanish War. The Navy now has three active Vice-Admirals.

(3) *Administration*: The head of this service should be The Adjutant General — G-1 — not a fighting man but an administrator. He, also, should have the rank of Lieutenant General — Corbin got it. The Adjutant General of the Confederate Army was a full General. The Adjutant General and all his subordinates should come up from the school of experience. They should not be the Leavenworth type at all. They should be men who have previously made good at posts and higher headquarters — as adjutants, aides, provost marshals, C.M.T.C. officers, recruiters, etc.

(4) *Supply*: Let's call the head of this service 'The Commissary General of Supply' — G-4. Like the Adjutant Gen-

¹ In the matter of promotion, pay, and pensions, the Army is now safe for Democracy!!

eral, he should be an executive and not necessarily a fighting man. He, also, should have the rank of Lieutenant General — Tasker H. Bliss, for ten years a commissary officer, became a full General during the World War. And as in the case of the Adjutant General's Department, the Commissary General of Supply and all his subordinates should be graduates of the school of experience and not the Leavenworth type. They should be men who have made good in the various supply jobs in the War Department and throughout the Army.¹

Let's go back now and take our principal subdivisions.

DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS

This is a natural outlet for the Command and Staff College and for all the Service schools. This is the one thing that in time of peace men can learn from books, and from books only, because there is no opportunity to learn by experience.

(5) *Collection of military information:* Under the title G-2 this service could go ahead as it has done heretofore, except that G-2-ing around among our own people in time of peace should not be permitted. G-2 should be headed by a Colonel.

(6) *Training of the Army:* This is essentially a function of command and the War Department's connection with it should be the supervision of Service schools, the preparation of Service manuals, and a very general supervision over the technique of the several arms by the heads of those services. The head of this branch, whom we will call G-5, should be a Major General. His immediate assistants should be the President of the Army War College (through which other Service schools should be coördinated), the Inspector Gen-

¹ This does not mean that the higher functions of administration and supply should not be taught at a General Staff school. They should be — but to men who by experience are qualified to undertake such work.

eral of Cavalry, the Inspector General of Artillery, and the Inspector General of Infantry.

(7) *Battle plans*: I am not sufficiently familiar with recent developments to say whether this office should be under G-5 or should be a separate branch directly under G-3. The main point is that it should be 'Battle Plans' — not 'War Plans,' because War Plans means the whole War Department, and the existence of a 'War Plans' division within the War Department is one of the most fruitful sources of dislocation of function, confusion, and overlapping responsibility. The whole War Department should be organized as a War Plans Division. The various jobs pertaining to war plans should be allocated to men and services qualified to perform them. They should not be in the hands of students and theorists.

ADMINISTRATION

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

It seems hardly necessary to define the duties of the Adjutant General's Department under this proposed new organization. Make the present Adjutant General¹ a Lieutenant General. Give him the Judge Advocate General as one of his assistants. Abolish G-1 and all the various personnel divisions in the War Department. He will do the rest in masterful fashion.

The following subdivisions are offered for the information of the reader:

(8) *Correspondence, orders, and records*: To be conducted as at present, under the Adjutant General.

(9) *Procurement of men*: This should include enlistment, draft, mobilization, assignment, transfer, promotion, and discharge — in short, all personnel. The personnel divisions

¹ Robert C. Davis.

in other branches of the staff and in the offices of the Chiefs of Infantry, Cavalry, etc., should be abolished.

(10) *Courts-martial*: The Judge Advocate General should be a subordinate of the Adjutant General.

(11) *Military police*: In time of war there should be a Provost Marshal General.

DEPARTMENT OF SUPPLY

The immediate assistants of the Commissary General of Supply should be the bureau chiefs. There should be no planners, policy-makers, or projectors between them and their chief. If there are to be any policies about ordnance, the Chief of Ordnance is, or should be, the best man in the world to determine them. No one else should be entrusted with that duty, even though he be an ordnance man masquerading as a General Staff officer and certified by a Leavenworth diploma.

Procurement: It would be necessary, however, to coördinate Procurement in the office of the Commissary General of Supply, through an operating branch, corresponding to 'Purchase' in General Goethals's P., S. and T. organization in Washington, or to General Dawes's Purchasing Board in the S.O.S.

(12) *Food and clothing*: This goes to the Quartermaster Corps, together with all other supplies and miscellaneous services now provided by that Corps, except transportation and construction.

(13) *Guns and ammunition*: To the Ordnance Department and to include ammunition, equipment, and appliances for chemical warfare. Seacoast guns and ammunition should be secured from the Navy, taking those that are obsolescent for naval purposes. Submarine mines should also be provided by the Navy.

(14) *Construction*: To the Engineers and to include fortifications, barracks and quarters, warehouses, railroads, docks and wharves, roads, walks, water and sewer lines, telephone, telegraph, radio, and all other construction, both in peace and war.

(15) *Transportation*: To a new service called the Transportation Corps and to include all manner of transportation by land and sea — ships, rail, animal, and motor except vehicles of special design for use by technical services, such as artillery carriages, airplanes, reel carts, etc.

(16) *Hospitalization*: To the Medical Department and to include the Dental and Veterinary Services.

(17) *Finance*: To Finance Department and to include pay, audit of property, and audit and settlement of money accounts.

MILITIA BUREAU

The provisions of the Constitution that govern the National Guard are as follows:

Congress shall have power —

To raise and support armies, . . .

To make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

To provide for organizing and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The National Guard is militia, and, strictly speaking, is a collection of separate State armies over which the Federal Government exercises limited supervision in time of peace

and complete control in time of war. The supervision exercised by the Federal Government in time of peace is confined by the Constitution to prescribing the organization and the system of discipline — or training. As an incident to this Congress has authorized the issue of certain equipment and the payment of certain monies to Guard organizations that come up to prescribed Federal standards.

Manifestly a Federal agency is necessary for this purpose, and in accordance with the principles previously enumerated in this chapter, one agency, and one only, should be charged with that duty. Such an agency has been created in the Militia Bureau.

I would give that Bureau exclusive jurisdiction over the National Guard in time of peace, with its Chief an Assistant Chief of Staff — G-7 — directly responsible to the Chief of Staff and entirely independent of all other sections and branches of the General Staff.

In time of war the National Guard would come into the service of the United States as a Federal force. The Militia Bureau would then lose all control and the various other agencies of the War Department — the Adjutant General, the Director General of Tactics, and the Commissary General of Supply — would control the National Guard in the same manner in which they would control the other forces making up the great emergency army.

AIR SERVICE

With the Air Service we have a somewhat similar situation, in that we have a highly specialized service which, in time of peace, could properly be handled in a manner quite different from that which might be necessary in time of war.

I should say, as a guess, that in time of peace ninety-five per cent of Air Service activity is in development, procure-

ment, and non-military flight; that is, flight not in conjunction with other combat arms. For this reason it is impossible to compare the peace-time organization, control, and training of the Air Service with that of other combat arms — Infantry, for example — which are not charged with development or procurement and whose whole activity is training in conjunction with other arms.

The Air Service is a new arm. Its future lies beyond the horizon. It should be in the hands of specialists who have cast their lot and their very lives into it and who understand its peculiar problems. In theory, and perhaps to some extent in practice, advantage might accrue to having some control and supervision by the present so-called General Staff or, under the proposed new organization, by the Adjutant General, the Director General of Tactics, or the Commissary General of Supply. But I believe the disadvantages would outweigh the advantages a hundred to one, and, as in the case of the Militia Bureau, I would make the Chief of the Air Service an Assistant Chief of Staff — G-6 — directly responsible to the Chief of Staff and entirely independent of all other sections and branches of the General Staff.

SECTION III

SERVICES TO BE ABOLISHED

Let's take up in detail the various services whose activities we propose to eliminate or turn over to other agencies.

G-1: This service was created in France in imitation of the French Premier Bureau. It served a useful purpose at G.H.Q. and at Tours. We had no other G-1's in the S.O.S. until just before the Armistice, when I authorized a full set of G's at Bordeaux at the request of General W. D. Connor, who had just taken command. Base Section No. 1, Saint-Nazaire, under Walsh and Sewell, with 200,000 men, got

along with an adjutant. There were no G-1's in the United States, but after the war the G's began to spread like measles and now we have them everywhere.¹

The Adjutant General's Department should be G-1.

G-4: This is a necessary service. Formerly in our Army the Quartermaster General was, in effect, G-4. At that time the other bureaus were technical services only. G-4 in the British Army is the Quartermaster General, a Lieutenant General. One of the earliest and most important offices in the German General Staff was Quartermaster General.² The French have a Quatrième Bureau, from which we took the name.

Under the organization proposed by me, the Commissary General of Supply would be G-4 in the War Department and would have deputy commissary generals at Corps Area and lesser headquarters.

The Inspector General's Department: This department is one of the oldest in the Army. It carries on its rolls such distinguished soldiers and patriots as Alexander Hamilton. Its usefulness has passed. As far back as 1878 its abolishment or consolidation with the Adjutant General's Department was advocated by Upton and others. The question was again agitated in 1898. But whatever reasons may have existed for not abolishing it in 1878 or 1898, those reasons have since disappeared. As late as ten or fifteen years ago the Inspector General's Department made tactical inspections and inspections of property and accounts. But these inspections are now made by other services and there is nothing left for the Inspector General's Department except to inspect money

¹ The 'G' system has permeated the staff services, and in the line has gone down to the battalion — an unnecessary and worse-than-useless multiplication of staff overhead.

² Ludendorff had this title during the World War, but his duties were not what we understand by that term.

accounts and to report infractions of the Regulations, which can better be handled otherwise.¹

The Signal Corps: The Signal Corps had its inception in the mind of a medical officer, Major Albert J. Myer, 'whose active interest in sign language was manifested by its development into a system of signal communication,' and for a long time Myer was alone in this work. In 1866 Congress provided for the organization of the Signal Corps, as we now understand it, by the detail of six officers and one hundred non-commissioned officers from the Engineers to assist Colonel Myer.

The object of the original organization was to develop and operate visual signals, particularly wig-wag and heliograph, but when telegraph and telephone came in, the Signal Corps took them over, though there was no more reason for its doing that than for taking over courier service, the post office, or any other means of communication. In time the mystery of the telegraph and telephone disappeared and the ordinary soldier could use them. So to keep itself going the Signal Corps developed what we now call the Weather Bureau. Later it took over photography and balloons, afterwards — just before the war — airplanes, and, finally, during the war, pigeons and aërial torpedoes.

In 1882 Congress passed a law providing that the Signal Corps should not duplicate work already performed by other services. If this law were enforced to-day, the Signal Corps would go out of existence, because there is nothing it does that is not done by some other branch of the staff or line. There is no construction work done by the Signal Corps that is not done by the Engineers, and there is no operation work

¹ The first Inspector General, Steuben, was a military expert from the staff of Frederick the Great. He was what now we call G-3. He wrote our first drill regulations, and according to the monument erected to him by Congress — 'He trained our citizen soldiers and instilled in their hearts the principles of military discipline.'

that is not done by the line. In fact, the Signal Corps formally withdrew many years ago from the seacoast fortifications and turned over its work of original installation to the Engineers, and its work of maintenance, repair, and operation to the coast artillery. There is nothing about telegraph, telephone, or radio that requires special training in time of peace to prepare the country for war. Commercial telephone and telegraph lines could be taken over and operated by their own personnel the same as the railroads. The Artillery, Coast and Field, in time of peace have just as good operators, officers, and men for telephone, telegraph, and radio as the Signal Corps. The Infantry and Cavalry should have the same.

In other words, the Signal Corps, with a wonderful record of achievement, has passed its usefulness and is now one of the expensive luxuries that the Army cannot afford to maintain in time of peace.¹

Construction should be taken away from the Quartermaster Corps and given to the Engineers. The Quartermaster Corps was not able to handle it during the war, either in the United States² or in France, and it is not able to handle it now. Of the old-time constructing quartermasters not half a dozen remain. Of other officers only eleven per cent are graduates of technical schools, including West Point, while twenty-five per cent are old soldiers who reached their maximum efficiency as quartermaster sergeants or motor mechanics. Many officers of the Quartermaster Corps in high position know nothing of construction, and in my own experience I have had post quartermasters in charge of construction work who did

¹ No other army in the world has a Signal Corps.

² It was handled in the United States by the Construction Branch, to all intents and purposes entirely independent of the Quartermaster Corps. The head of this branch was General R. C. Marshall, a coast artillery officer of conspicuous ability.

not know the names of common building material and could make no estimate of its value.

The Corps of Engineers is a construction corps, qualified to construct anything from a dugout to the Congressional Library, to dig anything from a trench to the Panama Canal, and to erect anything from a telegraph pole to the Washington Monument.

Transportation should be taken away from the Quartermaster Corps and organized into a separate department. It was so in the United States during the war, with General Frank Hines at the head. It was so in France with rail and water transportation under General Atterbury, motor transportation under General Walker, and animal transportation, only, retained by the Quartermaster. The Quartermaster Corps is a competitor in the delivery of supplies. Therefore, it should not control transportation any more than coal companies should control the railroads.

Chemical warfare: I can see no excuse, in time of peace, for the Chemical Warfare Service, with a Major General at its head. The United States is under a moral, if not an actual international, obligation to abolish poison gas as an agent of war.¹ The only excuse we can have for maintaining such a service, in time of peace, is to prevent our being caught by some other nation. We can do this by having a small branch of the Ordnance Department devote its attention to the necessary laboratory work to keep us abreast of the times in suitable chemicals and industrial facilities for producing them. During the World War the ammunition and appliances for chemical warfare were provided by the Ordnance Department, the conduct of chemical warfare was in the hands of line troops, and the de-gassing of men injured by chemical warfare was handled by the Medical Department.

¹ This phase of the question has not yet been settled, though General Pershing is credited with being opposed to the use of gas.

The chiefs of the line branches: The four offices of the Chief Coast Artillery, Chief of Field Artillery, Chief of Cavalry, and Chief of Infantry, each headed by a Major General, should be abolished and there should be substituted therefor three offices — the Inspector General of Artillery,¹ the Inspector General of Cavalry, and the Inspector General of Infantry, each headed by a Brigadier General only.

The presence of these four chiefs in Washington does not add to the efficiency of the Army. It detracts from it. Their organization is essentially disruptive in character. In theory their purpose is to give expert technical advice upon matters peculiar to their arms, but in practice the concern of each is largely to see that his own arm gets its 'rights,' gets its slice of every melon that is cut, and is properly represented in every Army activity. This may be desirable in the interest of individuals, but it makes artificial lines of cleavage and weakens the Army structure as a whole.

As predicted by General Schofield, these offices have usurped the authority of troop commanders — not directly, of course, but under the guise of suggestions to individuals or recommendations to the War Department — and have built up in the Service a divided allegiance, allegiance to the Chief being of the first importance and that to commanders secondary.

The law provides that after a chief has served for four years he may be returned to his arm and continue his service as a Colonel. In the Navy this is done. But no chief of any Army Branch has done this. They have all been either re-detailed, retired, or promoted. Once having been Exalted Ruler, it is difficult to go back, as contemplated by the law.

Change the name to Inspector, lower the rank, limit the

¹ The distinction between Coast Artillery and Field Artillery is purely imaginary, and authorities cannot agree as to which is which. The two arms should be combined.

office to a four-year detail, confine the activities to technique, make each of the offices a small branch of G-3, and we shall get a useful service, which is not now provided.

The Chief of Chaplains: The chaplains have a hard time of it. They do not get the proper support from the line.

They need chapels, they need development along ecclesiastical lines, they need help from the Army and from the country, but I do not think they need a military organization, headed by a chief in Washington. Certainly not one with the rank of Major General which is their ultimate ambition.

The Assistant Secretary of War: To protect the bureau chiefs against the ravages of the General Staff, Congress, after several previous futile efforts, has now prescribed a special function for the Assistant Secretary of War, to-wit:

‘Hereafter, in addition to such other duties as may be assigned him by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, under the direction of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with supervision of *the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of matériel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs.* . . . There shall be detailed to the office of the Assistant Secretary of War *from the branches engaged in procurement* such number of officers and civilian employees as may be authorized by regulations approved by the Secretary of War. . . .

‘Under the direction of the Secretary of War *chiefs of branches of the Army charged with the procurement of supplies for the Army shall report direct to the Assistant Secretary of War* regarding all matters of procurement.’

This legislation provides an asylum into which the bureau chiefs may flee under persecution, and at the same time it produces one of the strangest anomalies in the organization of the Army. The General Staff, under the guidance of a mili-

tary officer, G-4, performs the routine peace-time duty of supply for the Army, a function proper to a civil ministry of war, while the bureau chiefs, under the guidance of a civilian Assistant Secretary, make plans for the war-time mobilization of industry, a function — and the most important function — of the Supply Branch of a War Department General Staff. The duties are just reversed, and under this arrangement the bureau chiefs have demonstrated, if proof be needed, that they — not line officers of the General Staff — are the only ones really competent to handle the administration and supply problems of America at war.

Similarly, in order to protect the Air Service, Congress has created the office of Second Assistant Secretary of War, who has been called 'The Little Lord of the Air.'

The Secretary of War thus has three immediate subordinates, two civilian and one military, each charged with responsibility for an important branch of the Army, each entirely independent of the other, though each is in line for duty as Acting Secretary of War when the Secretary himself is absent, and each presiding over activities not clearly defined and separated from the others by a No Man's Land of indefinite dimensions. There are questions — many of them — that a bureau chief can take either to the General Staff or to his own particular Assistant Secretary of War. He uses his best judgment as to where he is likely to get the most favorable decision.¹

So that instead of having a two-headed War Department, with Miles *vs.* Corbin, or Wood *vs.* Ainsworth, we now have a three-headed organization without even the advantage of having it all military. In these several offices there are already conflicts of jurisdiction, smouldering jealousies that

¹ Just as at Neufchâteau, I could go either to Headquarters L.O.C. or to G.H.Q.

would flare up and add to the confusion previously pointed out as an incident to a complete reorganization of the War Department within the first few months of war.

There is even talk of abolishing the office of the Chief of Staff and going back to the plan of twenty-five years ago, when the head of the Army was a *de facto* commander and not merely a staff officer speaking in the name of a civilian Secretary. In other places there is talk of a Third Assistant Secretary of War — guardian angel to the National Guard.

The plan of having a Chief of the General Staff, with an Adjutant General, G-1; a Director General of Tactics, G-3; a Commissary General of Supply, G-4; and two additional assistants, one for the Air Service, G-6, and one for the National Guard, G-7, would in nowise lessen the supervising authority of the Assistant Secretaries of War, nor would it handicap the Secretary of War in performing the duties of his office. But the chain of authority would be from the Army to the Secretary of War through the Chief of the General Staff, and the Assistant Secretaries would handle their subjects in the office of the Secretary — just as the subordinates and assistants at other headquarters throughout the Army handle the various subjects assigned to them.

The Commissary General of Supply and all of his subordinates would be selected 'from the branches engaged in procurement,' as is now prescribed by law for those on duty in the office of the Assistant Secretary, but he and they would be a part of the General Staff and would be subject to the supervision and control of the military head of the Army, as is not the case in the present organization.

FINALE

In closing let me say that I do not expect the plan herein advocated to be put into effect. The difficulties of putting

such a plan through Congress are insurmountable even though a substantial majority in the military service should agree with me — which will not be the case. All I hope for is that my suggestions will start discussion and that as the years go by the young men of the next generation and the next — the ones that will fight the next war — will realize that their task is a difficult one; that we have not yet arrived at the final solution; and that the Army as they see it is far from what it will have to be to bring the country through perils great enough to threaten our place among the nations of the earth.

So let me suggest —

First: That we heed the advice of Washington, 'In time of peace prepare for war,' and see that the peace-time organization and methods of our Army be made so simple that they can be understood and operated by average emergency officers in time of war.

Second: That the monies appropriated by Congress for military purposes in time of peace be expended solely for those things that in time of war will bring immediate returns.

Third: That our system of National defense be based, not upon a European patchwork, but upon the peculiar genius of the American people, who — through their physique, their character, their great resources, their efficient little Army, their powerful Navy, their National Guard, their reserve officers, their R.O.T.C.'s, their C.M.T.C.'s, their American Legion, and their four million veterans of the World War — stand to-day invincible before the nations of the earth; but who by all the signs will soon find themselves once more as badly off as they were the day we sailed for France.

C'EST FINI

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
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